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Porkins Policy Radio ep. 30 Gladio B Roundtable with Sibel Edmonds and Tom Secker

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    ♪ [ Philip Glass – “Runaway Horses”
    (Mishima: A Life in Four Chapters) ] ♪
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    OK, everybody. Welcome back to
    another episode of Porkins Policy Radio.
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    As always, I am your host Pearse Redmond,
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    and you can find this podcast
    and all the other podcasts
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    by going to porkinspolicyreview.wordpress.com
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    Well, today we have a very special episode,
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    and we have two very special guests.
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    And we're going to be discussing The Lone Gladio,
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    Sibel Edmond's new novel, in greater detail,
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    As well as exploring some of the
    intricacies
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    of Gladio Plan B in general.
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    And joining me for this epic
    roundtable discussion on this
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    is, of course, our good friend and
    frequent guest on the show Tom Secker
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    from SpyCulture.com and the
    host of ClandesTime.
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    And also joining us all the way
    on the West Coast
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    in what has become the newest state
    to legalize marijuana
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    is our wonderful, wonderful guest
    who's been on the show recently
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    and that is, of course, the creator
    and founder of BoilingFrogsPost.com
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    and the author of The Lone Gladio,
    Sibel Edmonds
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    So Sibel, Tom: Thank you for joining
    me on the show today.
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    (Tom) Hi, thank you.
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    (Sibel) Good to be talking to you both.
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    (Pearse) Yeah, absolutely. So, basically
    me and Tom just wanted to ask you
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    about a million more questions
    that we didn't get to
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    when we both interviewed you
    for our respective shows
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    So... and I guess... Tom, why don't you
    start the conversation off?
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    (Tom) Sure. Well, I only have...
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    Well, I managed to whittle it down to two
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    that I didn't get to ask you before,
    Sibel.
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    Because we were talking about,
    essentially,
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    how your book The Lone Gladio
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    Subverts an awful lot of the
    normal spy fiction.
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    And that's because it's doing
    something vastly different.
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    It's, in many ways, an attack on
    the security state.
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    Rather than some kind of defense of it
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    or glorification of it, which is
    what you normally get.
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    And we picked up on... sorry,
    on various different things.
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    And there were a couple that I
    didn't get around to asking you about.
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    So the first one is this question of
    rogue agents.
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    Because in the book, the protagonist,
    the titular Lone Gladio, Greg,
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    He goes rogue and wreaks this havoc
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    against his former colleagues,
    his former paymasters
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    And normally in spy culture,
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    the rogue agent is portrayed
    as the bad apple, right?
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    The exception to the normal
    state of affairs.
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    Sort of they're the bad people
    within a good institution.
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    That's the usual picture you get.
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    Whereas in your book, in The Lone Gladio
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    Greg is a... I hesitate to say
    a good apple...
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    [laughter] but he's somewhat good.
    He does do good things.
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    He does protect people
    that need protecting
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    and that deserve to be protected.
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    Things like that.
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    Some of his...
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    some of the torture sequences,
    one might debate. [laughter]
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    [xx] how good these things are
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    but nonetheless, he is a somewhat
    good apple, if you like
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    within the bad institution.
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    So once again, this is a
    complete inversion
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    and reinvention of a stereotype
    in spy stories.
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    And yet you've said in other interviews
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    that Greg is somewhat based on real people
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    real black operatives that
    you've met along the way
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    and had conversations with
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    and to some extent got to know what
    kind of people they are.
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    So my question -- and I hope this
    isn't too cheeky --
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    is how realistic is Greg?
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    How realistic is it that one day,
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    there might be a real Lone Gladio?
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    (Sibel) Well, you may call it
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    to some degree, a wishful thinking.
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    Because we haven't had a real-life
    Greg MacPherson
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    Despite all the publicized, many of them totally scripted
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    supposed CIA whistleblowers
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    or people who have turned against
    the CIA to a certain degree.
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    We have never had a real Greg from
    the Agency
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    from the CIA
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    And also, to answer your question,
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    the first part of your question,
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    my feeling and my knowledge,
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    based on my knowledge, what I have seen,
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    has been that many of these
    mass-market books
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    the spy thrillers involving the Agency,
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    they are the ones that always
    subvert the reality
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    meaning, what really these people do
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    and the culture of the agency
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    who the agency actually serves,
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    it's not the American people.
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    And it's not even the United States
    government.
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    So it goes to the heart of the Deep State.
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    Those people who benefit from
    the Agency, from the CIA
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    and whom the Agency really serves.
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    So all the books that we see out there,
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    the Hollywood-made movies,
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    they subvert the facts, the reality
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    of what the Agency is about.
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    And because of this, all average Americans
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    or even people in Europe,
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    most people, they have
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    a complete false notion of
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    what the CIA is all about.
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    Now, this is actually to a lesser degree
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    or even, maybe, not even in any degree
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    in countries that have been the targets
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    of all these types of CIA,
    the Agency's, operations.
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    Because if you go and talk with people
    in countries like Iran,
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    the 1953 coup with Mossadeq
    being taken out
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    and Shah being placed in there.
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    If you go to some of the Central
    American, South American nations
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    because they have, these countries
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    -- in Middle East, in South and
    Central America --
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    since they have had first-hand
    experience, real experience
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    of what CIA actually does,
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    they are not under this false notion.
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    And you can engage in some
    really heated conversation
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    with people in these countries
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    with notions that they put forward
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    that are far more realistic, factual,
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    than, let's say, when you talk with
    people in the United States.
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    So I would put it this way:
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    I would say I subverted the
    subverted notion
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    of the Agency and the Agency people.
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    And you're absolutely right about Greg.
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    It's hard to call him a good person,
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    or the good apple,
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    but the book and the characters
    in the book
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    they go into the heart of what
    the Agency is about
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    what kind of people
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    are selected to be operatives.
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    And of course, the fictional aspect being
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    all it takes is one or two real good
    apples to actually,
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    truly expose what the Agency's about
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    and the operations, their objectives,
    and who they serve.
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    And we haven't had, to date,
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    such a good apple.
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    And it's really, really amazing.
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    For me, it's really amazing.
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    But then, on the other hand,
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    it may go to this whole notion of
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    the chicken or the egg.
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    In this way: that... well, to start with,
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    the poeple they select for these jobs
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    the operatives -- I'm not talking about
    the administrative people or analysts --
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    to start with are the kind of people
    who would never
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    become those good apples that
    they would step out
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    and go all the way into exposing
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    what the Agency is about.
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    I mean, this fact applies to
    a lesser degree
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    to agencies like, more law enforcement,
    the FBI
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    even though I'm not saying that
    they are good,
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    but we have had whistleblowers,
    or some good apples,
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    that have really exposed some
    major black deeds
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    performed or implemented
    by these agencies.
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    But not really with the CIA.
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    And some people may say,
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    "Oh, here we have had this agents,
    or that agents,"
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    and if you look at these so-called,
    supposed whistleblowers,
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    you see how controlled
    heir supposed exposure
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    or exposing of the agency is.
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    First of all, you get to see them
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    within the mainstream media, frequently.
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    Which tells you right there that they are
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    not exposing the Agency.
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    They would never get a chance
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    to be before millions of audience
    within the mainstream media
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    putting forth some factual...
    or some facts
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    that expose the true nature of the Agency.
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    They would never, ever be given
    that kind of a chance.
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    It doesn't happen.
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    It has never happend.
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    It really hasn't happened.
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    You'll see some people who would
    talk about how
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    the Agency is, by doing this
    particular thing,
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    in this particular way...
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    or people who are selling the notion
    of, yes, there are a few bad apples
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    within the Agencies who are doing
    this, within the management.
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    But this is similar to what people call
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    the controlled opposition.
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    It is tightly framed to further, still
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    the Agency's legitimacy -- which is,
    they are not legitimate.
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    And then within that tight frame,
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    put forth some very shallow criticism
    of some agencies.
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    And then, later on,
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    if you see, it's usually blamed
    on a President
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    or a particular party
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    rather than going to the Deep State
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    whom the Agency is there
    to protect and further their agenda,
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    not some puppet President, or some party.
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    Or... it boils down to some director
    not being good, being the bad apple.
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    I mean, these are all the false notions
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    that have been popularized
    by the mainstream media.
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    By all the books that subvert
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    what the Agency is about
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    And alternative media as well,
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    the so-called "alternative"media.
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    A lot of them, they parrot the
    same notion,
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    -- maybe they put it forth in a
    more heated manner --
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    but in the end, they are actually
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    repeating the same storyline.
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    Within the storyline, some plots
    are maybe targeted and criticized,
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    but not the story itself.
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    Well, I mean, you're absolutely
    right there, I think.
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    And when you were talking about
    how this was...
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    whenever you do get any kind
    of significant revelation,
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    it's always wrapped up in a
    "Oh, well, this was just"
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    "the policy of this particular
    White House"
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    "Or it was because there was
    a bad director of the CIA at that point"
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    "or..." there's never any kind of sense
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    of this being a fundamental,
    institutional problem
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    at... a fundamental problem
    in the character
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    of the CIA and other similar institutions.
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    And I was thinking, they've even tried
    this with the original Gladio.
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    That, this was always the way it was
    [xx] out there
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    by anyone who was insincere.
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    Was that, "Oh, this was just some
    stay-behind thing."
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    "It was Cold War paranoia.
    Nothing really came of it."
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    And they ignore that second phase
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    of the original Gladio
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    where it became this very aggressive means
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    of carrying out false-flag terrorism.
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    And they sort of pretend like
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    that never actually happened.
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    They say, oh, this was some...
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    oh, we were all worried about
    Stalin or whatever.
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    It's just written off in that way,
    the original Gladio.
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    (Tom) Yeah, sure.
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    So, I mean, that's one of the things,
    I suppose,
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    that I loved about The Lone Gladio
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    is that, not only are you kind of throwing
    all of that bullshit out the window,
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    you're actually talking about
    more or less the present day.
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    I mean, it's set about ten years ago, OK,
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    but it's the modern era.
    It's the War on Terror era.
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    (Sibel) Absolutely.
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    (Tom) So you're cutting right to the heart
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    of the modern-day reality
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    and my other question is kind of
    related to that.
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    And I'm not in any way trying to get you
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    to contradict yourself here.
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    But we do also have the question
    of blowback.
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    Because in some ways, that's what Greg
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    and his crusade of violence represents.
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    He is, to some extent,
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    the unintended consequence
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    of these black operations
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    Both in terms of his motivation
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    -- his wife is killed, essentially,
    accidentally, or at least carelessly:
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    they weren't trying to kill her --
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    And yet that's his...
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    that's at least the point at which
    he then decides
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    it's time to wreak havoc against them.
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    I know your opinion of blowback
    is roughly the same as mine,
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    that, again, it's one of these things
    that's hung out there
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    to cover up something that would
    otherwise be quite damaging.
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    Sometimes black operations do go bad.
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    And unintended things happen
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    but in general terms, blowback is
    just one of those covers.
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    It's a smokescreen.
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    It's..."the mujahideen in Afghanistan"
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    "evolved into al-Qaeda completely
    by accident." [laughter]
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    We've sort of accidentally
    let this happen.
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    We took our eye off the ball,
    blah-blah-blah.
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    It's totally untrue.
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    Of course, we know it's totally untrue.
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    And so I found it quite fascinating,
    that...
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    knowing that your opinion
    of blowback is quite similar to mine
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    if not the same as mine
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    that this same basic idea forms
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    such a central part of the story
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    in The Lone Gladio.
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    I mean, it's not a sort of explanation
    that you take all that seriously
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    for real events, is it?
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    But there, again, I suppose you're
    being quite subversive.
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    Because instead of using blowback as a
    way of covering up for black operations,
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    this story of Greg's retribution
    against the Company
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    is actually his sort of means of
    exposing them.
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    That's, I suppose, what... the overall
    point of this book was
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    was to try and expose the reality
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    and in doing so, that meant you simply
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    had to subvert the usual way in which
    these things worked
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    and therefore had to subvert
    even the concept of blowback.
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    I suppose... OK, my question: is this
    something that you did consciously,
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    or am I letting the literary analyst
    inside me get a bit carried away here?
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    (Sibel) Um, no. Absolutely, absolutely.
    First of all, you're absolutely right:
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    it is based on the notion of blowback
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    and in this case, it's a real blowback.
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    And that is: unintended consequences.
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    Because, as we know, Greg's woman
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    was killed purely accidentally.
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    So that was not designed by the powers
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    to get this reaction and this outcome
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    that is brought forth by Greg.
    Because he starts the mission.
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    And there are two things that
    are happening.
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    There are two things that are
    motivating Greg.
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    One, of course, we are talking
    about this Great Terror Event in 2001.
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    In the US.
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    And he was outside that highly-
    compartmentalized operation
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    to execute this, this false-flag operation
    in the home front
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    in the United States, on the US soil.
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    And he realizes this as it happens,
    and it's reported
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    by the tentacles of the Gladios.
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    This is the CNN and BBC, or BCB,
    as they are listed there
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    it may be a little bit cheesy [laughter]
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    But... so...
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    That is when it makes Greg stop and think
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    and the blowback doesn't begin here
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    but the roots, or the seeds, are
    planted there.
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    Because he is, himself, a highly unusual,
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    eccentric character
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    with some dark, to a certain degree
    sad background
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    that I don't get into in this book.
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    It will, hopefully, once I write and if I
    write the second book
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    will get more into Greg's childhood
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    and what started his intense hatred
    of Russians and everything Russian.
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    And that's one of the repeating
    themes there.
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    And that has been one of the driving force
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    for a lot of things that he has
    done in life.
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    But in all this, this... for this
    operation, false-flag
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    taking place in the US, that begins
    the process.
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    It plants the seed, and then the
    catalyst, of course,
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    two years later, becomes his
    woman accidentally
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    taken out by the Agency
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    So that basically triggers
    all these actions.
  • 18:00 - 18:02
    And again, that was unintended.
  • 18:02 - 18:05
    So that's a true blowback right there.
  • 18:05 - 18:09
    And you used the word "intended,"
    and that is very, very important.
  • 18:09 - 18:12
    It's the key word, because
  • 18:12 - 18:15
    for a blowback to be really a blowback,
  • 18:15 - 18:19
    the consequences have to be unintended.
  • 18:19 - 18:23
    And with these operations themselves,
  • 18:23 - 18:25
    the black ops, the false-flag operations,
  • 18:25 - 18:31
    the recruitment and the training
    of these terrorists,
  • 18:31 - 18:35
    in this case we had a black widow
    who's a Chechen,
  • 18:35 - 18:40
    who's Chechen, in Azerbaijan
  • 18:40 - 18:46
    and those operations are the
    false-flag operations
  • 18:46 - 18:49
    with intended consequences.
  • 18:49 - 18:52
    With intended consequences
  • 18:52 - 18:56
    therefore, anything that results
    from those operations
  • 18:56 - 18:59
    cannot in any way be considered blowback.
  • 18:59 - 19:03
    Because when you look at, let's say
  • 19:03 - 19:05
    a certain group being put in place,
  • 19:05 - 19:08
    trained, armed, directed, managed,
  • 19:08 - 19:12
    to execute a certain terror operation,
  • 19:12 - 19:15
    whether it's in Russia or if it's
    in Syria,
  • 19:15 - 19:17
    and if it's in Iraq,
  • 19:17 - 19:19
    executing that terror operation
  • 19:19 - 19:24
    is only a part of the intended results,
  • 19:24 - 19:29
    the objectives, the means to get
    to the objectives.
  • 19:29 - 19:33
    It's not all of consequences
    taking place afterwards:
  • 19:33 - 19:37
    those are the intended consequences.
  • 19:37 - 19:39
    So, let me give you an example.
  • 19:39 - 19:44
    For example, let's say when you
    train the Chechens,
  • 19:44 - 19:45
    a group of Chechens,
  • 19:45 - 19:47
    and arm them, and drug them,
  • 19:47 - 19:51
    and indoctrinate them, and manage them,
  • 19:51 - 19:55
    and say, "You're gonna go and blow
    up this in this part of Russia,"
  • 19:55 - 19:56
    for example.
  • 19:56 - 20:01
    Well, the first result of it is, OK,
    this horrible terror incident happens
  • 20:01 - 20:03
    in that particular city
  • 20:03 - 20:06
    or targeting this particular school,
    et cetera.
  • 20:06 - 20:11
    Now, what happens next is what
    is the intended consequence.
  • 20:11 - 20:15
    And that is to get Russia to react to it,
  • 20:15 - 20:17
    and to react to it, hopefully,
    dramatically.
  • 20:17 - 20:23
    Emotionally, and start rounding up
    hundreds of Chechens,
  • 20:23 - 20:28
    putting them in jail, or actually going
    and shooting 150 Chechens, right?
  • 20:28 - 20:32
    And that, in return, turning around
    and causing this...
  • 20:32 - 20:34
    more attacks over there.
  • 20:34 - 20:38
    Then, you start getting closer and closer
  • 20:38 - 20:40
    to the intended consequences.
  • 20:40 - 20:43
    The intended consequence in executing
  • 20:43 - 20:45
    this particular terror operation,
    this part of it
  • 20:45 - 20:47
    where something is blown up
  • 20:47 - 20:49
    and you have 100 people dying,
  • 20:49 - 20:50
    is not the first intent,
  • 20:50 - 20:53
    the most important objective here.
  • 20:53 - 20:59
    That is a way to get the following
    five or six consequent events,
  • 20:59 - 21:00
    which are intended,
  • 21:00 - 21:03
    to cause that chaos,
  • 21:03 - 21:07
    to cause that certain sect going
    after another sect
  • 21:07 - 21:12
    to cause for that to actually become
    even more,
  • 21:12 - 21:14
    explode even further
  • 21:14 - 21:16
    and affect a neighboring country.
  • 21:16 - 21:19
    Let's say, if it's in Syria, something
    is happening
  • 21:19 - 21:21
    with Jordan, and then
  • 21:21 - 21:22
    this happens in the border,
  • 21:22 - 21:25
    and you have, let's say, maybe half
    a million refugees
  • 21:25 - 21:26
    getting to this country.
  • 21:26 - 21:28
    Those in the media,
  • 21:28 - 21:32
    and then these so-called CIA analysts
    they are talking about,
  • 21:32 - 21:37
    they are always represented
    and presented to the viewers
  • 21:37 - 21:40
    as the unintended consequences.
  • 21:40 - 21:41
    I mean, they don't even say, "
  • 21:41 - 21:43
    "OK, we did help blow this thing up."
  • 21:43 - 21:45
    But let's say they armed it,
    and we didn't know.
  • 21:45 - 21:47
    The usual storyline.
  • 21:47 - 21:50
    "And look, all these things happen,
    and they're horrifying"
  • 21:50 - 21:53
    while all along the intended consequences
  • 21:53 - 21:57
    are events that take place long after,
    let's say,
  • 21:57 - 21:59
    a building being blown up
  • 21:59 - 22:01
    or 50 people getting killed.
  • 22:01 - 22:03
    And that's what we are talking about.
  • 22:03 - 22:08
    And in no way those can be considered
    as blowback
  • 22:08 - 22:10
    because they are absolutely intended.
  • 22:10 - 22:14
    Because when that chaos is taking place,
  • 22:14 - 22:16
    then the next things comes as
    a result of that,
  • 22:16 - 22:19
    and then these other two countries
    get involved,
  • 22:19 - 22:23
    and as a result of that, let's say,
    another country which says,
  • 22:23 - 22:26
    "You know what? Now we are really going
    to, let's say,"
  • 22:26 - 22:29
    "put our candidacy to become a member
    of NATO."
  • 22:29 - 22:32
    And as a result of that, this and this
    happens.
  • 22:32 - 22:34
    It's like a chess board.
  • 22:34 - 22:39
    And you want to look at the move
    that's gonna come
  • 22:39 - 22:41
    eight moves after the first move
  • 22:41 - 22:46
    in order to go and execute, or achieve
    what you want to achieve.
  • 22:46 - 22:48
    Not the first, initial things that
    take place
  • 22:48 - 22:50
    with the first or the second move.
  • 22:50 - 22:53
    And for those to be considered blowback,
  • 22:53 - 22:55
    is the fiction that, unfortunately,
  • 22:55 - 22:58
    almost everyone -- except for you guys
  • 22:58 - 23:04
    and a handful of other who I call
    the Irate Minority
  • 23:04 - 23:07
    real informed people, people don't know.
  • 23:07 - 23:10
    And I always try to give these
    examples and say,
  • 23:10 - 23:14
    if a certain action, modus operandi
  • 23:14 - 23:17
    results in unintended consequences...
  • 23:17 - 23:23
    Let's say this was talked about
    a lot after 9/11, saying...
  • 23:23 - 23:26
    "Oh, well, we supported the
    mujahideens in Afghanistan."
  • 23:26 - 23:31
    "In early '80s, late '70s. We armed them,
    we trained them."
  • 23:31 - 23:34
    "Including Osama Bin Laden;
    including Zawahiri."
  • 23:34 - 23:37
    And then those people turned around
  • 23:37 - 23:39
    and started doing these kinds of things.
  • 23:39 - 23:41
    And those were unintended.
  • 23:41 - 23:43
    So let's say what they say
  • 23:43 - 23:46
    -- this is the Deep State; this is
    the mainstream media;
  • 23:46 - 23:48
    this is the so-called CIA analyst,
  • 23:48 - 23:53
    these are the so-called CIA dissenters
    such as people like Mike Scheuer --
  • 23:53 - 23:59
    anonymously writing the
    blowback-related stories, fiction,
  • 23:59 - 24:01
    being marketed as non-fiction,
  • 24:01 - 24:03
    let's say if they were true, OK?
  • 24:03 - 24:06
    Well, think about it: any person,
  • 24:06 - 24:11
    any sane person, average normal
    person, would say,
  • 24:11 - 24:15
    "I did this, and these things came
    out of it -- unintended things."
  • 24:15 - 24:21
    So, you learn a lesson: you don't go
    and repeat it ten times again
  • 24:21 - 24:24
    after seeing these supposed
    unintended consequences.
  • 24:24 - 24:27
    But on the other hand, if you look
    at the reality
  • 24:27 - 24:31
    and say, OK, for the past 30 or 40 years,
  • 24:31 - 24:36
    how we repeat exactly the same script,
    the same scenario,
  • 24:36 - 24:38
    the same operations,
  • 24:38 - 24:42
    and getting the similar kind of blowback,
  • 24:42 - 24:45
    the reactions, eight steps later,
  • 24:45 - 24:48
    then you have to stop and say,
  • 24:48 - 24:51
    "Well, really, is that unintended?"
  • 24:51 - 24:53
    Because as the saying goes,
  • 24:53 - 24:54
    "Fool me once, shame on you."
  • 24:54 - 24:56
    "Fool me twice, shame on me."
  • 24:56 - 24:58
    I mean, you can't keep doing
    the same thing.
  • 24:58 - 25:01
    You do that with mujahideen:
    "Oops! Blowback!"
  • 25:01 - 25:03
    Then you go and you get these cells
  • 25:03 - 25:06
    you take then to Turkey from Syria
  • 25:06 - 25:08
    -- These cells from Syria --
  • 25:08 - 25:09
    You train them, you arm them,
  • 25:09 - 25:12
    you put them there, back into Syria.
  • 25:12 - 25:14
    You do the same thing with another cell:
  • 25:14 - 25:16
    take them to Jordan, train and arm them,
    put there,
  • 25:16 - 25:19
    knowing that, OK, they have...
  • 25:19 - 25:23
    or selecting, intentionally, extremists.
  • 25:23 - 25:25
    And then events take place, and say,
  • 25:25 - 25:28
    "Oops! That was unintended."
  • 25:28 - 25:32
    "Because our intention was getting
    this, really, just like mujahideen"
  • 25:32 - 25:36
    And all the other groups that
    we have used,
  • 25:36 - 25:38
    we consider them the freedom fighters.
  • 25:38 - 25:45
    For how long the United States
    media glorified the mujahideen
  • 25:45 - 25:51
    That includes Osama bin Laden as
    their commando, Zawahiri, in the '80s.
  • 25:51 - 25:56
    If you go and get the archives
    -- the newspaper articles, OK? --
  • 25:56 - 25:59
    all the clips from NPR, from CNN,
  • 25:59 - 26:02
    what you see is, they were glorified.
  • 26:02 - 26:06
    Nobody even put anything like
    "Islamists" or "extremists"
  • 26:06 - 26:09
    or any of those adjectives in
    association with these people.
  • 26:09 - 26:11
    They were the great freedom fighters.
  • 26:11 - 26:15
    They made Americans, all of them,
    cheer for mujahideen.
  • 26:15 - 26:20
    The fact that they had... they were
    stoning women, or doing...
  • 26:20 - 26:23
    which they did, during those
    years as well.
  • 26:23 - 26:26
    They were never exposed,
    because those were irrelevant.
  • 26:26 - 26:29
    They were the glorified freedom fighters.
  • 26:29 - 26:31
    Liberation armies, right?
  • 26:31 - 26:34
    And then, lo and behold:
  • 26:34 - 26:39
    one day they all turned to these awful,
    ferocious terrorists and al-Qaeda.
  • 26:39 - 26:43
    And their commandos became
    the top terrorists in the world,
  • 26:43 - 26:48
    with these extreme belief
    system and religious...
  • 26:48 - 26:52
    all those things happen: "Oops!"
    Those were like, "Ooh, we were caught"
  • 26:52 - 26:57
    "and we were shocked;
    and we were so surprised"
  • 26:57 - 26:58
    -- supposedly.
  • 26:58 - 27:00
    Again, we are doing the same thing.
  • 27:00 - 27:01
    We have been doing the same things.
  • 27:01 - 27:04
    Take these people, arm them,
    train them, manage them.
  • 27:04 - 27:07
    And then later come and say, "Oops!"
  • 27:07 - 27:09
    "Look at what these people are doing."
  • 27:09 - 27:10
    "They are extremists. We did not..."
  • 27:10 - 27:14
    "We did not account for these
    kinds of reaction,"
  • 27:14 - 27:16
    "and these kinds of practices
    by these people."
  • 27:16 - 27:20
    So therefore, in no way these operations
  • 27:20 - 27:22
    and the consequences of the operations,
  • 27:22 - 27:25
    can be considered blowback.
  • 27:25 - 27:29
    And then, the lastly, the most
    important thing to look at is:
  • 27:29 - 27:34
    Who benefits? Who benefits
    from these operations?
  • 27:34 - 27:36
    And the intended consequences.
  • 27:36 - 27:40
    Well, whoever is the puppet President
  • 27:40 - 27:42
    --whether it's Obama or Reagan --
  • 27:42 - 27:46
    they don't really, personally benefit
    from these.
  • 27:46 - 27:47
    It's not about the President.
  • 27:47 - 27:51
    it's not about a political party,
    or the Republican Party:
  • 27:51 - 27:53
    because of that, they got rich
    or they became powerful.
  • 27:53 - 27:57
    No. So that... those are not the
    beneficiaries.
  • 27:57 - 27:59
    So the people on the ground,
  • 27:59 - 28:03
    people in Syria, or people in Afghanistan,
  • 28:03 - 28:04
    they're not the beneficiaries.
  • 28:04 - 28:05
    their homes have been wrecked,
  • 28:05 - 28:09
    and they have lost tens of thousands
    of people.
  • 28:09 - 28:11
    The American people haven't been
    better off.
  • 28:11 - 28:15
    And either financially or security-wise.
  • 28:15 - 28:18
    So take the American people's
    interests out of the equation.
  • 28:18 - 28:20
    Then you look at the map,
  • 28:20 - 28:22
    you look at the situation, and say,
  • 28:22 - 28:25
    who has become richer and more powerful,
  • 28:25 - 28:29
    as a result of this.
  • 28:29 - 28:33
    And what you see is, "Oh, look at this."
  • 28:33 - 28:38
    Without these wars, the sales and
    the stock prices
  • 28:38 - 28:41
    for the military-industrial complex
  • 28:41 - 28:42
    would just plunge. I mean,
  • 28:42 - 28:45
    think about a scenario where we
    don't have these wars.
  • 28:45 - 28:47
    We are not engaged in Syria
    and Afghanistan,
  • 28:47 - 28:49
    and with the drones in Pakistan and Yemen.
  • 28:49 - 28:53
    Who are they gonna sell it to,
    these drones and bombs?
  • 28:53 - 28:56
    And then, when you look at NATO,
  • 28:56 - 28:59
    and you look at the militaristic
    expansion,
  • 28:59 - 29:02
    and, let's say, with 9/11,
  • 29:02 - 29:06
    before 9/11, how many bases did
    we have in the region?
  • 29:06 - 29:11
    Whether it's in Eastern Europe, or
    you're looking at nations like Azerbaijan,
  • 29:11 - 29:16
    I know they shut it down, but Manas
    Airbase in Kyrgyzstan:
  • 29:16 - 29:17
    look at how close they are to Russia.
  • 29:17 - 29:20
    Now, what made these possible
  • 29:20 - 29:23
    was the event that took place here,
  • 29:23 - 29:26
    the operation that took place here
    in the United States, 9/11
  • 29:26 - 29:32
    that gave us that legitimacy
    -- even though it's not legitimate --
  • 29:32 - 29:35
    to say, "OK, we don't have the Cold War,"
  • 29:35 - 29:36
    "We don't have Russia,"
  • 29:36 - 29:39
    "but we need to expand our bases
    and take over these countries."
  • 29:39 - 29:42
    Again, those countries, with our
    military bases
  • 29:42 - 29:45
    in order to protect ourselves again
    a new enemy
  • 29:45 - 29:48
    the enemy that we create, put in place,
    and manage.
  • 29:48 - 29:51
    So therefore, that's when
    you're looking at
  • 29:51 - 29:54
    the intended consequences
  • 29:54 - 29:55
    War, and who benefits from that.
  • 29:55 - 30:00
    How many military bases Russia
    has put in place,
  • 30:00 - 30:02
    created, put in place,
  • 30:02 - 30:04
    since the Cold War ended?
  • 30:04 - 30:08
    How many military bases China
    has put in place, created
  • 30:08 - 30:10
    and expanded and...
  • 30:10 - 30:11
    you don't see these.
  • 30:11 - 30:13
    But take a look at the United States,
  • 30:13 - 30:21
    and then start putting it with the
    cover, legitimacy that they have done.
  • 30:21 - 30:24
    It's always in the name of a great enemy
  • 30:24 - 30:26
    that we have militaristically
  • 30:26 - 30:29
    put these bases in these countries,
  • 30:29 - 30:31
    taken over these countries
    and their regimes,
  • 30:31 - 30:32
    or installing their regimes.
  • 30:32 - 30:35
    Therefore, without these operations,
  • 30:35 - 30:38
    without these wars, without
    these consequences,
  • 30:38 - 30:39
    we couldn't.
  • 30:39 - 30:42
    So this is how you, or anyone, could start
  • 30:42 - 30:45
    putting the two and two together, and say,
  • 30:45 - 30:50
    my father always taught me this,
    when I was six, seven, eight years old.
  • 30:50 - 30:52
    He said, "Whenever you look at any wars,"
  • 30:52 - 30:55
    "really look and see
    who benefits from it."
  • 30:55 - 30:57
    And it's never the case of people.
  • 30:57 - 31:01
    It's not ever the case of those,
    let's say, American soldiers
  • 31:01 - 31:04
    who are losing their lives doing these
  • 31:04 - 31:05
    atrocious things overseas.
  • 31:05 - 31:07
    Then who benefits/
  • 31:07 - 31:09
    And once you get that answer
  • 31:09 - 31:11
    and start to pinpoint the beneficiaries,
  • 31:11 - 31:16
    that's when you can in-depth,
    truly understand
  • 31:16 - 31:21
    what these wars, or these terror
    incidents, or these conflicts are about.
  • 31:21 - 31:24
    That was a long answer. [laughter]
  • 31:24 - 31:29
    (Tom) Well, yeah. And I suppose I'll
    just hand you over to Pearse here.
  • 31:29 - 31:32
    Because I could pick up on a dozen
    things that you just said.
  • 31:32 - 31:37
    Pearse, I know you wanted to kind of
    carry on on this topic of...
  • 31:37 - 31:38
    (Pearse) Yeah.
  • 31:38 - 31:39
    (Tom) Not necessarily blowback, but,
  • 31:39 - 31:41
    consequences of where this
    thing's going.
  • 31:41 - 31:44
    (Pearse) Well, yeah, I guess with
    everything that you've just been saying, Sibel,
  • 31:44 - 31:48
    and taking The Lone Gladio
    as kind of a road map for how this works
  • 31:48 - 31:51
    -- and again, it takes place around 2003,
  • 31:51 - 31:53
    so we can see how this is
    starting to form --
  • 31:53 - 31:56
    but it seems that right now we're
    sort of starting
  • 31:56 - 31:59
    to reach a new level, perhaps
  • 31:59 - 32:01
    within the Gladio operation.
  • 32:01 - 32:04
    And I guess my big question is,
  • 32:04 - 32:07
    what is the end-game scenario
    for Gladio B?
  • 32:07 - 32:09
    Or, even if there is one?
  • 32:09 - 32:10
    Because at some point
  • 32:10 - 32:13
    -- it's already happening to a
    slight degree
  • 32:13 - 32:15
    in places like Azerbaijan or Kyrgyzstan --
  • 32:15 - 32:19
    we're seeing a lot of these mercenaries
    trained by NATO returning.
  • 32:19 - 32:22
    Now, if one of the major goals of Gladio B
  • 32:22 - 32:26
    is the exploitation of natural resources,
  • 32:26 - 32:27
    like oil and gas,
  • 32:27 - 32:29
    and about encircling Russia,
  • 32:29 - 32:32
    how are... at what point does this
    become untenable
  • 32:32 - 32:37
    if you've got these jihadis running
    all over the place?
  • 32:37 - 32:39
    And kind of fleshing that out
    a little bit,
  • 32:39 - 32:43
    a lot of The Lone Gladio revolves
    around Turkey.
  • 32:43 - 32:46
    And I was recently talking with
    Christoph Germann on our new show,
  • 32:46 - 32:49
    and he was mentioning that more
    and more analysts
  • 32:49 - 32:52
    are starting to come around to the idea
  • 32:52 - 32:55
    that Turkey is entering this
    Pakistan-ization
  • 32:55 - 32:59
    where it's being broken up into
    these little areas
  • 32:59 - 33:02
    like Gaziantep or Hatay, which
    are right on the border
  • 33:02 - 33:06
    or Suruç, where Serena Shim
    was recently murdered
  • 33:06 - 33:09
    and they're starting to resemble
    more and more
  • 33:09 - 33:11
    places like Peshawar in the
    1980s and 1990s.
  • 33:11 - 33:15
    And again, the relationship between MIT,
  • 33:15 - 33:16
    the Turkish intelligence and ISIS
  • 33:16 - 33:19
    is somewhat similar to the ISI
    and the Taliban.
  • 33:19 - 33:25
    So I guess, is that really the direction
    that NATO and the CIA and MI6,
  • 33:25 - 33:29
    -- the Deep State network --
    want to go in?
  • 33:29 - 33:31
    Because it seems as if they're playing
  • 33:31 - 33:33
    a very dangerous game here.
  • 33:33 - 33:38
    And if Turkey really did become...
    like, a Pakistan-type scenario,
  • 33:38 - 33:42
    is that really an intended
    consequence of this?
  • 33:42 - 33:44
    I know, I don't want to keep
    bringing back...
  • 33:44 - 33:46
    (Sibel) No, absolutely. Absolutely, it is.
  • 33:46 - 33:51
    Because you have to look at the last,
    let's say, 8-10 years
  • 33:51 - 33:53
    of what's been happening with Turkey.
  • 33:53 - 33:56
    Having countries...
  • 33:56 - 34:01
    -- especially the countries that we
    control, our allies:
  • 34:01 - 34:04
    in this case, you just said Pakistan:
    very similar. --
  • 34:04 - 34:08
    having countries weak and not unified,
  • 34:08 - 34:11
    with lots of internal chaos...
  • 34:11 - 34:12
    let's say in Turkey,
  • 34:12 - 34:16
    a Turkey that has a lot of things
    going on with the Kurdish sects.
  • 34:16 - 34:20
    The Kurds executing some
    terror operations,
  • 34:20 - 34:24
    the atrocity of Turkish militaries
    against the Kurds,
  • 34:24 - 34:28
    all the internal chaos created
    by that division
  • 34:28 - 34:32
    between the Kurdish sects
    and the rest of Turkey.
  • 34:32 - 34:34
    Then, to have other pockets.
  • 34:34 - 34:41
    Division along the extremist religious
    people there,
  • 34:41 - 34:42
    versus the secular.
  • 34:42 - 34:47
    That's what we have always intended
    and we wanted...
  • 34:47 - 34:49
    -- and we want:
    this continues --
  • 34:49 - 34:52
    for countries that are allies.
  • 34:52 - 34:54
    A strong, unified nation,
  • 34:54 - 34:56
    especially for Middle East,
  • 34:56 - 35:01
    for a strategically, geographically
    strategic nation,
  • 35:01 - 35:03
    is something that we never want.
  • 35:03 - 35:04
    We never want it.
  • 35:04 - 35:09
    We want Iraq that is divided between
    Shia and Sunnis and Kurds.
  • 35:09 - 35:11
    Because that makes Iraq much weaker,
  • 35:11 - 35:16
    therefore much more susceptible
    to be a puppet nation.
  • 35:16 - 35:17
    To take over, to take over their oil.
  • 35:17 - 35:19
    Same thing with Pakistan.
  • 35:19 - 35:21
    Same thing with Turkey.
  • 35:21 - 35:22
    Now, what has been scaring...
  • 35:22 - 35:24
    because there has been so much
  • 35:24 - 35:29
    going on with the mainstream
    media reporting on Turkey
  • 35:29 - 35:32
    in the past five, six years here
    in the United States,
  • 35:32 - 35:37
    is a government that they don't like,
  • 35:37 - 35:40
    and a country that has started
    becoming economically strong.
  • 35:40 - 35:43
    If you look at what has been happening,
  • 35:43 - 35:49
    or what really happened with
    Europe in 2008, 2009 and 2010,
  • 35:49 - 35:50
    and turn around and look at what has...
  • 35:50 - 35:52
    -- economically, I'm talking about --
  • 35:52 - 35:55
    what has been happening during
    the same years,
  • 35:55 - 35:57
    those same years, in Turkey,
  • 35:57 - 36:01
    you see Turkey was one of the
    only nations there in the region
  • 36:01 - 36:05
    that with economy that actually
    got stronger and better
  • 36:05 - 36:08
    without all the havoc that was
    taking place in Europe.
  • 36:08 - 36:09
    That's number one.
  • 36:09 - 36:13
    Number two: you see what happened
    with the protests.
  • 36:13 - 36:16
    The Gezi protests and all the chaos
  • 36:16 - 36:19
    that were completely scripted
    and implemented in Turkey
  • 36:19 - 36:24
    by the United States, by the
    Gladio operation
  • 36:24 - 36:30
    being defeated. Because they...
    and there was so much coverage
  • 36:30 - 36:33
    when they were talking about
    the elections coming
  • 36:33 - 36:35
    and Erdoğan was not gonna be elected.
  • 36:35 - 36:38
    But Turkey still stood unified,
  • 36:38 - 36:39
    and they re-elected this guy.
  • 36:39 - 36:41
    So I'm not saying this guy is good
    or is bad.
  • 36:41 - 36:47
    We never, ever, in the Middle East,
    intend to have
  • 36:47 - 36:50
    any allies that can be strong and unified.
  • 36:50 - 36:55
    So taking countries and making sure
  • 36:55 - 36:58
    that they are bogged down by
    all these divisions
  • 36:58 - 37:01
    and internal conflicts between
    various sects,
  • 37:01 - 37:05
    either along the religious lines,
    Sunni versus Shia,
  • 37:05 - 37:10
    or along race, or along the ideologies:
  • 37:10 - 37:16
    that has been the recipe of...
  • 37:16 - 37:20
    and again, this is really interesting
    because, Tom,
  • 37:20 - 37:22
    this is something that we took from...
  • 37:22 - 37:25
    -- I don't want to say "inherited..." --
  • 37:25 - 37:27
    but took from the Brits,
    the British Empire.
  • 37:27 - 37:28
    (Tom) Sure.
  • 37:28 - 37:32
    (Sibel) Because that has always been
    the modus operandi
  • 37:32 - 37:36
    of the British Empire. The divide
    and conquer.
  • 37:36 - 37:38
    And that has been, even in Iran,
  • 37:38 - 37:43
    it's always been the tool utilized
    and the modus operandi
  • 37:43 - 37:47
    put in place and practiced by the
    British Empire,
  • 37:47 - 37:52
    and it is now part of the Gladio and
    the United States' modus operandi.
  • 37:52 - 37:55
    So for... we don't want a strong Turkey.
  • 37:55 - 37:58
    We don't want a peaceful, unified Turkey.
  • 37:58 - 37:59
    We do not want a strong Iraq.
  • 37:59 - 38:01
    I mean, one of the...
  • 38:01 - 38:03
    look at, when we were taking over Iraq...
  • 38:03 - 38:09
    -- the war against Iraq, and then
    Saddam, and going in there --
  • 38:09 - 38:11
    one of the things that made it
    much easier...
  • 38:11 - 38:15
    -- and the chaos that's going on there,
    currently, is completely intended --
  • 38:15 - 38:18
    was the country was not one country.
  • 38:18 - 38:22
    In the north, you had these whole
    big Kurds who are against Saddam
  • 38:22 - 38:25
    they have had their internal wars
    for years and years
  • 38:25 - 38:27
    between Saddam and the Kurds.
  • 38:27 - 38:29
    In the south, we had the Shias.
  • 38:29 - 38:31
    And in the center, we had the Sunnis.
  • 38:31 - 38:33
    And even during the First Gulf War,
  • 38:33 - 38:35
    that, again, was used:
  • 38:35 - 38:38
    with the Kurds in the north
    and the Shias in the south,
  • 38:38 - 38:41
    and, look: all the people that
    got massacred and killed
  • 38:41 - 38:42
    and from all three sides.
  • 38:42 - 38:45
    but that's exactly what we want.
  • 38:45 - 38:48
    And that's exactly what the
    British Empire wanted before
  • 38:48 - 38:53
    when they re-drew the maps
    of the entire region
  • 38:53 - 38:54
    and that includes, even, Africa.
  • 38:54 - 38:57
    The maps were drawn in such a way
  • 38:57 - 39:02
    that would keep these countries
    to prosper, the region,
  • 39:02 - 39:05
    and to be unified, and to be peaceful.
  • 39:05 - 39:08
    These maps, the borders,
  • 39:08 - 39:09
    were all drawn and created
  • 39:09 - 39:14
    based on the division and the
    dividing lines
  • 39:14 - 39:17
    between the tribes, between
    various religious sects.
  • 39:17 - 39:19
    So absolutely, this is intended.
  • 39:19 - 39:22
    And as far as to what end,
  • 39:22 - 39:25
    this is why the book gets into,
    well, Operation Gladio B
  • 39:25 - 39:28
    will be Operation Gladio C at some point
  • 39:28 - 39:30
    and Gladio C will be Gladio D
  • 39:30 - 39:34
    because one region you don't
    hear American media talking about
  • 39:34 - 39:37
    it China and the Xinjiang region.
  • 39:37 - 39:40
    They call it [East] Turkestan,
    they call it Uyghuristan.
  • 39:40 - 39:45
    The Uyghurs, well, these are
    the Muslim minorities
  • 39:45 - 39:48
    in that region of China.
  • 39:48 - 39:50
    And they are Turkic heritage,
  • 39:50 - 39:53
    and we don't hear much about that.
  • 39:53 - 39:54
    But that is in the plan.
  • 39:54 - 39:56
    That is part of Operation Gladio.
  • 39:56 - 40:00
    And what we want, basically, is...
  • 40:00 - 40:01
    and that's what's gonna happen.
  • 40:01 - 40:03
    You're gonna see this happening
  • 40:03 - 40:06
    in the next, I would say, less than five,
    six years.
  • 40:06 - 40:09
    You see, once in a while, they talk
    about the US media
  • 40:09 - 40:14
    how oppressive the Chinese regime
    is against these people.
  • 40:14 - 40:17
    You know, these people, they don't
    consider themselves Chinese.
  • 40:17 - 40:18
    They consider themselves Muslims.
  • 40:18 - 40:20
    They consider themselves Uyghurs.
  • 40:20 - 40:21
    They consider themselves Turkic.
  • 40:21 - 40:23
    Their language is Turkic, OK?
  • 40:23 - 40:25
    They want independence.
  • 40:25 - 40:28
    Well, we have been cultivating that
    for the past...
  • 40:28 - 40:33
    since 1997, 1996 there, OK?
  • 40:33 - 40:35
    And what we want is
  • 40:35 - 40:39
    we want some of these terror incidents
  • 40:39 - 40:41
    and the escalation of that,
  • 40:41 - 40:45
    and getting China to increase its
    oppression and react,
  • 40:45 - 40:50
    because China wants to [xx] they just
    want to defend their interests,
  • 40:50 - 40:54
    then show that to the international
    community by saying,
  • 40:54 - 40:57
    "Look, these poor little minority
    groups there,"
  • 40:57 - 41:00
    "They are being crucified. They are
    being massacred"
  • 41:00 - 41:02
    "It's almost like genocide."
  • 41:02 - 41:04
    They want this genocidal operation,
  • 41:04 - 41:09
    they want it to escalate to the point
    of genocidal operations,
  • 41:09 - 41:11
    they want to push China into reacting
  • 41:11 - 41:14
    and turning this into a genocidal
    operations.
  • 41:14 - 41:18
    So then, with the consent of the
    international community,
  • 41:18 - 41:22
    we go there, in there, and say we
    are here to stand by the sects
  • 41:22 - 41:25
    because we are such great nation.
  • 41:25 - 41:27
    We care a lot [laughter]
  • 41:27 - 41:29
    about humanity.
  • 41:29 - 41:32
    And we always have these great
    intentions.
  • 41:32 - 41:35
    It's always because we want to democrat---
  • 41:35 - 41:38
    we bring democracy and
    democratize a nation.
  • 41:38 - 41:40
    We want to protect some underdog.
  • 41:40 - 41:43
    We want to defend some minority groups
  • 41:43 - 41:45
    because we are that kind of nation, guys.
  • 41:45 - 41:49
    OK? That's what we always,
    always have done, right?
  • 41:49 - 41:50
    You know, it's always glorified.
  • 41:50 - 41:52
    We always intend good things.
  • 41:52 - 41:55
    And look, bad things happen as a result:
    but they are unintended.
  • 41:55 - 41:57
    Again, going back to "blowback."
  • 41:57 - 41:58
    But once we have that,
  • 41:58 - 42:01
    once we have a situation escalate
  • 42:01 - 42:03
    and we are pushing it to that degree
  • 42:03 - 42:05
    -- this is all planned: it's been in
    motion since 1996 --
  • 42:05 - 42:08
    then we're gonna say, "We've got to
    help these guys,"
  • 42:08 - 42:09
    "so we've got to put our military there,"
  • 42:09 - 42:12
    and it's going to be another Taiwan.
  • 42:12 - 42:14
    That's the intention, OK?
  • 42:14 - 42:15
    That's the objective.
  • 42:15 - 42:20
    We want to separate Xinjiang area
    from the rest of mainland China.
  • 42:20 - 42:24
    We will put a base there, in the name
    of protecting these minorities,
  • 42:24 - 42:27
    and we're gonna turn it to
    another Taiwan.
  • 42:27 - 42:29
    That is the ultimate goal.
  • 42:29 - 42:31
    And look and see where Xinjiang is:
  • 42:31 - 42:37
    not only for us to get close to China
    just the way we are doing with Russia,
  • 42:37 - 42:40
    with using the Caucasus and Central Asia,
  • 42:40 - 42:43
    this is the start for us with this
    Xinjiang region
  • 42:43 - 42:47
    to exactly implement the same objective,
    the same plan
  • 42:47 - 42:50
    and get close to China and close in
    on China.
  • 42:50 - 42:51
    So, that's number one.
  • 42:51 - 42:56
    And number two, if you look at the
    pipeline scenario
  • 42:56 - 42:58
    -- this is for the oil and gas --
  • 42:58 - 43:04
    the oil and gas resource-rich regions
    of Central Asia and Caucasus,
  • 43:04 - 43:07
    when you look at Turkmenistan
    and Kazakhstan, et cetera,
  • 43:07 - 43:09
    and you see all the business deals
  • 43:09 - 43:13
    between China and these
    Central Asia/Caucasus,
  • 43:13 - 43:15
    ex-Soviet nations...
  • 43:15 - 43:18
    --because how many billion people
    are in China? --
  • 43:18 - 43:23
    China has the greatest need for
    energy resources
  • 43:23 - 43:25
    compared to any other nation
    in the world.
  • 43:25 - 43:28
    They need this oil, they need this gas,
  • 43:28 - 43:31
    and they are putting all these pipelines
    to bring...
  • 43:31 - 43:32
    -- with business deals --
  • 43:32 - 43:38
    this needed gas and oil into China.
    Into mainland china.
  • 43:38 - 43:41
    Well, go and see where these pipelines
    pass through.
  • 43:41 - 43:46
    Then you start realizing the significance
    of the Xinjiang region.
  • 43:46 - 43:52
    So by having our power, our military
    boots on the ground,
  • 43:52 - 43:54
    our base there in Xinjiang,
  • 43:54 - 43:56
    not only we are controlling getting
    close to China,
  • 43:56 - 43:59
    but we are sitting in the section
  • 43:59 - 44:05
    that is the [xx] that the pipelines entry
    into mainland China.
  • 44:05 - 44:10
    We can starve and deprive China of all
    oil and gas
  • 44:10 - 44:13
    coming from that region by sitting there.
  • 44:13 - 44:19
    So that's the area you don't hear much
    from the mainstream media, US,
  • 44:19 - 44:21
    even though so much has been
    taking place.
  • 44:21 - 44:27
    They only broadcast when China reacts
    to some terror incidents that we manage
  • 44:27 - 44:30
    -- "we" being the United States,
    Operation Gladio --
  • 44:30 - 44:34
    by the Xinjiang Uyghurs, and show
    how despotic they are.
  • 44:34 - 44:38
    You know, they go there and they are
    oppressing people, repressing people,
  • 44:38 - 44:41
    they are killing people, they are
    jailing people,
  • 44:41 - 44:44
    awful stuff that China is doing to
    these people, right?
  • 44:44 - 44:47
    We don't show the casualties of
    when these groups, our groups,
  • 44:47 - 44:50
    implement terror operations in
    mainland China,
  • 44:50 - 44:52
    but we right away broadcast
    what China did.
  • 44:52 - 44:56
    So we are basically massaging
    the peoples,
  • 44:56 - 44:59
    Americans and also
    international communities,
  • 44:59 - 45:01
    and even especially the Muslim region,
  • 45:01 - 45:05
    of, "Look, what is China doing
    to these people?"
  • 45:05 - 45:06
    The same thing we've been doing with,
  • 45:06 - 45:09
    "Look what Russians are doing
    to Chechens!'
  • 45:09 - 45:12
    Exactly the same scenario.
  • 45:12 - 45:13
    It's the same Operation Gladio.
  • 45:13 - 45:16
    And again, when you said, "To what end?"
  • 45:16 - 45:19
    That's... we are... we have these
    objectives in place.
  • 45:19 - 45:22
    Not "we:" the Operation;
    the Operation Gladio.
  • 45:22 - 45:25
    And China and getting close,
  • 45:25 - 45:31
    controlling the entry of the needed oil
    and gas into China
  • 45:31 - 45:35
    thus containing China from becoming
    the superpower,
  • 45:35 - 45:40
    is in motion. And the same thing
    with Russia.
  • 45:40 - 45:43
    And of course we have the prize
    there that we haven't done anything.
  • 45:43 - 45:46
    That's for the next administration.
  • 45:46 - 45:49
    Right now, we have Syria.
    We had Libya before that.
  • 45:49 - 45:53
    Yemen, Afghanistan with... we're
    gonna stay there.
  • 45:53 - 45:55
    Of course that's gonna be our
    permanent base.
  • 45:55 - 45:57
    There's no question about that.
  • 45:57 - 45:59
    Pakistan is our puppet region.
  • 45:59 - 46:02
    Of course, these regions sometimes
    play off of US against China.
  • 46:02 - 46:07
    "OK, so you do this, then I'm gonna
    go and make a deal with China."
  • 46:07 - 46:08
    Well, we don't want that, right?
  • 46:08 - 46:12
    And again, that ends up being
    some headlines once in a while,
  • 46:12 - 46:16
    but the importance of it is way beyond
    what the US media
  • 46:16 - 46:19
    represents in its reporting.
  • 46:19 - 46:21
    So of course the prize being Iran there.
  • 46:21 - 46:23
    And between Central Asia, Caucasus,
  • 46:23 - 46:25
    Iran, Afghanistan,
  • 46:25 - 46:29
    the goal is whoever controls
    the resources,
  • 46:29 - 46:35
    the needed resources: the oil, the gas, the needed minerals --
  • 46:35 - 46:37
    that is the superpower.
  • 46:38 - 46:42
    That is the sole empire of the globe, the world.
  • 46:42 - 46:46
    And we have been doing it through
    Operation Gladio,
  • 46:46 - 46:50
    and of course with our more
    militaristic covert wars.
  • 46:50 - 46:51
    But then look at our competitors,
  • 46:51 - 46:53
    supposedly our enemies,
  • 46:53 - 46:54
    China and Russia:
  • 46:54 - 46:56
    we haven't seen anything like that
    from them.
  • 46:56 - 46:59
    And so that is our modus operandi,
  • 46:59 - 47:00
    and that is the objective.
  • 47:00 - 47:04
    The objective is who is going to be
    the sole superpower,
  • 47:04 - 47:05
    the super-empire.
  • 47:05 - 47:07
    And as long as that's the objective,
  • 47:07 - 47:08
    these are the things we're
    gonna be doing.
  • 47:08 - 47:13
    (Pearse) Hmm. And I think that you're
    really right in pointing out that this is...
  • 47:13 - 47:17
    the situation in Xinjiang right now is
    actually starting
  • 47:17 - 47:19
    to get more, sort of, intense;
  • 47:19 - 47:21
    and we're already seeing Uyghurs
  • 47:21 - 47:23
    that were fighting in Iraq
    that were captured.
  • 47:23 - 47:26
    And it seems that perhaps
  • 47:26 - 47:29
    we are entering into a different
    phase of Gladio.
  • 47:29 - 47:32
    And just briefly, I just wanted to take
    your take on
  • 47:32 - 47:35
    Tarkhan Batirashvili or Omar al-Shishani,
  • 47:35 - 47:38
    who is the "Ginger Jihadi."
  • 47:38 - 47:41
    And he seems to have been thrust
    into the spotlight of ISIS.
  • 47:41 - 47:45
    There was a Daily Beast article calling
    him "The Bin Laden of the Group."
  • 47:45 - 47:48
    Of course, and then a little bit down
    in the article they say,
  • 47:48 - 47:51
    "Well, his brother is really the brains
    behind all of this."
  • 47:51 - 47:54
    And Batirashvili has a somewhat
    similar background
  • 47:54 - 47:57
    to a character in The Lone Gladio,
    Yusuf Mohammed
  • 47:57 - 48:00
    and we'll leave that to the audience
    to decipher who is is.
  • 48:00 - 48:03
    But of course, Batirashvili was trained
    by the Americans
  • 48:03 - 48:05
    in a Georgian Special Forces outfit,
  • 48:05 - 48:08
    fought against the Russians in Chechnya,
  • 48:08 - 48:11
    and he has repeatedly said that he wants
  • 48:11 - 48:14
    to bring the fight back to Kadyrov
    and Putin,
  • 48:14 - 48:16
    with not so much as a peep out
    of Georgia.
  • 48:16 - 48:19
    So I just wanted to see and get your
    take on this, Sibel.
  • 48:19 - 48:25
    And is this a, sort of, new ramping up?
  • 48:25 - 48:31
    Are we going to go from the small-scale
    attacks like in The Lone Gladio,
  • 48:31 - 48:35
    like the bombing in the Defense Ministry
    in the beginning of the book,
  • 48:35 - 48:38
    to a more, sort of, open war with Russia?
  • 48:38 - 48:44
    And with, perhaps, this Batirashvili --
    this white jihadi guy -- at the forefront?
  • 48:44 - 48:49
    (Sibel) My answer, I guess, will have
    three different segments into it.
  • 48:49 - 48:52
    Number one, that's right: you mentioned
    the character Yusuf Mohammed.
  • 48:52 - 48:58
    But the biography, the summary short
    biography that you just mentioned,
  • 48:58 - 49:01
    fits exactly Ayman Zawahiri's.
  • 49:01 - 49:02
    Mm.
  • 49:02 - 49:05
    OK? Ayman Zawahiri was jailed;
    he was tortured.
  • 49:05 - 49:10
    Then he went there and became the
    lieutenant for Osama Bin Laden
  • 49:10 - 49:17
    and was fighting against Russia in...
    with mujahideen cell in Afghanistan.
  • 49:17 - 49:20
    So you... as you said, you're looking
    at the repeated bios.
  • 49:20 - 49:24
    So these are the... the profiles are
    so consistent.
  • 49:24 - 49:27
    See, that's one of the other
    interesting things
  • 49:27 - 49:30
    about the United States and NATO,
  • 49:30 - 49:32
    the Operation Gladio,
  • 49:32 - 49:33
    and that is the consistency.
  • 49:33 - 49:38
    Really, you may see some small
    variations here and there,
  • 49:38 - 49:41
    but if you look at it overall,
  • 49:41 - 49:44
    the script is the same. The scenario
    is the same.
  • 49:44 - 49:49
    I mean, in a way: it's awful, but it's
    also boring.
  • 49:49 - 49:50
    But guess what?
  • 49:50 - 49:53
    If it works, if it ain't break,
    don't fix it, right?
  • 49:53 - 49:54
    That's how the saying goes?
  • 49:54 - 49:57
    It worked with Afghanistan,
  • 49:57 - 50:00
    it worked with... it has been working.
  • 50:00 - 50:03
    So why change it, right?
  • 50:03 - 50:05
    So that's number one aspect of it.
  • 50:05 - 50:08
    That the bios being exactly consistent
    as the rest of them.
  • 50:08 - 50:12
    you know, Zawahiri and Yusuf Mohammed.
  • 50:12 - 50:14
    And the second part of it
  • 50:14 - 50:18
    has to do with the psychological
    aspects of it.
  • 50:18 - 50:19
    And this is the psychological warfare,
  • 50:19 - 50:22
    and also propaganda.
  • 50:22 - 50:27
    And that is when you put... let's say
    you have an enemy cell.
  • 50:27 - 50:30
    ISIS, ISIS, right? They are doing
    these ferocious things.
  • 50:30 - 50:33
    It goes only so far.
  • 50:33 - 50:35
    Of course, let's say, look at the
    Americans' opinion:
  • 50:35 - 50:39
    these barbaric Muslims -- they
    are Islamists, number one.
  • 50:39 - 50:41
    "This is what Islam advocates,"
  • 50:41 - 50:44
    "and these barbaric extremists,
    they're doing all this stuff. "
  • 50:44 - 50:47
    Goes... it's effective; but it goes
    only so far.
  • 50:47 - 50:52
    What you always need in a
    psychological warfare and propaganda
  • 50:52 - 50:56
    is to put a human, actual human face
    and name to it.
  • 50:56 - 51:00
    Because then, that makes it so
    personal, right?
  • 51:00 - 51:05
    Because, as we did with Osama Bin Laden.
  • 51:05 - 51:09
    Showing the picture of that Khalid
    Sheikh Mohammed.
  • 51:09 - 51:12
    That evil-looking guy, you know?
    He's crazy, right?
  • 51:12 - 51:13
    "MOOONSTER!"
  • 51:13 - 51:16
    So we associate, when we think
    about the Americans...
  • 51:16 - 51:17
    you know, people,
  • 51:17 - 51:21
    then we are thinking about these
    horrifying boogeymen.
  • 51:21 - 51:23
    If we don't have, put some pictures
    there...
  • 51:23 - 51:25
    you know, it's like Freddy Krueger,
    right?
  • 51:25 - 51:30
    Freddy Kruger. I mean, you can write
    all the stories about Freddy Krueger,
  • 51:30 - 51:34
    but if you don't create an image
    that goes with Freddy Krueger,
  • 51:34 - 51:38
    Freddy Krueger can't become
    that monstrously scary, right?
  • 51:38 - 51:43
    So Osama Bin Laden, with that long
    beard and the dark, piercing black eyes,
  • 51:43 - 51:48
    that screams evil, and you have Khalid
    Sheikh Mohammed, that crazed guy there.
  • 51:48 - 51:52
    And then you are looking at
    Ayman Zawahiri,
  • 51:52 - 51:56
    and the photos when he's talking
    passionate with his index finger up,
  • 51:56 - 52:00
    you know, the extremist Islamist
    mullah with his headpiece.
  • 52:00 - 52:01
    Well, those are effective.
  • 52:01 - 52:05
    Because just like Hollywood movies,
    just like Freddy Krueger,
  • 52:05 - 52:07
    you need to have a human face
    and name
  • 52:07 - 52:11
    that you make it synonymous with
    whatever cell
  • 52:11 - 52:14
    you have created and put in
    place, right?
  • 52:14 - 52:16
    And that's exactly what we are
    seeing with this guy.
  • 52:16 - 52:20
    Because ISIS, ISIL, IS -- they did this?
    OK, that's fine.
  • 52:20 - 52:25
    But now it's time to enter, to bring in
  • 52:25 - 52:27
    and introduce the face that
    represents it all.
  • 52:27 - 52:30
    Now, you have [xx] this person.
  • 52:30 - 52:32
    So that's the second segment.
  • 52:32 - 52:34
    And as far as yet bigger war,
  • 52:34 - 52:40
    I think we are putting things in place
    for that if needed,
  • 52:40 - 52:44
    but I will offer my own
    hypothesis theory.
  • 52:44 - 52:46
    Because I don't know this for a fact,
  • 52:46 - 52:49
    but if someone were to ask me to speculate
  • 52:49 - 52:53
    and say when and why...
    when we would do such things,
  • 52:53 - 52:55
    in terms of going into full-blown war,
  • 52:55 - 52:58
    this is what I have to offer.
  • 52:58 - 53:01
    Again, this is based on my own analysis
    and opinion,
  • 53:01 - 53:04
    and I'm not going to market it as,
    "Oh, this is pure fact."
  • 53:04 - 53:06
    This is my opinion.
  • 53:06 - 53:09
    First of all, we are going to see much
    more stuff
  • 53:09 - 53:11
    with Georgia, Abkhazia region.
  • 53:11 - 53:15
    We had that -- what was it? -- six-day
    war, eight-day war a few years ago?
  • 53:15 - 53:16
    That was just a warm-up.
  • 53:16 - 53:22
    But with Georgia's candidacy,
    integration into NATO that is coming,
  • 53:22 - 53:26
    that is going to happen in that region.
  • 53:26 - 53:30
    We're gonna see more conflict
    and confrontation there.
  • 53:30 - 53:34
    Similar to Ukraine, we're gonna see it
    in the Abkhazia region there.
  • 53:34 - 53:37
    And again, these terror cells and
    the groups,
  • 53:37 - 53:40
    we have already cultivated,
    put together, put in place,
  • 53:40 - 53:41
    we've been managing in that region.
  • 53:41 - 53:44
    We got a little bit of taste of
    that during
  • 53:44 - 53:47
    the so-called false flag Boston
    bombing.
  • 53:47 - 53:49
    People started hearing,
  • 53:49 - 53:51
    at least their ears got a little bit
    used to,
  • 53:51 - 53:54
    this "Dagestan" region?
  • 53:54 - 53:55
    [laughter]
  • 53:55 - 53:56
    You see?
  • 53:56 - 53:58
    Because ordinarily, most Americans:
    they don't like geography, OK?
  • 53:58 - 54:03
    They like to view the world as this...
    the United States of America.
  • 54:03 - 54:05
    OK? It's huge.
  • 54:05 - 54:07
    Look, Turkey's the size of Texas, right?
  • 54:07 - 54:09
    Well, I don't even know where Turkey
    exactly is.
  • 54:09 - 54:10
    We are a big country,
  • 54:10 - 54:12
    we are just by ourselves here.
  • 54:12 - 54:15
    There are some countries and nations
    with weird names, oh,
  • 54:15 - 54:17
    thousands of miles away.
  • 54:17 - 54:18
    Who needs to know about them?
  • 54:18 - 54:20
    If you were to ask Americans,
  • 54:20 - 54:24
    I would say 94 percent -- I'm just gonna
    throw a number here --
  • 54:24 - 54:26
    if you put the map and say,
  • 54:26 - 54:31
    "OK, put your finger on the region that
    is considered Caucasus/Central Asia,"
  • 54:31 - 54:34
    I can guarantee you, if we were to
    implement this test,
  • 54:34 - 54:37
    You would see that 94% of Americans,
  • 54:37 - 54:39
    their index finger would freeze
    in the air.
  • 54:39 - 54:43
    "What?" "Can you show me Kyrgyzstan?"
    "What's that?"
  • 54:43 - 54:47
    I mean, I'll just give you a quick...
    it's not a joke, it's a real-life thing.
  • 54:47 - 54:50
    When I started college, university
    here in the United States --
  • 54:50 - 54:55
    and this is during my second, third year,
    so this is not in high school
  • 54:55 - 54:56
    this is in college-level
  • 54:56 - 54:59
    this one guy in my class, he says,
    "You're from Turkey, right?"
  • 54:59 - 55:01
    I said, "Yeah, I'm from Turkey."
  • 55:01 - 55:04
    He says, "Turkey is in Saudi Arabia,
    right?"
  • 55:04 - 55:05
    "One of the nations in Saudi Arabia?"
  • 55:05 - 55:08
    And I was like, "Oh my goodness."
  • 55:08 - 55:11
    They have made Saudi Arabia a continent,
  • 55:12 - 55:17
    And Turkey a nation in that
    continent called Saudi Arabia.
  • 55:17 - 55:18
    But unfortunately
  • 55:18 - 55:20
    -- this is a fact; this is true, OK? --
  • 55:20 - 55:25
    we... I spent years living in
    other countries.
  • 55:25 - 55:26
    I lived in Vietnam for a year.
  • 55:26 - 55:31
    I lived in Russia in 1992, right after
    the end of the Cold War.
  • 55:31 - 55:36
    And I have traveled to a lot of
    places, to many, many countries.
  • 55:36 - 55:41
    But when it comes to geography,
    with Americans,
  • 55:41 - 55:45
    I never... I'm still amazed, OK?
    It is just...
  • 55:45 - 55:48
    and then I traveled... another thing
    I noticed, like, when I was
  • 55:48 - 55:50
    when I was there, when I was in Vietnam,
  • 55:50 - 55:54
    I saw all these backpackers
    from Scandinavian nations
  • 55:54 - 55:57
    Australia, New Zealand, a lot of Brits.
  • 55:57 - 55:59
    You know, they are 21, right
    out of college.
  • 55:59 - 56:01
    Or they are taking a break from college.
  • 56:01 - 56:06
    And they have their backpacks, and they
    are traveling all over Laos and Vietnam.
  • 56:06 - 56:08
    And I struck a friendship with a lot of
    these people.
  • 56:08 - 56:10
    You hardly see Americans doing that.
  • 56:10 - 56:17
    There is this inherent desire to explore
    the world by some of those nations.
  • 56:17 - 56:19
    But you don't see it much for Americans.
  • 56:19 - 56:24
    That's another thing: that worldliness
    which reduces xenophobia.
  • 56:24 - 56:25
    When you start getting more familiar,
  • 56:25 - 56:31
    the culture and other traditions and
    people and races,
  • 56:31 - 56:34
    that kind of reduces your xenophobia,
  • 56:34 - 56:38
    but also it makes you an informed
    person about the world.
  • 56:38 - 56:41
    It makes you worldly.
    Well, you don't see that much in America.
  • 56:41 - 56:44
    So, going back to the topic
    of Kyrgyzstan,
  • 56:44 - 56:45
    "I don't even know where that is,"
  • 56:45 - 56:49
    we are going to see this conflict.
  • 56:49 - 56:51
    We have already planted that.
  • 56:51 - 56:54
    We said, "Let's make Americans
    familiar with this name Dagestan"'
  • 56:54 - 56:58
    Dagestan and terrorism have become
    kind of synonymous
  • 56:58 - 56:59
    thanks to the Boston bombing.
  • 56:59 - 57:02
    So Chechen, Dagestan, these people came,
  • 57:02 - 57:03
    they're extremists.
  • 57:03 - 57:05
    They're somehow related
  • 57:05 - 57:08
    to either al-Qaeda or Jamaati
    [sic: Jabhat?] al-Nusra... whatever.
  • 57:08 - 57:10
    But that region has many,
    many terrorists, OK?
  • 57:10 - 57:15
    We are going to reintroduce that
    topic again as a nation,
  • 57:15 - 57:18
    as Operation Gladio, when the time
    comes, which is going to be soon
  • 57:18 - 57:20
    in Georgia, Abkhazia region.
  • 57:20 - 57:22
    But as far as a bigger war with Russia,
  • 57:22 - 57:27
    I doubt it under current circumstances.
    That's my opinion,
  • 57:27 - 57:29
    because of Putin and who Putin is.
  • 57:29 - 57:32
    And again, Putin's rating went
    up in Russia,
  • 57:32 - 57:36
    and Putin's popularity really went
    up there.
  • 57:36 - 57:40
    And Putin has been portrayed,
    even here by US media,
  • 57:40 - 57:44
    as a tough, nationalistic leader
    in Russia, right?
  • 57:44 - 57:47
    Because Putin is standing up
    to the United States.
  • 57:47 - 57:50
    He did -- he and the Russians --
  • 57:50 - 57:54
    when we were talking about going
    into Syria two years ago, right?
  • 57:54 - 57:56
    And of course what we saw with Ukraine.
  • 57:56 - 58:03
    My theory is just like the limited
    opposition framed and controlled,
  • 58:03 - 58:07
    I believe there is... we have Putin tied,
  • 58:07 - 58:13
    and into a certain degree, Putin
    can only do it so much.
  • 58:13 - 58:16
    And you're going to say, why that is?
  • 58:16 - 58:20
    One of, again, our modus operandi
    has been...
  • 58:20 - 58:24
    -- and you see it a lot in Operation Gladio-related sections
  • 58:24 - 58:25
    of The Lone Gladio --
  • 58:25 - 58:30
    is blackmail and collecting crap,
    shit from people, right?
  • 58:30 - 58:32
    I mean, we do it with Congress.
  • 58:32 - 58:39
    Even with the FBI we did it. FBI had files
    on some top figures in the House.
  • 58:39 - 58:47
    Just in the operation that involved
    Turkey and the Turkish lobby, right?
  • 58:47 - 58:49
    That was involved in my case.
  • 58:49 - 58:52
    but CIA has been doing it forever,
  • 58:52 - 58:54
    since its inception and creation.
  • 58:54 - 58:58
    There are some Presidents,
    and we do that.
  • 58:58 - 59:00
    Otherwise they won't become President.
  • 59:00 - 59:02
    That's one of the qualifications,
    requirements.
  • 59:02 - 59:05
    And again, the book The Lone Gladio
    goes into that.
  • 59:05 - 59:08
    To be qualified to get to that level,
  • 59:08 - 59:09
    to that level of power seat,
  • 59:09 - 59:12
    you have to have a lot of dirt, OK?
  • 59:12 - 59:14
    That makes you a viable candidate.
  • 59:14 - 59:16
    because you are controllable.
  • 59:16 - 59:20
    If you don't have lots of skeletons
    and dirt,
  • 59:20 - 59:22
    you are not as easily controllable.
  • 59:22 - 59:29
    It's pure and simple. Well we've been
    doing that with, also, world leaders.
  • 59:29 - 59:31
    It just came out and leaked that, OK,
  • 59:31 - 59:34
    we've been collecting dirt on Angela
    Merkel, right?
  • 59:34 - 59:39
    With this NSA spying: her personal
    phones were being listened to, correct?
  • 59:39 - 59:43
    Well, why would we do that?
    Think about it.
  • 59:43 - 59:45
    Because at any given time...
  • 59:45 - 59:49
    let's say someone like Angela Merkel, if
    she was not the scumbag that she is, OK?
  • 59:49 - 59:55
    And we decided that you know, Germany,
    or this country or that country,
  • 59:55 - 59:57
    is not backing us with this,
  • 59:57 - 59:59
    what would happen if we...
  • 59:59 - 60:02
    -- "We," the United States;
    Operation Gladio --
  • 60:02 - 60:09
    would release to the media in France,
    or in Germany, or in UK?
  • 60:09 - 60:11
    All sorts of recorded tapes,
  • 60:11 - 60:15
    and also maybe some Internet activities
  • 60:15 - 60:18
    showing that this particular leader
    is a pedophile, OK?
  • 60:18 - 60:20
    Let's say... you know, let's say Sarkozy.
  • 60:20 - 60:23
    I'm just giving you a hypothetical
    example.
  • 60:23 - 60:28
    What would happen if all these pictures
    come out
  • 60:28 - 60:30
    that Sarkozy has been having
  • 60:30 - 60:32
    this relationship with five,
    six-years-old boys
  • 60:32 - 60:36
    and, through... and he's been a pedophile?
  • 60:36 - 60:38
    Can you imagine right away that leader
    not disappearing from that country?
  • 60:38 - 60:42
    We have that power, because we've
    been... we've been doing this a lot.
  • 60:42 - 60:49
    We first use what we collect on the
    world leaders in terms of blackmail
  • 60:49 - 60:53
    by saying, "You know what? You don't
    do this and we will expose this."
  • 60:53 - 60:57
    OK? Number two, if needed, we would
    do that.
  • 60:57 - 61:02
    Some things happen with the Bakayev
    family in Kyrgyzstan
  • 61:02 - 61:06
    A lot of things are associated with that
    that I'm not gonna get into right now.
  • 61:06 - 61:12
    But with Putin, it's already estimated
    that his net worth, his wealth,
  • 61:12 - 61:14
    is way over $500 million dollars, OK?
  • 61:14 - 61:19
    Where is his money?
    As of 2003, 2004 --
  • 61:19 - 61:23
    and this is based on direct,
    first/second-hand information
  • 61:23 - 61:25
    from people within intelligence community
  • 61:25 - 61:32
    a lot of his wealth is kept in the Greek
    portion of Cyprus, the banks there.
  • 61:32 - 61:36
    And they're... so if intelligence
    agencies,
  • 61:36 - 61:40
    CIA, and even through
    counterintelligence monitoring FBI,
  • 61:40 - 61:45
    knows and has all the information
  • 61:45 - 61:47
    about where Putin keeps some
    of his wealth,
  • 61:47 - 61:50
    or if some other leader
    keeps it in Dubai,
  • 61:50 - 61:54
    this ones keeps it -- let's say,
    hypothetically speaking,
  • 61:54 - 61:57
    Putin keeps it in certain banks in Malta?
  • 61:57 - 61:59
    OK? Malta is another important place.
  • 61:59 - 62:00
    Nobody talks about it,
  • 62:00 - 62:04
    but in terms of the money laundering
    and the financial operations center
  • 62:04 - 62:06
    and in Cyprus.
  • 62:06 - 62:12
    And if this were to come out in Russia --
    how did he get this wealth, OK?
  • 62:12 - 62:15
    Because this is the nation's wealth
    that leaders go and take out, right?
  • 62:15 - 62:18
    In countries like... whatever countries
    that you look at.
  • 62:18 - 62:20
    And where they are kept.
  • 62:20 - 62:22
    They can...
  • 62:22 - 62:23
    -- and this is the Operation Gladio,
  • 62:23 - 62:25
    this is the United States,
    this is the UK --
  • 62:25 - 62:29
    they can make Putin a scandalous leader
  • 62:29 - 62:32
    and take away all his popularity
  • 62:32 - 62:35
    in less than a day, if they wanted to.
  • 62:35 - 62:38
    If they wanted to.
  • 62:38 - 62:44
    So you are looking at a leader,
    let's say in Russia, that has to
  • 62:44 - 62:48
    balance... has to balance two things.
  • 62:48 - 62:53
    Number one, to appeal to the
    nationalistic side of its nation
  • 62:53 - 62:58
    Because any leader of Russia has to
    kind of be tough
  • 62:58 - 63:00
    when it comes to the Western powers,
    right?
  • 63:00 - 63:01
    Because it was not that long ago
  • 63:01 - 63:04
    when Russia was the Soviet Union.
  • 63:04 - 63:06
    It was the second empire in the world.
  • 63:06 - 63:09
    It was the Western empire, and it
    was the Soviet Union, OK?
  • 63:09 - 63:11
    So in order to stay in power,
  • 63:12 - 63:17
    that leader has to appeal and maintain
    that faith of the people there,
  • 63:17 - 63:20
    that he's tough, and he can stand up.
  • 63:20 - 63:22
    He's not a butler, OK? He's not weak.
  • 63:22 - 63:23
    He can stand up to the United States.
  • 63:23 - 63:26
    He can growl and say, "Rawwwrr!" OK?
  • 63:26 - 63:30
    Or maybe bark a little bit, and say,
    "Woof, woof!" OK?
  • 63:30 - 63:31
    But, he won't bite.
  • 63:31 - 63:35
    Because then that leader has
    to balance it.
  • 63:35 - 63:38
    Because we know Russia has a
    lot of corrupt people.
  • 63:38 - 63:41
    We know that. I lived there for a
    year, OK?
  • 63:41 - 63:47
    And I know how a lot of top-level
    KGB, former KGB people
  • 63:47 - 63:51
    got to be some of the top business
    people we hear about today,
  • 63:51 - 63:56
    with hundreds of million or billion
    dollars net worth.
  • 63:56 - 63:59
    So that... you need a leader that
    can growl,
  • 63:59 - 64:03
    that can bark a little bit when the
    situation arises,
  • 64:03 - 64:07
    and appeal to his people's
    nationalistic tendencies.
  • 64:07 - 64:10
    They still have that pride, Russians.
  • 64:10 - 64:13
    But yet, do it to a certain degree,
  • 64:13 - 64:16
    and not totally piss off and totally
    stand up to
  • 64:16 - 64:20
    the Western nations that have
    the blackmail power.
  • 64:20 - 64:23
    That have the power to expose him, OK?
  • 64:23 - 64:27
    That is, I believe, what we see
    with Putin.
  • 64:27 - 64:30
    We do see some really
    nice-looking growling,
  • 64:30 - 64:32
    and a little woof-woof,
  • 64:32 - 64:34
    but Putin is not going to bite.
  • 64:34 - 64:37
    And as long as Putin is in this position,
  • 64:37 - 64:41
    I don't believe that we are going to
    see a full-blown war with Russia.
  • 64:41 - 64:45
    It's not gonna happen, because
    another thing you should look at is,
  • 64:45 - 64:47
    ask yourself,
  • 64:47 - 64:48
    and I'm gonna ask, because you both
  • 64:48 - 64:52
    are experts with this whole area
    and the region,
  • 64:52 - 64:59
    how come Russia really hasn't done
    anything in the past 15 years
  • 64:59 - 65:06
    when the United States and NATO
    has been closing in to Russia's borders
  • 65:06 - 65:08
    by taking over Azerbaijan,
  • 65:08 - 65:12
    you know, until last year, Manas,
    Kyrgyzstan;
  • 65:12 - 65:15
    Georgia, OK?
  • 65:15 - 65:20
    And you start looking at all this,
    and say, "Whoa!"
  • 65:20 - 65:21
    Think about it!
  • 65:21 - 65:27
    Why, for the past 14, 15 years,
    Russia hasn't become really antsy.
  • 65:27 - 65:29
    Saying, "Well, these are my
    backdoor neighbors."
  • 65:29 - 65:31
    "They're right there on my border."
  • 65:31 - 65:33
    Think about it: why not?
  • 65:33 - 65:35
    Let me put it on the other hand and say,
  • 65:35 - 65:36
    what would happen...
  • 65:36 - 65:41
    imagine, what would happen if Russia
    starts building closer relationship
  • 65:41 - 65:43
    -- business relationship; militaristically,
    relationship --
  • 65:43 - 65:45
    with Mexico,
  • 65:45 - 65:48
    and starts coming to Mexico
    and put a huge base there
  • 65:48 - 65:52
    with 15,000 boots on the ground
    in the base, with Mexico?
  • 65:52 - 65:54
    Oh, it would be chaos!
  • 65:54 - 65:56
    Can you imagine?
  • 65:56 - 65:59
    First of all, we would not, as United
    States, let it get to that point, right?
  • 65:59 - 66:03
    And even as a notion would arise,
  • 66:03 - 66:07
    we would start using what power we
    have with Mexico, right?
  • 66:07 - 66:09
    And do everything: that would not happen.
  • 66:09 - 66:12
    It would not happen. Not...
  • 66:12 - 66:13
    or in Canada, OK?
  • 66:13 - 66:15
    Or even let's go further:
  • 66:15 - 66:17
    what would happen if, Russia says,
  • 66:17 - 66:18
    "Now I'm gonna go and put a base,"
  • 66:18 - 66:20
    "because I have now put this
    relationship,"
  • 66:20 - 66:23
    because a lot of these nations,
    all you have to do is make a contract,
  • 66:23 - 66:25
    business contract for $15 billion
    dollars,
  • 66:25 - 66:27
    you have the country and its leader.
  • 66:27 - 66:30
    And I'm gonna put it in Panama, OK?
    Where the canal is. ;
  • 66:30 - 66:32
    Put myself strategically in that
    situation.
  • 66:32 - 66:35
    Can you imagine that being allowed?
  • 66:35 - 66:39
    It wouldn't even come close
    to implementation.
  • 66:39 - 66:42
    Now, let's go back to the other side.
  • 66:42 - 66:44
    How come, for the last 15 years,
  • 66:44 - 66:50
    Russia has not made a peep, sound,
    about the United States, NATO,
  • 66:50 - 66:54
    going and putting all these bases in all
    these countries right along its borders?
  • 66:54 - 66:55
    Why?
  • 66:55 - 66:55
    [laughter]
  • 66:55 - 66:57
    (Pearse) I actually don't know,
  • 66:57 - 66:58
    because I see it as...
  • 66:58 - 67:01
    with Abkhazia and now South Ossetia,
  • 67:01 - 67:05
    that Russia might sort of be saying,
    "If you're gonna keep moving,"
  • 67:05 - 67:07
    "Then we'll take these little tiny
    areas,"
  • 67:07 - 67:10
    "And what are the Georgians going to do?"
  • 67:10 - 67:12
    But I don't know. I'd like to hear your...
  • 67:12 - 67:13
    (Sibel) That's right.
  • 67:13 - 67:17
    But that would be similar, it would
    be parallel to saying,
  • 67:17 - 67:23
    we would let Russia to come and
    put this bases in, let's say, in Mexico,
  • 67:23 - 67:27
    and then if Russia starts coming
    towards Texas
  • 67:27 - 67:30
    and do something right along
    the Texas border,
  • 67:30 - 67:32
    then US may flex its muscle.
  • 67:32 - 67:35
    But we would never let that happen
    in the first place,
  • 67:35 - 67:38
    to put ourselves in that vulnerable
    situation.
  • 67:38 - 67:44
    And even the stupidest Russian
    general, Russian strategic analyst,
  • 67:44 - 67:46
    they would know from 15 years ago
  • 67:46 - 67:51
    that putting these bases by US and
    NATO in Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan,
  • 67:51 - 67:56
    that would definitely lead to what
    we saw happening with Ukraine, OK?
  • 67:56 - 68:01
    Because the preparation for this
    started taking place in mid-'90s.
  • 68:01 - 68:03
    When after the fall of the Soviet Union,
  • 68:03 - 68:08
    we started seeing with Eastern Europe
    and all these nations,
  • 68:08 - 68:10
    we're gonna get closer
    and closer and closer:
  • 68:10 - 68:13
    during this entire period
    of 20 years, almost,
  • 68:13 - 68:15
    Russia and Russian leaders...
  • 68:15 - 68:19
    and we know what kind of Russian
    leaders we had even before Putin, right?
  • 68:19 - 68:21
    Gorbachev? Very nationalistic, you think?
  • 68:21 - 68:26
    Russia sat there and let the
    United States and NATO
  • 68:26 - 68:28
    closing up on it, right?
  • 68:28 - 68:33
    And closing in, closing in, and
    now we saw the stuff with Ukraine,
  • 68:33 - 68:35
    and then we're gonna be seeing
    with Georgia.
  • 68:35 - 68:36
    But it was allowed to happen.
  • 68:36 - 68:39
    They didn't stand up and say,
    "Whoa-whoa-whoa-whoa-whoa!"
  • 68:39 - 68:42
    "Over my dead body! You're not coming
    this close!"
  • 68:42 - 68:43
    They didn't.
  • 68:43 - 68:47
    Meaning, Russia never went to war
    for any of these places,
  • 68:47 - 68:51
    the colonizations that we have been
    putting in place in that region.
  • 68:51 - 68:53
    We didn't need to have any war
    with Russia.
  • 68:53 - 68:56
    We didn't even have any kind of
    a posturing war with Russia.
  • 68:56 - 68:58
    It happened, very easily. Smooth sail.
  • 68:58 - 69:01
    Thus, this is why I'm thinking
  • 69:01 - 69:06
    that the chances of having a full-blown
    war with Russia is highly unlikely,
  • 69:06 - 69:12
    unless, unless, we have been
    reading the notion and the fact
  • 69:12 - 69:16
    that there is a revival of nationalism
    in Russia.
  • 69:16 - 69:22
    That people, they're... the segment,
    the nationalistic segment saying, OK,
  • 69:22 - 69:26
    initially, at the end of Cold War, I went
    to Russia.
  • 69:26 - 69:27
    I lived there for almost a year.
  • 69:27 - 69:30
    It was this huge desire
    of Westernization,
  • 69:30 - 69:32
    especially in Saint Petersburg
    and Moscow.
  • 69:32 - 69:37
    I arrived in Moscow from Saint P,
    because my base was in Saint Petersburg,
  • 69:37 - 69:40
    on the day that the first McDonald's
    opened In Moscow,
  • 69:40 - 69:42
    in this big center there.
  • 69:42 - 69:45
    And as we were approaching
  • 69:45 - 69:47
    that downtown section where
    McDonald's opened,
  • 69:47 - 69:49
    the traffic was just stood still.
  • 69:49 - 69:54
    They had this line -- and it was a
    very big McDonald's building --
  • 69:54 - 69:59
    there was this line that wrapped around
    this McDonald's building for the opening
  • 69:59 - 70:04
    that was, like, going around about
    14, 15 times.
  • 70:04 - 70:07
    And if you would stand them up in
    one linear line,
  • 70:07 - 70:12
    you would see almost quarter mile of
    a line in front of the first McDonald's.
  • 70:12 - 70:16
    It was a huge deal, OK?
  • 70:16 - 70:17
    I mean, it was...
  • 70:17 - 70:23
    it was during the shock stage of the
    Soviet Union disappearing.
  • 70:23 - 70:25
    People didn't know what to think.
  • 70:25 - 70:28
    They had this desire of openness,
    they can wear the...
  • 70:28 - 70:30
    they can have lipstick. They can go
    and buy this lipstick.
  • 70:30 - 70:32
    You don't have to buy it from the
    black market.
  • 70:32 - 70:36
    And then the country was saturated
    with all these vultures
  • 70:36 - 70:38
    from the US and from Europe.
  • 70:38 - 70:41
    Who were there to take away things
    quickly, while things were cheap.
  • 70:41 - 70:44
    There was this US group that was buying
  • 70:44 - 70:47
    the high-value downtown real estate.
  • 70:47 - 70:49
    There was no regulation.
  • 70:49 - 70:51
    I mean, it was total chaos,
  • 70:51 - 70:53
    and the Western nations were
    taking advantage of it.
  • 70:53 - 70:55
    They were just placing themselves,
  • 70:55 - 70:57
    they were putting their boots,
    business boots, on the ground.
  • 70:58 - 71:00
    But the Russians were just too baffled.
  • 71:00 - 71:03
    They were excited about all the
    Western things.
  • 71:03 - 71:07
    They were a bit shocked: they couldn't
    believe that the Soviet Union was over.
  • 71:07 - 71:12
    And so that era of shock and awe for them
  • 71:12 - 71:16
    started kind of wearing off around 2002,
    2003.
  • 71:16 - 71:21
    Now, gradually, we are seeing, to a
    certain degree,
  • 71:21 - 71:25
    this revival of nationalism in Russia,
    by people who are...
  • 71:25 - 71:27
    and maybe ex-generals,
  • 71:27 - 71:31
    maybe some other ex-intelligence
    figures from KGB era
  • 71:31 - 71:36
    that are seeing the fact that their
    mother nation is being surrounded.
  • 71:36 - 71:38
    And they are looking, maybe, at Putin,
  • 71:38 - 71:40
    and saying,
    "How could you let this happen?"
  • 71:40 - 71:43
    OK? And it's the Russian pride.
  • 71:43 - 71:47
    So if, for example, Putin is toppled,
  • 71:47 - 71:54
    and we see a more real, nationalistic
    leader come into power,
  • 71:54 - 71:58
    then, sure: I would say, then it would be
    likely to see some direct confrontation
  • 71:58 - 72:04
    with Russia. But as of now, with Putin,
    with his limited woof and bark,
  • 72:04 - 72:07
    I would say no: it's not likely. It's not.
  • 72:07 - 72:11
    If it were going to happen, we would
    have seen it even with Ukraine.
  • 72:11 - 72:13
    (Pearse) Yeah.
  • 72:13 - 72:15
    We just saw some level of posturing.
  • 72:15 - 72:21
    And it made him look taller,
    and his rating went up.
  • 72:21 - 72:23
    But then I was reading just last week,
  • 72:23 - 72:25
    that it's been going gradually
    down again.
  • 72:25 - 72:27
    Because it gave hope
  • 72:27 - 72:30
    to that nationalistic feeling
    on the ground in Russia
  • 72:30 - 72:33
    that yeah, they're... our leader is
    standing up!
  • 72:33 - 72:34
    We're not gonna let this happen!
  • 72:34 - 72:36
    But, it happened.
  • 72:36 - 72:40
    Really, with Ukraine, if you see,
    it really happened.
  • 72:40 - 72:45
    And I think it's also important to note
    that at the end of the day,
  • 72:45 - 72:48
    many of these people, while they might
    be confrontational in public,
  • 72:48 - 72:51
    are essentially working towards the
    same end goals
  • 72:51 - 72:55
    and, you know, the really, really
    independent leaders...
  • 72:55 - 73:00
    -- people like Gaddafi or the former
    President of the Ivory Coast --
  • 73:00 - 73:02
    you know, those people are taken out.
  • 73:02 - 73:04
    They're really... they're just murdered
    and overthrown.
  • 73:04 - 73:07
    You know, any sort of independent
    leader like that.
  • 73:07 - 73:09
    So you know, you do have to
    wonder sometimes.
  • 73:09 - 73:12
    But I know we've been talking now
    for quite a while,
  • 73:12 - 73:14
    and Tom, you've been a little quiet,
  • 73:14 - 73:16
    so before we wrap up, Tom,
  • 73:16 - 73:19
    do you have any quick questions
    you'd like to ask Sibel?
  • 73:19 - 73:23
    (Tom) No, but I am thinking
    about this subject
  • 73:23 - 73:25
    and this question that you've raised,
  • 73:25 - 73:33
    and I'm not 100 percent convinced
    -- I'll say that much -- but...
  • 73:33 - 73:36
    it is an interesting question.
  • 73:36 - 73:38
    Maybe that would be a good place
    to kick off
  • 73:38 - 73:40
    a further conversation on this,
  • 73:40 - 73:45
    because we've perhaps got to the end
    of our conversation
  • 73:45 - 73:47
    about The Lone Gladio per se
  • 73:47 - 73:51
    but a lot of this stuff that's spinning
    out from this conversation, I think,
  • 73:51 - 73:54
    is certainly worthy of greater
    discussion.
  • 73:54 - 73:58
    And I'd be interested to see
    how our differing approaches
  • 73:58 - 74:01
    kind of, how we could marry
    them together,
  • 74:01 - 74:05
    and at least delineate differences
    between our perspectives on this.
  • 74:05 - 74:08
    so, I mean, yeah. Perhaps we'll leave
    it here,
  • 74:08 - 74:12
    and hopefully in the near future,
    the three of us can explore this again.
  • 74:12 - 74:14
    Because I do think we're starting
    to, now,
  • 74:14 - 74:17
    get into some really
    interesting territory.
  • 74:17 - 74:20
    But again, I'd like to thank both
    of you guys
  • 74:20 - 74:22
    for joining me today. It was a
    wonderful conversation.
  • 74:22 - 74:25
    (Pearse) And quickly, Sibel:
    where can they find
  • 74:25 - 74:27
    The Lone Gladio? Where can
    they find your work?
  • 74:27 - 74:32
    (Sibel) Sure. The Lone Gladio is
    available via Amazon,
  • 74:32 - 74:35
    both print book and also
    electronically through Kindle.
  • 74:35 - 74:39
    but people who don't want to
    deal with Amazon,
  • 74:39 - 74:44
    they can purchase it directly from
    the website TheLoneGladio.com
  • 74:44 - 74:46
    and they can have, even, signed copies.
  • 74:46 - 74:51
    So those are the two top places,
    and easiest places,
  • 74:51 - 74:55
    for people to obtain, purchase,
    The Lone Gladio
  • 74:55 - 74:59
    But even if they just go to
    TheLoneGladio.com website,
  • 74:59 - 75:01
    they will see the links from there
  • 75:01 - 75:04
    to all the other channels where
    they can get the book,
  • 75:04 - 75:05
    either electronically or in print.
  • 75:05 - 75:07
    (Pearse) And Tom, I'm sure that almost
    all my listeners
  • 75:07 - 75:09
    know where to find your work,
  • 75:09 - 75:11
    but we've always got new people coming,
  • 75:11 - 75:13
    so please, tell everybody about
    your website,
  • 75:13 - 75:16
    your podcast, and your novel as well.
  • 75:16 - 75:18
    Or -- excuse me! -- not a novel:
    book. [laughs]
  • 75:18 - 75:23
    (Tom) Sure. I mean, my main website
    is SpyCulture.com,
  • 75:23 - 75:28
    and on there you'll find links to my book
    about 7/7, Secret Spies and 7/7.
  • 75:28 - 75:33
    I also do an about fortnightly podcast
    called ClandesTime
  • 75:33 - 75:35
    that's available on Spy Culture
    and on YouTube.
  • 75:35 - 75:37
    So anybody who hasn't already
    checked that out, please do.
  • 75:37 - 75:42
    (Pearse) All right. well, thank you both,
    again, for joining,
  • 75:42 - 75:43
    and I hope we can pick this up
    again soon.
  • 75:43 - 75:45
    But thanks so much.
  • 75:45 - 75:47
    (Sibel) Thank you. Sorry for dominating
    the conversation.
  • 75:47 - 75:50
    So next time, I really want to hear
    your perspectives on this.
  • 75:50 - 75:52
    As I said, with some of the answers,
  • 75:52 - 75:55
    I have had only hypotheses
    or some theories to offer,
  • 75:55 - 75:57
    not as concrete fact,
  • 75:57 - 75:59
    so I would love to get your opinions
    on that.
  • 75:59 - 76:00
    And also, thank you for the opportunity.
  • 76:00 - 76:02
    it was great, thank you.
  • 76:02 - 76:06
    (Tom) Thank you Pierce, and thank you
    Sibel. it's been great talking to both of you.
  • 76:06 - 76:09
    (Pearse) OK, everybody.
  • 76:09 - 76:12
    So, that about does it for this episode of Porkins Policy Radio.
  • 76:12 - 76:15
    Thank you all for joining me and
    listening to this podcast.
  • 76:15 - 76:17
    And if you enjoyed this and you'd
    like to hear some more,
  • 76:17 - 76:21
    then please visit
    PorkinsPolicyReview.wordpress.com
  • 76:21 - 76:24
    And there you can find all of the
    podcasts free for download.
  • 76:24 - 76:27
    you can, of course, find them on
    YouTube also,
  • 76:27 - 76:31
    and if you use YouTube, then please,
    please subscribe to my YouTube channel,
  • 76:31 - 76:35
    which is YouTube.com/1138porkins
  • 76:35 - 76:40
    And also definitely follow me on
    Twitter @porkinspolicy,
  • 76:40 - 76:43
    and you can also follow the podcast
    through the RSS feed,
  • 76:43 - 76:45
    and also through email blasts as well.
  • 76:45 - 76:49
    And I just have a few quick programming
    notes before I completely sign off.
  • 76:49 - 76:54
    Just want to thank everybody who listened
    to the second episode
  • 76:54 - 76:56
    of me and Christoph Germann's
    new podcast,
  • 76:56 - 76:58
    Porkins Great Game.
  • 76:58 - 77:02
    We've gotten tremendous feedback
    and lots of hits on that episode.
  • 77:02 - 77:07
    So I'm really grateful for everybody
    that's been listening to it
  • 77:07 - 77:10
    and putting it up on social media,
    and whatnot like that.
  • 77:10 - 77:12
    And it's been really great.
  • 77:12 - 77:15
    And again, you can find that on the
    main site, as well as on YouTube.
  • 77:15 - 77:18
    And I just want to say one other
    quick thing.
  • 77:18 - 77:20
    And I know that I made a promise...
  • 77:20 - 77:23
    I believe it was actually the last time
    I spoke to Sibel
  • 77:23 - 77:28
    that I would have two episodes up
    on Porkins Policy Radio.
  • 77:28 - 77:29
    One dealing with Scientology,
  • 77:29 - 77:32
    and one dealing with Jim Jones
    and The People's Temple.
  • 77:32 - 77:34
    Well, I just want to say that I have
    not forgotten about that,
  • 77:34 - 77:38
    and I have been doing quite a bit
    of research on Jim Jones.
  • 77:38 - 77:40
    And I think that'll probably be
    the episode,
  • 77:40 - 77:43
    the next episode for
    Porkins Policy Radio.
  • 77:43 - 77:48
    So definitely stay tuned, and look out
    for that one on the horizon.
  • 77:48 - 77:53
    And again, we will be speaking with
    both Sibel and Tom again very soon,
  • 77:53 - 77:56
    and expand on some of the issues that
    we discussed, again, in this podcast.
  • 77:56 - 77:59
    So with that, I just want to
    thank everybody.
  • 77:59 - 78:03
    And again, if you liked this podcast,
    please tell a friend.
  • 78:03 - 78:06
    Email it to someone, put it up on
    your social media, whatever:
  • 78:06 - 78:11
    just help spread the word, because... and
    I just want to say, the fans have been...
  • 78:11 - 78:12
    the listeners are just fantastic.
  • 78:12 - 78:15
    Everyone has been promoting the show,
  • 78:15 - 78:17
    and it's really fantastic.
  • 78:17 - 78:19
    And a quick shout-out to James Corbett,
  • 78:19 - 78:23
    who included this podcast and me
    and Christoph's podcast
  • 78:23 - 78:29
    as one of the podcasts that he listens
    to in his Reddit AMA.
  • 78:29 - 78:31
    So that was very cool and very awesome,
  • 78:31 - 78:33
    and thanks so much, James.
  • 78:33 - 78:35
    So, I think we're there, we're gonna
    leave it,
  • 78:35 - 78:36
    and I will be talking to you very soon.
  • 78:36 - 78:55
    ♪ [ Philip Glass – “Mishima/Closing”
    (Mishima: A Life in Four Chapters) ] ♪
  • 81:21 - 81:25
    [Subtitled by "Adjuvant"]
    [CC-BY 4.0]
Title:
Porkins Policy Radio ep. 30 Gladio B Roundtable with Sibel Edmonds and Tom Secker
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