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Meet global corruption's hidden players

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    When we talk about corruption,
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    there are typical types
    of individuals that spring to mind.
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    There's the former Soviet megalomaniacs.
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    Saparmurat Niyazov, he was one of them.
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    Until his death in 2006,
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    he was the all-powerful
    leader of Turkmenistan,
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    a Central Asian country
    rich in natural gas.
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    Now, he really loved to issue
    presidential decrees.
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    And one renamed the months of the year
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    including after himself and his mother.
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    He spent millions of dollars
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    creating a bizarre personality cult,
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    and his crowning glory was the building
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    of a 40-foot-high gold-plated
    statue of himself
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    which stood proudly
    in the capital's central square
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    and rotated to follow the sun.
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    He was a slightly unusual guy.
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    And then there's that cliché,
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    the African dictator
    or minister or official.
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    There's Teodorín Obiang.
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    So his daddy is president
    for life of Equatorial Guinea,
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    a West African nation that has exported
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    billions of dollars of oil since the 1990s
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    and yet has a truly appalling
    human rights record.
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    The vast majority of its people
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    are living in really miserable poverty
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    despite an income
    per capita that's on a par
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    with that of Portugal.
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    So Obiang junior, well, he buys himself
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    a $30 million mansion
    in Malibu, California.
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    I've been up to its front gates.
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    I can tell you it's a magnificent spread.
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    He bought an €18 million art collection
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    that used to belong to fashion
    designer Yves Saint Laurent,
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    a stack of fabulous sports cars,
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    some costing a million dollars apiece --
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    oh, and a Gulfstream jet, too.
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    Now get this:
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    Until recently, he was earning
    an official monthly salary
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    of less than 7,000 dollars.
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    And there's Dan Etete.
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    Well, he was the former
    oil minister of Nigeria
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    under President Abacha,
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    and it just so happens
    he's a convicted money launderer too.
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    We've spent a great deal of time
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    investigating a $1 billion --
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    that's right, a $1 billion —
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    oil deal that he was involved with,
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    and what we found was pretty shocking,
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    but more about that later.
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    So it's easy to think
    that corruption happens
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    somewhere over there,
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    carried out by a bunch of greedy despots
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    and individuals up to no good in countries
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    that we, personally, may
    know very little about
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    and feel really unconnected to
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    and unaffected by what might be going on.
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    But does it just happen over there?
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    Well, at 22, I was very lucky.
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    My first job out of university
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    was investigating the illegal
    trade in African ivory.
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    And that's how my relationship
    with corruption really began.
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    In 1993, with two friends
    who were colleagues,
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    Simon Taylor and Patrick Alley,
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    we set up an organization
    called Global Witness.
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    Our first campaign
    was investigating the role
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    of illegal logging in funding
    the war in Cambodia.
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    So a few years later, and it's now 1997,
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    and I'm in Angola undercover
    investigating blood diamonds.
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    Perhaps you saw the film,
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    the Hollywood film "Blood Diamond,"
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    the one with Leonardo DiCaprio.
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    Well, some of that sprang from our work.
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    Luanda, it was full of land mine victims
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    who were struggling
    to survive on the streets
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    and war orphans living
    in sewers under the streets,
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    and a tiny, very wealthy elite
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    who gossiped about shopping
    trips to Brazil and Portugal.
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    And it was a slightly crazy place.
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    So I'm sitting in a hot
    and very stuffy hotel room
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    feeling just totally overwhelmed.
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    But it wasn't about blood diamonds.
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    Because I'd been speaking
    to lots of people there
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    who, well, they talked
    about a different problem:
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    that of a massive web
    of corruption on a global scale
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    and millions of oil dollars going missing.
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    And for what was then
    a very small organization
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    of just a few people,
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    trying to even begin to think
    how we might tackle that
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    was an enormous challenge.
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    And in the years that I've been,
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    and we've all been campaigning
    and investigating,
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    I've repeatedly seen
    that what makes corruption
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    on a global, massive scale possible,
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    well it isn't just greed
    or the misuse of power
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    or that nebulous phrase "weak governance."
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    I mean, yes, it's all of those,
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    but corruption, it's made
    possible by the actions
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    of global facilitators.
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    So let's go back to some of those
    people I talked about earlier.
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    Now, they're all people
    we've investigated,
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    and they're all people who couldn't
    do what they do alone.
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    Take Obiang junior. Well, he didn't end up
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    with high-end art and luxury
    houses without help.
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    He did business with global banks.
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    A bank in Paris held accounts
    of companies controlled by him,
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    one of which was used to buy the art,
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    and American banks, well, they funneled
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    73 million dollars into the States,
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    some of which was used to buy
    that California mansion.
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    And he didn't do all of this
    in his own name either.
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    He used shell companies.
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    He used one to buy
    the property, and another,
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    which was in somebody else's name,
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    to pay the huge bills it
    cost to run the place.
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    And then there's Dan Etete.
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    Well, when he was oil minister,
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    he awarded an oil block now
    worth over a billion dollars
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    to a company that, guess what, yeah,
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    he was the hidden owner of.
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    Now, it was then much later traded on
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    with the kind assistance
    of the Nigerian government --
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    now I have to be careful what I say here —
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    to subsidiaries of Shell
    and the Italian Eni,
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    two of the biggest oil companies around.
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    So the reality is,
    is that the engine of corruption,
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    well, it exists far
    beyond the shores of countries
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    like Equatorial Guinea
    or Nigeria or Turkmenistan.
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    This engine, well, it's driven
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    by our international banking system,
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    by the problem of anonymous
    shell companies,
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    and by the secrecy that we have afforded
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    big oil, gas and mining operations,
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    and, most of all, by the failure
    of our politicians
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    to back up their rhetoric and do something
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    really meaningful and systemic
    to tackle this stuff.
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    Now let's take the banks first.
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    Well, it's not going
    to come as any surprise
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    for me to tell you that banks
    accept dirty money,
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    but they prioritize their profits
    in other destructive ways too.
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    For example, in Sarawak, Malaysia.
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    Now this region, it has just five percent
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    of its forests left intact. Five percent.
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    So how did that happen?
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    Well, because an elite
    and its facilitators
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    have been making millions of dollars
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    from supporting logging
    on an industrial scale
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    for many years.
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    So we sent an undercover investigator in
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    to secretly film meetings
    with members of the ruling elite,
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    and the resulting footage, well,
    it made some people very angry,
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    and you can see that on YouTube,
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    but it proved what we had long suspected,
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    because it showed
    how the state's chief minister,
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    despite his later denials,
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    used his control over land
    and forest licenses
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    to enrich himself and his family.
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    And HSBC, well, we know
    that HSBC bankrolled
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    the region's largest logging companies
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    that were responsible
    for some of that destruction
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    in Sarawak and elsewhere.
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    The bank violated its own
    sustainability policies in the process,
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    but it earned around 130 million dollars.
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    Now shortly after our exposé,
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    very shortly after our exposé
    earlier this year,
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    the bank announced
    a policy review on this.
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    And is this progress? Maybe,
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    but we're going to be
    keeping a very close eye
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    on that case.
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    And then there's the problem
    of anonymous shell companies.
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    Well, we've all heard
    about what they are, I think,
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    and we all know they're used quite a bit
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    by people and companies
    who are trying to avoid
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    paying their proper dues to society,
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    also known as taxes.
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    But what doesn't usually come to light
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    is how shell companies are used to steal
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    huge sums of money,
    transformational sums of money,
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    from poor countries.
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    In virtually every case of corruption
    that we've investigated,
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    shell companies have appeared,
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    and sometimes
    it's been impossible to find out
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    who is really involved in the deal.
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    A recent study by the World Bank
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    looked at 200 cases of corruption.
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    It found that over 70
    percent of those cases
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    had used anonymous shell companies,
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    totaling almost 56 billion dollars.
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    Now many of these
    companies were in America
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    or the United Kingdom,
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    its overseas territories
    and Crown dependencies,
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    and so it's not just an offshore problem,
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    it's an on-shore one too.
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    You see, shell companies, they're central
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    to the secret deals which may
    benefit wealthy elites
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    rather than ordinary citizens.
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    One striking recent case
    that we've investigated
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    is how the government
    in the Democratic Republic of Congo
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    sold off a series of valuable,
    state-owned mining assets
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    to shell companies
    in the British Virgin Islands.
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    So we spoke to sources in country,
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    trawled through company
    documents and other information
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    trying to piece together a really
    true picture of the deal.
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    And we were alarmed to find
    that these shell companies
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    had quickly flipped many of the assets on
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    for huge profits to major
    international mining companies
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    listed in London.
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    Now, the Africa Progress
    Panel, led by Kofi Annan,
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    they've calculated
    that Congo may have lost
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    more than 1.3 billion dollars
    from these deals.
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    That's almost twice
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    the country's annual health
    and education budget combined.
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    And will the people of Congo,
    will they ever get their money back?
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    Well, the answer to that question,
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    and who was really involved
    and what really happened,
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    well that's going to probably
    remain locked away
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    in the secretive company registries
    of the British Virgin Islands
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    and elsewhere unless we all do
    something about it.
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    And how about the oil, gas
    and mining companies?
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    Okay, maybe it's a bit
    of a cliché to talk about them.
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    Corruption in that sector, no surprise.
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    There's corruption everywhere,
    so why focus on that sector?
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    Well, because there's a lot at stake.
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    In 2011, natural resource exports
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    outweighed aid flows by almost 19 to one
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    in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
    Nineteen to one.
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    Now that's a hell of a lot
    of schools and universities
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    and hospitals and business startups,
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    many of which haven't
    materialized and never will
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    because some of that money
    has simply been stolen away.
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    Now let's go back to the oil
    and mining companies,
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    and let's go back to Dan Etete
    and that $1 billion deal.
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    And now forgive me, I'm
    going to read the next bit
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    because it's a very live
    issue, and our lawyers
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    have been through this in some detail
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    and they want me to get it right.
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    Now, on the surface, the deal
    appeared straightforward.
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    Subsidiaries of Shell and Eni
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    paid the Nigerian
    government for the block.
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    The Nigerian government transferred
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    precisely the same amount,
    to the very dollar,
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    to an account earmarked
    for a shell company
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    whose hidden owner was Etete.
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    Now, that's not bad going
    for a convicted money launderer.
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    And here's the thing.
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    After many months of digging around
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    and reading through hundreds
    of pages of court documents,
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    we found evidence that, in fact,
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    Shell and Eni had known that the funds
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    would be transferred
    to that shell company,
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    and frankly, it's hard
    to believe they didn't know
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    who they were really dealing with there.
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    Now, it just shouldn't take
    these sorts of efforts
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    to find out where the money
    in deals like this went.
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    I mean, these are state assets.
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    They're supposed to be
    used for the benefit
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    of the people in the country.
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    But in some countries,
    citizens and journalists
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    who are trying to expose stories like this
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    have been harassed and arrested
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    and some have even risked
    their lives to do so.
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    And finally, well, there
    are those who believe
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    that corruption is unavoidable.
  • 12:39 - 12:41
    It's just how some business is done.
  • 12:41 - 12:43
    It's too complex and difficult to change.
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    So in effect, what? We just accept it.
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    But as a campaigner and investigator,
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    I have a different view,
  • 12:50 - 12:52
    because I've seen what can happen
  • 12:52 - 12:54
    when an idea gains momentum.
  • 12:54 - 12:57
    In the oil and mining sector, for example,
  • 12:57 - 12:58
    there is now the beginning
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    of a truly worldwide transparency standard
  • 13:02 - 13:05
    that could tackle some of these problems.
  • 13:05 - 13:07
    In 1999, when Global Witness called
  • 13:07 - 13:10
    for oil companies to make
    payments on deals transparent,
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    well, some people laughed
    at the extreme naiveté
  • 13:14 - 13:16
    of that small idea.
  • 13:16 - 13:20
    But literally hundreds
    of civil society groups
  • 13:20 - 13:22
    from around the world came together
  • 13:22 - 13:23
    to fight for transparency,
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    and now it's fast becoming
    the norm and the law.
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    Two thirds of the value
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    of the world's oil and mining companies
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    are now covered by transparency laws.
    Two thirds.
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    So this is change happening.
  • 13:37 - 13:39
    This is progress.
  • 13:39 - 13:42
    But we're not there yet, by far.
  • 13:42 - 13:44
    Because it really isn't about corruption
  • 13:44 - 13:46
    somewhere over there, is it?
  • 13:46 - 13:49
    In a globalized world, corruption
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    is a truly globalized business,
  • 13:51 - 13:53
    and one that needs global solutions,
  • 13:53 - 13:57
    supported and pushed by us
    all, as global citizens,
  • 13:57 - 13:58
    right here.
  • 13:58 - 13:59
    Thank you.
  • 13:59 - 14:06
    (Applause)
Title:
Meet global corruption's hidden players
Speaker:
Charmian Gooch
Description:

When the son of the president of a desperately poor country starts buying mansions and sportscars on an official monthly salary of $7,000, Charmian Gooch suggests, corruption is probably somewhere in the picture. In a blistering, eye-opening talk (and through several specific examples), she details how global corruption trackers follow the money -- to some surprisingly familiar faces.

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Video Language:
English
Team:
closed TED
Project:
TEDTalks
Duration:
14:27

English subtitles

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