Signaling
-
0:14 - 0:17- [Professor Tyler Cowen] So how did the Korean
Hyundai become such an excellent car, and -
0:17 - 0:23earn so much success in the marketplace?
Well, let's go back in time. In 1986, the -
0:23 - 0:29first Hyundai Excel was sold in the United
States. It was not entirely attractive, -
0:29 - 0:34but it was inexpensive. The problem
though that it just didn't work that well. -
0:34 - 0:39So Hyundais quickly developed a reputation
for being lower quality cars and in -
0:39 - 0:44time, they became the butt of jokes
among American consumers. Jay Leno, who -
0:44 - 0:47was at the time was host of the Tonight
Show, said that you could double the -
0:47 - 0:52value of your Hyundai by filling it up
with gas. Hyundai wanted to flip this -
0:52 - 0:57reputation and compete with the more
successful companies, such as Honda and -
0:57 - 1:02Toyota, and they managed. Hyundai decided
they would invest in new advanced -
1:02 - 1:07factories, in worker training, and in
quality control. This in turn would result -
1:07 - 1:13in much higher quality cars. But how could
Hyundai convince consumers of this higher -
1:13 - 1:18quality - quality that was maybe difficult
to see unless you had owned the car for a -
1:18 - 1:23few years already. Consumers didn't, in
fact, usually know what was going on in -
1:23 - 1:28Hyundai’s factories. So again, we have a
case of asymmetric information where -
1:28 - 1:34Hyundai knew much more about the quality
of its products than did consumers. So -
1:34 - 1:39what could the company do? Hyundai rolled out
what it called “America's Best Warranty.” -
1:39 - 1:44The warranty assured consumers that the
cars were high quality and it got -
1:44 - 1:49consumers to start buying those cars.
What's great about this idea is that it -
1:49 - 1:53doesn't actually cost Hyundai very much
because the cars were in fact high quality -
1:53 - 1:56and they didn't need to be
fixed all the time. -
1:56 - 2:00This Hyundai warranty is an
example of a signal. -
2:00 - 2:06A signal is an expensive action that
reveals information, and for it to work a -
2:06 - 2:12signal has to be credible. In this case,
if Hyundai cars were still unreliable, such -
2:12 - 2:17a comprehensive warranty would have been
extremely costly to Hyundai. Consumers, -
2:17 - 2:21Therefore, bought Hyundai figuring that if
the warranty were so strong, well, the -
2:21 - 2:24company had to have a lot of faith
in its cars. -
2:24 - 2:30So how does a signal help alleviate
asymmetric information? Hyundai knew their -
2:30 - 2:35cars were of high quality but consumers
didn't know. The warranty was a credible -
2:35 - 2:40signal that conveyed information to the
consumers, specifically information about -
2:40 - 2:45the quality under the hood, that consumers
otherwise couldn't easily judge. This -
2:45 - 2:50signal gave consumer the information
necessary to have enough confidence to buy -
2:50 - 2:54a Hyundai. Indeed this story had
a happy ending. -
2:55 - 2:59So where else might we see signaling?
Well, let's consider a puzzle in higher -
2:59 - 3:05education. If going to college was simply
all about learning skills, then you would -
3:05 - 3:09expect your expected wages would steadily
grow as you completed more and more -
3:09 - 3:14classes. For instance, when you would get
halfway through with your degree, you -
3:14 - 3:19would get half of the expected wage
increase from earning the degree. In each -
3:19 - 3:24class you're learning valuable skills so
your expected wages should incrementally -
3:24 - 3:31rise with each class completed, right?
Well, wrong. In fact, a large fraction of -
3:31 - 3:36the value of a degree comes on the day
you earned your degree and finish. So -
3:36 - 3:40rather than seeing a steady increase in
your expected wage as you go through -
3:40 - 3:46college, you have a sharp upturn in that
wage right at the end. Again, when you -
3:46 - 3:51finish. This is called the “Sheepskin
Effect” because diplomas used to be printed -
3:51 - 3:57on sheepskin. Additionally, we see people
who receive a degree in, say, Art History, -
3:57 - 4:01and they take jobs that maybe have little
or nothing to do with history of art. -
4:02 - 4:07Yet these people receive higher wages
than those without a degree altogether. -
4:07 - 4:12Why? Well, the learning of art history may
not be applicable to the jobs, but it -
4:12 - 4:17shows those people have some kind of
talent. The signaling theory of education -
4:17 - 4:22from Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence is
that education is valuable, not only -
4:22 - 4:28because it teaches us things, but also
because it signals worker quality. There’s -
4:28 - 4:33asymmetric information between an employee
and a potential employer. The employer -
4:33 - 4:38doesn't know how smart, determined, or
conscientious you might be. A degree -
4:38 - 4:43provides a credible signal of these traits
and gives employers more information about -
4:43 - 4:49possible hires. Why is it credible? Well,
getting a degree is harder for someone who -
4:49 - 4:54isn't as smart, determined, or
conscientious. Here are some other signals -
4:54 - 5:01to think about. Are diamond just about
giving your love one something beautiful? -
5:01 - 5:06Or is it also important the ring costs a
lot? What asymmetric information might -
5:06 - 5:12this signal help reveal? Here's another
one. Why do criminal tattoo their faces? -
5:12 - 5:17What might be the asymmetric information
problems they're trying to solve? And -
5:17 - 5:22signaling is not only a human phenomenon.
Why does a peacock drag around a large -
5:22 - 5:28colorful tail which might appear to hinder
its survival? What kind of signal might be -
5:28 - 5:33going on there? And to whom? Check your
intuitions to these puzzles in our -
5:33 - 5:38practice questions after this video. So,
now that we've covered how signals can -
5:38 - 5:43help overcome asymmetric information, you
might wonder, "Are signals always a good -
5:43 - 5:48thing?” It might seem wasteful to spend
four years at college, or to spend two -
5:48 - 5:53months’ salary on the ring just to signal
something. Students might prefer to learn -
5:53 - 5:58more rather than spending so much time
jumping through hoops, and it might be -
5:58 - 6:02better to buy something more practical for
a potential spouse than just a ring. -
6:02 - 6:08While signals do create some inefficiency,
they also generate benefits -
6:08 - 6:13by creating more information. They help
individuals in markets realize gains -
6:13 - 6:19from trades by overcoming problems of
asymmetric information. So if you've -
6:19 - 6:25enjoyed this video, well, give us a signal
and please let us know. Drop us a note or -
6:25 - 6:30leave a suggestion for us. Your feedback
will help determine how we produce future -
6:30 - 6:32videos and materials. Thanks.
-
6:32 - 6:36- [Announcer] If you want to test yourself,
click “Practice Questions.” -
6:37 - 6:41Or, if you're ready to move on,
just click “Next Video.”
- Title:
- Signaling
- Description:
-
A signal is an action that reveals information. Let’s look at higher education, for example. A large fraction of the value you receive from your degree comes on the day you earn your diploma. Your expected wages don’t increase with each class you complete along the way; instead, they spike sharply at the end when you receive your diploma. This is often referred to as the “Sheepskin Effect” because diplomas used to be printed on sheepskin.
Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence did research on this subject and found that education is valuable not necessarily because it creates valuable skills, but rather that it signals valuable skills. So how does the signal, represented by a degree, alleviate asymmetric information?
Employers don’t necessarily know how smart or skilled you are. Your degree, however, provides a credible signal of these traits and gives them more information they can use in the hiring process.
What other signals exist? We discuss examples like diamond engagement rings, why criminals tattoo their face, and why a peacock has a colorful tail. Let us know what examples you come up with in the comments.
Microeconomics Course: http://mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics
Ask a question about the video: http://www.mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics/signaling-economics#QandA
- Video Language:
- English
- Team:
- Marginal Revolution University
- Project:
- Micro
- Duration:
- 06:46
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Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling | ||
Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling | ||
Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling | ||
Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling | ||
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MRU2 edited English subtitles for Signaling |