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Reasonable Doubt Extra: Does Religion Make Us Better People?

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    Welcome to Reasonable Doubts,
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    your skeptical guide to religion.
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    (Music)
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    You're listening to Reasonable Doubts,
    the radio show and podcast for those who
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    won't just take things on faith.
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    I'm Jamie Beahan
    and for this special episode
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    of Reasonable Doubts, we're featuring a
    lecture I gave in February
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    to the Grand Traverse humanists in
    Traverse City, Michigan.
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    The lecture was entitled;
    “Does religion make us better?",
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    a critical review of the religious
    pro-sociality hypothesis.
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    Longtime listeners will no doubt
    recognize many of the studies
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    talked about in this lecture.
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    A previous RD-extra and our episode “The Skeptics Toolkit to Psychology of Religion”
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    discussed these findings.
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    But this lecture is a bit different,
    mostly in the trivial
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    and, I'm sure, disappointing fact that I
    am presenting the findings rather than
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    our resident doctor professor Luke Galen.
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    But I think this lecture has some merit
    in that it finally collects a wide range
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    of studies, discussed over several years
    on the show, into one convenient place
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    hopefully making it easier for fans of
    the show to review the information
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    or share with a friend and please do
    share. This is important research and I
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    know doctor Galen would agree with me
    in thinking that it hasn't gotten as
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    much attention as it deserves.
    So you'd be doing us
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    and the cause of skepticism
    a great favor by sharing this lecture
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    on whatever blogs or social media you
    frequent and never underestimate
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    the power of good old
    word-of-mouth sharing either.
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    And please visit doubtcast.org to share
    any comments or questions or feedback
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    you may have about the episode.
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    So be sure to tune in next week for
    the Doubtcasters review
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    of the New Christian propaganda film
    “God's not dead”.
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    Should be a good one. Until then, take
    care and keep doubting.
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    (Music)
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    (Applause)
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    Thank you for coming and thank
    you for the privilege of
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    allowing me to speak to your group. My
    name is Jeremy Beahan.
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    I teach World Religions and Introduction
    to Philosophy along with a handful of
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    other subjects
    at Kendall College of Art and Design.
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    I'm also the producer and cohost
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    of the Reasonable Doubt Podcast which
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    at its peak was the top atheist podcast
    on iTunes for several years,
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    won the People's Choice
    podcasting award
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    for best religious inspirational podcast
    which was - (Laughing) - different.
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    People look at me funny
    when I mention that.
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    I'm speaking tonight on the issue of
    “Does religion make people better?”
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    and we're approaching
    this not so much from a philosophical
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    perspective, as you usually
    hear this question grapple with,
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    but we're approaching this
    from an empirical standpoint.
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    What can science actually tell us
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    about how religion affects morality.
    The subtitle here's a skeptical review
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    of the religious pro-sociality hypothesis.
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    So, that might take some explanation.
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    You might guess from that subtitle that
    this is going to be a bit have been
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    informationally dense talk tonight.
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    But I don't have to tell you
    that in our culture
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    there's an overwhelming assumption
    among the general public
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    that being religious is necessary
    to be a happy and ethical person.
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    We have plenty of preachers
    and pundits and ordinary people
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    reminding us daily that without God
    society will quickly de-evolve
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    into wickedness and anarchy.
    What you may not be familiar with
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    as much however is the growing body
    of social psychology research
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    that at first glance actually
    seems to support this notion.
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    The more technical term for the
    hypothesis that religion makes us good
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    is known as the religious
    pro-sociality hypothesis.
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    My task tonight is to present you with
    an overview of this research
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    and to acquit you with the tools
    necessary to think critically about it.
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    Because as we're about to see the
    religious pro-sociality hypothesis
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    really does indeed
    have some support.
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    But when we look at the evidence
    more closely, we're going to
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    discover little devils
    within the details.
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    But first I have to
    give you a quick disclaimer:
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    I don't get any credit or blame
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    for what I'm about to say this evening.
    This is not my research
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    that I'm reporting on, this is actually
    doctor Luke Galen's research.
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    He is a professor of psychology of religion
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    at Grand Valley State University and
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    almost all what I'm going to be drawing
    from tonight comes from his paper
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    in the Psychological Bulletin of
    the American Psychological Association
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    called: “Does religious belief promote
    pro-sociality, a critical examination”
    .
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    How did I get involved in this topic?
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    He put me in charge of
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    writing up a summary of his research,
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    kind of distilling pages
    upon pages and pages of review
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    into something coherent
    that the average consumer
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    could actually understand.
    So that was my task writing up
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    his review and free inquiry,
    since Luke Galen
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    doesn't like their leave the house
    too often or interact
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    with ordinary human beings.
    (Laughing)
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    He kind of appointed me
    to be his spokesman.
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    He jokingly refers to me
    as Galen's Bulldog.
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    I guess I'm Thomas Henry Huxley
    to his Darwin.
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    So I've been glad to have
    the opportunity to do interviews
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    and talk to groups like this
    about this research because I think it
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    needs to get out there.
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    All right,
    before we go any further
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    let us define
    what we mean by pro-sociality.
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    I hate that word already.
    I am barely into this lecture
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    and tired of saying it,
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    but the term pro-social refers
    to any kind of positive social behavior
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    and this runs the gamut from generosity
    in the form a charitable giving
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    or time spent volunteering to personal
    qualities perhaps
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    such as positive personality traits:
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    being helpful, being honest and there's
    actually an impressive array of
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    scientific studies that support this
    hypothesis, that try to show
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    that the religious exhibit greater
    pro-sociality than the non-religious.
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    In effect this has even become the subject
    of a number a popular books.
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    One you may have heard of
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    is “A Friendly Letter to Skeptics
    and Atheists”
    by David Myers
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    or more recently “American Grace, How
    Religion Divides and Unites Us”
    .
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    So the general public is being told
    that the data are in
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    and religion makes you happy, happier,
    healthier and more helpful.
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    That this is a conclusion that is not
    just philosophy or religion. It's science.
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    In fact even some atheists
    are getting in on this.
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    A seemingly overwhelming case
    for the pro-social effects
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    of religion has been enough to
    convince people here like Jessie Bering,
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    an atheist psychologist and actually a
    pretty good author.
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    Enough to convince him that religion
    is beneficial, at least for others.
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    In a recent Slate article
    entitled *“Don't trust the godless”(,
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    Jesse Bering confessed; "Even as an
    atheist, I have more confidence
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    in religious people
    and now science is backing me up.”
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    A fuller quote is up here; "This is a
    difficult confession to make
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    because on the surface I'm sure
    it sounds wildly, wildly hypocritical.
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    Still here it goes; "I trust religious people
    more than I trust atheists."
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    Trustworthiness is a different thing
    altogether from intellect
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    and I suppose
    I'm the ever so social pragmatist
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    in my dealings with other people."
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    So pretty serious claim,
    if you get even atheist psychologists
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    saying; "Don't trust the godless".
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    Before we go any further though
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    we're going to have to look at
    what are the kind of methods
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    that are used in pro-sociality research.
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    We're going to see a variety of different
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    experimental setups and methods
    for conducting this kind of research.
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    This would include self-reports,
    what people say about themselves and
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    third-party ratings of individuals,
    laboratory tests of behavior,
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    lab studies of economic games
    – we’ll talk about those more later -
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    priming studies, where people are presented
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    with the religious concept subconsciously
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    - usually where they will not realize
    they've been primed by the concept
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    and then we'll see what happens -
    and also spirituality scales.
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    Scales are meant to design, to detect
    the level of one's spirituality
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    and then we compare their behaviors on that.
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    What I'm going to try to highlight
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    is some other pitfalls
    that researchers face
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    in each of these types
    of research methods.
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    Let's start with the top report data;
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    "Will being religious
    make you a better person?"
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    Well, the fateful
    certainly seem to think so.
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    When asked to give an assessment of
    their own character and values,
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    religious individuals
    tend to report being...
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    having a more grateful disposition;
    they rate themselves as more helpful;
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    they claim to value forgiveness
    more highly than the non-religious;
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    And many studies actually take
    these self-reports at face value.
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    The fact that believers
    think they're more moral
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    is actually taken as evidence
    that they do exhibit
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    these pro-social traits. Big question is:
    "Should we take believers at their word?
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    No. Not if their evaluations
    are based on a self-serving bias
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    rather than a realistic assessment
    of their own character.
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    Self-report data tend to be
    unreliable by its very nature.
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    People are prone to forming positive
    illusions about themselves. We all do it.
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    We tend to inflate our responses on
    questionnaires as a result

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    to make ourselves look better.
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    Sometimes this is just concern
    over our own personal self-image.
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    Social psychologists call this
    self-enhancement.
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    Or sometimes we want to make
    a good impression with others
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    or good impression for our group in particular.
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    This is sometimes referred
    to as impression management.
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    While this is a widespread tendency
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    and it's by no means restricted
    just to the religious.
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    What's interesting is, this tendency
    might be more pronounced
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    in those who have
    a strong level of religious belief.
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    Highly religious people tend to view
    themselves as better than others, generally.
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    Even better than
    other religious individuals.
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    And they also evaluate themselves more
    highly than non-religious individuals
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    on attributes that have absolutely
    nothing to do with religion.
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    So for example they might
    score themselves higher
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    on measures of intelligence
    or being a good worker.
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    Things that do not seem immediately
    related to their religious morality.
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    Those high in intrinsic religiosity
    actually have been shown to have
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    a higher degree of self-enhancement
    and impression management.
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    Just one example: if you prime a
    Christian with self-esteem primes,
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    you'll see them actually rating themselves
    as living up to Christian principles
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    more often than their fellow believers.
    If however you do the reverse
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    and you offer up an assessment that
    questions their high self-esteem
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    or make them write about something
    that they don't like about themselves,
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    those who are high
    in intrinsic religiosity
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    - that means the level of belief -
    they are more likely
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    to resort to self-deception
    as a compensating strategy.
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    Also highly religious people
    are particularly
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    concerned with presenting themselves
    as moral persons
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    and particularly threatened
    when that self-image is challenged.
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    So, I guess the big question is;
    "Why do researchers even rely
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    on these self-reports some of the time?"
    Well, because at least in some cases
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    these positive self-assessments are actually corroborated by others:
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    their family, their colleagues, their peers.
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    So, third-party evaluators
    rate religious individuals
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    as being nicer, more cooperative
    and highly altruistic
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    and empathetic as well.
    To some this is proof
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    that the self-reports are not
    self-delusion, they're not moral hypocrisy.
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    They are correct assessments
    of their character.
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    But I think we can still
    be a little skeptical here.
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    When we're talking
    about a predominantly religious society,
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    where about 80 to 95%
    of people are religious
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    and around 75% are at least
    nominally Christian,
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    it's a good bet that a significant
    proportion of those subjects, families
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    and peers are also religious,
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    meaning there's a possibility
    of in-group bias at work here.
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    And actually there is some evidence
    to support that.
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    In-group favoritism is a well-studied
    phenomenon in social psychology.
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    Again, this is not just religious
    people here, this is all of us.
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    It is natural for individuals to
    derive self-esteem from the groups
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    they’re associated with.
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    It's natural to provide
    a positive image to the public
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    for those who share their identity.
    So, consistent with the predictions
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    of social identity theory,
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    we see believers tend to show more
    favoritism towards other individuals
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    and speak more poorly of non-religious
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    and this even includes
    those from different religious groups.
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    Often the favoritism
    - and here's the key point here -
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    often the favoritism is extended
    to other religious individuals,
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    regardless of whether or not
    they behaved well or poorly,
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    are still be reviewed more favorably,
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    even when they've been up to no good.
    I'll give you an example here
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    of when sometimes believers will rate
    religious individuals more highly
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    than non-religious individuals, even when
    they exhibit the exact same behaviors.
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    I was a part of this study
    which was published in 2011.
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    I was a participant and so in front of a
    camera I wore two different T-shirts,
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    I wore three actually:
    just a plain white T-shirt
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    then in the other condition
    I wore a Jesus fish T-shirt
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    and then third condition
    I wore a Darwin fish T-shirt.
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    And then I read
    the exact same script each time
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    which was I was presenting myself
    as a college student
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    who was using my spring break to help
    in disaster relief organization
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    and talking
    about my positive experiences.
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    No mention of religion or anything else.
    What we found in this study
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    was that people rated me
    as more likable,
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    more intelligent, more trustworthy
    and more kind,
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    and more moral overall
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    when I was wearing the Jesus fish.
    So exact same behaviors but a subtle cue
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    that I might be religious makes
    people evaluate my behavior better.
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    Most studies that rely on peer-rated
    ratings do not adequately control
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    for this tendency for in-group bias
    and that's the problem.
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    Ideally researchers would ensure
    that participants are completely unaware
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    of the religious identity
    of those they're rating.
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    Then we have more reason to trust
    their evaluations as accurate,
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    but this sadly is rarely the case.
    However in studies
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    that do, and most studies
    where the raters
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    are actually aware of their targets
    religious identities
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    a clear bias emerges
    and that suggests
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    an in-group bias
    when the people know they're religious,
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    they rate them more positively.
    There is an interesting twist to all of this:
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    non-religious individuals do not appear
    to rate their fellow non-believers
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    as any more pro-social than they do the
    religious. For some reason this
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    in-group bias doesn't seem to be affecting
    the non-religious to the same degree.
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    Now should the fact
    that non-religious people also rate
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    the religious highly, indicate that
    these judgments are based on a clear
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    added assessment of their character?
    Are atheists really going to have
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    a pro-religious bias? Actually it's quite
    possible that they would
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    if their judgments have been swayed
    by a strong religious,
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    pro-religious cultural stereotype.
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    And again, there is evidence to suggest
    that's the case.
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    Here's more evidence
    for a pro-religious stereotype,
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    that we can find by looking at
    similar studies that are conducted
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    in different cultures than our own.
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    For example some report that happiness,
    life satisfaction
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    and personality measures
    like agreeableness
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    are more closely associated
    with religion in the United States
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    than in the United Kingdom or Northern
    Europe where religion is less dominant.
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    To give you one specific example:
    this particular study here
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    asks people to rate their impressions
    of people just from looking at photographs
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    of faces and smiling faces were judged
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    to be more religious
    than non smiling faces.
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    That was in the United States.
    In the United Kingdom
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    the exact opposite was true and
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    tends to be a general relationship
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    between religion and self-control,
    mental well-being,
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    psychological adjustment,
    social support.
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    In general in societies where the
    non-religious are the majority
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    the non-religious are rated more favorably
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    on all those particular measures.
    So, again evidence that there
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    is a cultural bias at work here.
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    I think by now it should be clear that
    self-report data doesn't provide
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    reliable evidence for the religious
    pro-social reality hypothesis.
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    Self-evaluations on religious subjects
    are vulnerable to self-enhancement,
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    impression management, distortions and
    others and they are contaminated
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    quite possibly by a widely-held
    pro-religious cultural stereotype.
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    It might be better
    instead of trusting self-reports
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    to look at experimentally
    controlled measures of behavior
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    or, if you prefer the way Jesus might say
    it, we should judge believers
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    by their fruit not by their words.
    Let's look at
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    what their actual deeds tell us.
    Well, for one religious individuals
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    claim to value forgiveness
    more than others
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    but actually any effect of their religiosity
    on actual forgiveness
  • 17:57 - 18:02
    has been found to be negligible.
    This is just one study
  • 18:02 - 18:06
    that shows that the comparison
    of self-reports with controlled experiments
  • 18:06 - 18:09
    on behavior reveal how often believers
  • 18:09 - 18:12
    fail to live up to their high opinion
    of themselves.
  • 18:12 - 18:17
    Those in high in intrinsic religiosity again
    - this is a measure of belief -
  • 18:17 - 18:20
    reported a more grateful disposition
    but don't do not perform
  • 18:20 - 18:22
    better than anyone else in studies
  • 18:22 - 18:25
    measuring reciprocal behavioral
    gratitude: "Will they give back?"
  • 18:25 - 18:29
    High intrinsic religiosity doesn't seem
    to reduce aggression
  • 18:29 - 18:33
    here is the scary detail:
    it tends to make people think
  • 18:33 - 18:35
    they're less aggressive
    than they really are.
  • 18:35 - 18:38
    Fundamentalists in particular report
  • 18:38 - 18:41
    higher levels of altruism
    towards everybody
  • 18:41 - 18:45
    but in reality they are
    more willing to help friends
  • 18:45 - 18:48
    or like-minded individuals.
    They're not as likely to help strangers
  • 18:48 - 18:52
    or what is sometimes called
    'value violators',
  • 18:52 - 18:55
    perhaps like a homosexual or
    something like that,
  • 18:55 - 18:59
    that is clearly on the wrong side
    of the divide on some culture war issue.
  • 18:59 - 19:02
    We have to remember again
    that everyone tends
  • 19:02 - 19:05
    to overestimate
    how moral they actually are.
  • 19:05 - 19:10
    So, this is really common to find a gap
    between how individuals predict
  • 19:10 - 19:12
    they'll behave
    and how they actually behave.
  • 19:12 - 19:14
    If we were to take everybody in this
    room we would probably
  • 19:14 - 19:17
    see the exact same phenomena.
  • 19:17 - 19:20
    We are no different.
    It's just that the fact
  • 19:20 - 19:23
    seems to be more pronounced
    in religious populations.
  • 19:23 - 19:28
    As we said before, highly religious do
    show a greater tendency
  • 19:28 - 19:32
    towards self-enhancement
    on questionnaires and this disjunction
  • 19:32 - 19:34
    between self-reported measured behavior
  • 19:34 - 19:38
    is actually wider in the religious
    than in the rest of the population.
  • 19:38 - 19:41
    In fact the greatest gap
    we can see
  • 19:41 - 19:45
    between altruistic beliefs and
    altruistic behaviors
  • 19:45 - 19:48
    is actually found
    in those who rate religion
  • 19:48 - 19:50
    as more important to them personally.
  • 19:50 - 19:54
    What's funny is that sometimes
    the experimental evidence
  • 19:54 - 19:58
    is so contrary
    to our stereotypes about religion
  • 19:58 - 20:01
    that some researchers
    put a spin on this conclusion.
  • 20:01 - 20:06
    What they're publishing
    is showing no positive effect for religion
  • 20:06 - 20:09
    but their abstracts or the way
    they interpret the data
  • 20:09 - 20:13
    speaks in glowing terms. For example
    this particular study here.
  • 20:13 - 20:17
    McCullough & Worthington in 1999 said that
  • 20:17 - 20:21
    "Even if religious people
    are no more facile
  • 20:21 - 20:25
    at forgiving in real life situations
    than are less religious people,
  • 20:25 - 20:30
    they do you desire to be forgiving and
    go on about how great it is that they
  • 20:30 - 20:32
    want to be good forgiving people."
  • 20:32 - 20:36
    I'd like to argue to you that praising
    the leaders for their moral intentions
  • 20:36 - 20:38
    kind of misses the point.
  • 20:38 - 20:41
    It's not that we just desire to be
    better - and that's good -
  • 20:41 - 20:45
    in some cases they already
    think they're superior.
  • 20:45 - 20:49
    And there are major dangers in having an unrealistic assessment
  • 20:49 - 20:51
    of one's own character and limits
  • 20:51 - 20:54
    Let's move on to a different type of study:
  • 20:54 - 20:58
    religious priming studies.
    Although religious individuals do not seem
  • 20:58 - 21:00
    to behave as morally as they report,
  • 21:00 - 21:04
    it would still be very odd.
    I personally would find it strange
  • 21:04 - 21:07
    if religion didn't have some impact
    on moral behavior.
  • 21:07 - 21:11
    After all, scriptures and sermons abound
    with exhortations to love thy neighbor,
  • 21:11 - 21:15
    to do unto others
    as you would have them do onto you
  • 21:15 - 21:18
    and I think frequent exposure
    to these messages
  • 21:18 - 21:20
    would result in pro-social behaviors.
  • 21:20 - 21:24
    So priming studies are a useful way
    of seeving this out.
  • 21:24 - 21:28
    Again participants are primed somehow.
    Maybe they have to unscramble
  • 21:28 - 21:30
    a word bank
    and it has religious words in it.
  • 21:30 - 21:32
    Or perhaps they have to read
  • 21:32 - 21:35
    a portion of Scripture
    and write a response to it.
  • 21:35 - 21:38
    Sometimes it can be really subtle:
    symbols in the room,
  • 21:38 - 21:40
    a crucifix in the room,
  • 21:40 - 21:44
    jewelry or clothing.
    Sometimes it's just the context.
  • 21:44 - 21:48
    Conducting the experiment in a
    church instead of,
  • 21:48 - 21:51
    say, a high school gymnasium
    or something like that.
  • 21:51 - 21:55
    Well the good news of priming studies
    is that this is the best evidence
  • 21:55 - 21:59
    we can find for the religious
    pro-sociality hypothesis.
  • 21:59 - 22:01
    There's a lot of data supporting it.
  • 22:01 - 22:02
    There are good studies
  • 22:02 - 22:05
    showing greater honesty and generosity
  • 22:05 - 22:08
    amongst the religious,
    increased sharing,
  • 22:08 - 22:11
    increased cooperation,
    better self-control in distressing situations
  • 22:11 - 22:16
    and greater resistance to temptation.
  • 22:16 - 22:20
    So why are religious concepts so good at
    priming these kinds of behavior?
  • 22:20 - 22:23
    Several studies cited a possible
    mechanism here.
  • 22:23 - 22:25
    'Supernatural surveillance' they called it.
  • 22:25 - 22:29
    The belief that one's actions
    are constantly and inescapably
  • 22:29 - 22:32
    being observed by a divine being.
  • 22:32 - 22:35
    Thinking that this is a strong
    reminder to us
  • 22:35 - 22:38
    to be aware of our actions
    and perhaps that's why
  • 22:38 - 22:42
    religious concepts prime
    these pro-social behaviors.
  • 22:42 - 22:45
    God might be watching after all.
  • 22:45 - 22:47
    But I wont to share
    some curious details
  • 22:47 - 22:51
    that aren't as often shared
    in these priming studies.
  • 22:51 - 22:54
    Neutral religious works
    like Bible, the Cycle ????
  • 22:54 - 22:58
    or Chapel don't seem to promote
    any helping behavior.
  • 22:58 - 23:01
    It seems to be only positive words
    like heaven, miracle or bless
  • 23:01 - 23:05
    that have that effect on people.
    Even more interesting
  • 23:05 - 23:08
    the positive effects
    don't seem to be dependent
  • 23:08 - 23:12
    on the participants level of religiosity.
    You can be just kind of religious
  • 23:12 - 23:14
    or you could be a hardcore fundamentalist
  • 23:14 - 23:17
    and the priming affects you the same way.
  • 23:17 - 23:22
    Also, non-religious people respond
    positively to religious primes
  • 23:22 - 23:25
    and to the exact same degree
    as their religious counterparts.
  • 23:25 - 23:31
    If you were to look at all those symbols,
    you would act more morally too.
  • 23:31 - 23:34
    Even more interesting:
    priming secular concepts, like civil
  • 23:34 - 23:38
    or court, seem to have
    the same power to promote
  • 23:38 - 23:42
    honesty or lower hypocrisy
    as religious primes do.
  • 23:42 - 23:45
    And religious destructive atheists:
  • 23:45 - 23:48
    the distrust they have for us
    goes down
  • 23:48 - 23:52
    when the religious are primed
    with concepts of secular authority.
  • 23:52 - 23:55
    That's really interesting.
    Why would that possibly be?
  • 23:55 - 24:00
    Well, one idea, not exactly sure,
    but one idea is that the leaders know
  • 24:00 - 24:04
    that atheists do not live their lives
    as if God is watching them.
  • 24:04 - 24:06
    So without the supernatural monitoring
    they may wonder
  • 24:06 - 24:10
    what reason we have
    for behaving well.
  • 24:10 - 24:14
    But this distrust can be ameliorated
    when we are reminded
  • 24:14 - 24:17
    that morality can be
    monitored in different ways.
  • 24:17 - 24:19
    So these kind of pacific primes
    remind everybody;
  • 24:19 - 24:23
    "Oh wait, there is a social order,
    there is something keeping these
  • 24:23 - 24:27
    evil atheists in check." And so their negative impressions go down.
  • 24:27 - 24:31
    Amazingly even the presence of a mirror
  • 24:31 - 24:36
    or just pictures of eyes in the laboratory
    will actually have these same effects
  • 24:36 - 24:41
    which actually really boost
    that notion of supernatural surveillance.
  • 24:41 - 24:46
    Obviously this has implications
    for the religious pro-sociality hypothesis.
  • 24:46 - 24:49
    Religious concepts do not seem
  • 24:49 - 24:54
    to prime pro-social behavior like honesty
    because they're religious.
  • 24:54 - 24:59
    It may be that any concepts that are
    associated with morality in a particular
  • 24:59 - 25:03
    culture trigger greater concern
    for protecting your reputation.
  • 25:03 - 25:06
    Again since there's a widespread
    cultural stereotype
  • 25:06 - 25:08
    that religion is linked to morality here,
  • 25:08 - 25:12
    religious concepts will activate moral
    behavior, but as we pointed out
  • 25:12 - 25:15
    secular primes do just as well.
  • 25:15 - 25:17
    While the positive effects
    of religious priming
  • 25:17 - 25:21
    are the stuff of headlines, what you don't
    usually hear about is the dark side
  • 25:21 - 25:23
    of religious primes.
  • 25:23 - 25:25
    Numerous studies demonstrate
  • 25:25 - 25:26
    that socially undesirable behaviors
  • 25:26 - 25:31
    also manifest when subjects
    are exposed to religious messages.
  • 25:31 - 25:35
    So for example, participants
    who read passages from the Bible
  • 25:35 - 25:39
    depicting God sanctioned violence,
    administer more electrical shocks
  • 25:39 - 25:41
    than the control group
    in studies of aggression.
  • 25:41 - 25:45
    We should note this works
    on non-believers as well.
  • 25:45 - 25:49
    Even a non-believer reading
    those passages from the Bible
  • 25:49 - 25:54
    will also become more vicious
    in their behaviors toward somebody.
  • 25:54 - 25:58
    It's just that the effect seems to
    be more pronounced for believers.
  • 25:58 - 26:01
    Especially disturbing is this subgroup
  • 26:01 - 26:05
    of religious believers
    high in intrinsic religiosity
  • 26:05 - 26:08
    and also high in levels of submissiveness.
  • 26:08 - 26:12
    This group was very disturbing
    because they became the most vengeful
  • 26:12 - 26:16
    after being primed with religious words.
    They really seemed to go off the rails.
  • 26:16 - 26:19
    So I guess what I'm saying is:
    it doesn't affect all people equally.
  • 26:19 - 26:24
    Certain personality characteristics
    come into play here too
  • 26:24 - 26:27
    to either aggravate
    or kind of mute these responses.
  • 26:27 - 26:31
    I'd like to share this study real quick.
    Experiments where people were assigned
  • 26:31 - 26:34
    to read the biblical version
    of the golden rule
  • 26:34 - 26:38
    actually had no effect on diminishing
    Christians’ homophobia.
  • 26:38 - 26:40
    So, negative attitudes
    towards homosexuals
  • 26:40 - 26:42
    were not at all diminished
  • 26:42 - 26:45
    by reading what we think
    is a very positive prime,
  • 26:45 - 26:50
    right, the golden rule. Strangely enough
    reading the Buddhist version
  • 26:50 - 26:54
    of the golden rule actually increased
    their homophobic responses.
  • 26:54 - 26:58
    If they read another religious text
    telling them to be merciful
  • 26:58 - 27:01
    and do onto others as you would have
    them to do want to them,
  • 27:01 - 27:05
    they wanted to do that even less.
    This is perhaps
  • 27:05 - 27:08
    because the moral imperative
  • 27:08 - 27:12
    was coming from this
    distrusted out-group source.
  • 27:12 - 27:16
    Likewise unscrambling words associated
    with Christianity increased
  • 27:16 - 27:18
    racial prejudice
    towards african-americans
  • 27:18 - 27:22
    that was found by Johnson,
    lead author Johnson in 2010.
  • 27:22 - 27:26
    And attitudes toward all out-group
    members became more negative
  • 27:26 - 27:29
    when experiments were conducted
    in a church setting rather than
  • 27:29 - 27:32
    than in a civic context.
  • 27:32 - 27:35
    This is a strange paradox
    we're looking at here.
  • 27:35 - 27:37
    Religious priming seems to increase
  • 27:37 - 27:42
    both pro-social behaviors like honesty and
    sharing, and non pro-social behaviors
  • 27:42 - 27:47
    like aggression and prejudice. This will
    make more sense I think to us when we
  • 27:47 - 27:49
    consider another curious,
  • 27:49 - 27:53
    but consistent finding in this literature
  • 27:53 - 27:56
    that the kindness of religious individuals
    is typically not
  • 27:56 - 27:59
    extended universally to everyone.
  • 27:59 - 28:03
    Instead the primary beneficiaries
    of a religious pro-sociality
  • 28:03 - 28:09
    are usually other believers. This can be
    most clearly seen in economic games.
  • 28:09 - 28:12
    So, to save a little bit of time
    I'm not going to go into how all of
  • 28:12 - 28:18
    these games work, but they basically
    start with people trading or exchanging money.
  • 28:18 - 28:22
    Those games are designed
    to encourage cooperation and trust.
  • 28:22 - 28:26
    So basically
    if the players work together,
  • 28:26 - 28:30
    they will both get further along,
    but one player
  • 28:30 - 28:35
    might have the opportunity to make off
    with more money if they deceive or lie
  • 28:35 - 28:38
    or cheat the other players.
    So this is all trying
  • 28:38 - 28:40
    to assess cooperation, trust,
  • 28:40 - 28:44
    giving, that sort of thing.
    The economic games shown
  • 28:44 - 28:49
    in behavioral economic studies where
    the religiosity of the participants is none.
  • 28:49 - 28:52
    - so we actually know what they are -
    a general trend emerges:
  • 28:52 - 28:56
    religious individuals cooperate more
    and give more money
  • 28:56 - 28:59
    than non-religious participants.
    So they do that overall.
  • 28:59 - 29:03
    They give more and they trust more
    than the non-religious.
  • 29:03 - 29:06
    The pro-sociality hypothesis is true.
  • 29:06 - 29:09
    It's just has that twist:
    they only give it to those
  • 29:09 - 29:11
    who share their religious identity.
  • 29:11 - 29:15
    For example this study, Ahmed, 2009
    found the clergy students
  • 29:15 - 29:19
    exchanged greater money offers
    than non clergy students,
  • 29:19 - 29:24
    but only to those from their own
    religious group.
  • 29:24 - 29:26
    These findings are almost,
    well, they are most likely due
  • 29:26 - 29:30
    to that previous phenomenon
    we mentioned of in-group favoritism.
  • 29:30 - 29:34
    But there also might be something else
    going on here. This might be that
  • 29:34 - 29:36
    pro-religious cultural stereotype
  • 29:36 - 29:39
    happening again, because notice:
    non-religious participants
  • 29:39 - 29:43
    did not show the same in-group favoritism
  • 29:43 - 29:46
    in those economic games.
    They also trusted
  • 29:46 - 29:51
    religious participants more
    than their non-religious peers
  • 29:51 - 29:55
    and allocated more money to them overall,
    even though that money
  • 29:55 - 29:57
    would not be reciprocated.
  • 29:57 - 30:02
    Yeah, it's amazing
    how ingrained that stereotype is.
  • 30:02 - 30:03
    This pattern of preferential treatment
  • 30:03 - 30:06
    is not limited
    to behavioral economic studies.
  • 30:06 - 30:10
    It constitutes a general trend
    across the entire literature.
  • 30:10 - 30:14
    In fact a new word had to be coined
    just to explain it.
  • 30:14 - 30:18
    One researcher who is very popular in
    this by the name of Saroglou
  • 30:18 - 30:22
    coined the term "minimal prosociality",
  • 30:22 - 30:25
    meaning the greater helping on the part of
    the religious that extended to friends
  • 30:25 - 30:28
    an in-group members
    but not too out-group members
  • 30:28 - 30:31
    who threatened religious values.
  • 30:31 - 30:35
    So, I guess the correct way to say it
    or was consistent with most of the evidence
  • 30:35 - 30:36
    in these economic games
  • 30:36 - 30:40
    are that religious people
    are ‘minimally pro-social’.
  • 30:40 - 30:44
    And actually if we take this idea
    of limited pro-sociality seriously
  • 30:44 - 30:47
    it explains a lot of other trends
    that we see in the data.
  • 30:47 - 30:50
    For example across different cultures
    we see that religiosity
  • 30:50 - 30:56
    is weakly but still positively correlated
    with the value of benevolence,
  • 30:56 - 31:01
    charity, helping people out
    and yet at the same time is negatively
  • 31:01 - 31:03
    related with the value of universalism,
  • 31:03 - 31:06
    helping out, you know, your neighbor,
    your stranger,
  • 31:06 - 31:11
    the Good Samaritan, that type of thing.
    Again it seems like a contradiction,
  • 31:11 - 31:14
    but when you take the idea of limited
  • 31:14 - 31:16
    or minimal pro-sociality seriously,
  • 31:16 - 31:20
    it tends to make more sense.
    It's that in-group favoritism again.
  • 31:20 - 31:23
    Also it might explain things
    like why religious primes
  • 31:23 - 31:24
    increase ethnic prejudice
  • 31:24 - 31:27
    and derogation of out-group members,
  • 31:27 - 31:32
    because religious concepts activated
    in-group bias in people's minds.
  • 31:32 - 31:35
    This also plays through
    religious research on giving.
  • 31:35 - 31:38
    This one conclusion
    I'm not as sure about,
  • 31:38 - 31:42
    but it is very clear that religious
    organizations themselves
  • 31:42 - 31:47
    are the largest source of charitable giving.
    Religious people give way more to charity
  • 31:47 - 31:51
    than the non-religious and that finding
    has held up across the board.
  • 31:51 - 31:55
    But as other studies note,
    many of the recipients of these,
  • 31:55 - 31:58
    even ones that are labeled secular,
  • 31:58 - 32:03
    tend to be religious
    or some religious organization.
  • 32:03 - 32:05
    So all this money is exchanging hands
    within the in-group.
  • 32:05 - 32:07
    This would be really
    interesting one to test
  • 32:07 - 32:09
    if we can tease out that in-group favoritism
  • 32:09 - 32:13
    would we still see a charity gap
    between the non-religious
  • 32:13 - 32:17
    and the religious? We might, actually I
    suspect, we probably would
  • 32:17 - 32:21
    and for this reason
    there's another aspect
  • 32:21 - 32:25
    to religious charitable giving,
    and that is generosity
  • 32:25 - 32:29
    measured as a function
    of religious importance
  • 32:29 - 32:33
    was smaller than those measured as a
    variation in religious attendance.
  • 32:33 - 32:37
    That is church attendance
    seems to be the key factor
  • 32:37 - 32:41
    in how much a religious person will give.
  • 32:41 - 32:45
    If you actually
    measure religiosity by belief,
  • 32:45 - 32:49
    how much conviction do you have
    that God exists
  • 32:49 - 32:52
    we'll see that
    that predicts giving to a lesser degree
  • 32:52 - 32:55
    then church attendance.
    I think what's going on here is
  • 32:55 - 32:59
    when you're actually in the building,
    you're given an opportunity
  • 32:59 - 33:02
    to give, right?
    The plate is passed around
  • 33:02 - 33:06
    and there's social pressure for you
    to put something in that plate.
  • 33:06 - 33:09
    I still think the religious should get
    credit for this, but they get credit for
  • 33:09 - 33:13
    building institutions
    that support charitable giving.
  • 33:13 - 33:15
    It may not be the belief,
    the religious belief,
  • 33:15 - 33:17
    that's really motivating this behavior.
  • 33:17 - 33:19
    So I guess that kind of brings up
    an interesting question here.
  • 33:19 - 33:23
    How actually are we measuring religiosity
  • 33:23 - 33:26
    because, as we just saw,
    depending on how we measured it,
  • 33:26 - 33:28
    we might get different effects.
  • 33:28 - 33:32
    Typically the methodology
    that's employed here is to compare
  • 33:32 - 33:36
    a general population of people
    to highly religious people
  • 33:36 - 33:40
    and weekly religious people.
    And then the atheists agnostics
  • 33:40 - 33:44
    or all the nones, we call them,
    those who declare no religious affiliation,
  • 33:44 - 33:46
    are mixed into that sample as well.
  • 33:46 - 33:49
    There are different ways
    again of measuring
  • 33:49 - 33:51
    intrinsically religiosity as I
    mentioned is a measure
  • 33:51 - 33:54
    of metaphysical belief or commitment.
  • 33:54 - 33:59
    Extrinsic religiosity, as I call it,
    is often a measure of behavior,
  • 33:59 - 34:02
    how often do you pray,
    engage in rituals.
  • 34:02 - 34:05
    That sometimes includes another way
    that is measured
  • 34:05 - 34:09
    is measuring religiosity purely
    through church attendance alone.
  • 34:09 - 34:13
    So whenever you see a study
    that says religious people are better
  • 34:13 - 34:17
    at XYZ, the next question you should ask is;
  • 34:17 - 34:20
    "Better compared to whom?"
    And the reason is:
  • 34:20 - 34:24
    how one measures religiosity
    has a major impact on your findings.
  • 34:24 - 34:27
    For example, frequent church attendance
    has been linked
  • 34:27 - 34:31
    to modestly lower rates of mental
    illness such as depression,
  • 34:31 - 34:35
    but the effect is negligible
    when you measure
  • 34:35 - 34:37
    religiosity as strength of belief.
  • 34:37 - 34:40
    Again, people have better mental health
    because they're
  • 34:40 - 34:44
    in a congregation of people, they have a
    support social support network,
  • 34:44 - 34:49
    like-minded people to talk to. The belief
    doesn't seem to be as important.
  • 34:49 - 34:52
    Studies that control
    for purely social factors
  • 34:52 - 34:54
    find a greatly diminished
    or non-existent effect
  • 34:54 - 34:57
    of religious beliefs
    on pro-social measures.
  • 34:57 - 34:59
    So you can see how we measure religion
  • 34:59 - 35:04
    and who we compare our groups to
    is very important in this debate.
  • 35:04 - 35:06
    Most frequently
    the strongest pro-social effects
  • 35:06 - 35:08
    are associated with church attendance
  • 35:08 - 35:12
    and social contacts
    rather than just metaphysical belief.
  • 35:12 - 35:16
    So it appears that group affiliation
    drives many of these behaviors.
  • 35:16 - 35:20
    Could a committed secular group
    - like this one right here -
  • 35:20 - 35:24
    have effect on its membership
    similar to that of a church?
  • 35:24 - 35:28
    In this book that I mentioned earlier -
    unfortunately it's buried on page 472 -
  • 35:28 - 35:33
    you have to get
    through all the good stuff
  • 35:33 - 35:36
    to finally see this qualification,
  • 35:36 - 35:40
    but Robert Putnam mentions
    "even an atheist
  • 35:40 - 35:43
    who happens to become
    involved in the social life
  • 35:43 - 35:48
    of a congregation is much more likely
    to volunteer at a soup kitchen
  • 35:48 - 35:50
    then the most fervent believer who prays alone."
  • 35:50 - 35:54
    And then it goes on to say
    - or slightly before that on page 465 -
  • 35:54 - 35:59
    he says: "Religious belief turns out to be
    utterly irrelevant to explaining the religious
  • 35:59 - 36:04
    as in good neighbourliness."
    That should've been on page 1.
  • 36:04 - 36:10
    But both reviewers in that book
    didn't get that far.
  • 36:10 - 36:14
    You can guess how it was depicted
    in the popular press.
  • 36:14 - 36:18
    In fact that's a major problem.
    The problem with most studies is
  • 36:18 - 36:22
    that they are lumping all nonbelievers
    together, without considering how
  • 36:22 - 36:24
    confident they are in their non-belief,
  • 36:24 - 36:27
    whether or not they attend groups
    like you do right here,
  • 36:27 - 36:29
    how involved they are
    with the community overall.
  • 36:29 - 36:33
    They're just all dumped
    into one pool: the non-religious.
  • 36:33 - 36:37
    And then they're compared with weekly
    religious and highly religious,
  • 36:37 - 36:41
    typically highly religious people
    who are in a church context.
  • 36:41 - 36:45
    When you do that, you do get
    what's called a linear effect.
  • 36:45 - 36:50
    If pro-social, being happy, healthy
    and more helpful is all on this axis,
  • 36:50 - 36:54
    and religiosity on this one,
    we would see as religiosity rises
  • 36:54 - 36:57
    the more religious you get,
    the more happy, helpful
  • 36:57 - 37:00
    and honest you are as an individual.
  • 37:00 - 37:03
    But what we're kind of doing is
    we're cutting off half of our sample.
  • 37:03 - 37:07
    The few studies that compare
    highly religious people
  • 37:07 - 37:10
    with the confidently non-religious
    actually show
  • 37:10 - 37:12
    what's called a curvilinear effect
  • 37:12 - 37:15
    between religiosity and pro-sociality.
  • 37:15 - 37:19
    To explain what's going on
    with this curvilinear effect,
  • 37:19 - 37:24
    - I should have had noticed, but I didn't -
  • 37:24 - 37:27
    Essentially what we do, what we've
    done is we've expanded our sample.
  • 37:27 - 37:32
    So before the atheists and agnostics and
    humanists were getting lost in this side of
  • 37:32 - 37:35
    the curve now we brought it out
  • 37:35 - 37:39
    and we actually see that it's the
    less confident, the weekly religious,
  • 37:39 - 37:40
    the weekly secular in the middle
  • 37:40 - 37:45
    that tend to have poor
    ratings on pro-social measures.
  • 37:45 - 37:48
    Oh, here's what I was looking for.
    Nominal believers,
  • 37:48 - 37:52
    not atheists, show the highest levels
    of depression actually,
  • 37:52 - 37:53
    the poorest mental health
  • 37:53 - 37:56
    and they generally report
    less satisfaction with life.
  • 37:56 - 38:01
    And fact is, this is true of the
    cross-cultural data on this too.
  • 38:01 - 38:05
    The world value survey found that both
    those who claim religion is very important
  • 38:05 - 38:07
    and those who claim
    that it wasn't important at all,
  • 38:07 - 38:09
    tended to be the happiest.
  • 38:09 - 38:14
    So curvilinear effects
    are also found in the moral realm,
  • 38:14 - 38:19
    for example physicians, Doctors
    Without Borders and that sort of thing
  • 38:19 - 38:23
    highest membership is going to be
    highly religious and totally atheist.
  • 38:23 - 38:25

    This is true when
  • 38:25 - 38:29
    Milgrams famous obedience trials
    - if you're familiar with those studies -
  • 38:29 - 38:32
    where we get to see
    just how much will somebody
  • 38:32 - 38:35
    obey the experimenter.
    When those were replicated,
  • 38:35 - 38:38
    it was the extreme believers
    and the extreme non-believers
  • 38:38 - 38:42
    that were most likely to disobey the
    researchers unethical orders.
  • 38:42 - 38:47
    So actually being highly
    religious or highly non-religious
  • 38:47 - 38:50
    seems to give you a little
    bit more moral integrity.
  • 38:50 - 38:54
    Part of the hypothesis
    why this might be is because
  • 38:54 - 38:58
    these pools of individuals, they're so
    certain of their world view
  • 38:58 - 39:04
    that they're not as kicked around
    by the pressure of social conformity as others.
  • 39:04 - 39:06
    So it appears that confidence in one's worldview
  • 39:06 - 39:09
    and regular affiliation with like minded people
  • 39:09 - 39:13
    are far more important to well-being
    and moral integrity
  • 39:13 - 39:17
    than your particular beliefs
    about metaphysics. Sorry guys,
  • 39:17 - 39:22
    even some non-believers are sad to hear
    that sometimes, they want to believe that
  • 39:22 - 39:25
    believing the right thing, having the
    right grasp on reality
  • 39:25 - 39:27
    will make you a better person
  • 39:27 - 39:32
    and it doesn't seem that metaphysical
    beliefs are all that important.
  • 39:32 - 39:37
    But sadly studies are not designed to
    notice curvilinear effects a lot of times
  • 39:37 - 39:42
    And when they aren't, they can give
    the impression that atheists are in danger
  • 39:42 - 39:44
    of poor physical or mental health
  • 39:44 - 39:50
    and this is exactly what we see with the military's spiritual fitness scale, that they have.
  • 39:50 - 39:53
    I don't know if anybody has
    ever heard of that?
  • 39:53 - 39:57
    The US military has a spiritual fitness
    dimension in their instrument
  • 39:57 - 40:00
    that they use to assess
    a soldier's wellness and mental health.
  • 40:00 - 40:04
    And they conclude that soldiers
    have the greatest resiliency
  • 40:04 - 40:06
    when they are spiritual,
    when they are religious
  • 40:06 - 40:11
    and this has prompted
    some superior officers
  • 40:11 - 40:14
    to go find their underlings
    who are non-religious
  • 40:14 - 40:19
    and to pressure them into prayer meetings
    and other religious services, right,
  • 40:19 - 40:22
    because it's bad for their health.
    They might be in a suicide risk.
  • 40:22 - 40:29
    However though an examination of the
    actual question items on the spirituality scale
  • 40:29 - 40:32
    shows a major flaw in the way
    these concepts are measured.
  • 40:32 - 40:37
    And it's going to be my last major point
    about how this research is conducted.
  • 40:37 - 40:39
    "Criterion contamination"
  • 40:39 - 40:42
    this is where the pro-sociality literature
  • 40:42 - 40:46
    defines spirituality in a way
    that kind of begs the question.
  • 40:46 - 40:51
    So for example, usually when we
    make a prediction
  • 40:51 - 40:55
    of some sort of criterion, you want the
    items used in the prediction
  • 40:55 - 40:59
    to not contain elements
    of what is being predicted.
  • 40:59 - 41:03
    If you flip the conclusion
    and you put it in your premise,
  • 41:03 - 41:06
    you're arguing in a circle, right?
  • 41:06 - 41:08
    But yet we see
    this happen all the time,
  • 41:08 - 41:11
    we see the reverse
    happening all the time.
  • 41:11 - 41:15
    For example this right here.
    Religiously engaged individuals
  • 41:15 - 41:19
    have greater social networks,
    but religious engagement
  • 41:19 - 41:23
    was defined by having church social contacts.
  • 41:23 - 41:27
    So really all this is saying
    - I mean it sounds really good, right? -
  • 41:27 - 41:31
    Doesn't it? Wow? Religious
    engagement really benefits us.
  • 41:31 - 41:34
    All this is saying, is;
    "Socially engaged religious people
  • 41:34 - 41:36
    are socially engaged religious people."
  • 41:36 - 41:41
    That is all that is said .
    Many spirituality scales measure concepts
  • 41:41 - 41:46
    that do not necessarily refer
    to supernatural believes either.
  • 41:46 - 41:50
    For example, these are all the things
    that will get you a high rating as a
  • 41:50 - 41:53
    spiritual person on these fitness scales.
  • 41:53 - 41:56
    "I believe there is
    a larger meaning to life.
  • 41:56 - 42:00
    It's important for me
    to give something back to my community."
  • 42:00 - 42:03
    If you answer yes to that,
    you're labeled as religious on this scale.
  • 42:03 - 42:07
    "I believe that humanity
    as a whole is basically good."
  • 42:07 - 42:10
    If you have a positive humanistic outlook,
  • 42:10 - 42:14
    you might say you're going to score
    on that spirituality scale too.
  • 42:14 - 42:19
    "I'm concerned about those
    who will come after me in life."
  • 42:19 - 42:23
    So numerous studies including this
    military spiritual fitness assessment
  • 42:23 - 42:27
    claims to demonstrate that religiosity is
    related to pro-social outcomes,
  • 42:27 - 42:31
    but they are really
    just criterion contamination effects.
  • 42:31 - 42:33
    Having pro-social traits here
  • 42:33 - 42:36
    is what defines being religious.
  • 42:36 - 42:39
    Just begging the question.
    And as we know many atheists
  • 42:39 - 42:43
    with a broader sense of meaning
    would score ‘spiritual’ on these same scales.
  • 42:43 - 42:47
    This artificially inflates the apparent
    relationship between religiosity
  • 42:47 - 42:51
    or spirituality and these positive
    pro-social outcomes.
  • 42:51 - 42:55
    All right.
    So, tying it all together.
  • 42:55 - 42:59
    The question; “Does religion make us
    better?” actually doesn't admit
  • 42:59 - 43:03
    of a simple answer. You've already seen
    evidence showing: "yes and no"
  • 43:03 - 43:07
    or "yes in particular ways and no and other
    particular ways".
  • 43:07 - 43:10
    Unfortunately this stuff just doesn't
    work in a sound bite
  • 43:10 - 43:12
    and we live in a sound-bite culture.
  • 43:12 - 43:15
    The conclusion one reaches depends
  • 43:15 - 43:20
    on the measure of religiosity being used;
    the way pro-sociality is defined.
  • 43:20 - 43:23
    We have to be cognizant of a host of
  • 43:23 - 43:26
    complicating factors if we're going to be accurate.
  • 43:26 - 43:31
    Really this is like a minefield for a critical thinker.
  • 43:31 - 43:36
    Even the most experienced critical thinker
    is going to run into problems
  • 43:36 - 43:38
    with how complex this data is.
  • 43:38 - 43:43
    So we came up with 10 questions for
    thinking critically about religious pro-sociality
  • 43:43 - 43:49
    that will help people in the future
    to think more carefully about these studies.
  • 43:49 - 43:53
    Number 1: has the research controlled
    for the possibility that stereotypes
  • 43:53 - 43:58
    - such as the expectation that
    religious individuals will be more pro-social -
  • 43:58 - 44:01
    have those stereotypes affected
    self-reports and ratings?
  • 44:01 - 44:05
    2: Are the results based on evidence
    that have been compromised
  • 44:05 - 44:07
    by in-group favoritism or bias?
  • 44:07 - 44:11
    3: When pro-social effects follow
    the priming of religious concepts,
  • 44:11 - 44:14

    will those same effects follow secular prime?
  • 44:14 - 44:16
    That's a great one
    for the priming study.
  • 44:16 - 44:20
    Number 4: is the study also able
    to detect potential negative
  • 44:20 - 44:23
    as well as positive effects
    for religious primes?
  • 44:23 - 44:29
    5: Is the research based on self-reports
    or does it also measures actual behaviors?
  • 44:29 - 44:34
    If it doesn't measure actual behaviors,
    it's worthless.
  • 44:34 - 44:38
    6: could the context of this study have
    an impact on the results? For example,
  • 44:38 - 44:43
    would this study get the same results in
    the United States as opposed to
  • 44:43 - 44:48
    other nations in Northern Europe that
    are predominately non-religious?
  • 44:48 - 44:52
    7: are the results solely attributable to
    religious belief itself
  • 44:52 - 44:54
    or is there a group affiliation effect
    going on?
  • 44:54 - 44:58
    If church attending believers are compared to non church attenders,
  • 44:58 - 45:02
    the sources of any differences
    might be unclear.
  • 45:02 - 45:06
    Number 8: does the study conflate non-believe with low religiosity
  • 45:06 - 45:09
    or do we have a clear measure
    of the non-believers?
  • 45:09 - 45:14
    By the way, for we gonna fulfill number 8
    we need more research on secularists.
  • 45:14 - 45:18
    So we need more researchers willing
    to study communities like this
  • 45:18 - 45:20
    and answer surveys and that sort of things.
  • 45:20 - 45:22
    If you ever see those things pop up in your inbox.
  • 45:22 - 45:26
    Please take'm.
    You will help us all.
  • 45:26 - 45:28
    Number 9: do the religious groups
    under comparison allow
  • 45:28 - 45:31
    for an examination of curvilinear effects?
  • 45:31 - 45:34
    That is, if you're comparing a church group,
  • 45:34 - 45:39
    you got to compare it with an equal group like this.
  • 45:39 - 45:42
    Number 10: has religion or spirituality
  • 45:42 - 45:46
    been defined in a way that
    would also include
  • 45:46 - 45:49
    pro-social behavior
    just from the definition?
  • 45:49 - 45:53
    I think if you watch for those things
    you're going to have a leg up
  • 45:53 - 45:58
    on most other people who are paying attention
    to this particular research.
  • 45:58 - 46:02
    I hope you got something out of that.
    I hope that brings a little more clarity
  • 46:02 - 46:04
    to this often confusing debate
  • 46:04 - 46:09
    and a last thing I just wont to put
    in another plug for my podcast:
  • 46:09 - 46:16
    if you happen to enjoy what you heart tonight,
    found it enlightening at all,
  • 46:16 - 46:19
    both I and the author of the
    the Psych Review, Luke Galen,
  • 46:19 - 46:22
    we both work
    on this podcast "Reasonable Doubts",
  • 46:22 - 46:26
    you can find it at doubtcast.org.
  • 46:26 - 46:28
    It is one of the most informationally dense
    podcasts you'll find
  • 46:28 - 46:31
    that still manages to be funny from time to time.
  • 46:31 - 46:33
    I thank you very much.
  • 46:33 - 46:41
    (Applause)
  • 46:42 - 46:45
    To catch up on past Reasonable Doubts episodes
  • 46:45 - 46:46
    or to email your questions or comments,
  • 46:46 - 46:50
    check out www.doubtcast.org
  • 46:50 - 46:54
    Reasonable Doubt is a production
    of WPRR Reality Radio.
  • 46:54 - 46:59
    You can find out more about Reality
    Radio at publicrealityradio.org
  • 46:59 - 47:04
    Reasonable Doubt's theme music is performed
    by Love Fossil and used with permission
  • 47:04 - 47:18
    Subtitled by www.kritischdenken.info
Title:
Reasonable Doubt Extra: Does Religion Make Us Better People?
Description:

Does religion make us happier, healthier and more helpful? A number of popular psychology books and articles argue that religion is a positive force for enhancing the health and well-being of both individuals and whole communities. A careful examination of the social psychological literature, however, reveals a complicated relationship between religion and "pro-social" traits that defies such a simple characterization. Luke Galen, Professor of Psychology at Grand Valley State University, recently reviewed dozens of studies on religion and pro-social traits for the American Psychological Association's Psychology Bulletin, exposing some of the misleading ways in which this research is conducted and presented to the public. For this talk Jeremy Beahan (instructor of Philosophy and World Religions at Kendall College of Art and Design and co-host of the popular Reasonable Doubts Podcast) will summarize key details of the review in a way that is accessible to non-professionals and reveal the devil lurking in the details.

http://freethoughtblogs.com/reasonabledoubts/2014/04/07/rd-extra-does-religion-make-us-better-people-galens-bulldog-edition/

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
47:21

English subtitles

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