The surprising way groups like ISIS stay in power
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0:01 - 0:02For the past decade,
-
0:02 - 0:05I've been studying non-state armed groups:
-
0:05 - 0:09armed organizations like terrorists,
insurgents or militias. -
0:10 - 0:13I document what these groups do
when they're not shooting. -
0:13 - 0:16My goal is to better understand
these violent actors -
0:16 - 0:20and to study ways to encourage transition
from violent engagement -
0:20 - 0:22to nonviolent confrontation.
-
0:22 - 0:25I work in the field, in the policy world
and in the library. -
0:26 - 0:31Understanding non-state armed groups
is key to solving most ongoing conflict, -
0:31 - 0:32because war has changed.
-
0:32 - 0:35It used to be a contest between states.
-
0:36 - 0:37No longer.
-
0:37 - 0:41It is now a conflict between states
and non-state actors. -
0:41 - 0:45For example, of the 216 peace agreements
-
0:45 - 0:48signed between 1975 and 2011,
-
0:48 - 0:54196 of them were between a state
and a non-state actor. -
0:54 - 0:57So we need to understand these groups;
we need to either engage them -
0:57 - 1:02or defeat them in any conflict resolution
process that has to be successful. -
1:02 - 1:03So how do we do that?
-
1:04 - 1:07We need to know what makes
these organizations tick. -
1:07 - 1:10We know a lot about
how they fight, why they fight, -
1:10 - 1:13but no one looks at what they're doing
when they're not fighting. -
1:13 - 1:17Yet, armed struggle
and unarmed politics are related. -
1:17 - 1:19It is all part of the same organization.
-
1:19 - 1:22We cannot understand these groups,
let alone defeat them, -
1:22 - 1:24if we don't have the full picture.
-
1:25 - 1:28And armed groups today
are complex organizations. -
1:28 - 1:30Take the Lebanese Hezbollah,
-
1:30 - 1:33known for its violent
confrontation against Israel. -
1:33 - 1:36But since its creation in the early 1980s,
-
1:36 - 1:38Hezbollah has also set up
a political party, -
1:38 - 1:42a social-service network,
and a military apparatus. -
1:42 - 1:44Similarly, the Palestinian Hamas,
-
1:44 - 1:47known for its suicide attacks
against Israel, -
1:47 - 1:50also runs the Gaza Strip since 2007.
-
1:50 - 1:53So these groups do way more
than just shoot. -
1:53 - 1:55They multi-task.
-
1:55 - 1:58They set up complex
communication machines -- -
1:58 - 2:00radio stations, TV channels,
-
2:00 - 2:03Internet websites
and social media strategies. -
2:03 - 2:06And up here, you have the ISIS magazine,
-
2:06 - 2:09printed in English
and published to recruit. -
2:09 - 2:12Armed groups also invest
in complex fund-raising -- -
2:12 - 2:16not looting, but setting up
profitable businesses; -
2:16 - 2:18for example, construction companies.
-
2:18 - 2:20Now, these activities are keys.
-
2:20 - 2:23They allow these groups
to increase their strength, -
2:23 - 2:24increase their funds,
-
2:24 - 2:27to better recruit
and to build their brand. -
2:28 - 2:29Armed groups also do something else:
-
2:29 - 2:32they build stronger bonds
with the population -
2:32 - 2:34by investing in social services.
-
2:34 - 2:37They build schools, they run hospitals,
-
2:37 - 2:41they set up vocational-training programs
or micro-loan programs. -
2:41 - 2:45Hezbollah offers all
of these services and more. -
2:45 - 2:48Armed groups also seek
to win the population over -
2:48 - 2:52by offering something
that the state is not providing: -
2:52 - 2:54safety and security.
-
2:54 - 2:58The initial rise of the Taliban
in war-torn Afghanistan, -
2:58 - 3:01or even the beginning
of the ascent of ISIS, -
3:01 - 3:04can be understood also by looking
at these groups' efforts -
3:04 - 3:06to provide security.
-
3:06 - 3:09Now, unfortunately, in these cases,
-
3:09 - 3:12the provision of security
came at an unbearably high price -
3:12 - 3:13for the population.
-
3:13 - 3:18But in general, providing
social services fills a gap, -
3:18 - 3:20a governance gap left by the government,
-
3:20 - 3:22and allows these groups
to increase their strength -
3:23 - 3:24and their power.
-
3:24 - 3:28For example, the 2006 electoral victory
of the Palestinian Hamas -
3:28 - 3:32cannot be understood without
acknowledging the group's social work. -
3:33 - 3:35Now, this is a really complex picture,
-
3:35 - 3:38yet in the West,
when we look at armed groups, -
3:38 - 3:40we only think of the violent side.
-
3:40 - 3:43But that's not enough to understand
these groups' strength, -
3:43 - 3:45strategy or long-term vision.
-
3:45 - 3:47These groups are hybrid.
-
3:47 - 3:50They rise because they fill a gap
left by the government, -
3:50 - 3:54and they emerge
to be both armed and political, -
3:54 - 3:57engage in violent struggle
and provide governance. -
3:57 - 4:01And the more these organizations
are complex and sophisticated, -
4:01 - 4:05the less we can think of them
as the opposite of a state. -
4:05 - 4:07Now, what do you call
a group like Hezbollah? -
4:07 - 4:10They run part of a territory,
they administer all their functions, -
4:10 - 4:14they pick up the garbage,
they run the sewage system. -
4:14 - 4:16Is this a state? Is it a rebel group?
-
4:17 - 4:20Or maybe something else,
something different and new? -
4:20 - 4:22And what about ISIS?
-
4:22 - 4:23The lines are blurred.
-
4:23 - 4:27We live in a world of states,
non-states, and in-between, -
4:27 - 4:30and the more states are weak,
like in the Middle East today, -
4:30 - 4:34the more non-state actors
step in and fill that gap. -
4:34 - 4:37This matters for governments,
because to counter these groups, -
4:37 - 4:40they will have to invest more
in non-military tools. -
4:41 - 4:43Filling that governance gap
-
4:43 - 4:46has to be at the center
of any sustainable approach. -
4:46 - 4:50This also matters very much
for peacemaking and peacebuilding. -
4:50 - 4:52If we better understand armed groups,
-
4:52 - 4:54we will better know
what incentives to offer -
4:54 - 4:58to encourage the transition
from violence to nonviolence. -
4:58 - 5:02So in this new contest
between states and non-states, -
5:02 - 5:05military power can win some battles,
-
5:05 - 5:08but it will not give us
peace nor stability. -
5:08 - 5:10To achieve these objectives,
-
5:10 - 5:15what we need is a long-term investment
in filling that security gap, -
5:15 - 5:17in filling that governance gap
-
5:17 - 5:20that allowed these groups
to thrive in the first place. -
5:20 - 5:21Thank you.
-
5:21 - 5:25(Applause)
- Title:
- The surprising way groups like ISIS stay in power
- Speaker:
- Benedetta Berti
- Description:
-
ISIS, Hezbollah, Hamas. These three very different groups are known for violence — but that’s only a portion of what they do, says policy analyst Benedetti Berti. They also attempt to win over populations with social work: setting up schools and hospitals, offering safety and security, and filling the gaps left by weak governments. Understanding the broader work of these groups suggests new strategies for ending the violence.
- Video Language:
- English
- Team:
- closed TED
- Project:
- TEDTalks
- Duration:
- 05:38
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Krystian Aparta edited English subtitles for The surprising way groups like ISIS stay in power | ||
Krystian Aparta edited English subtitles for The surprising way groups like ISIS stay in power | ||
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Camille Martínez edited English subtitles for The surprising way groups like ISIS stay in power |