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Nationalism vs. globalism: the new political divide

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    Chris Anderson: Hello.
    Welcome to this TED Dialogues.
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    It's the first of a series
    that's going to be done
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    in response to the current
    political upheaval.
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    I don't know about you;
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    I've become quite concerned about
    the growing divisiveness in this country
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    and in the world.
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    No one's listening to each other. Right?
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    They aren't.
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    I mean, it feels like we need
    a different kind of conversation,
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    one that's based on -- I don't know,
    on reason, listening, on understanding,
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    on a broader context.
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    That's at least what we're going to try
    in these TED Dialogues,
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    starting today.
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    And we couldn't have anyone with us
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    who I'd be more excited to kick this off.
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    This is a mind right here that thinks
    pretty much like no one else
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    on the planet, I would hasten to say.
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    I'm serious.
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    (Yuval Noah Harari laughs)
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    I'm serious.
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    He synthesizes history
    with underlying ideas
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    in a way that kind of takes
    your breath away.
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    So, some of you will know
    this book, "Sapiens."
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    Has anyone here read "Sapiens"?
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    (Applause)
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    I mean, I could not put it down.
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    The way that he tells the story of mankind
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    through big ideas that really make you
    think differently --
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    it's kind of amazing.
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    And here's the follow-up,
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    which I think is being published
    in the US next week.
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    YNH: Yeah, next week.
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    CA: "Homo Deus."
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    Now, this is the history
    of the next hundred years.
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    I've had a chance to read it.
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    It's extremely dramatic,
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    and I daresay, for some people,
    quite alarming.
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    It's a must-read.
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    And honestly, we couldn't have
    someone better to help
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    make sense of what on Earth
    is happening in the world right now.
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    So a warm welcome, please,
    to Yuval Noah Harari.
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    (Applause)
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    It's great to be joined by our friends
    on Facebook and around the Web.
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    Hello, Facebook.
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    And all of you, as I start
    asking questions of Yuval,
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    come up with your own questions,
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    and not necessarily about
    the political scandal du jour,
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    but about the broader understanding
    of: Where are we heading?
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    You ready? OK, we're going to go.
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    So here we are, Yuval:
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    New York City, 2017,
    there's a new president in power,
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    and shock waves rippling around the world.
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    What on Earth is happening?
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    YNH: I think the basic thing that happened
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    is that we have lost our story.
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    Humans think in stories,
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    and we try to make sense of the world
    by telling stories.
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    And for the last few decades,
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    we had a very simple
    and very attractive story
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    about what's happening in the world.
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    And the story said that,
    oh, what's happening is
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    that the economy is being globalized,
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    politics is being liberalized,
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    and the combination of the two
    will create paradise on Earth,
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    and we just need to keep on
    globalizing the economy
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    and liberalizing the political system,
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    and everything will be wonderful.
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    And 2016 is the moment
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    when a very large segment,
    even of the Western world,
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    stopped believing in this story.
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    For good or bad reasons --
    it doesn't matter.
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    People stopped believing in the story,
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    and when you don't have a story,
    you don't understand what's happening.
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    CA: Part of you believes that that story
    was actually a very effective story.
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    It worked.
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    YNH: To some extent, yes.
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    According to some measurements,
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    we are now in the best time ever
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    for humankind.
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    Today, for the first time in history,
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    more people die from eating too much
    than from eating too little,
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    which is an amazing achievement.
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    (Laughter)
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    Also for the first time in history,
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    more people die from old age
    than from infectious diseases,
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    and violence is also down.
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    For the first time in history,
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    more people commit suicide
    than are killed by crime and terrorism
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    and war put together.
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    Statistically, you are
    your own worst enemy.
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    At least, of all the people in the world,
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    you are most likely
    to be killed by yourself --
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    (Laughter)
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    which is, again,
    very good news, compared --
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    (Laughter)
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    compared to the level of violence
    that we saw in previous eras.
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    CA: But this process
    of connecting the world
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    ended up with a large group of people
    kind of feeling left out,
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    and they've reacted.
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    And so we have this bombshell
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    that's sort of ripping
    through the whole system.
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    I mean, what do you make
    of what's happened?
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    It feels like the old way
    that people thought of politics,
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    the left-right divide,
    has been blown up and replaced.
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    How should we think of this?
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    YNH: Yeah, the old 20th-century
    political model of left versus right
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    is now largely irrelevant,
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    and the real divide today
    is between global and national,
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    global or local.
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    And you see it again all over the world
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    that this is now the main struggle.
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    We probably need completely
    new political models
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    and completely new ways
    of thinking about politics.
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    In essence, what you can say
    is that we now have global ecology,
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    we have a global economy
    but we have national politics,
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    and this doesn't work together.
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    This makes the political
    system ineffective,
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    because it has no control
    over the forces that shape our life.
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    And you have basically two solutions
    to this imbalance:
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    either de-globalize the economy
    and turn it back into a national economy,
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    or globalize the political system.
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    CA: So some, I guess
    many liberals out there
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    view Trump and his government
    as kind of irredeemably bad,
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    just awful in every way.
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    Do you see any underlying narrative
    or political philosophy in there
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    that is at least worth understanding?
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    How would you articulate that philosophy?
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    Is it just the philosophy of nationalism?
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    YNH: I think the underlying
    feeling or idea
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    is that the political system --
    something is broken there.
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    It doesn't empower
    the ordinary person anymore.
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    It doesn't care so much
    about the ordinary person anymore,
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    and I think this diagnosis
    of the political disease is correct.
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    With regard to the answers,
    I am far less certain.
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    I think what we are seeing
    is the immediate human reaction:
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    if something doesn't work, let's go back.
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    And you see it all over the world,
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    that people, almost nobody
    in the political system today,
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    has any future-oriented vision
    of where humankind is going.
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    Almost everywhere,
    you see retrograde vision:
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    "Let's make America great again,"
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    like it was great -- I don't know --
    in the '50s, in the '80s, sometime,
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    let's go back there.
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    And you go to Russia
    a hundred years after Lenin,
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    Putin's vision for the future
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    is basically, ah, let's go back
    to the Tsarist empire.
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    And in Israel, where I come from,
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    the hottest political vision
    of the present is:
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    "Let's build the temple again."
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    So let's go back 2,000 years backwards.
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    So people are thinking
    sometime in the past we've lost it,
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    and sometimes in the past, it's like
    you've lost your way in the city,
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    and you say OK, let's go back
    to the point where I felt secure
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    and start again.
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    I don't think this can work,
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    but a lot of people,
    this is their gut instinct.
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    CA: But why couldn't it work?
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    "America First" is a very
    appealing slogan in many ways.
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    Patriotism is, in many ways,
    a very noble thing.
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    It's played a role
    in promoting cooperation
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    among large numbers of people.
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    Why couldn't you have a world
    organized in countries,
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    all of which put themselves first?
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    YNH: For many centuries,
    even thousands of years,
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    patriotism worked quite well.
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    Of course, it led to wars an so forth,
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    but we shouldn't focus
    too much on the bad.
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    There are also many,
    many positive things about patriotism,
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    and the ability to have
    a large number of people
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    care about each other,
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    sympathize with one another,
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    and come together for collective action.
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    If you go back to the first nations,
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    so, thousands of years ago,
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    the people who lived along
    the Yellow River in China --
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    it was many, many different tribes
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    and they all depended on the river
    for survival and for prosperity,
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    but all of them also suffered
    from periodical floods
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    and periodical droughts.
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    And no tribe could really do
    anything about it,
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    because each of them controlled
    just a tiny section of the river.
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    And then in a long
    and complicated process,
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    the tribes coalesced together
    to form the Chinese nation,
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    which controlled the entire Yellow River
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    and had the ability to bring
    hundreds of thousands of people together
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    to build dams and canals
    and regulate the river
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    and prevent the worst floods and droughts
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    and raise the level
    of prosperity for everybody.
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    And this worked in many places
    around the world.
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    But in the 21st century,
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    technology is changing all that
    in a fundamental way.
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    We are now living -- all people
    in the world --
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    are living alongside the same cyber river,
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    and no single nation can regulate
    this river by itself.
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    We are all living together
    on a single planet,
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    which is threatened by our own actions.
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    And if you don't have some kind
    of global cooperation,
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    nationalism is just not on the right level
    to tackle the problems,
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    whether it's climate change
    or whether it's technological disruption.
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    CA: So it was a beautiful idea
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    in a world where most of the action,
    most of the issues,
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    took place on national scale,
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    but your argument is that the issues
    that matter most today
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    no longer take place on a national scale
    but on a global scale.
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    YNH: Exactly. All the major problems
    of the world today
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    are global in essence,
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    and they cannot be solved
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    unless through some kind
    of global cooperation.
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    It's not just climate change,
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    which is, like, the most obvious
    example people give.
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    I think more in terms
    of technological disruption.
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    If you think about, for example,
    artificial intelligence,
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    over the next 20, 30 years
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    pushing hundreds of millions of people
    out of the job market --
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    this is a problem on a global level.
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    It will disrupt the economy
    of all the countries.
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    And similarly, if you think
    about, say, bioengineering
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    and people being afraid of conducting,
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    I don't know, genetic engineering
    research in humans,
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    it won't help if just
    a single country, let's say the US,
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    outlaws all genetic experiments in humans,
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    but China or North Korea
    continues to do it.
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    So the US cannot solve it by itself,
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    and very quickly, the pressure on the US
    to do the same will be immense
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    because we are talking about
    high-risk, high-gain technologies.
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    If somebody else is doing it,
    I can't allow myself to remain behind.
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    The only way to have regulations,
    effective regulations,
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    on things like genetic engineering,
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    is to have global regulations.
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    If you just have national regulations,
    nobody would like to stay behind.
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    CA: So this is really interesting.
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    It seems to me that this may be one key
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    to provoking at least
    a constructive conversation
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    between the different sides here,
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    because I think everyone can agree
    that the start point
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    of a lot of the anger
    that's propelled us to where we are
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    is because of the legitimate
    concerns about job loss.
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    Work is gone, a traditional
    way of life has gone,
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    and it's no wonder
    that people are furious about that.
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    And in general, they have blamed
    globalism, global elites,
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    for doing this to them
    without asking their permission,
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    and that seems like
    a legitimate complaint.
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    But what I hear you saying
    is that -- so a key question is:
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    What is the real cause of job loss,
    both now and going forward?
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    To the extent that it's about globalism,
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    then the right response,
    yes, is to shut down borders
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    and keep people out
    and change trade agreements and so forth.
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    But you're saying, I think,
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    that actually the bigger cause of job loss
    is not going to be that at all.
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    It's going to originate
    in technological questions,
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    and we have no chance of solving that
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    unless we operate as a connected world.
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    YNH: Yeah, I think that,
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    I don't know about the present,
    but looking to the future,
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    it's not the Mexicans or Chinese
    who will take the jobs
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    from the people in Pennsylvania,
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    it's the robots and algorithms.
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    So unless you plan to build a big wall
    on the border of California --
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    (Laughter)
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    the wall on the border with Mexico
    is going to be very ineffective.
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    And I was struck when I watched
    the debates before the election,
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    I was struck that certainly Trump
    did not even attempt to frighten people
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    by saying the robots will take your jobs.
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    Now even if it's not true,
    it doesn't matter.
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    It could have been an extremely
    effective way of frightening people --
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    (Laughter)
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    and galvanizing people:
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    "The robots will take your jobs!"
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    And nobody used that line.
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    And it made me afraid,
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    because it meant
    that no matter what happens
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    in universities and laboratories,
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    and there, there is already
    an intense debate about it,
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    but in the mainstream political system
    and among the general public,
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    people are just unaware
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    that there could be an immense
    technological disruption --
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    not in 200 years,
    but in 10, 20, 30 years --
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    and we have to do something about it now,
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    partly because most of what we teach
    children today in school or in college
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    is going to be completely irrelevant
    to the job market of 2040, 2050.
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    So it's not something we'll need
    to think about in 2040.
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    We need to think today
    what to teach the young people.
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    CA: Yeah, no, absolutely.
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    You've often written about
    moments in history
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    where humankind has ...
    entered a new era, unintentionally.
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    Decisions have been made,
    technologies have been developed,
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    and suddenly the world has changed,
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    possibly in a way
    that's worse for everyone.
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    So one of the examples
    you give in "Sapiens"
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    is just the whole agricultural revolution,
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    which, for an actual person
    tilling the fields,
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    they just picked up a 12-hour
    backbreaking workday
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    instead of six hours in the jungle
    and a much more interesting lifestyle.
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    (Laughter)
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    So are we at another possible
    phase change here,
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    where we kind of sleepwalk into a future
    that none of us actually wants?
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    YNH: Yes, very much so.
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    During the agricultural revolution,
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    what happened is that immense
    technological and economic revolution
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    empowered the human collective,
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    but when you look at actual
    individual lives,
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    the life of a tiny elite
    became much better,
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    and the lives of the majority of people
    became considerably worse.
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    And this can happen again
    in the 21st century.
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    No doubt the new technologies
    will empower the human collective.
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    But we may end up again
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    with a tiny elite reaping
    all the benefits, taking all the fruits,
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    and the masses of the population
    finding themselves worse
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    than they were before,
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    certainly much worse than this tiny elite.
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    CA: And those elites
    might not even be human elites.
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    They might be cyborgs or --
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    YNH: Yeah, they could be
    enhanced super humans.
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    They could be cyborgs.
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    They could be completely
    nonorganic elites.
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    They could even be
    non-conscious algorithms.
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    What we see now in the world
    is authority shifting away
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    from humans to algorithms.
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    More and more decisions --
    about personal lives,
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    about economic matters,
    about political matters --
  • 16:37 - 16:40
    are actually being taken by algorithms.
  • 16:40 - 16:42
    If you ask the bank for a loan,
  • 16:42 - 16:47
    chances are your fate is decided
    by an algorithm, not by a human being.
  • 16:47 - 16:53
    And the general impression
    is that maybe Homo sapiens just lost it.
  • 16:53 - 16:58
    The world is so complicated,
    there is so much data,
  • 16:58 - 17:00
    things are changing so fast,
  • 17:00 - 17:04
    that this thing that evolved
    on the African savanna
  • 17:04 - 17:06
    tens of thousands of years ago --
  • 17:06 - 17:09
    to cope with a particular environment,
  • 17:09 - 17:13
    a particular volume
    of information and data --
  • 17:13 - 17:17
    it just can't handle the realities
    of the 21st century,
  • 17:17 - 17:20
    and the only thing
    that may be able to handle it
  • 17:20 - 17:22
    is big-data algorithms.
  • 17:22 - 17:28
    So no wonder more and more authority
    is shifting from us to the algorithms.
  • 17:29 - 17:33
    CA: So we're in New York City
    for the first of a series of TED Dialogues
  • 17:33 - 17:35
    with Yuval Harari,
  • 17:35 - 17:39
    and there's a Facebook Live
    audience out there.
  • 17:39 - 17:41
    We're excited to have you with us.
  • 17:41 - 17:43
    We'll start coming
    to some of your questions
  • 17:43 - 17:44
    and questions of people in the room
  • 17:44 - 17:46
    in just a few minutes,
  • 17:46 - 17:48
    so have those coming.
  • 17:48 - 17:52
    Yuval, if you're going
    to make the argument
  • 17:52 - 17:58
    that we need to get past nationalism
    because of the coming technological ...
  • 17:59 - 18:01
    danger, in a way,
  • 18:01 - 18:03
    presented by so much of what's happening
  • 18:03 - 18:05
    we've got to have
    a global conversation about this.
  • 18:06 - 18:09
    Trouble is, it's hard to get people
    really believing that, I don't know,
  • 18:09 - 18:11
    AI really is an imminent
    threat, and so forth.
  • 18:11 - 18:14
    The things that people,
    some people at least,
  • 18:14 - 18:16
    care about much more immediately, perhaps,
  • 18:16 - 18:18
    is climate change,
  • 18:18 - 18:22
    perhaps other issues like refugees,
    nuclear weapons, and so forth.
  • 18:22 - 18:28
    Would you argue that where
    we are right now
  • 18:28 - 18:31
    that somehow those issues
    need to be dialed up?
  • 18:31 - 18:33
    You've talked about climate change,
  • 18:33 - 18:37
    but Trump has said
    he doesn't believe in that.
  • 18:37 - 18:39
    So in a way, your most powerful argument,
  • 18:39 - 18:42
    you can't actually use to make this case.
  • 18:42 - 18:44
    YNH: Yeah, I think with climate change,
  • 18:44 - 18:48
    at first sight, it's quite surprising
  • 18:48 - 18:51
    that there is a very close correlation
  • 18:51 - 18:54
    between nationalism and climate change.
  • 18:54 - 18:59
    I mean, almost always, the people
    who deny climate change are nationalists.
  • 18:59 - 19:01
    And at first sight, you think: Why?
  • 19:01 - 19:02
    What's the connection?
  • 19:02 - 19:05
    Why don't you have socialists
    denying climate change?
  • 19:05 - 19:07
    But then, when you think
    about it, it's obvious --
  • 19:07 - 19:11
    because nationalism has no solution
    to climate change.
  • 19:11 - 19:14
    If you want to be a nationalist
    in the 21st century,
  • 19:14 - 19:16
    you have to deny the problem.
  • 19:16 - 19:20
    If you accept the reality of the problem,
    then you must accept that, yes,
  • 19:21 - 19:23
    there is still room in the world
    for patriotism,
  • 19:23 - 19:27
    there is still room in the world
    for having special loyalties
  • 19:27 - 19:32
    and obligations towards your own people,
    towards your own country.
  • 19:32 - 19:36
    I don't think anybody is really
    thinking of abolishing that.
  • 19:36 - 19:39
    But in order to confront climate change,
  • 19:39 - 19:43
    we need additional loyalties
    and commitments
  • 19:43 - 19:45
    to a level beyond the nation.
  • 19:45 - 19:48
    And that should not be impossible,
  • 19:48 - 19:51
    because people can have
    several layers of loyalty.
  • 19:51 - 19:54
    You can be loyal to your family
  • 19:54 - 19:55
    and to your community
  • 19:55 - 19:57
    and to your nation,
  • 19:57 - 20:00
    so why can't you also be loyal
    to humankind as a whole?
  • 20:00 - 20:04
    Of course, there are occasions
    when it becomes difficult,
  • 20:04 - 20:06
    what to put first,
  • 20:06 - 20:07
    but, you know, life is difficult.
  • 20:08 - 20:09
    Handle it.
  • 20:09 - 20:11
    (Laughter)
  • 20:11 - 20:16
    CA: OK, so I would love to get
    some questions from the audience here.
  • 20:16 - 20:18
    We've got a microphone here.
  • 20:18 - 20:21
    Speak into it, and Facebook,
    get them coming, too.
  • 20:21 - 20:24
    Howard Morgan: One of the things that has
    clearly made a huge difference
  • 20:25 - 20:26
    in this country and other countries
  • 20:26 - 20:29
    is the income distribution inequality,
  • 20:29 - 20:33
    the dramatic change
    in income distribution in the US
  • 20:33 - 20:35
    from what it was 50 years ago,
  • 20:35 - 20:36
    and around the world.
  • 20:36 - 20:39
    Is there anything we can do
    to affect that?
  • 20:39 - 20:42
    Because that gets at a lot
    of the underlying causes.
  • 20:44 - 20:50
    YNH: So far I haven't heard a very
    good idea about what to do about it,
  • 20:50 - 20:53
    again, partly because most ideas
    remain on the national level,
  • 20:53 - 20:55
    and the problem is global.
  • 20:55 - 20:58
    I mean, one idea that we hear
    quite a lot about now
  • 20:58 - 21:00
    is universal basic income.
  • 21:00 - 21:01
    But this is a problem.
  • 21:01 - 21:03
    I mean, I think it's a good start,
  • 21:03 - 21:07
    but it's a problematic idea because
    it's not clear what "universal" is
  • 21:07 - 21:08
    and it's not clear what "basic" is.
  • 21:08 - 21:12
    Most people when they speak
    about universal basic income,
  • 21:12 - 21:15
    they actually mean national basic income.
  • 21:15 - 21:16
    But the problem is global.
  • 21:16 - 21:22
    Let's say that you have AI and 3D printers
    taking away millions of jobs
  • 21:22 - 21:23
    in Bangladesh,
  • 21:23 - 21:27
    from all the people who make
    my shirts and my shoes.
  • 21:27 - 21:28
    So what's going to happen?
  • 21:28 - 21:34
    The US government will levy taxes
    on Google and Apple in California,
  • 21:34 - 21:39
    and use that to pay basic income
    to unemployed Bangladeshis?
  • 21:39 - 21:42
    If you believe that,
    you can just as well believe
  • 21:42 - 21:45
    that Santa Claus will come
    and solve the problem.
  • 21:45 - 21:51
    So unless we have really universal
    and not national basic income,
  • 21:51 - 21:54
    the deep problems
    are not going to go away.
  • 21:54 - 21:56
    And also it's not clear what basic is,
  • 21:57 - 21:59
    because what are basic human needs?
  • 21:59 - 22:02
    A thousand years ago,
    just food and shelter was enough.
  • 22:02 - 22:06
    But today, people will say
    education is a basic human need,
  • 22:06 - 22:07
    it should be part of the package.
  • 22:07 - 22:11
    But how much? Six years?
    Twelve years? PhD?
  • 22:11 - 22:13
    Similarly, with health care,
  • 22:13 - 22:16
    let's say that in 20, 30, 40 years,
  • 22:16 - 22:19
    you'll have expensive treatments
    that can extend human life
  • 22:19 - 22:21
    to 120, I don't know.
  • 22:21 - 22:27
    Will this be part of the basket
    of basic income or not?
  • 22:27 - 22:28
    It's a very difficult problem,
  • 22:28 - 22:34
    because in a world where people
    lose their ability to be employed,
  • 22:34 - 22:38
    the only thing they are going to get
    is this basic income.
  • 22:38 - 22:43
    So what's part of it is a very,
    very difficult ethical question.
  • 22:43 - 22:46
    CA: There's a bunch of questions
    on how the world affords it as well,
  • 22:46 - 22:48
    who pays.
  • 22:48 - 22:50
    There's a question here
    from Facebook from Lisa Larson:
  • 22:50 - 22:53
    "How does nationalism in the US now
  • 22:53 - 22:56
    compare to that between
    World War I and World War II
  • 22:56 - 22:58
    in the last century?"
  • 22:58 - 23:02
    YNH: Well the good news, with regard
    to the dangers of nationalism,
  • 23:02 - 23:06
    we are in a much better position
    than a century ago.
  • 23:06 - 23:09
    A century ago, 1917,
  • 23:09 - 23:12
    Europeans were killing
    each other by the millions.
  • 23:12 - 23:16
    In 2016, with Brexit,
    as far as I remember,
  • 23:17 - 23:22
    a single person lost their life,
    an MP who was murdered by some extremist.
  • 23:22 - 23:23
    Just a single person.
  • 23:23 - 23:26
    I mean, if Brexit was about
    British independence,
  • 23:26 - 23:31
    this is the most peaceful
    war of independence in human history.
  • 23:31 - 23:37
    And let's say that Scotland
    will now choose to leave the UK
  • 23:37 - 23:39
    after Brexit.
  • 23:39 - 23:41
    So in the 18th century,
  • 23:41 - 23:44
    if Scotland wanted -- and the Scots
    wanted several times --
  • 23:44 - 23:48
    to break out of the control of London,
  • 23:48 - 23:52
    the reaction of the government
    in London was to send an army up north
  • 23:52 - 23:55
    to burn down Edinburgh
    and massacre the highland tribes.
  • 23:55 - 24:01
    My guess is that if, in 2018,
    the Scots vote for independence,
  • 24:01 - 24:04
    the London government
    will not send an army up north
  • 24:04 - 24:06
    to burn down Edinburgh.
  • 24:06 - 24:10
    Very few people are now willing
    to kill or be killed
  • 24:10 - 24:13
    for Scottish or for British independence.
  • 24:13 - 24:18
    So for all the talk
    of the rise of nationalism
  • 24:18 - 24:20
    and going back to the 1930s,
  • 24:20 - 24:24
    to the 19th century, in the West at least,
  • 24:24 - 24:31
    the power of national sentiments
    today is far, far smaller
  • 24:31 - 24:32
    than it was a century ago.
  • 24:32 - 24:36
    CA: Although some people now,
    you hear publicly worrying
  • 24:36 - 24:39
    about whether that might be shifting,
  • 24:39 - 24:42
    that there could actually be
    outbreaks of violence in the US
  • 24:42 - 24:45
    depending on how things turn out.
  • 24:45 - 24:46
    Should we be worried about that,
  • 24:46 - 24:48
    or do you really think
    things have shifted?
  • 24:49 - 24:50
    YNH: No, we should be worried.
  • 24:50 - 24:52
    We should be aware of two things.
  • 24:52 - 24:53
    First of all, don't be hysterical.
  • 24:53 - 24:57
    We are not back
    in the First World War yet.
  • 24:57 - 25:00
    But on the other hand,
    don't be complacent.
  • 25:00 - 25:05
    We reached from 1917 to 2017,
  • 25:05 - 25:07
    not by some divine miracle,
  • 25:07 - 25:09
    but simply by human decisions,
  • 25:09 - 25:12
    and if we now start making
    the wrong decisions,
  • 25:12 - 25:17
    we could be back
    in an analogous situation to 1917
  • 25:17 - 25:18
    in a few years.
  • 25:18 - 25:20
    One of the things I know as a historian
  • 25:20 - 25:24
    is that you should never
    underestimate human stupidity.
  • 25:24 - 25:27
    (Laughter)
  • 25:27 - 25:30
    It's one of the most powerful
    forces in history,
  • 25:30 - 25:33
    human stupidity and human violence.
  • 25:33 - 25:37
    Humans do such crazy things
    for no obvious reason,
  • 25:37 - 25:38
    but again, at the same time,
  • 25:38 - 25:42
    another very powerful force
    in human history is human wisdom.
  • 25:42 - 25:43
    We have both.
  • 25:43 - 25:46
    CA: We have with us here
    moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt,
  • 25:46 - 25:48
    who I think has a question.
  • 25:49 - 25:50
    Jonathan Haidt: Thanks, Yuval.
  • 25:50 - 25:53
    So you seem to be a fan
    of global governance,
  • 25:53 - 25:56
    but when you look at the map of the world
    from Transparency International,
  • 25:56 - 26:00
    which rates the level of corruption
    of political institutions,
  • 26:00 - 26:03
    it's a vast sea of red with little bits
    of yellow here and there
  • 26:03 - 26:04
    for those with good institutions.
  • 26:05 - 26:07
    So if we were to have
    some kind of global governance,
  • 26:07 - 26:10
    what makes you think it would end up
    being more like Denmark
  • 26:10 - 26:12
    rather than more like Russia or Honduras,
  • 26:12 - 26:13
    and aren't there alternatives,
  • 26:13 - 26:16
    such as we did with CFCs?
  • 26:16 - 26:19
    There are ways to solve global problems
    with national governments.
  • 26:19 - 26:21
    What would world government
    actually look like,
  • 26:21 - 26:23
    and why do you think it would work?
  • 26:23 - 26:26
    YNH: Well, I don't know
    what it would look like.
  • 26:26 - 26:30
    Nobody still has a model for that.
  • 26:30 - 26:32
    The main reason we need it
  • 26:32 - 26:37
    is because many of these issues
    are lose-lose situations.
  • 26:37 - 26:39
    When you have
    a win-win situation like trade,
  • 26:39 - 26:42
    both sides can benefit
    from a trade agreement,
  • 26:42 - 26:45
    then this is something you can work out.
  • 26:45 - 26:47
    Without some kind of global government,
  • 26:47 - 26:50
    national governments each
    have an interest in doing it.
  • 26:50 - 26:54
    But when you have a lose-lose situation
    like with climate change,
  • 26:54 - 26:56
    it's much more difficult
  • 26:56 - 27:00
    without some overarching
    authority, real authority.
  • 27:00 - 27:03
    Now, how to get there
    and what would it look like,
  • 27:03 - 27:05
    I don't know.
  • 27:05 - 27:08
    And certainly there is no obvious reason
  • 27:08 - 27:11
    to think that it would look like Denmark,
  • 27:11 - 27:12
    or that it would be a democracy.
  • 27:12 - 27:15
    Most likely it wouldn't.
  • 27:15 - 27:21
    We don't have workable democratic models
  • 27:21 - 27:23
    for a global government.
  • 27:23 - 27:26
    So maybe it would look more
    like ancient China
  • 27:26 - 27:28
    than like modern Denmark.
  • 27:28 - 27:33
    But still, given the dangers
    that we are facing,
  • 27:33 - 27:38
    I think the imperative of having
    some kind of real ability
  • 27:38 - 27:42
    to force through difficult decisions
    on the global level
  • 27:42 - 27:47
    is more important
    than almost anything else.
  • 27:48 - 27:50
    CA: There's a question from Facebook here,
  • 27:50 - 27:52
    and then we'll get the mic to Andrew.
  • 27:52 - 27:54
    So, Kat Hebron on Facebook,
  • 27:54 - 27:56
    calling in from Vail:
  • 27:56 - 28:00
    "How would developed nations manage
    the millions of climate migrants?"
  • 28:01 - 28:03
    YNH: I don't know.
  • 28:03 - 28:05
    CA: That's your answer, Kat. (Laughter)
  • 28:05 - 28:07
    YNH: And I don't think
    that they know either.
  • 28:07 - 28:09
    They'll just deny the problem, maybe.
  • 28:09 - 28:12
    CA: But immigration, generally,
    is another example of a problem
  • 28:12 - 28:15
    that's very hard to solve
    on a nation-by-nation basis.
  • 28:15 - 28:16
    One nation can shut its doors,
  • 28:16 - 28:19
    but maybe that stores up
    problems for the future.
  • 28:19 - 28:22
    YNH: Yes, I mean --
    it's another very good case,
  • 28:22 - 28:25
    especially because it's so much easier
  • 28:25 - 28:27
    to migrate today
  • 28:27 - 28:30
    than it was in the Middle Ages
    or in ancient times.
  • 28:30 - 28:35
    CA: Yuval, there's a belief
    among many technologists, certainly,
  • 28:35 - 28:37
    that political concerns
    are kind of overblown,
  • 28:37 - 28:41
    that actually, political leaders
    don't have that much influence
  • 28:41 - 28:42
    in the world,
  • 28:42 - 28:46
    that the real determination of humanity
    at this point is by science,
  • 28:46 - 28:48
    by invention, by companies,
  • 28:48 - 28:52
    by many things
    other than political leaders,
  • 28:52 - 28:54
    and it's actually very hard
    for leaders to do much,
  • 28:54 - 28:57
    so we're actually worrying
    about nothing here.
  • 28:58 - 29:00
    YNH: Well, first, it should be emphasized
  • 29:00 - 29:05
    that it's true that political leaders'
    ability to do good is very limited,
  • 29:05 - 29:08
    but their ability to do harm is unlimited.
  • 29:08 - 29:11
    There is a basic imbalance here.
  • 29:11 - 29:15
    You can still press the button
    and blow everybody up.
  • 29:15 - 29:16
    You have that kind of ability.
  • 29:16 - 29:20
    But if you want, for example,
    to reduce inequality,
  • 29:20 - 29:22
    that's very, very difficult.
  • 29:22 - 29:23
    But to start a war,
  • 29:23 - 29:25
    you can still do so very easily.
  • 29:25 - 29:29
    So there is a built-in imbalance
    in the political system today
  • 29:29 - 29:30
    which is very frustrating,
  • 29:30 - 29:35
    where you cannot do a lot of good
    but you can still do a lot of harm.
  • 29:35 - 29:39
    And this makes the political system
    still a very big concern.
  • 29:40 - 29:42
    CA: So as you look at
    what's happening today,
  • 29:42 - 29:44
    and putting your historian's hat on,
  • 29:44 - 29:47
    do you look back in history at moments
    when things were going just fine
  • 29:47 - 29:53
    and an individual leader really took
    the world or their country backwards?
  • 29:53 - 29:56
    YNH: There are quite a few examples,
  • 29:56 - 29:59
    but I should emphasize,
    it's never an individual leader.
  • 29:59 - 30:00
    I mean, somebody put him there,
  • 30:00 - 30:04
    and somebody allowed him
    to continue to be there.
  • 30:04 - 30:08
    So it's never really just the fault
    of a single individual.
  • 30:08 - 30:12
    There are a lot of people
    behind every such individual.
  • 30:13 - 30:16
    CA: Can we have the microphone
    here, please, to Andrew?
  • 30:19 - 30:23
    Andrew Solomon: You've talked a lot
    about the global versus the national,
  • 30:23 - 30:24
    but increasingly, it seems to me,
  • 30:24 - 30:27
    the world situation
    is in the hands of identity groups.
  • 30:27 - 30:29
    We look at people within the United States
  • 30:29 - 30:31
    who have been recruited by ISIS.
  • 30:31 - 30:33
    We look at these other groups
    which have formed
  • 30:33 - 30:35
    which go outside of national bounds
  • 30:35 - 30:37
    but still represent
    significant authorities.
  • 30:37 - 30:40
    How are they to be integrated
    into the system,
  • 30:40 - 30:44
    and how is a diverse set of identities
    to be made coherent
  • 30:44 - 30:46
    under either national
    or global leadership?
  • 30:47 - 30:51
    YNH: Well, the problem
    of such diverse identities
  • 30:51 - 30:53
    is a problem from nationalism as well.
  • 30:53 - 30:58
    Nationalism believes
    in a single, monolithic identity,
  • 30:58 - 31:02
    and exclusive or at least
    more extreme versions of nationalism
  • 31:02 - 31:05
    believe in an exclusive loyalty
    to a single identity.
  • 31:05 - 31:08
    And therefore, nationalism has had
    a lot of problems
  • 31:08 - 31:11
    with people wanting to divide
    their identities
  • 31:11 - 31:13
    between various groups.
  • 31:13 - 31:18
    So it's not just a problem, say,
    for a global vision.
  • 31:19 - 31:22
    And I think, again, history shows
  • 31:22 - 31:29
    that you shouldn't necessarily
    think in such exclusive terms.
  • 31:29 - 31:32
    If you think that there is just
    a single identity for a person,
  • 31:32 - 31:37
    "I am just X, that's it, I can't be
    several things, I can be just that,"
  • 31:37 - 31:39
    that's the start of the problem.
  • 31:39 - 31:42
    You have religions, you have nations
  • 31:42 - 31:45
    that sometimes demand exclusive loyalty,
  • 31:45 - 31:47
    but it's not the only option.
  • 31:47 - 31:49
    There are many religions and many nations
  • 31:49 - 31:53
    that enable you to have
    diverse identities at the same time.
  • 31:53 - 31:58
    CA: But is one explanation
    of what's happened in the last year
  • 31:58 - 32:03
    that a group of people have got
    fed up with, if you like,
  • 32:03 - 32:06
    the liberal elites,
    for want of a better term,
  • 32:06 - 32:10
    obsessing over many, many different
    identities and them feeling,
  • 32:10 - 32:14
    "But what about my identity?
    I am being completely ignored here.
  • 32:14 - 32:17
    And by the way, I thought
    I was the majority"?
  • 32:17 - 32:20
    And that that's actually
    sparked a lot of the anger.
  • 32:21 - 32:24
    YNH: Yeah. Identity is always problematic,
  • 32:24 - 32:28
    because identity is always based
    on fictional stories
  • 32:28 - 32:31
    that sooner or later collide with reality.
  • 32:32 - 32:33
    Almost all identities,
  • 32:33 - 32:37
    I mean, beyond the level
    of the basic community
  • 32:37 - 32:38
    of a few dozen people,
  • 32:38 - 32:40
    are based on a fictional story.
  • 32:40 - 32:42
    They are not the truth.
  • 32:42 - 32:43
    They are not the reality.
  • 32:43 - 32:46
    It's just a story that people invent
    and tell one another
  • 32:46 - 32:48
    and start believing.
  • 32:48 - 32:53
    And therefore all identities
    are extremely unstable.
  • 32:53 - 32:56
    They are not a biological reality.
  • 32:56 - 32:58
    Sometimes nationalists, for example,
  • 32:58 - 33:01
    think that the nation
    is a biological entity.
  • 33:01 - 33:04
    It's made of the combination
    of soil and blood,
  • 33:04 - 33:06
    creates the nation.
  • 33:06 - 33:09
    But this is just a fictional story.
  • 33:09 - 33:12
    CA: Soil and blood
    kind of makes a gooey mess.
  • 33:12 - 33:14
    (Laughter)
  • 33:14 - 33:17
    YNH: It does, and also
    it messes with your mind
  • 33:17 - 33:22
    when you think too much
    that I am a combination of soil and blood.
  • 33:22 - 33:24
    If you look from a biological perspective,
  • 33:24 - 33:28
    obviously none of the nations
    that exist today
  • 33:28 - 33:30
    existed 5,000 years ago.
  • 33:30 - 33:34
    Homo sapiens is a social animal,
    that's for sure.
  • 33:34 - 33:37
    But for millions of years,
  • 33:37 - 33:41
    Homo sapiens and our hominid ancestors
    lived in small communities
  • 33:41 - 33:44
    of a few dozen individuals.
  • 33:44 - 33:46
    Everybody knew everybody else.
  • 33:46 - 33:50
    Whereas modern nations
    are imagined communities,
  • 33:50 - 33:52
    in the sense that I don't even know
    all these people.
  • 33:52 - 33:55
    I come from a relatively
    small nation, Israel,
  • 33:55 - 33:57
    and of eight million Israelis,
  • 33:57 - 33:59
    I never met most of them.
  • 33:59 - 34:02
    I will never meet most of them.
  • 34:02 - 34:04
    They basically exist here.
  • 34:04 - 34:07
    CA: But in terms of this identity,
  • 34:07 - 34:13
    this group who feel left out
    and perhaps have work taken away,
  • 34:13 - 34:15
    I mean, in "Homo Deus,"
  • 34:15 - 34:18
    you actually speak of this group
    in one sense expanding,
  • 34:18 - 34:22
    that so many people
    may have their jobs taken away
  • 34:22 - 34:26
    by technology in some way
    that we could end up with
  • 34:26 - 34:29
    a really large -- I think you call it
    a "useless class" --
  • 34:29 - 34:31
    a class where traditionally,
  • 34:31 - 34:34
    as viewed by the economy,
    these people have no use.
  • 34:34 - 34:35
    YNH: Yes.
  • 34:35 - 34:38
    CA: How likely a possibility is that?
  • 34:38 - 34:41
    Is that something
    we should be terrified about?
  • 34:41 - 34:44
    And can we address it in any way?
  • 34:44 - 34:46
    YNH: We should think about it
    very carefully.
  • 34:46 - 34:49
    I mean, nobody really knows
    what the job market will look like
  • 34:49 - 34:51
    in 2040, 2050.
  • 34:51 - 34:53
    There is a chance
    many new jobs will appear,
  • 34:53 - 34:55
    but it's not certain.
  • 34:55 - 34:57
    And even if new jobs do appear,
  • 34:58 - 34:59
    it won't necessarily be easy
  • 35:00 - 35:03
    for a 50-year old unemployed truck driver
  • 35:03 - 35:06
    made unemployed by self-driving vehicles,
  • 35:06 - 35:09
    it won't be easy
    for an unemployed truck driver
  • 35:09 - 35:14
    to reinvent himself or herself
    as a designer of virtual worlds.
  • 35:14 - 35:18
    Previously, if you look at the trajectory
    of the industrial revolution,
  • 35:18 - 35:22
    when machines replaced humans
    in one type of work,
  • 35:22 - 35:27
    the solution usually came
    from low-skill work
  • 35:27 - 35:29
    in new lines of business.
  • 35:29 - 35:33
    So you didn't need any more
    agricultural workers,
  • 35:33 - 35:38
    so people moved to working
    in low-skill industrial jobs,
  • 35:38 - 35:42
    and when this was taken away
    by more and more machines,
  • 35:42 - 35:45
    people moved to low-skill service jobs.
  • 35:45 - 35:48
    Now, when people say there will
    be new jobs in the future,
  • 35:48 - 35:51
    that humans can do better than AI,
  • 35:51 - 35:52
    that humans can do better than robots,
  • 35:52 - 35:55
    they usually think about high-skill jobs,
  • 35:55 - 35:59
    like software engineers
    designing virtual worlds.
  • 35:59 - 36:04
    Now, I don't see how
    an unemployed cashier from Wal-Mart
  • 36:04 - 36:09
    reinvents herself or himself at 50
    as a designer of virtual worlds,
  • 36:09 - 36:11
    and certainly I don't see
  • 36:11 - 36:14
    how the millions of unemployed
    Bangladeshi textile workers
  • 36:14 - 36:16
    will be able to do that.
  • 36:16 - 36:17
    I mean, if they are going to do it,
  • 36:17 - 36:21
    we need to start teaching
    the Bangladeshis today
  • 36:21 - 36:23
    how to be software designers,
  • 36:23 - 36:24
    and we are not doing it.
  • 36:24 - 36:26
    So what will they do in 20 years?
  • 36:26 - 36:30
    CA: So it feels like you're really
    highlighting a question
  • 36:30 - 36:34
    that's really been bugging me
    the last few months more and more.
  • 36:35 - 36:37
    It's almost a hard question
    to ask in public,
  • 36:37 - 36:41
    but if any mind has some wisdom
    to offer in it, maybe it's yours,
  • 36:41 - 36:42
    so I'm going to ask you:
  • 36:42 - 36:44
    What are humans for?
  • 36:45 - 36:47
    YNH: As far as we know, for nothing.
  • 36:47 - 36:49
    (Laughter)
  • 36:49 - 36:54
    I mean, there is no great cosmic drama,
    some great cosmic plan,
  • 36:54 - 36:57
    that we have a role to play in.
  • 36:57 - 37:00
    And we just need to discover
    what our role is
  • 37:00 - 37:03
    and then play it to the best
    of our ability.
  • 37:03 - 37:08
    This has been the story of all religions
    and ideologies and so forth,
  • 37:08 - 37:12
    but as a scientist, the best I can say
    is this is not true.
  • 37:12 - 37:17
    There is no universal drama
    with a role in it for Homo sapiens.
  • 37:17 - 37:19
    So --
  • 37:19 - 37:21
    CA: I'm going to push back on you
    just for a minute,
  • 37:22 - 37:23
    just from your own book,
  • 37:23 - 37:24
    because in "Homo Deus,"
  • 37:24 - 37:29
    you give really one of the most coherent
    and understandable accounts
  • 37:29 - 37:31
    about sentience, about consciousness,
  • 37:31 - 37:34
    and that unique sort of human skill.
  • 37:34 - 37:37
    You point out that it's different
    from intelligence,
  • 37:37 - 37:39
    the intelligence
    that we're building in machines,
  • 37:39 - 37:43
    and that there's actually a lot
    of mystery around it.
  • 37:43 - 37:46
    How can you be sure there's no purpose
  • 37:46 - 37:50
    when we don't even understand
    what this sentience thing is?
  • 37:50 - 37:53
    I mean, in your own thinking,
    isn't there a chance
  • 37:53 - 37:57
    that what humans are for
    is to be the universe's sentient things,
  • 37:57 - 38:01
    to be the centers of joy and love
    and happiness and hope?
  • 38:01 - 38:04
    And maybe we can build machines
    that actually help amplify that,
  • 38:04 - 38:07
    even if they're not going to become
    sentient themselves?
  • 38:07 - 38:08
    Is that crazy?
  • 38:08 - 38:11
    I kind of found myself hoping that,
    reading your book.
  • 38:11 - 38:15
    YNH: Well, I certainly think that the most
    interesting question today in science
  • 38:15 - 38:18
    is the question
    of consciousness and the mind.
  • 38:18 - 38:21
    We are getting better and better
    in understanding the brain
  • 38:21 - 38:22
    and intelligence,
  • 38:22 - 38:25
    but we are not getting much better
  • 38:25 - 38:27
    in understanding the mind
    and consciousness.
  • 38:27 - 38:31
    People often confuse intelligence
    and consciousness,
  • 38:31 - 38:33
    especially in places like Silicon Valley,
  • 38:33 - 38:37
    which is understandable,
    because in humans, they go together.
  • 38:37 - 38:40
    I mean, intelligence basically
    is the ability to solve problems.
  • 38:40 - 38:43
    Consciousness is the ability
    to feel things,
  • 38:43 - 38:48
    to feel joy and sadness
    and boredom and pain and so forth.
  • 38:48 - 38:52
    In Homo sapiens and all other mammals
    as well -- it's not unique to humans --
  • 38:52 - 38:55
    in all mammals and birds
    and some other animals,
  • 38:55 - 38:58
    intelligence and consciousness
    go together.
  • 38:58 - 39:01
    We often solve problems by feeling things.
  • 39:01 - 39:03
    So we tend to confuse them.
  • 39:03 - 39:04
    But they are different things.
  • 39:04 - 39:07
    What's happening today
    in places like Silicon Valley
  • 39:07 - 39:11
    is that we are creating
    artificial intelligence
  • 39:11 - 39:13
    but not artificial consciousness.
  • 39:13 - 39:16
    There has been an amazing development
    in computer intelligence
  • 39:16 - 39:18
    over the last 50 years,
  • 39:18 - 39:22
    and exactly zero development
    in computer consciousness,
  • 39:22 - 39:26
    and there is no indication that computers
    are going to become conscious
  • 39:26 - 39:28
    anytime soon.
  • 39:28 - 39:34
    So first of all, if there is
    some cosmic role for consciousness,
  • 39:34 - 39:36
    it's not unique to Homo sapiens.
  • 39:36 - 39:38
    Cows are conscious, pigs are conscious,
  • 39:38 - 39:41
    chimpanzees are conscious,
    chickens are conscious,
  • 39:41 - 39:45
    so if we go that way, first of all,
    we need to broaden our horizons
  • 39:45 - 39:50
    and remember very clearly we are not
    the only sentient beings on Earth,
  • 39:50 - 39:52
    and when it comes to sentience --
  • 39:52 - 39:55
    when it comes to intelligence,
    there is good reason to think
  • 39:55 - 39:58
    we are the most intelligent
    of the whole bunch.
  • 39:58 - 40:01
    But when it comes to sentience,
  • 40:01 - 40:04
    to say that humans are more
    sentient than whales,
  • 40:04 - 40:08
    or more sentient than baboons
    or more sentient than cats,
  • 40:08 - 40:11
    I see no evidence for that.
  • 40:11 - 40:14
    So first step is, you go
    in that direction, expand.
  • 40:14 - 40:18
    And then the second question
    of what is it for,
  • 40:18 - 40:20
    I would reverse it
  • 40:20 - 40:24
    and I would say that I don't think
    sentience is for anything.
  • 40:24 - 40:29
    I think we don't need
    to find our role in the universe.
  • 40:29 - 40:34
    The really important thing
    is to liberate ourselves from suffering.
  • 40:34 - 40:37
    What characterizes sentient beings
  • 40:37 - 40:40
    in contrast to robots, to stones,
  • 40:40 - 40:41
    to whatever,
  • 40:41 - 40:45
    is that sentient beings
    suffer, can suffer,
  • 40:45 - 40:48
    and what they should focus on
  • 40:48 - 40:52
    is not finding their place
    in some mysterious cosmic drama.
  • 40:52 - 40:56
    They should focus on understanding
    what suffering is,
  • 40:56 - 40:59
    what causes it and how
    to be liberated from it.
  • 41:00 - 41:03
    CA: I know this is a big issue for you,
    and that was very eloquent.
  • 41:03 - 41:06
    We're going to have a blizzard
    of questions from the audience here,
  • 41:07 - 41:08
    and maybe from Facebook as well,
  • 41:08 - 41:10
    and maybe some comments as well.
  • 41:10 - 41:12
    So let's go quick.
  • 41:12 - 41:13
    There's one right here.
  • 41:15 - 41:18
    Keep your hands held up
    at the back if you want the mic,
  • 41:18 - 41:19
    and we'll get it back to you.
  • 41:19 - 41:22
    Question: In your work, you talk a lot
    about the fictional stories
  • 41:22 - 41:24
    that we accept as truth,
  • 41:24 - 41:26
    and we live our lives by it.
  • 41:26 - 41:28
    As an individual, knowing that,
  • 41:28 - 41:32
    how does it impact the stories
    that you choose to live your life,
  • 41:32 - 41:36
    and do you confuse them
    with the truth, like all of us?
  • 41:36 - 41:37
    YNH: I try not to.
  • 41:37 - 41:40
    I mean, for me, maybe the most
    important question,
  • 41:40 - 41:43
    both as a scientist and as a person,
  • 41:43 - 41:47
    is how to tell the difference
    between fiction and reality,
  • 41:47 - 41:49
    because reality is there.
  • 41:49 - 41:51
    I'm not saying that everything is fiction.
  • 41:51 - 41:54
    It's just very difficult for human beings
    to tell the difference
  • 41:54 - 41:56
    between fiction and reality,
  • 41:56 - 42:01
    and it has become more and more difficult
    as history progressed,
  • 42:01 - 42:04
    because the fictions
    that we have created --
  • 42:04 - 42:07
    nations and gods and money
    and corporations --
  • 42:07 - 42:08
    they now control the world.
  • 42:08 - 42:09
    So just to even think,
  • 42:09 - 42:13
    "Oh, this is just all fictional entities
    that we've created,"
  • 42:13 - 42:14
    is very difficult.
  • 42:14 - 42:16
    But reality is there.
  • 42:17 - 42:19
    For me the best ...
  • 42:19 - 42:21
    There are several tests
  • 42:21 - 42:24
    to tell the difference
    between fiction and reality.
  • 42:24 - 42:27
    The simplest one, the best one
    that I can say in short,
  • 42:27 - 42:29
    is the test of suffering.
  • 42:29 - 42:31
    If it can suffer, it's real.
  • 42:31 - 42:33
    If it can't suffer, it's not real.
  • 42:33 - 42:34
    A nation cannot suffer.
  • 42:34 - 42:36
    That's very, very clear.
  • 42:36 - 42:38
    Even if a nation loses a war,
  • 42:38 - 42:42
    we say, "Germany suffered a defeat
    in the First World War,"
  • 42:42 - 42:43
    it's a metaphor.
  • 42:43 - 42:46
    Germany cannot suffer.
    Germany has no mind.
  • 42:46 - 42:47
    Germany has no consciousness.
  • 42:47 - 42:51
    Germans can suffer, yes,
    but Germany cannot.
  • 42:51 - 42:54
    Similarly, when a bank goes bust,
  • 42:54 - 42:56
    the bank cannot suffer.
  • 42:56 - 42:59
    When the dollar loses its value,
    the dollar doesn't suffer.
  • 42:59 - 43:02
    People can suffer. Animals can suffer.
  • 43:02 - 43:03
    This is real.
  • 43:03 - 43:07
    So I would start, if you
    really want to see reality,
  • 43:07 - 43:09
    I would go through the door of suffering.
  • 43:09 - 43:12
    If you can really understand
    what suffering is,
  • 43:12 - 43:15
    this will give you also the key
  • 43:15 - 43:17
    to understand what reality is.
  • 43:17 - 43:20
    CA: There's a Facebook question
    here that connects to this,
  • 43:20 - 43:23
    from someone around the world
    in a language that I cannot read.
  • 43:23 - 43:25
    YNH: Oh, it's Hebrew.
    CA: Hebrew. There you go.
  • 43:25 - 43:26
    (Laughter)
  • 43:26 - 43:27
    Can you read the name?
  • 43:27 - 43:29
    YNH: Or Lauterbach Goren.
  • 43:29 - 43:31
    CA: Well, thank you for writing in.
  • 43:31 - 43:35
    The question is: "Is the post-truth era
    really a brand-new era,
  • 43:35 - 43:40
    or just another climax or moment
    in a never-ending trend?
  • 43:41 - 43:44
    YNH: Personally, I don't connect
    with this idea of post-truth.
  • 43:44 - 43:47
    My basic reaction as a historian is:
  • 43:47 - 43:51
    If this is the era of post-truth,
    when the hell was the era of truth?
  • 43:51 - 43:52
    CA: Right.
  • 43:52 - 43:53
    (Laughter)
  • 43:53 - 43:58
    YNH: Was it the 1980s, the 1950s,
    the Middle Ages?
  • 43:58 - 44:02
    I mean, we have always lived
    in an era, in a way, of post-truth.
  • 44:03 - 44:05
    CA: But I'd push back on that,
  • 44:05 - 44:08
    because I think what people
    are talking about
  • 44:08 - 44:15
    is that there was a world
    where you had fewer journalistic outlets,
  • 44:15 - 44:19
    where there were traditions,
    that things were fact-checked.
  • 44:19 - 44:23
    It was incorporated into the charter
    of those organizations
  • 44:23 - 44:25
    that the truth mattered.
  • 44:25 - 44:26
    So if you believe in a reality,
  • 44:27 - 44:29
    then what you write is information.
  • 44:29 - 44:33
    There was a belief that that information
    should connect to reality in a real way,
  • 44:33 - 44:36
    and if you wrote a headline,
    it was a serious, earnest attempt
  • 44:36 - 44:38
    to reflect something
    that had actually happened.
  • 44:38 - 44:40
    And people didn't always get it right.
  • 44:40 - 44:42
    But I think the concern now is you've got
  • 44:42 - 44:44
    a technological system
    that's incredibly powerful
  • 44:44 - 44:48
    that, for a while at least,
    massively amplified anything
  • 44:48 - 44:51
    with no attention paid to whether
    it connected to reality,
  • 44:51 - 44:54
    only to whether it connected
    to clicks and attention,
  • 44:54 - 44:56
    and that that was arguably toxic.
  • 44:56 - 44:58
    That's a reasonable concern, isn't it?
  • 44:58 - 45:01
    YNH: Yeah, it is. I mean,
    the technology changes,
  • 45:01 - 45:06
    and it's now easier to disseminate
    both truth and fiction and falsehood.
  • 45:06 - 45:08
    It goes both ways.
  • 45:08 - 45:13
    It's also much easier, though, to spread
    the truth than it was ever before.
  • 45:13 - 45:16
    But I don't think there
    is anything essentially new
  • 45:16 - 45:21
    about this disseminating
    fictions and errors.
  • 45:21 - 45:25
    There is nothing that -- I don't know --
    Joseph Goebbels, didn't know
  • 45:25 - 45:31
    about all this idea of fake
    news and post-truth.
  • 45:31 - 45:34
    He famously said that if you repeat
    a lie often enough,
  • 45:34 - 45:36
    people will think it's the truth,
  • 45:36 - 45:39
    and the bigger the lie, the better,
  • 45:39 - 45:45
    because people won't even think
    that something so big can be a lie.
  • 45:45 - 45:50
    I think that fake news
    has been with us for thousands of years.
  • 45:50 - 45:52
    Just think of the Bible.
  • 45:52 - 45:54
    (Laughter)
  • 45:54 - 45:55
    CA: But there is a concern
  • 45:55 - 45:59
    that the fake news is associated
    with tyrannical regimes,
  • 45:59 - 46:02
    and when you see an uprise in fake news
  • 46:02 - 46:06
    that is a canary in the coal mine
    that there may be dark times coming.
  • 46:08 - 46:15
    YNH: Yeah. I mean, the intentional use
    of fake news is a disturbing sign.
  • 46:16 - 46:20
    But I'm not saying that it's not bad,
    I'm just saying that it's not new.
  • 46:21 - 46:24
    CA: There's a lot of interest
    on Facebook on this question
  • 46:24 - 46:29
    about global governance
    versus nationalism.
  • 46:29 - 46:31
    Question here from Phil Dennis:
  • 46:31 - 46:34
    "How do we get people, governments,
    to relinquish power?
  • 46:34 - 46:38
    Is that -- is that --
    actually, the text is so big
  • 46:38 - 46:40
    I can't read the full question.
  • 46:40 - 46:41
    But is that a necessity?
  • 46:41 - 46:44
    Is it going to take war to get there?
  • 46:44 - 46:48
    Sorry Phil -- I mangled your question,
    but I blame the text right here.
  • 46:48 - 46:50
    YNH: One option
    that some people talk about
  • 46:50 - 46:55
    is that only a catastrophe
    can shake humankind
  • 46:55 - 47:00
    and open the path to a real system
    of global governance,
  • 47:00 - 47:04
    and they say that we can't do it
    before the catastrophe,
  • 47:04 - 47:07
    but we need to start
    laying the foundations
  • 47:07 - 47:09
    so that when the disaster strikes,
  • 47:09 - 47:12
    we can react quickly.
  • 47:12 - 47:16
    But people will just not have
    the motivation to do such a thing
  • 47:16 - 47:18
    before the disaster strikes.
  • 47:18 - 47:20
    Another thing that I would emphasize
  • 47:20 - 47:25
    is that anybody who is really
    interested in global governance
  • 47:25 - 47:28
    should always make it very, very clear
  • 47:28 - 47:35
    that it doesn't replace or abolish
    local identities and communities,
  • 47:35 - 47:38
    that it should come both as --
  • 47:38 - 47:41
    It should be part of a single package.
  • 47:41 - 47:44
    CA: I want to hear more on this,
  • 47:44 - 47:47
    because the very words "global governance"
  • 47:47 - 47:52
    are almost the epitome of evil
    in the mindset of a lot of people
  • 47:52 - 47:53
    on the alt-right right now.
  • 47:53 - 47:56
    It just seems scary, remote, distant,
    and it has let them down,
  • 47:56 - 48:00
    and so globalists,
    global governance -- no, go away!
  • 48:00 - 48:04
    And many view the election
    as the ultimate poke in the eye
  • 48:04 - 48:06
    to anyone who believes in that.
  • 48:06 - 48:09
    So how do we change the narrative
  • 48:09 - 48:12
    so that it doesn't seem
    so scary and remote?
  • 48:12 - 48:15
    Build more on this idea
    of it being compatible
  • 48:15 - 48:18
    with local identity, local communities.
  • 48:18 - 48:20
    YNH: Well, I think again we should start
  • 48:20 - 48:23
    really with the biological realities
  • 48:23 - 48:25
    of Homo sapiens.
  • 48:26 - 48:30
    And biology tells us two things
    about Homo sapiens
  • 48:30 - 48:32
    which are very relevant to this issue:
  • 48:32 - 48:35
    first of all, that we are
    completely dependent
  • 48:35 - 48:38
    on the ecological system around us,
  • 48:38 - 48:41
    and that today we are talking
    about a global system.
  • 48:41 - 48:42
    You cannot escape that.
  • 48:42 - 48:46
    And at the same time, biology tells us
    about Homo sapiens
  • 48:46 - 48:48
    that we are social animals,
  • 48:48 - 48:53
    but that we are social
    on a very, very local level.
  • 48:53 - 48:57
    It's just a simple fact of humanity
  • 48:57 - 49:01
    that we cannot have intimate familiarity
  • 49:01 - 49:05
    with more than about 150 individuals.
  • 49:05 - 49:10
    The size of the natural group,
  • 49:10 - 49:13
    the natural community of Homo sapiens,
  • 49:13 - 49:16
    is not more than 150 individuals,
  • 49:16 - 49:23
    and everything beyond that is really
    based on all kinds of imaginary stories
  • 49:23 - 49:25
    and large-scale institutions,
  • 49:25 - 49:29
    and I think that we can find a way,
  • 49:29 - 49:34
    again, based on a biological
    understanding of our species,
  • 49:34 - 49:36
    to weave the two together
  • 49:36 - 49:39
    and to understand that today
    in the 21st century,
  • 49:39 - 49:44
    we need both the global level
    and the local community.
  • 49:44 - 49:46
    And I would go even further than that
  • 49:46 - 49:50
    and say that it starts
    with the body itself.
  • 49:50 - 49:55
    The feelings that people today have
    of alienation and loneliness
  • 49:55 - 49:58
    and not finding their place in the world,
  • 49:58 - 50:04
    I would think that the chief problem
    is not global capitalism.
  • 50:04 - 50:07
    The chief problem is that over
    the last hundred years,
  • 50:07 - 50:11
    people have been becoming disembodied,
  • 50:11 - 50:14
    have been distancing themselves
    from their body.
  • 50:14 - 50:17
    As a hunter-gatherer or even as a peasant,
  • 50:17 - 50:21
    to survive, you need to be
    constantly in touch
  • 50:21 - 50:24
    with your body and with your senses,
  • 50:24 - 50:25
    every moment.
  • 50:25 - 50:27
    If you go to the forest
    to look for mushrooms
  • 50:27 - 50:29
    and you don't pay attention
    to what you hear,
  • 50:29 - 50:31
    to what you smell, to what you taste,
  • 50:31 - 50:32
    you're dead.
  • 50:32 - 50:35
    So you must be very connected.
  • 50:35 - 50:39
    In the last hundred years,
    people are losing their ability
  • 50:39 - 50:42
    to be in touch with their body
    and their senses,
  • 50:42 - 50:44
    to hear, to smell, to feel.
  • 50:44 - 50:47
    More and more attention goes to screens,
  • 50:47 - 50:49
    to what is happening elsewhere,
  • 50:49 - 50:50
    some other time.
  • 50:50 - 50:53
    This, I think, is the deep reason
  • 50:53 - 50:57
    for the feelings of alienation
    and loneliness and so forth,
  • 50:57 - 50:59
    and therefore part of the solution
  • 50:59 - 51:03
    is not to bring back
    some mass nationalism,
  • 51:03 - 51:08
    but also reconnect with our own bodies,
  • 51:08 - 51:11
    and if you are back
    in touch with your body,
  • 51:11 - 51:14
    you will feel much more at home
    in the world also.
  • 51:14 - 51:18
    CA: Well, depending on how things go,
    we may all be back in the forest soon.
  • 51:18 - 51:20
    We're going to have
    one more question in the room
  • 51:20 - 51:22
    and one more on Facebook.
  • 51:22 - 51:25
    Ama Adi-Dako: Hello. I'm from Ghana,
    West Africa, and my question is:
  • 51:25 - 51:30
    I'm wondering how do you present
    and justify the idea of global governance
  • 51:30 - 51:33
    to countries that have been
    historically disenfranchised
  • 51:33 - 51:35
    by the effects of globalization,
  • 51:35 - 51:38
    and also, if we're talking about
    global governance,
  • 51:38 - 51:41
    it sounds to me like it will definitely
    come from a very Westernized idea
  • 51:41 - 51:43
    of what the "global"
    is supposed to look like.
  • 51:43 - 51:47
    So how do we present and justify
    that idea of global
  • 51:47 - 51:50
    versus wholly nationalist
  • 51:50 - 51:53
    to people in countries like Ghana
    and Nigeria and Togo
  • 51:53 - 51:55
    and other countries like that?
  • 51:56 - 52:03
    YNH: I would start by saying
    that history is extremely unfair,
  • 52:03 - 52:06
    and that we should realize that.
  • 52:07 - 52:10
    Many of the countries that suffered most
  • 52:10 - 52:14
    from the last 200 years of globalization
  • 52:14 - 52:16
    and imperialism and industrialization
  • 52:16 - 52:22
    are exactly the countries
    which are also most likely to suffer most
  • 52:22 - 52:25
    from the next wave.
  • 52:25 - 52:29
    And we should be very,
    very clear about that.
  • 52:29 - 52:33
    If we don't have a global governance,
  • 52:33 - 52:36
    and if we suffer from climate change,
  • 52:36 - 52:38
    from technological disruptions,
  • 52:38 - 52:42
    the worst suffering will not be in the US.
  • 52:42 - 52:47
    The worst suffering will be in Ghana,
    will be in Sudan, will be in Syria,
  • 52:47 - 52:50
    will be in Bangladesh,
    will be in those places.
  • 52:50 - 52:56
    So I think those countries
    have an even greater incentive
  • 52:56 - 53:00
    to do something about
    the next wave of disruption,
  • 53:00 - 53:03
    whether it's ecological
    or whether it's technological.
  • 53:03 - 53:06
    Again, if you think about
    technological disruption,
  • 53:06 - 53:10
    so if AI and 3D printers and robots
    will take the jobs
  • 53:10 - 53:13
    from billions of people,
  • 53:13 - 53:16
    I worry far less about the Swedes
  • 53:16 - 53:20
    than about the people in Ghana
    or in Bangladesh.
  • 53:20 - 53:25
    And therefore,
    because history is so unfair
  • 53:25 - 53:29
    and the results of a calamity
  • 53:29 - 53:32
    will not be shared equally
    between everybody,
  • 53:32 - 53:36
    as usual, the rich
    will be able to get away
  • 53:36 - 53:40
    from the worst consequences
    of climate change
  • 53:40 - 53:42
    in a way that the poor
    will not be able to.
  • 53:43 - 53:47
    CA: And here's a great question
    from Cameron Taylor on Facebook:
  • 53:47 - 53:49
    "At the end of 'Sapiens,'"
  • 53:49 - 53:51
    you said we should be asking the question,
  • 53:51 - 53:53
    'What do we want to want?'
  • 53:53 - 53:56
    Well, what do you think
    we should want to want?"
  • 53:56 - 54:00
    YNH: I think we should want
    to want to know the truth,
  • 54:00 - 54:03
    to understand reality.
  • 54:03 - 54:08
    Mostly what we want is to change reality,
  • 54:08 - 54:12
    to fit it to our own desires,
    to our own wishes,
  • 54:12 - 54:16
    and I think we should first
    want to understand it.
  • 54:16 - 54:20
    If you look at the long-term
    trajectory of history,
  • 54:20 - 54:22
    what you see is that
    for thousands of years
  • 54:22 - 54:26
    we humans have been gaining
    control of the world outside us
  • 54:26 - 54:29
    and trying to shape it
    to fit our own desires.
  • 54:29 - 54:32
    And we've gained control
    of the other animals,
  • 54:32 - 54:34
    of the rivers, of the forests,
  • 54:34 - 54:38
    and reshaped them completely,
  • 54:38 - 54:41
    causing an ecological destruction
  • 54:41 - 54:44
    without making ourselves satisfied.
  • 54:44 - 54:48
    So the next step
    is we turn our gaze inwards,
  • 54:48 - 54:53
    and we say OK, getting control
    of the world outside us
  • 54:53 - 54:54
    did not really make us satisfied.
  • 54:54 - 54:57
    Let's now try to gain control
    of the world inside us.
  • 54:57 - 54:59
    This is the really big project
  • 54:59 - 55:04
    of science and technology
    and industry in the 21st century --
  • 55:04 - 55:07
    to try and gain control
    of the world inside us,
  • 55:07 - 55:12
    to learn how to engineer and produce
    bodies and brains and minds.
  • 55:12 - 55:17
    These are likely to be the main
    products of the 21st century economy.
  • 55:17 - 55:21
    When people think about the future,
    very often they think in terms,
  • 55:21 - 55:25
    "Oh, I want to gain control
    of my body and of my brain."
  • 55:25 - 55:27
    And I think that's very dangerous.
  • 55:27 - 55:31
    If we've learned anything
    from our previous history,
  • 55:31 - 55:35
    it's that yes, we gain
    the power to manipulate,
  • 55:35 - 55:37
    but because we didn't really
    understand the complexity
  • 55:37 - 55:39
    of the ecological system,
  • 55:39 - 55:43
    we are now facing an ecological meltdown.
  • 55:43 - 55:48
    And if we now try to reengineer
    the world inside us
  • 55:48 - 55:51
    without really understanding it,
  • 55:51 - 55:55
    especially without understanding
    the complexity of our mental system,
  • 55:55 - 56:00
    we might cause a kind of internal
    ecological disaster,
  • 56:00 - 56:03
    and we'll face a kind of mental
    meltdown inside us.
  • 56:04 - 56:07
    CA: Putting all the pieces
    together here --
  • 56:07 - 56:09
    the current politics,
    the coming technology,
  • 56:09 - 56:12
    concerns like the one
    you've just outlined --
  • 56:12 - 56:15
    I mean, it seems like you yourself
    are in quite a bleak place
  • 56:15 - 56:16
    when you think about the future.
  • 56:16 - 56:18
    You're pretty worried about it.
  • 56:18 - 56:19
    Is that right?
  • 56:19 - 56:26
    And if there was one cause for hope,
    how would you state that?
  • 56:26 - 56:30
    YNH: I focus on the most
    dangerous possibilities
  • 56:30 - 56:33
    partly because this is like
    my job or responsibility
  • 56:33 - 56:35
    as a historian or social critic.
  • 56:35 - 56:40
    I mean, the industry focuses mainly
    on the positive sides,
  • 56:40 - 56:43
    so it's the job of historians
    and philosophers and sociologists
  • 56:43 - 56:48
    to highlight the more dangerous potential
    of all these new technologies.
  • 56:48 - 56:50
    I don't think any of that is inevitable.
  • 56:50 - 56:53
    Technology is never deterministic.
  • 56:53 - 56:55
    You can use the same technology
  • 56:55 - 56:58
    to create very different
    kinds of societies.
  • 56:58 - 57:00
    If you look at the 20th century,
  • 57:00 - 57:03
    so, the technologies
    of the Industrial Revolution,
  • 57:03 - 57:06
    the trains and electricity and all that
  • 57:06 - 57:09
    could be used to create
    a communist dictatorship
  • 57:09 - 57:12
    or a fascist regime
    or a liberal democracy.
  • 57:12 - 57:14
    The trains did not tell you
    what to do with them.
  • 57:14 - 57:19
    Similarly, now, artificial intelligence
    and bioengineering and all of that --
  • 57:19 - 57:22
    they don't predetermine a single outcome.
  • 57:23 - 57:26
    Humanity can rise up to the challenge,
  • 57:26 - 57:28
    and the best example we have
  • 57:28 - 57:32
    of humanity rising up
    to the challenge of a new technology
  • 57:32 - 57:33
    is nuclear weapons.
  • 57:33 - 57:36
    In the late 1940s, '50s,
  • 57:36 - 57:38
    many people were convinced
  • 57:39 - 57:43
    that sooner or later the Cold War
    will end in a nuclear catastrophe,
  • 57:43 - 57:45
    destroying human civilization.
  • 57:45 - 57:46
    And this did not happen.
  • 57:46 - 57:53
    In fact, nuclear weapons prompted
    humans all over the world
  • 57:53 - 57:57
    to change the way that they manage
    international politics
  • 57:57 - 58:00
    to reduce violence.
  • 58:00 - 58:03
    And many countries basically took out war
  • 58:03 - 58:05
    from their political toolkit.
  • 58:05 - 58:09
    They no longer tried to pursue
    their interests with warfare.
  • 58:10 - 58:13
    Not all countries have done so,
    but many countries have.
  • 58:13 - 58:17
    And this is maybe
    the most important reason
  • 58:17 - 58:23
    why international violence
    declined dramatically since 1945,
  • 58:23 - 58:26
    and today, as I said,
    more people commit suicide
  • 58:26 - 58:29
    than are killed in war.
  • 58:29 - 58:33
    So this, I think, gives us a good example
  • 58:33 - 58:37
    that even the most frightening technology,
  • 58:37 - 58:40
    humans can rise up to the challenge
  • 58:40 - 58:43
    and actually some good can come out of it.
  • 58:43 - 58:47
    The problem is, we have very little
    margin for error.
  • 58:47 - 58:49
    If we don't get it right,
  • 58:49 - 58:53
    we might not have
    a second option to try again.
  • 58:54 - 58:56
    CA: That's a very powerful note,
  • 58:56 - 58:59
    on which I think we should draw
    this to a conclusion.
  • 58:59 - 59:02
    Before I wrap up, I just want to say
    one thing to people here
  • 59:02 - 59:07
    and to the global TED community
    watching online, anyone watching online:
  • 59:07 - 59:10
    help us with these dialogues.
  • 59:10 - 59:13
    If you believe, like we do,
  • 59:13 - 59:16
    that we need to find
    a different kind of conversation,
  • 59:16 - 59:18
    now more than ever, help us do it.
  • 59:18 - 59:20
    Reach out to other people,
  • 59:21 - 59:24
    try and have conversations
    with people you disagree with,
  • 59:24 - 59:25
    understand them,
  • 59:25 - 59:27
    pull the pieces together,
  • 59:27 - 59:31
    and help us figure out how to take
    these conversations forward
  • 59:31 - 59:33
    so we can make a real contribution
  • 59:33 - 59:36
    to what's happening
    in the world right now.
  • 59:36 - 59:39
    I think everyone feels more alive,
  • 59:39 - 59:41
    more concerned, more engaged
  • 59:41 - 59:44
    with the politics of the moment.
  • 59:44 - 59:46
    The stakes do seem quite high,
  • 59:46 - 59:51
    so help us respond to it
    in a wise, wise way.
  • 59:51 - 59:53
    Yuval Harari, thank you.
  • 59:53 - 59:56
    (Applause)
Title:
Nationalism vs. globalism: the new political divide
Speaker:
Yuval Noah Harari
Description:

How do we make sense of today's political divisions? In a wide-ranging conversation full of insight, historian Yuval Harari places our current turmoil in a broader context, against the ongoing disruption of our technology, climate, media — even our notion of what humanity is for. This is the first of a series of TED Dialogues, seeking a thoughtful response to escalating political divisiveness. Make time (just over an hour) for this fascinating discussion between Harari and TED curator Chris Anderson.

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Video Language:
English
Team:
closed TED
Project:
TEDTalks
Duration:
01:00:08

English subtitles

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