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What’s wrong with your pa$$w0rd?

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    I am a computer science and engineering
    professor here at Carnegie Mellon,
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    and my research focuses on
    usable privacy and security,
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    and so my friends like to give me examples
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    of their frustrations with computing systems,
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    especially frustrations related to
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    unusable privacy and security.
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    So passwords are something that I hear a lot about.
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    A lot of people are frustrated with passwords,
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    and it's bad enough
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    when you have to have one really good password
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    that you can remember
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    but nobody else is going to be able to guess.
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    But what do you do when you have accounts
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    on a hundred different systems
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    and you're supposed to have a unique password
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    for each of these systems?
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    It's tough.
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    At Carnegie Mellon, they used to make it
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    actually pretty easy for us
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    to remember our passwords.
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    The password requirement up through 2009
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    was just that you had to have a password
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    with at least one character.
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    Pretty easy. But then they changed things,
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    and at the end of 2009, they announced
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    that we were going to have a new policy,
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    and this new policy required
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    passwords that were at least eight characters long,
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    with an uppercase letter, lowercase letter,
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    a digit, a symbol,
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    you couldn't use the same
    character more than three times,
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    and it wasn't allowed to be in a dictionary.
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    Now, when they implemented this new policy,
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    a lot of people, my colleagues and friends,
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    came up to me and they said, "Wow,
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    now that's really unusable.
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    Why are they doing this to us,
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    and why didn't you stop them?"
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    And I said, "Well, you know what?
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    They didn't ask me."
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    But I got curious, and I decided to go talk
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    to the people in charge of our computer systems
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    and find out what led them to introduce
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    this new policy,
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    and they said that the university
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    had joined a consortium of universities,
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    and one of the requirements of membership
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    was that we had to have stronger passwords
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    that complied with some new requirements,
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    and these requirements were that our passwords
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    had to have a lot of entropy.
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    Now entropy is a complicated term,
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    but basically it measures the strength of passwords.
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    But the thing is, there isn't actually
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    a standard measure of entropy.
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    Now, the National Institute
    of Standards and Technology
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    has a set of guidelines
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    which have some rules of thumb
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    for measuring entropy,
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    but they don't have anything too specific,
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    and the reason they only have rules of thumb
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    is it turns out they don't actually have any good data
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    on passwords.
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    In fact, their report states,
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    "Unfortunately, we do not have much data
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    on the passwords users
    choose under particular rules.
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    NIST would like to obtain more data
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    on the passwords users actually choose,
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    but system administrators
    are understandably reluctant
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    to reveal password data to others."
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    So this is a problem, but our research group
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    looked at it as an opportunity.
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    We said, "Well, there's a need
    for good password data.
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    Maybe we can collect some good password data
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    and actually advance the state of the art here.
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    So the first thing we did is,
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    we got a bag of candy bars
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    and we walked around campus
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    and talked to students, faculty and staff,
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    and asked them for information
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    about their passwords.
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    Now we didn't say, "Give us your password."
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    No, we just asked them about their password.
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    How long is it? Does it have a digit?
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    Does it have a symbol?
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    And were you annoyed at having to create
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    a new one last week?
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    So we got results from 470 students,
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    faculty and staff,
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    and indeed we confirmed that the new policy
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    was very annoying,
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    but we also found that people said
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    they felt more secure with these new passwords.
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    We found that most people knew
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    they were not supposed to
    write their password down,
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    and only 13 percent of them did,
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    but disturbingly, 80 percent of people
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    said they were reusing their password.
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    Now, this is actually more dangerous
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    than writing your password down,
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    because it makes you much
    more susceptible to attackers.
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    So if you have to, write your passwords down,
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    but don't reuse them.
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    We also found some interesting things
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    about the symbols people use in passwords.
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    So CMU allows 32 possible symbols,
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    but as you can see, there's only a small number
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    that most people are using,
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    so we're not actually getting very much strength
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    from the symbols in our passwords.
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    So this was a really interesting study,
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    and now we had data from 470 people,
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    but in the scheme of things,
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    that's really not very much password data,
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    and so we looked around to see
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    where could we find additional password data?
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    So it turns out there are a lot of people
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    going around stealing passwords,
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    and they often go and post these passwords
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    on the Internet.
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    So we were able to get access
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    to some of these stolen password sets.
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    This is still not really ideal for research, though,
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    because it's not entirely clear
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    where all of these passwords came from,
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    or exactly what policies were in effect
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    when people created these passwords.
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    So we wanted to find some better source of data.
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    So we decided that one thing we could do
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    is we could do a study and have people
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    actually create passwords for our study.
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    So we used a service called
    Amazon Mechanical Turk,
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    and this is a service where you can post
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    a small job online that takes a minute,
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    a few minutes, an hour,
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    and pay people, a penny, ten cents, a few dollars,
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    to do a task for you,
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    and then you pay them through Amazon.com.
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    So we paid people about 50 cents
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    to create a password following our rules
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    and answering a survey,
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    and then we paid them again to come back
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    two days later and log in
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    using their password and answering another survey.
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    So we did this, and we collected 5,000 passwords,
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    and we gave people a bunch of different policies
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    to create passwords with.
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    So some people had a pretty easy policy,
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    we call it Basic8,
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    and here the only rule was that your password
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    had to have at least eight characters.
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    Then some people had a much harder policy,
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    and this was very similar to the CMU policy,
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    that it had to have eight characters
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    including uppercase, lowercase, digit, symbol,
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    and pass a dictionary check.
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    And one of the other policies we tried,
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    and there were a whole bunch more,
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    but one of the ones we tried was called Basic16,
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    and the only requirement here
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    was that your password had
    to have at least 16 characters.
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    All right, so now we had 5,000 passwords,
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    and so we had much more detailed information.
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    Again we see that there's only a small number
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    of symbols that people are actually using
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    in their passwords.
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    We also wanted to get an idea of how strong
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    the passwords were that people were creating,
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    but as you may recall, there isn't a good measure
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    of password strength.
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    So what we decided to do was to see
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    how long it would take to crack these passwords
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    using the best cracking tools
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    that the bad guys are using,
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    or that we could find information about
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    in the research literature.
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    So to give you an idea of how bad guys
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    go about cracking passwords,
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    they will steal a password file
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    that will have all of the passwords
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    in kind of a scrambled form, called a hash,
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    and so what they'll do is they'll make a guess
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    as to what a password is,
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    run it through a hashing function,
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    and see whether it matches
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    the passwords they have on
    their stolen password list.
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    So a dumb attacker will try every password in order.
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    They'll start with AAAAA and move on to AAAAB,
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    and this is going to take a really long time
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    before they get any passwords
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    that people are really likely to actually have.
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    A smart attacker, on the other hand,
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    does something much more clever.
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    They look at the passwords
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    that are known to be popular
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    from these stolen password sets,
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    and they guess those first.
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    So they're going to start by guessing "password,"
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    and then they'll guess "I love you," and "monkey,"
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    and "12345678,"
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    because these are the passwords
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    that are most likely for people to have.
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    In fact, some of you probably have these passwords.
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    So what we found
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    by running all of these 5,000 passwords we collected
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    through these tests to see how strong they were,
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    we found that the long passwords
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    were actually pretty strong,
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    and the complex passwords were pretty strong too.
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    However, when we looked at the survey data,
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    we saw that people were really frustrated
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    by the very complex passwords,
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    and the long passwords were a lot more usable,
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    and in some cases, they were actually
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    even stronger than the complex passwords.
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    So this suggests that,
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    instead of telling people that they need
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    to put all these symbols and numbers
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    and crazy things into their passwords,
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    we might be better off just telling people
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    to have long passwords.
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    Now here's the problem, though:
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    Some people had long passwords
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    that actually weren't very strong.
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    You can make long passwords
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    that are still the sort of thing
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    that an attacker could easily guess.
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    So we need to do more than
    just say long passwords.
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    There has to be some additional requirements,
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    and some of our ongoing research is looking at
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    what additional requirements we should add
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    to make for stronger passwords
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    that also are going to be easy for people
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    to remember and type.
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    Another approach to getting people to have
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    stronger passwords is to use a password meter.
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    Here are some examples.
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    You may have seen these on the Internet
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    when you were creating passwords.
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    We decided to do a study to find out
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    whether these password meters actually work.
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    Do they actually help people
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    have stronger passwords,
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    and if so, which ones are better?
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    So we tested password meters that were
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    different sizes, shapes, colors,
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    different words next to them,
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    and we even tested one that was a dancing bunny.
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    As you type a better password,
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    the bunny dances faster and faster.
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    So this was pretty fun.
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    What we found
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    was that password meters do work.
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    (Laughter)
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    Most of the password meters were actually effective,
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    and the dancing bunny was very effective too,
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    but the password meters that were the most effective
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    were the ones that made you work harder
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    before they gave you that thumbs up and said
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    you were doing a good job,
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    and in fact we found that most
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    of the password meters on the Internet today
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    are too soft.
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    They tell you you're doing a good job too early,
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    and if they would just wait a little bit
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    before giving you that positive feedback,
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    you probably would have better passwords.
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    Now another approach to better passwords, perhaps,
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    is to use pass phrases instead of passwords.
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    So this was an xkcd cartoon
    from a couple of years ago,
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    and the cartoonist suggests
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    that we should all use pass phrases,
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    and if you look at the second row of this cartoon,
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    you can see the cartoonist is suggesting
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    that the pass phrase "correct horse battery staple"
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    would be a very strong pass phrase
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    and something really easy to remember.
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    He says, in fact, you've already remembered it.
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    And so we decided to do a research study
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    to find out whether this was true or not.
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    In fact, everybody who I talk to,
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    who I mention I'm doing password research,
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    they point out this cartoon.
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    "Oh, have you seen it? That xkcd.
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    Correct horse battery staple."
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    So we did the research study to see
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    what would actually happen.
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    So in our study, we used Mechanical Turk again,
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    and we had the computer pick the random words
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    in the pass phrase.
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    Now the reason we did this
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    is that humans are not very good
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    at picking random words.
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    If we asked a human to do it,
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    they would pick things that were not very random.
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    So we tried a few different conditions.
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    In one condition, the computer picked
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    from a dictionary of the very common words
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    in the English language,
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    and so you'd get pass phrases like
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    "try there three come."
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    And we looked at that, and we said,
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    "Well, that doesn't really seem very memorable."
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    So then we tried picking words
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    that came from specific parts of speech,
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    so how about noun-verb-adjective-noun.
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    That comes up with something
    that's sort of sentence-like.
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    So you can get a pass phrase like
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    "plan builds sure power"
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    or "end determines red drug."
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    And these seemed a little bit more memorable,
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    and maybe people would like those a little bit better.
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    We wanted to compare them with passwords,
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    and so we had the computer
    pick random passwords,
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    and these were nice and short, but as you can see,
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    they don't really look very memorable.
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    And then we decided to try something called
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    a pronounceable password.
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    So here the computer picks random syllables
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    and puts them together
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    so you have something sort of pronounceable,
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    like "tufritvi" and "vadasabi."
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    That one kind of rolls off your tongue.
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    So these were random passwords that were
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    generated by our computer.
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    So what we found in this study was that, surprisingly,
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    pass phrases were not actually all that good.
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    People were not really better at remembering
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    the pass phrases than these random passwords,
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    and because the pass phrases are longer,
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    they took longer to type
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    and people made more errors while typing them in.
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    So it's not really a clear win for pass phrases.
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    Sorry, all of you xkcd fans.
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    On the other hand, we did find
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    that pronounceable passwords
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    worked surprisingly well,
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    and so we actually are doing some more research
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    to see if we can make that
    approach work even better.
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    So one of the problems
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    with some of the studies that we've done
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    is that because they're all done
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    using Mechanical Turk,
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    these are not people's real passwords.
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    They're the passwords that they created
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    or the computer created for them for our study.
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    And we wanted to know whether people
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    would actually behave the same way
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    with their real passwords.
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    So we talked to the information
    security office at Carnegie Mellon
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    and asked them if we could
    have everybody's real passwords.
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    Not surprisingly, they were a little bit reluctant
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    to share them with us,
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    but we were actually able to work out
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    a system with them
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    where they put all of the real passwords
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    for 25,000 CMU students, faculty and staff,
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    into a locked computer in a locked room,
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    not connected to the Internet,
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    and they ran code on it that we wrote
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    to analyze these passwords.
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    They audited our code.
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    They ran the code.
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    And so we never actually saw
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    anybody's password.
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    We got some interesting results,
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    and those of you Tepper students in the back
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    will be very interested in this.
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    So we found that the passwords created
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    by people affiliated with the
    school of computer science
  • 14:00 - 14:03
    were actually 1.8 times stronger
  • 14:03 - 14:07
    than those affiliated with the business school.
  • 14:07 - 14:09
    We have lots of other really interesting
  • 14:09 - 14:11
    demographic information as well.
  • 14:11 - 14:13
    The other interesting thing that we found
  • 14:13 - 14:15
    is that when we compared
    the Carnegie Mellon passwords
  • 14:15 - 14:17
    to the Mechanical Turk-generated passwords,
  • 14:17 - 14:20
    there was actually a lot of similarities,
  • 14:20 - 14:22
    and so this helped validate our research method
  • 14:22 - 14:24
    and show that actually, collecting passwords
  • 14:24 - 14:26
    using these Mechanical Turk studies
  • 14:26 - 14:29
    is actually a valid way to study passwords.
  • 14:29 - 14:31
    So that was good news.
  • 14:31 - 14:34
    Okay, I want to close by talking about
  • 14:34 - 14:36
    some insights I gained while on sabbatical
  • 14:36 - 14:39
    last year in the Carnegie Mellon art school.
  • 14:39 - 14:40
    One of the things that I did
  • 14:40 - 14:42
    is I made a number of quilts,
  • 14:42 - 14:43
    and I made this quilt here.
  • 14:43 - 14:45
    It's called "Security Blanket."
  • 14:45 - 14:48
    (Laughter)
  • 14:48 - 14:51
    And this quilt has the 1,000
  • 14:51 - 14:53
    most frequent passwords stolen
  • 14:53 - 14:56
    from the RockYou website.
  • 14:56 - 14:58
    And the size of the passwords is proportional
  • 14:58 - 15:00
    to how frequently they appeared
  • 15:00 - 15:02
    in the stolen dataset.
  • 15:02 - 15:05
    And what I did is I created this word cloud,
  • 15:05 - 15:07
    and I went through all 1,000 words,
  • 15:07 - 15:08
    and I categorized them into
  • 15:08 - 15:11
    loose thematic categories.
  • 15:11 - 15:13
    And it was, in some cases,
  • 15:13 - 15:15
    it was kind of difficult to figure out
  • 15:15 - 15:17
    what category they should be in,
  • 15:17 - 15:18
    and then I color-coded them.
  • 15:18 - 15:21
    So here are some examples of the difficulty.
  • 15:21 - 15:22
    So "justin."
  • 15:22 - 15:24
    Is that the name of the user,
  • 15:24 - 15:25
    their boyfriend, their son?
  • 15:25 - 15:28
    Maybe they're a Justin Bieber fan.
  • 15:28 - 15:30
    Or "princess."
  • 15:30 - 15:32
    Is that a nickname?
  • 15:32 - 15:34
    Are they Disney princess fans?
  • 15:34 - 15:37
    Or maybe that's the name of their cat.
  • 15:37 - 15:39
    "Iloveyou" appears many times
  • 15:39 - 15:41
    in many different languages.
  • 15:41 - 15:44
    There's a lot of love in these passwords.
  • 15:44 - 15:46
    If you look carefully, you'll see there's also
  • 15:46 - 15:48
    some profanity,
  • 15:48 - 15:50
    but it was really interesting to me to see
  • 15:50 - 15:53
    that there's a lot more love than hate
  • 15:53 - 15:55
    in these passwords.
  • 15:55 - 15:56
    And there are animals,
  • 15:56 - 15:58
    a lot of animals,
  • 15:58 - 16:00
    and "monkey" is the most common animal
  • 16:00 - 16:04
    and the 14th most popular password overall.
  • 16:04 - 16:06
    And this was really curious to me,
  • 16:06 - 16:08
    and I wondered, "Why are monkeys so popular?"
  • 16:08 - 16:12
    And so in our last password study,
  • 16:12 - 16:13
    any time we detected somebody
  • 16:13 - 16:16
    creating a password with the word "monkey" in it,
  • 16:16 - 16:19
    we asked them why they had
    a monkey in their password.
  • 16:19 - 16:21
    And what we found out --
  • 16:21 - 16:23
    we found 17 people so far, I think,
  • 16:23 - 16:24
    who have the word "monkey" --
  • 16:24 - 16:26
    We found out about a third of them said
  • 16:26 - 16:28
    they have a pet named "monkey"
  • 16:28 - 16:30
    or a friend whose nickname is "monkey,"
  • 16:30 - 16:32
    and about a third of them said
  • 16:32 - 16:33
    that they just like monkeys
  • 16:33 - 16:35
    and monkeys are really cute.
  • 16:35 - 16:39
    And that guy is really cute.
  • 16:39 - 16:42
    So it seems that at the end of the day,
  • 16:42 - 16:44
    when we make passwords,
  • 16:44 - 16:46
    we either make something that's really easy
  • 16:46 - 16:49
    to type, a common pattern,
  • 16:49 - 16:51
    or things that remind us of the word password
  • 16:51 - 16:55
    or the account that we've created the password for,
  • 16:55 - 16:57
    or whatever.
  • 16:57 - 17:00
    Or we think about things that make us happy,
  • 17:00 - 17:01
    and we create our password
  • 17:01 - 17:04
    based on things that make us happy.
  • 17:04 - 17:06
    And while this makes typing
  • 17:06 - 17:09
    and remembering your password more fun,
  • 17:09 - 17:11
    it also makes it a lot easier
  • 17:11 - 17:13
    to guess your password.
  • 17:13 - 17:14
    So I know a lot of these TED Talks
  • 17:14 - 17:16
    are inspirational
  • 17:16 - 17:18
    and they make you think about nice, happy things,
  • 17:18 - 17:20
    but when you're creating your password,
  • 17:20 - 17:22
    try to think about something else.
  • 17:22 - 17:23
    Thank you.
  • 17:23 - 17:24
    (Applause)
Title:
What’s wrong with your pa$$w0rd?
Speaker:
Lorrie Faith Cranor
Description:

Lorrie Faith Cranor studied thousands of real passwords to figure out the surprising, very common mistakes that users — and secured sites — make to compromise security. And how, you may ask, did she study thousands of real passwords without compromising the security of any users? That's a story in itself. It's secret data worth knowing, especially if your password is 123456 ...

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Video Language:
English
Team:
closed TED
Project:
TEDTalks
Duration:
17:41

English subtitles

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