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Signaling

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    - [Professor Tyler Cowen] So how did the Korean
    Hyundai become such an excellent car, and
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    earn so much success in the marketplace?
    Well, let's go back in time. In 1986, the
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    first Hyundai Excel was sold in the United
    States. It was not entirely attractive,
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    but it was inexpensive. The problem
    though that it just didn't work that well.
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    So Hyundais quickly developed a reputation
    for being lower quality cars and in
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    time, they became the butt of jokes
    among American consumers. Jay Leno, who
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    was at the time was host of the Tonight
    Show, said that you could double the
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    value of your Hyundai by filling it up
    with gas. Hyundai wanted to flip this
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    reputation and compete with the more
    successful companies, such as Honda and
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    Toyota, and they managed. Hyundai decided
    they would invest in new advanced
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    factories, in worker training, and in
    quality control. This in turn would result
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    in much higher quality cars. But how could
    Hyundai convince consumers of this higher
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    quality - quality that was maybe difficult
    to see unless you had owned the car for a
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    few years already. Consumers didn't, in
    fact, usually know what was going on in
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    Hyundai’s factories. So again, we have a
    case of asymmetric information where
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    Hyundai knew much more about the quality
    of its products than did consumers. So
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    what could the company do? Hyundai rolled out
    what it called “America's Best Warranty.”
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    The warranty assured consumers that the
    cars were high quality and it got
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    consumers to start buying those cars.
    What's great about this idea is that it
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    doesn't actually cost Hyundai very much
    because the cars were in fact high quality
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    and they didn't need to be
    fixed all the time.
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    This Hyundai warranty is an
    example of a signal.
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    A signal is an expensive action that
    reveals information, and for it to work a
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    signal has to be credible. In this case,
    if Hyundai cars were still unreliable, such
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    a comprehensive warranty would have been
    extremely costly to Hyundai. Consumers,
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    Therefore, bought Hyundai figuring that if
    the warranty were so strong, well, the
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    company had to have a lot of faith
    in its cars.
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    So how does a signal help alleviate
    asymmetric information? Hyundai knew their
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    cars were of high quality but consumers
    didn't know. The warranty was a credible
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    signal that conveyed information to the
    consumers, specifically information about
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    the quality under the hood, that consumers
    otherwise couldn't easily judge. This
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    signal gave consumer the information
    necessary to have enough confidence to buy
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    a Hyundai. Indeed this story had
    a happy ending.
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    So where else might we see signaling?
    Well, let's consider a puzzle in higher
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    education. If going to college was simply
    all about learning skills, then you would
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    expect your expected wages would steadily
    grow as you completed more and more
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    classes. For instance, when you would get
    halfway through with your degree, you
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    would get half of the expected wage
    increase from earning the degree. In each
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    class you're learning valuable skills so
    your expected wages should incrementally
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    rise with each class completed, right?
    Well, wrong. In fact, a large fraction of
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    the value of a degree comes on the day
    you earned your degree and finish. So
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    rather than seeing a steady increase in
    your expected wage as you go through
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    college, you have a sharp upturn in that
    wage right at the end. Again, when you
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    finish. This is called the “Sheepskin
    Effect” because diplomas used to be printed
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    on sheepskin. Additionally, we see people
    who receive a degree in, say, Art History,
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    and they take jobs that maybe have little
    or nothing to do with history of art.
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    Yet these people receive higher wages
    than those without a degree altogether.
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    Why? Well, the learning of art history may
    not be applicable to the jobs, but it
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    shows those people have some kind of
    talent. The signaling theory of education
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    from Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence is
    that education is valuable, not only
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    because it teaches us things, but also
    because it signals worker quality. There’s
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    asymmetric information between an employee
    and a potential employer. The employer
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    doesn't know how smart, determined, or
    conscientious you might be. A degree
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    provides a credible signal of these traits
    and gives employers more information about
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    possible hires. Why is it credible? Well,
    getting a degree is harder for someone who
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    isn't as smart, determined, or
    conscientious. Here are some other signals
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    to think about. Are diamond just about
    giving your love one something beautiful?
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    Or is it also important the ring costs a
    lot? What asymmetric information might
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    this signal help reveal? Here's another
    one. Why do criminal tattoo their faces?
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    What might be the asymmetric information
    problems they're trying to solve? And
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    signaling is not only a human phenomenon.
    Why does a peacock drag around a large
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    colorful tail which might appear to hinder
    its survival? What kind of signal might be
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    going on there? And to whom? Check your
    intuitions to these puzzles in our
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    practice questions after this video. So,
    now that we've covered how signals can
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    help overcome asymmetric information, you
    might wonder, "Are signals always a good
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    thing?” It might seem wasteful to spend
    four years at college, or to spend two
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    months’ salary on the ring just to signal
    something. Students might prefer to learn
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    more rather than spending so much time
    jumping through hoops, and it might be
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    better to buy something more practical for
    a potential spouse than just a ring.
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    While signals do create some inefficiency,
    they also generate benefits
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    by creating more information. They help
    individuals in markets realize gains
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    from trades by overcoming problems of
    asymmetric information. So if you've
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    enjoyed this video, well, give us a signal
    and please let us know. Drop us a note or
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    leave a suggestion for us. Your feedback
    will help determine how we produce future
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    videos and materials. Thanks.
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    - [Announcer] If you want to test yourself,
    click “Practice Questions.”
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    Or, if you're ready to move on,
    just click “Next Video.”
Title:
Signaling
Description:

A signal is an action that reveals information. Let’s look at higher education, for example. A large fraction of the value you receive from your degree comes on the day you earn your diploma. Your expected wages don’t increase with each class you complete along the way; instead, they spike sharply at the end when you receive your diploma. This is often referred to as the “Sheepskin Effect” because diplomas used to be printed on sheepskin.

Nobel Prize winner Michael Spence did research on this subject and found that education is valuable not necessarily because it creates valuable skills, but rather that it signals valuable skills. So how does the signal, represented by a degree, alleviate asymmetric information?

Employers don’t necessarily know how smart or skilled you are. Your degree, however, provides a credible signal of these traits and gives them more information they can use in the hiring process.

What other signals exist? We discuss examples like diamond engagement rings, why criminals tattoo their face, and why a peacock has a colorful tail. Let us know what examples you come up with in the comments.

Microeconomics Course: http://mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics

Ask a question about the video: http://www.mruniversity.com/courses/principles-economics-microeconomics/signaling-economics#QandA

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Video Language:
English
Team:
Marginal Revolution University
Project:
Micro
Duration:
06:46
Marilia_PM edited English subtitles for Signaling
Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling
Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling
Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling
Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling
Theresa Ranft edited English subtitles for Signaling
MRU2 edited English subtitles for Signaling
MRU2 edited English subtitles for Signaling

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