Applications Using Elasticity
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0:00 - 0:03♪ (music) ♪
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0:09 - 0:11- [Alex] In the last video,
Tyler introduced the topic -
0:11 - 0:13of slave redemption
-
0:13 - 0:17and how elasticity can help us
to understand its consequences. -
0:17 - 0:20In this video,
we'll dive deeper into this problem -
0:20 - 0:24and show how to analyze it using
supply, demand, and elasticity. -
0:24 - 0:26We'll also look
at some other real world -
0:26 - 0:28applications of elasticity.
-
0:28 - 0:29Let's get started.
-
0:34 - 0:36- [Tyler] Okay, let's begin our analysis.
-
0:36 - 0:38We'll put the price of slaves
on the vertical axis, -
0:38 - 0:40the quantity on the horizontal axis.
-
0:40 - 0:45And this is the demand for slaves
from potential slave owners. -
0:45 - 0:48So, this is the demand --
if you like -- from the bad guys. -
0:48 - 0:51It often helps in these situations
to begin with a polar case. -
0:51 - 0:54So let's assume to start
with that the supply of slaves -
0:54 - 0:58is perfectly inelastic --
that is, it doesn't respond at all -- -
0:58 - 1:02quantity supplied of slaves
does not respond to the price. -
1:02 - 1:06Given these assumptions,
the equilibrium is found at point A -
1:06 - 1:09with a price of slaves
of $15 per slave -
1:09 - 1:12and with 1,000 people being enslaved --
-
1:12 - 1:13being put into captivity
-
1:13 - 1:16every period --
every year, in this case. -
1:16 - 1:17Now...
-
1:18 - 1:20what does the redemption program do?
-
1:21 - 1:24Well, what the redemption
program does is it increases -
1:24 - 1:25the demand for slaves.
-
1:25 - 1:27So the demand for slaves
-
1:27 - 1:31now shifts out --
twists out -- to this red curve. -
1:31 - 1:35And this is the demand
from the potential slave owners -
1:35 - 1:37plus the demand from the redeemers.
-
1:37 - 1:40So, this is the total
demand for slaves. -
1:40 - 1:43And with that new
increased total demand, -
1:43 - 1:46what we see
is the equilibrium is at point B -
1:47 - 1:51with a price of slaves
of $50 per slave. -
1:51 - 1:56Now -- that increased price
of slaves is a good thing -
1:56 - 1:58from the point of view
of the program -
1:58 - 2:01because it's precisely
that higher price -
2:01 - 2:05which is going to discourage
the potential slave owners -
2:05 - 2:07from buying slaves.
-
2:07 - 2:11It's that higher price
which prices them out of the market. -
2:11 - 2:12What the redeemers are really doing
-
2:12 - 2:15is they're making
slaves too expensive -
2:15 - 2:18for potential slave owners to buy.
-
2:18 - 2:19So the potential slave owners
-
2:19 - 2:23start off at a price of $15
buying 1,000 slaves. -
2:23 - 2:26At the higher price of $50,
-
2:26 - 2:31the potential slave owners
only buy 200 slaves. -
2:31 - 2:33So, 200 slaves end up
being held in captivity -
2:33 - 2:36after the redemption
program -- per year -- -
2:36 - 2:41compared to 1,000
before the redemption program. -
2:41 - 2:46So, what the redemption program does
is it ends up freeing 800 slaves. -
2:46 - 2:48And in this situation
-
2:48 - 2:51where the supply curve
is perfectly inelastic, -
2:51 - 2:53the program works quite well --
-
2:53 - 2:58in the sense that every freed slave
-
2:59 - 3:01would have been a slave
-
3:01 - 3:04had it not been
for the redemption program. -
3:04 - 3:07That is --
of these 800 freed slaves -- -
3:07 - 3:11all of them
would have been held in captivity -
3:11 - 3:13were it not
for the redemption program. -
3:13 - 3:15And what we're going
to see in a minute, -
3:15 - 3:19is that when the supply curve
is more elastic, that's not the case. -
3:19 - 3:21When the supply curve is more elastic,
-
3:21 - 3:26the redemption program itself
can increase the number of people -
3:26 - 3:29who are enslaved
at least for a period of time. -
3:30 - 3:31So let's take a look now
-
3:31 - 3:34at the case where the supply
curve is more elastic. -
3:34 - 3:36So now, we're basically
going to repeat the analysis -
3:36 - 3:39but with a more elastic supply curve.
-
3:39 - 3:42So here's our demand curve --
just the same as we had it before. -
3:42 - 3:44Here's our more
elastic supply curve. -
3:44 - 3:46Notice that I've drawn the curves
-
3:46 - 3:50so that the equilibrium is exactly
the same as it was before -- -
3:50 - 3:52that is, at point A.
-
3:52 - 3:55The price of slaves
is $15 per slave -
3:55 - 3:57and there are 1,000 people
-
3:57 - 4:00who are enslaved
in our initial equilibrium -- -
4:00 - 4:02again -- exactly as we had before.
-
4:02 - 4:04Now, what does
the redemption program do? -
4:04 - 4:07It increases the demand for slaves.
-
4:07 - 4:10At the new higher demand --
okay, we’re at point B -- -
4:10 - 4:12is our new equilibrium.
-
4:12 - 4:13At point B,
-
4:14 - 4:18notice that the price
of slaves is $30 per slave. -
4:18 - 4:20Not $50 per slave --
-
4:20 - 4:23the price has not gone
up as much as it did before. -
4:23 - 4:24Why not?
-
4:24 - 4:27Well, the price hasn't gone
up as much as it did before -
4:27 - 4:33because now the higher price
induces a greater quantity supplied. -
4:33 - 4:36So now,
what the redeemers have done -
4:36 - 4:39by increasing
the demand for slaves, -
4:39 - 4:43they've increased
the incentive of the slave traders -
4:43 - 4:46to go out and capture more slaves.
-
4:46 - 4:47And indeed, before,
-
4:47 - 4:50the slave traders were capturing
1,000 people per period -- -
4:51 - 4:55now they're capturing
2,200 people per period. -
4:55 - 4:57So there's been
an increase of people -
4:57 - 5:00who are enslaved --
who are put into slavery -- of 1,200. -
5:02 - 5:06The program still works
in the following sense. -
5:06 - 5:08The quantity of slaves
-
5:08 - 5:12demanded by the potential
slave owners does fall, -
5:12 - 5:13not as much as before
-
5:13 - 5:15because the price
isn't driven up as high. -
5:15 - 5:19But the price rises from $15 to $30
-
5:19 - 5:22and that reduces
the quantity of slaves -
5:22 - 5:26demanded by the potential
slave owners to 600. -
5:26 - 5:28So the program
is still successful -
5:28 - 5:32in the sense
that before the program begins, -
5:32 - 5:351,000 people are held in captivity.
-
5:35 - 5:39After the program,
only 600 people are held in captivity, -
5:39 - 5:41so 400 people are freed.
-
5:42 - 5:45However, those 400 net freed
-
5:45 - 5:47come at a high price
-
5:47 - 5:49because now...
-
5:51 - 5:53...1,200 additional people
-
5:53 - 5:57are put into slavery --
at least, for some period of time. -
5:57 - 5:59A bunch of them
are then bought up -
5:59 - 6:02but 1,200 of the 1,600 people
-
6:02 - 6:05who are redeemed
would not have been slaves -
6:05 - 6:08had it not been
for the redemption program. -
6:08 - 6:10So the redemption program ends up
-
6:10 - 6:13in a sense, freeing more people --
-
6:13 - 6:17the number of people
freed on the books is 1,600. -
6:18 - 6:20But 1,200 of those
-
6:21 - 6:23wouldn't have been slaves
-
6:23 - 6:26had it not been
for the redemption program itself -
6:26 - 6:29driving up the price of slaves
-
6:29 - 6:31and the incentive
to capture more slaves. -
6:31 - 6:35So, on net, only 400 people
are actually freed. -
6:35 - 6:38So the program is less successful
-
6:38 - 6:42when the supply curve
is more elastic, -
6:42 - 6:43really, for two reasons.
-
6:43 - 6:45First,
-
6:45 - 6:49the number of people
who are freed on net goes down -- -
6:49 - 6:53we don't get as big a drop
in the quantity of slaves demanded -
6:53 - 6:55because the price
doesn't go up as much. -
6:56 - 6:57The second reason, however,
-
6:57 - 7:00is that in order
to get that net freed, -
7:00 - 7:03we've actually created more slaves,
-
7:03 - 7:06we've actually created
more people who are captured. -
7:06 - 7:08So, at the end of the day,
-
7:08 - 7:10400 people are still freed.
-
7:11 - 7:15On net, fewer people end up
being slaves at the end of the day, -
7:15 - 7:19but to get there,
at the beginning of the day, -
7:19 - 7:22we've got a lot more
people who are enslaved -- -
7:22 - 7:24who were taken
by the slave traders. -
7:25 - 7:28So, this makes it very difficult.
-
7:28 - 7:30The more elastic
the supply curve is, -
7:30 - 7:32the less successful
the program can be -
7:32 - 7:37and the more of these terrible,
terrible trade-offs that there are. -
7:37 - 7:40And if we remember
some of the facts about elasticity -- -
7:40 - 7:41in particular, remember...
-
7:42 - 7:45supply curves get more
elastic in the long run -- -
7:45 - 7:49well that's exactly what we saw
in the case in the Sudan. -
7:49 - 7:50At the beginning,
-
7:50 - 7:54the redemption program
increased the price of slaves a lot, -
7:55 - 7:59but as the supply curve
became more elastic over time, -
7:59 - 8:02the price of slaves began
to fall back down again -- -
8:02 - 8:04it was not increased by as much.
-
8:05 - 8:08And thus, this redemption program
-
8:08 - 8:12became less successful over time.
-
8:12 - 8:14So, this is a very tricky issue.
-
8:14 - 8:16It's a very controversial issue.
-
8:16 - 8:19Did the groups like Christian
Solidarity International -- -
8:19 - 8:21were they on net helpful?
-
8:21 - 8:23There are these terrible trade-offs.
-
8:23 - 8:26Economics can't answer this question,
-
8:26 - 8:31but it can at least point
to the supply response -
8:31 - 8:33and what that means in moral terms.
-
8:34 - 8:36Let's look at another application.
-
8:37 - 8:39Let's look at another
important question -
8:39 - 8:41which we can analyze
using demand and supply. -
8:41 - 8:44What is the effect of gun buybacks?
-
8:44 - 8:46Now these buybacks are often
sponsored by local governments, -
8:46 - 8:49the local police,
the local mayor and so forth. -
8:49 - 8:55In this buyback --
which was held in Oakland -- -
8:55 - 8:57the officials offered $250 cash
-
8:57 - 9:00for each working gun,
no questions asked. -
9:00 - 9:05They then collected the guns
and they melted them down. -
9:05 - 9:07The idea was to get
guns off the street. -
9:07 - 9:08They ended up collecting
about 500 guns in this buyback. -
9:08 - 9:10These buybacks are often held.
-
9:10 - 9:11There's been one
in Washington, D.C. -
9:11 - 9:14and Rochester, New York,
and throughout the United States. -
9:14 - 9:19They're fairly common
again at the local level. -
9:19 - 9:24The question is:
can these buybacks be effective? -
9:24 - 9:26And to answer that we need
to make some assumptions -
9:26 - 9:29or we need to know something
about demand and supply. -
9:29 - 9:33In particular,
what assumptions would make sense -
9:33 - 9:36about the elasticity of supply?
-
9:36 - 9:38Is the supply curve of guns
to a city like Washington, D.C. -
9:38 - 9:39or Oakland, California --
-
9:39 - 9:41is that supply curve going
to be inelastic or elastic? -
9:41 - 9:49Bear in mind what that means.
-
9:49 - 9:54So we're looking at the elasticity
of supply of guns in a city -
9:54 - 9:57like Washington, D.C. or a town.
-
9:57 - 10:02Also bear in mind
that in the United States -
10:04 - 10:05as a whole -- there are
hundreds of millions of guns -- -
10:05 - 10:06and that guns continue
to be produced, manufactured, -
10:06 - 10:08bought and sold every day.
-
10:08 - 10:11So what assumptions
-
10:11 - 10:12would you make
about the local supply curve -
10:12 - 10:14of guns in a city
like Washington, D.C.? -
10:14 - 10:18Think about that.
-
10:18 - 10:21I'll give you an answer
on the next slide. -
10:21 - 10:24The supply of guns
-
10:24 - 10:27to a local region
is going to be very elastic. -
10:27 - 10:34Remember our earlier example
of suppose that we have an increase -
10:35 - 10:36in demand for gasoline
in Washington, D.C. -- -
10:36 - 10:39is that going to increase the price
of gasoline in Washington, D.C.? -
10:39 - 10:43The answer is no --
-
10:43 - 10:44because just a tiny
increase in price -
10:44 - 10:46and lots of gasoline
will come in from Virginia, -
10:46 - 10:48from Maryland,
from other states in the country. -
10:50 - 10:57Remember, the more local the supply,
the more elastic the supply curve. -
10:57 - 10:59So an increase in the demand
for gasoline in Washington, D.C. -- -
10:59 - 11:02that's not going to increase
the world price of gasoline. -
11:02 - 11:07And it's not even going to increase
-
11:07 - 11:10the price of gasoline
in Washington, D.C., -
11:10 - 11:13because if it did people
-
11:14 - 11:15would start to sell gas
in Washington, D.C. -
11:15 - 11:17instead of next door,
in Virginia or Maryland. -
11:17 - 11:18So the price has got
to be about the same -
11:18 - 11:21throughout the United States.
-
11:21 - 11:24The same thing is true for guns.
-
11:24 - 11:25The supply of guns
to a local region -
11:25 - 11:27like Oakland or Washington, D.C.
is going to be very elastic. -
11:27 - 11:31That has surprising facts.
-
11:31 - 11:34It means that local buybacks
-
11:34 - 11:37won't affect the number
-
11:37 - 11:40of guns on the street
nor even their price. -
11:40 - 11:48Let's take a look
at the diagram. -
11:48 - 11:50Here is our demand curve for guns.
-
11:50 - 11:51Here's our supply curve,
-
11:51 - 11:53which is drawn very elastic
because it's a local market. -
11:53 - 11:54The initial equilibrium is at point A
-
11:54 - 11:57at a certain price of guns
and a certain quantity of guns -
11:57 - 12:00traded each period.
-
12:00 - 12:02What the buyback
does is it increases -
12:02 - 12:05the demand for guns,
-
12:05 - 12:08shifting the equilibrium to point B.
-
12:08 - 12:11So the buyback,
they end up buying a lot of guns, -
12:11 - 12:12but all of the guns
they end up buying -
12:12 - 12:14come from the increase
in the quantity supplied. -
12:14 - 12:20Notice that the buyback
doesn't push the price of guns up. -
12:20 - 12:22Because it doesn't push
the price of guns up, -
12:22 - 12:25no one stops buying a gun.
-
12:25 - 12:31Remember, a buyback is going
-
12:31 - 12:32to be effective only
if it makes guns more expensive, -
12:32 - 12:34only if it reduces
the quantity demands of guns. -
12:34 - 12:39Since all of the increase in supply
-
12:45 - 12:48is being generated
by the buyback itself, -
12:50 - 12:51the buyback doesn't increase
the price of guns in Washington, D.C., -
12:51 - 12:54therefore it doesn't reduce
-
12:54 - 12:55the quantity demands
of guns in Washington, D.C., -
12:55 - 12:57therefore no effect
on the number of guns held. -
12:57 - 12:59Now in particular,
what's going to happen -
13:00 - 13:01is that if the mayor
offers $250 for a gun, -
13:01 - 13:03people are going
to go into their closet, -
13:03 - 13:04they're going to find
an old low-quality gun -- -
13:04 - 13:06a gun they don't really want.
-
13:06 - 13:07They're going to turn
that in and maybe a few weeks -
13:07 - 13:08or a few months later,
they're going to buy a new gun. -
13:08 - 13:13Think about it this way.
-
13:13 - 13:18Imagine for whatever odd reason
-
13:20 - 13:22that the government
in Washington, D.C. -
13:22 - 13:23wanted to reduce the number
of people wearing sneakers -
13:23 - 13:25so they offered
a sneaker buyback. -
13:25 - 13:31For $50, they would buy any pair
of sneakers -- no questions asked. -
13:31 - 13:32Well, of course people
are going to go into their closet, -
13:32 - 13:33they're going to find
old pairs of sneakers -
13:33 - 13:34they don't really want anymore
and they're going to turn those in. -
13:34 - 13:35They're going to sell
-
13:35 - 13:37they're going to sell
those sneakers to the government. -
13:37 - 13:42But is anyone in Washington, D.C.
going to end up in the long run -
13:44 - 13:47going shoeless --
even going sneaker-less? No. -
13:48 - 13:50They may turn their sneakers in,
-
13:50 - 13:51but a few weeks
a few months later, -
13:51 - 13:53they're going to be buying
a new pair of sneakers. -
13:57 - 13:59We haven't changed
the price of sneakers, -
13:59 - 14:02therefore we haven't changed
the quantity demanded of sneakers, -
14:02 - 14:05therefore we're going
to stay at the equilibrium. -
14:05 - 14:08Once the buyback is over,
-
14:08 - 14:11we're going to be
at the same equilibrium at point A. -
14:11 - 14:16So local gun buybacks don't work.
-
14:16 - 14:19They're really --
in my view -- a waste of time. -
14:19 - 14:20This doesn't mean
that we can't do anything. -
14:20 - 14:23We may want to put
more police on the street, -
14:23 - 14:24we may want
to fight crime in other ways, -
14:24 - 14:27but a local gun buyback
isn't going to work. -
14:27 - 14:31Another point, a few countries,
-
14:31 - 14:34such as Australia,
that had required buybacks, -
14:34 - 14:36mandatory buybacks,
-
14:36 - 14:39where they ban guns
and then, buy them back. -
14:39 - 14:41Well, since that's, A Mandatory,
and B for the country as a whole, -
14:41 - 14:44that might get guns off the street,
-
14:44 - 14:51but here we're talking
about a local buyback. -
14:52 - 14:54And because
of the elasticity of supply, -
14:54 - 14:55it's not going to affect
-
14:55 - 14:57the number of guns
on the local streets -
14:57 - 15:00nor even their price
-
15:00 - 15:03and thus it's going to be,
in my view, completely ineffective. -
15:03 - 15:08It's really quite amazing
how a little bit of economics -
15:08 - 15:12can go a long way
-
15:12 - 15:15to understanding
and improving public policy. -
15:15 - 15:19Hopefully you see the argument
-
15:20 - 15:21about the elasticity
of supply of guns -
15:21 - 15:22and yet we see these policies
being passed all the time, -
15:22 - 15:24these ineffective policies
are actually put into place. -
15:24 - 15:25A little bit of economics
-
15:25 - 15:26goes a long way
to improving public policy, -
15:26 - 15:28if only we can get the message out.
-
15:28 - 15:34Okay, thanks very much.
See you next chapter. -
15:36 - 15:41- [Narrator] If you want to test
yourself, click “Practice Questions.” -
15:41 - 15:44Or, if you're ready to move on,
just click “Next Video.” -
15:44 - 15:46♪ (music) ♪
- Title:
- Applications Using Elasticity
- Description:
-
In this video, we take a look at real-world applications of elasticity, using the examples of slave redemption in Sudan and and the effects of gun buyback programs in the U.S.
Microeconomics Course: http://mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics
Ask a question about the video: http://mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics/elasticity-examples-applications#QandA
Next video: http://mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics/taxes-subsidies-definition-tax-wedge
- Video Language:
- English
- Team:
- Marginal Revolution University
- Project:
- Micro
- Duration:
- 15:49
James Graciano edited English subtitles for Applications Using Elasticity | ||
James Graciano edited English subtitles for Applications Using Elasticity | ||
James Graciano edited English subtitles for Applications Using Elasticity | ||
James Graciano edited English subtitles for Applications Using Elasticity | ||
James Graciano edited English subtitles for Applications Using Elasticity | ||
James Graciano edited English subtitles for Applications Using Elasticity | ||
James Graciano edited English subtitles for Applications Using Elasticity | ||
James Graciano edited English subtitles for Applications Using Elasticity |