Signaling
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0:00 - 0:03♪ (music) ♪
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0:14 - 0:15- [Professor Tyler] So how did
the Korean Hyundai -
0:15 - 0:17become such an excellent car,
-
0:17 - 0:20and earn so much success
in the marketplace? -
0:20 - 0:22Well, let's go back in time.
-
0:22 - 0:27In 1986, the first Hyundai Excel
was sold in the United States. -
0:27 - 0:30It was not entirely attractive,
but it was inexpensive. -
0:30 - 0:34The problem though that it just
didn't work that well. -
0:34 - 0:36So Hyundais quickly
developed a reputation -
0:36 - 0:38for being lower quality cars
-
0:38 - 0:43and in time, they became the butt
of jokes among American consumers. -
0:43 - 0:46Jay Leno, who was at the time
was host of the Tonight Show -
0:46 - 0:48said that you could double
the value of your Hyundai -
0:48 - 0:51by filling it up with gas.
-
0:51 - 0:53Hyundai wanted
to flip this reputation -
0:53 - 0:56and compete with the more
successful companies, -
0:56 - 0:59such as Honda and Toyota,
and they managed. -
0:59 - 1:03Hyundai decided they would invest
in new advanced factories, -
1:03 - 1:06in worker training,
and in quality control. -
1:06 - 1:10This in turn would result
in much higher quality cars. -
1:10 - 1:14But how could Hyundai convince
consumers of this higher quality -- -
1:14 - 1:16quality that was maybe
difficult to see -
1:16 - 1:20unless you had owned the car
for a few years already. -
1:20 - 1:23Consumers didn't, in fact,
usually know what was going on -
1:23 - 1:25in Hyundai’s factories.
-
1:25 - 1:28So again, we have a case
of asymmetric information, -
1:28 - 1:31where Hyundai knew much more
about the quality of its products -
1:31 - 1:33than did consumers.
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1:33 - 1:35So what could the company do?
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1:35 - 1:39Hyundai rolled out what it called
"America's Best Warranty." -
1:39 - 1:43The warranty assured consumers
that the cars were high quality -
1:43 - 1:46and it got consumers
to start buying those cars. -
1:46 - 1:48What's great about this idea
-
1:48 - 1:51is that it doesn't actually cost
Hyundai very much -
1:51 - 1:53because the cars
were in fact high quality -
1:53 - 1:56and they didn't need to be
fixed all the time. -
1:56 - 2:00This Hyundai warranty
is an example of a signal. -
2:00 - 2:04A signal is an expensive action
that reveals information, -
2:04 - 2:07and for it to work a signal
has to be credible. -
2:07 - 2:11In this case, if Hyundai cars
were still unreliable, -
2:11 - 2:13such a comprehensive warranty
-
2:13 - 2:16would have been
extremely costly to Hyundai. -
2:16 - 2:19Consumers, therefore, bought Hyundai
-
2:21 - 2:22figuring that if the warranty
were so strong, -
2:22 - 2:25well, the company had to have
a lot of faith in its cars. -
2:25 - 2:29So how does a signal help alleviate
asymmetric information? -
2:29 - 2:31Hyundai knew their cars
were of high quality -
2:31 - 2:33but consumers didn't know.
-
2:33 - 2:36The warranty was a credible signal
-
2:36 - 2:38that conveyed information
to the consumers, -
2:38 - 2:42specifically information
about the quality under the hood, -
2:42 - 2:45that consumers otherwise
couldn't easily judge. -
2:45 - 2:48This signal gave consumer
the information necessary -
2:48 - 2:52to have enough confidence
to buy a Hyundai. -
2:52 - 2:55Indeed, this story
had a happy ending. -
2:55 - 2:57So where else
might we see signaling? -
2:57 - 3:01Well, let's consider a puzzle
in higher education. -
3:01 - 3:04If going to college was simply
all about learning skills, -
3:04 - 3:07then you would expect
your expected wages -
3:07 - 3:11would steadily grow as you completed
more and more classes. -
3:11 - 3:14For instance, when you would get
halfway through with your degree, -
3:14 - 3:19you would get half of the expected wage
increase from earning the degree. -
3:19 - 3:22In each class you're learning
valuable skills -
3:22 - 3:25so your expected wages
should incrementally rise -
3:25 - 3:28with each class completed, right?
-
3:28 - 3:29Well, wrong.
-
3:29 - 3:33In fact, a large fraction
of the value of a degree -
3:33 - 3:36comes on the day you earned
your degree and finish. -
3:36 - 3:38So rather than seeing
a steady increase -
3:38 - 3:41in your expected wage
as you go through college, -
3:41 - 3:45you have a sharp upturn
in that wage right at the end. -
3:45 - 3:47Again, when you finish.
-
3:47 - 3:49This is called
the "Sheepskin Effect," -
3:49 - 3:53because diplomas
used to be printed on sheepskin. -
3:53 - 3:55Additionally, we see people
who receive a degree in, -
3:55 - 3:57say, Art History,
-
3:57 - 4:00and they take jobs that maybe
have little or nothing to do -
4:00 - 4:02with history of art.
-
4:02 - 4:04Yet these people
receive higher wages -
4:04 - 4:07than those without
a degree altogether. -
4:07 - 4:11Why? Well, the learning of art history
may not be applicable to the jobs, -
4:11 - 4:15but it shows those people
have some kind of talent. -
4:15 - 4:17The signaling theory of education
-
4:17 - 4:20from Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence
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4:20 - 4:22is that education is valuable,
-
4:22 - 4:24not only because it teaches us things,
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4:24 - 4:28but also because it signals
worker quality. -
4:28 - 4:29There’s asymmetric information
-
4:29 - 4:32between an employee
and a potential employer. -
4:32 - 4:35The employer doesn't know
how smart, determined, -
4:35 - 4:38or conscientious you might be.
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4:38 - 4:41A degree provides
a credible signal of these traits -
4:41 - 4:45and gives employers
more information about possible hires. -
4:45 - 4:46Why is it credible?
-
4:46 - 4:49Well, getting a degree
is harder for someone -
4:49 - 4:53who isn't as smart,
determined, or conscientious. -
4:53 - 4:55Here are some other signals
to think about. -
4:55 - 5:01Are diamond just about giving
your love one something beautiful? -
5:01 - 5:04Or is it also important
the ring costs a lot? -
5:04 - 5:08What asymmetric information
might this signal help reveal? -
5:08 - 5:09Here's another one.
-
5:09 - 5:12Why do criminal tattoo their faces?
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5:12 - 5:15What might be the asymmetric
information problems -
5:15 - 5:17they're trying to solve?
-
5:17 - 5:20And signaling is not only
a human phenomenon. -
5:20 - 5:23Why does a peacock
drag around a large colorful tail -
5:23 - 5:27which might appear
to hinder its survival? -
5:27 - 5:29What kind of signal
might be going on there? -
5:29 - 5:31And to whom?
-
5:31 - 5:33Check your intuitions
to these puzzles -
5:33 - 5:36in our practice questions
after this video. -
5:36 - 5:39So, now that we've covered
how signals can help overcome -
5:39 - 5:41asymmetric information,
-
5:41 - 5:45you might wonder,
"Are signals always a good thing?" -
5:45 - 5:47It might seem wasteful
to spend four years at college, -
5:47 - 5:52or to spend two months’ salary
on the ring just to signal something. -
5:52 - 5:54Students might prefer to learn more
-
5:54 - 5:57rather than spending so much time
jumping through hoops, -
5:57 - 6:00and it might be better
to buy something more practical -
6:00 - 6:03for a potential spouse than just a ring.
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6:03 - 6:06While signals do create
some inefficiency, -
6:06 - 6:10they also generate benefits
by creating more information. -
6:10 - 6:13They help individuals
in markets realize gains -
6:13 - 6:18from trades by overcoming problems
of asymmetric information. -
6:18 - 6:20So if you've enjoyed this video,
-
6:20 - 6:23well, give us a signal
and please let us know. -
6:23 - 6:27Drop us a note or leave
a suggestion for us. -
6:27 - 6:28Your feedback will help determine
-
6:28 - 6:32how we produce
future videos and materials. -
6:32 - 6:33Thanks.
-
6:33 - 6:35- [Announcer] If you want
to test yourself, click -
6:35 - 6:37"Practice Questions."
-
6:37 - 6:41Or, if you're ready to move on,
just click "Next Video." -
6:41 - 6:43♪ (music) ♪
- Title:
- Signaling
- Description:
-
A signal is an action that reveals information. Let’s look at higher education, for example. A large fraction of the value you receive from your degree comes on the day you earn your diploma. Your expected wages don’t increase with each class you complete along the way; instead, they spike sharply at the end when you receive your diploma. This is often referred to as the “Sheepskin Effect” because diplomas used to be printed on sheepskin.
Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence did research on this subject and found that education is valuable not necessarily because it creates valuable skills, but rather that it signals valuable skills. So how does the signal, represented by a degree, alleviate asymmetric information?
Employers don’t necessarily know how smart or skilled you are. Your degree, however, provides a credible signal of these traits and gives them more information they can use in the hiring process.
What other signals exist? We discuss examples like diamond engagement rings, why criminals tattoo their face, and why a peacock has a colorful tail. Let us know what examples you come up with in the comments.
Microeconomics Course: http://mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics
Ask a question about the video: http://www.mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics/signaling-economics#QandA
- Video Language:
- English
- Team:
- Marginal Revolution University
- Project:
- Micro
- Duration:
- 06:46
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