New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century
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0:01 - 0:03It's very nice to be here tonight.
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0:03 - 0:07So I've been working on the history of income
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0:07 - 0:10and wealth distribution for the past 15 years,
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0:10 - 0:13and one of the interesting lessons
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0:13 - 0:16coming from this historical evidence
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0:16 - 0:18is indeed that, in the long run,
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0:18 - 0:21there is a tendency for
the rate of return of capital -
0:21 - 0:24to exceed the economy's growth rate,
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0:24 - 0:27and this tends to lead to
high concentration of wealth. -
0:27 - 0:28Not infinite concentration of wealth,
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0:28 - 0:31but the higher the gap between r and g,
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0:31 - 0:34the higher the level of inequality of wealth
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0:34 - 0:37towards which society tends to converge.
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0:37 - 0:41So this is a key force that
I'm going to talk about today, -
0:41 - 0:43but let me say right away
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0:43 - 0:45that this is not the only important force
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0:45 - 0:48in the dynamics of income
and wealth distribution, -
0:48 - 0:50and there are many other forces that play
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0:50 - 0:53an important role in the long-run dynamics
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0:53 - 0:54of income and wealth distribution.
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0:54 - 0:56Also there is a lot of data
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0:56 - 0:58that still needs to be collected.
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0:58 - 1:01We know a little bit more today
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1:01 - 1:03than we used to know,
but we still know too little, -
1:03 - 1:06and certainly there are
many different processes — -
1:06 - 1:08economic, social, political —
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1:08 - 1:10that need to be studied more.
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1:10 - 1:13And so I'm going to focus today on this simple force,
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1:13 - 1:15but that doesn't mean that other important forces
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1:15 - 1:16do not exist.
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1:16 - 1:18So most of the data I'm going to present
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1:18 - 1:21comes from this database
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1:21 - 1:22that's available online:
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1:22 - 1:23the World Top Incomes Database.
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1:23 - 1:25So this is the largest existing
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1:25 - 1:28historical database on inequality,
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1:28 - 1:29and this comes from the effort
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1:29 - 1:33of over 30 scholars from several dozen countries.
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1:33 - 1:36So let me show you a couple of facts
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1:36 - 1:37coming from this database,
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1:37 - 1:39and then we'll return to r bigger than g.
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1:39 - 1:42So fact number one is that there has been
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1:42 - 1:45a big reversal in the ordering of income inequality
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1:45 - 1:47between the United States and Europe
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1:47 - 1:48over the past century.
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1:48 - 1:52So back in 1900, 1910, income inequality was actually
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1:52 - 1:54much higher in Europe than in the United States,
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1:54 - 1:57whereas today, it is a lot higher in the United States.
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1:57 - 1:59So let me be very clear:
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1:59 - 2:02The main explanation for this is not r bigger than g.
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2:02 - 2:05It has more to do with changing supply and demand
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2:05 - 2:09for skill, the race between education and technology,
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2:09 - 2:12globalization, probably more unequal access
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2:12 - 2:14to skills in the U.S.,
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2:14 - 2:16where you have very good, very top universities
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2:16 - 2:19but where the bottom part of the educational system
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2:19 - 2:20is not as good,
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2:20 - 2:22so very unequal access to skills,
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2:22 - 2:24and also an unprecedented rise
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2:24 - 2:27of top managerial compensation of the United States,
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2:27 - 2:30which is difficult to account for
just on the basis of education. -
2:30 - 2:32So there is more going on here,
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2:32 - 2:34but I'm not going to talk too much about this today,
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2:34 - 2:37because I want to focus on wealth inequality.
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2:37 - 2:40So let me just show you a very simple indicator
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2:40 - 2:42about the income inequality part.
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2:42 - 2:45So this is the share of total income
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2:45 - 2:46going to the top 10 percent.
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2:46 - 2:49So you can see that one century ago,
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2:49 - 2:52it was between 45 and 50 percent in Europe
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2:52 - 2:55and a little bit above 40 percent in the U.S.,
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2:55 - 2:57so there was more inequality in Europe.
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2:57 - 2:59Then there was a sharp decline
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2:59 - 3:02during the first half of the 20th century,
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3:02 - 3:04and in the recent decade, you can see that
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3:04 - 3:08the U.S. has become more unequal than Europe,
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3:08 - 3:10and this is the first fact I just talked about.
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3:10 - 3:14Now, the second fact is more about wealth inequality,
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3:14 - 3:17and here the central fact is that wealth inequality
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3:17 - 3:20is always a lot higher than income inequality,
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3:20 - 3:22and also that wealth inequality,
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3:22 - 3:25although it has also increased in recent decades,
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3:25 - 3:27is still less extreme today
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3:27 - 3:29than what it was a century ago,
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3:29 - 3:31although the total quantity of wealth
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3:31 - 3:33relative to income has now recovered
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3:33 - 3:35from the very large shocks
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3:35 - 3:37caused by World War I, the Great Depression,
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3:37 - 3:38World War II.
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3:38 - 3:40So let me show you two graphs
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3:40 - 3:43illustrating fact number two and fact number three.
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3:43 - 3:47So first, if you look at the level of wealth inequality,
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3:47 - 3:51this is the share of total wealth
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3:51 - 3:53going to the top 10 percent of wealth holders,
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3:53 - 3:56so you can see the same kind of reversal
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3:56 - 3:58between the U.S. and Europe that we had before
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3:58 - 4:00for income inequality.
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4:00 - 4:04So wealth concentration was higher
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4:04 - 4:06in Europe than in the U.S. a century ago,
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4:06 - 4:08and now it is the opposite.
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4:08 - 4:10But you can also show two things:
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4:10 - 4:13First, the general level of wealth inequality
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4:13 - 4:16is always higher than income inequality.
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4:16 - 4:18So remember, for income inequality,
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4:18 - 4:21the share going to the top 10 percent
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4:21 - 4:25was between 30 and 50 percent of total income,
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4:25 - 4:28whereas for wealth, the share is always
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4:28 - 4:30between 60 and 90 percent.
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4:30 - 4:31Okay, so that's fact number one,
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4:31 - 4:33and that's very important for what follows.
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4:33 - 4:35Wealth concentration is always
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4:35 - 4:37a lot higher than income concentration.
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4:37 - 4:40Fact number two is that the rise
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4:40 - 4:43in wealth inequality in recent decades
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4:43 - 4:47is still not enough to get us back to 1910.
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4:47 - 4:49So the big difference today,
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4:49 - 4:51wealth inequality is still very large,
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4:51 - 4:54with 60, 70 percent of total wealth for the top 10,
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4:54 - 4:56but the good news is that it's actually
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4:56 - 4:58better than one century ago,
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4:58 - 5:01where you had 90 percent in
Europe going to the top 10. -
5:01 - 5:03So today what you have
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5:03 - 5:05is what I call the middle 40 percent,
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5:05 - 5:07the people who are not in the top 10
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5:07 - 5:09and who are not in the bottom 50,
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5:09 - 5:11and what you can view as the wealth middle class
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5:11 - 5:15that owns 20 to 30 percent
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5:15 - 5:16of total wealth, national wealth,
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5:16 - 5:20whereas they used to be poor, a century ago,
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5:20 - 5:22when there was basically no wealth middle class.
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5:22 - 5:24So this is an important change,
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5:24 - 5:29and it's interesting to see that wealth inequality
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5:29 - 5:32has not fully recovered to pre-World War I levels,
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5:32 - 5:35although the total quantity of wealth has recovered.
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5:35 - 5:37Okay? So this is the total value
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5:37 - 5:40of wealth relative to income,
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5:40 - 5:42and you can see that in particular in Europe,
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5:42 - 5:45we are almost back to the pre-World War I level.
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5:45 - 5:47So there are really two
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5:47 - 5:50different parts of the story here.
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5:50 - 5:51One has to do with
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5:51 - 5:53the total quantity of wealth that we accumulate,
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5:53 - 5:55and there is nothing bad per se, of course,
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5:55 - 5:57in accumulating a lot of wealth,
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5:57 - 6:00and in particular if it is more diffuse
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6:00 - 6:01and less concentrated.
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6:01 - 6:04So what we really want to focus on
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6:04 - 6:06is the long-run evolution of wealth inequality,
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6:06 - 6:09and what's going to happen in the future.
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6:09 - 6:11How can we account for the fact that
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6:11 - 6:14until World War I, wealth inequality was so high
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6:14 - 6:17and, if anything, was rising to even higher levels,
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6:17 - 6:21and how can we think about the future?
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6:21 - 6:25So let me come to some of the explanations
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6:25 - 6:27and speculations about the future.
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6:27 - 6:28Let me first say that
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6:28 - 6:30probably the best model to explain
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6:30 - 6:32why wealth is so much
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6:32 - 6:35more concentrated than income
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6:35 - 6:38is a dynamic, dynastic model
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6:38 - 6:40where individuals have a long horizon
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6:40 - 6:43and accumulate wealth for all sorts of reasons.
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6:43 - 6:46If people were accumulating wealth
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6:46 - 6:48only for life cycle reasons,
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6:48 - 6:50you know, to be able to consume
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6:50 - 6:51when they are old,
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6:51 - 6:54then the level of wealth inequality
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6:54 - 6:56should be more or less in line
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6:56 - 6:58with the level of income inequality.
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6:58 - 7:00But it will be very difficult to explain
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7:00 - 7:02why you have so much more wealth inequality
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7:02 - 7:03than income inequality
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7:03 - 7:05with a pure life cycle model,
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7:05 - 7:07so you need a story
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7:07 - 7:08where people also care
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7:08 - 7:11about wealth accumulation for other reasons.
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7:11 - 7:13So typically, they want to transmit
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7:13 - 7:16wealth to the next generation, to their children,
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7:16 - 7:18or sometimes they want to accumulate wealth
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7:18 - 7:21because of the prestige, the
power that goes with wealth. -
7:21 - 7:22So there must be other reasons
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7:22 - 7:24for accumulating wealth than just life cycle
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7:24 - 7:27to explain what we see in the data.
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7:27 - 7:30Now, in a large class of dynamic models
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7:30 - 7:32of wealth accumulation
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7:32 - 7:36with such dynastic motive for accumulating wealth,
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7:36 - 7:39you will have all sorts of random,
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7:39 - 7:40multiplicative shocks.
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7:40 - 7:42So for instance, some families
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7:42 - 7:43have a very large number of children,
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7:43 - 7:45so the wealth will be divided.
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7:45 - 7:47Some families have fewer children.
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7:47 - 7:49You also have shocks to rates of return.
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7:49 - 7:51Some families make huge capital gains.
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7:51 - 7:53Some made bad investments.
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7:53 - 7:55So you will always have some mobility
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7:55 - 7:57in the wealth process.
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7:57 - 7:59Some people will move up,
some people will move down. -
7:59 - 8:01The important point is that,
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8:01 - 8:02in any such model,
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8:02 - 8:05for a given variance of such shocks,
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8:05 - 8:07the equilibrium level of wealth inequality
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8:07 - 8:11will be a steeply rising function of r minus g.
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8:11 - 8:14And intuitively, the reason why the difference
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8:14 - 8:16between the rate of return to wealth
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8:16 - 8:18and the growth rate is important
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8:18 - 8:20is that initial wealth inequalities
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8:20 - 8:23will be amplified at a faster pace
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8:23 - 8:25with a bigger r minus g.
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8:25 - 8:26So take a simple example,
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8:26 - 8:30with r equals five percent and g equals one percent,
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8:30 - 8:32wealth holders only need to reinvest
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8:32 - 8:35one fifth of their capital income to ensure
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8:35 - 8:37that their wealth rises as fast
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8:37 - 8:39as the size of the economy.
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8:39 - 8:41So this makes it easier
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8:41 - 8:42to build and perpetuate large fortunes
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8:42 - 8:44because you can consume four fifths,
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8:44 - 8:46assuming zero tax,
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8:46 - 8:48and you can just reinvest one fifth.
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8:48 - 8:50So of course some families
will consume more than that, -
8:50 - 8:52some will consume less, so there will be
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8:52 - 8:54some mobility in the distribution,
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8:54 - 8:57but on average, they only need to reinvest one fifth,
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8:57 - 9:00so this allows high wealth inequalities to be sustained.
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9:00 - 9:03Now, you should not be surprised
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9:03 - 9:07by the statement that r can be bigger than g forever,
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9:07 - 9:08because, in fact, this is what happened
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9:08 - 9:10during most of the history of mankind.
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9:10 - 9:14And this was in a way very obvious to everybody
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9:14 - 9:15for a simple reason, which is that growth
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9:15 - 9:18was close to zero percent
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9:18 - 9:19during most of the history of mankind.
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9:19 - 9:23Growth was maybe 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 percent,
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9:23 - 9:25but very slow growth of population
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9:25 - 9:27and output per capita,
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9:27 - 9:29whereas the rate of return on capital
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9:29 - 9:30of course was not zero percent.
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9:30 - 9:32It was, for land assets, which was
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9:32 - 9:34the traditional form
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9:34 - 9:37of assets in preindustrial societies,
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9:37 - 9:38it was typically five percent.
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9:38 - 9:42Any reader of Jane Austen would know that.
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9:42 - 9:45If you want an annual income of 1,000 pounds,
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9:45 - 9:47you should have a capital value
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9:47 - 9:49of 20,000 pounds so that
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9:49 - 9:51five percent of 20,000 is 1,000.
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9:51 - 9:53And in a way, this was
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9:53 - 9:55the very foundation of society,
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9:55 - 9:58because r bigger than g
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9:58 - 10:02was what allowed holders of wealth and assets
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10:02 - 10:05to live off their capital income
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10:05 - 10:07and to do something else in life
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10:07 - 10:11than just to care about their own survival.
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10:11 - 10:13Now, one important conclusion
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10:13 - 10:15of my historical research is that
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10:15 - 10:18modern industrial growth did not change
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10:18 - 10:20this basic fact as much as one might have expected.
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10:20 - 10:22Of course, the growth rate
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10:22 - 10:24following the Industrial Revolution
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10:24 - 10:28rose, typically from zero to one to two percent,
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10:28 - 10:30but at the same time, the rate of return
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10:30 - 10:32to capital also rose
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10:32 - 10:34so that the gap between the two
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10:34 - 10:36did not really change.
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10:36 - 10:38So during the 20th century,
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10:38 - 10:41you had a very unique combination of events.
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10:41 - 10:43First, a very low rate of return
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10:43 - 10:46due to the 1914 and 1945 war shocks,
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10:46 - 10:48destruction of wealth, inflation,
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10:48 - 10:50bankruptcy during the Great Depression,
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10:50 - 10:52and all of this reduced
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10:52 - 10:53the private rate of return to wealth
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10:53 - 10:55to unusually low levels
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10:55 - 10:57between 1914 and 1945.
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10:57 - 10:59And then, in the postwar period,
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10:59 - 11:03you had unusually high growth rate,
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11:03 - 11:05partly due to the reconstruction.
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11:05 - 11:07You know, in Germany, in France, in Japan,
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11:07 - 11:08you had five percent growth rate
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11:08 - 11:12between 1950 and 1980
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11:12 - 11:13largely due to reconstruction,
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11:13 - 11:16and also due to very large demographic growth,
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11:16 - 11:18the Baby Boom Cohort effect.
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11:18 - 11:20Now, apparently that's not going to last for very long,
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11:20 - 11:22or at least the population growth
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11:22 - 11:25is supposed to decline in the future,
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11:25 - 11:28and the best projections we have is that
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11:28 - 11:30the long-run growth is going to be closer
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11:30 - 11:31to one to two percent
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11:31 - 11:33rather than four to five percent.
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11:33 - 11:36So if you look at this,
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11:36 - 11:38these are the best estimates we have
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11:38 - 11:40of world GDP growth
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11:40 - 11:42and rate of return on capital,
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11:42 - 11:44average rates of return on capital,
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11:44 - 11:45so you can see that during most
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11:45 - 11:47of the history of mankind,
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11:47 - 11:49the growth rate was very small,
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11:49 - 11:50much lower than the rate of return,
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11:50 - 11:53and then during the 20th century,
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11:53 - 11:55it is really the population growth,
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11:55 - 11:57very high in the postwar period,
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11:57 - 11:59and the reconstruction process
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11:59 - 12:00that brought growth
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12:00 - 12:03to a smaller gap with the rate of return.
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12:03 - 12:07Here I use the United Nations population projections,
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12:07 - 12:09so of course they are uncertain.
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12:09 - 12:11It could be that we all start
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12:11 - 12:13having a lot of children in the future,
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12:13 - 12:16and the growth rates are going to be higher,
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12:16 - 12:17but from now on,
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12:17 - 12:20these are the best projections we have,
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12:20 - 12:22and this will make global growth
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12:22 - 12:24decline and the gap between
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12:24 - 12:26the rate of return go up.
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12:26 - 12:29Now, the other unusual event
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12:29 - 12:31during the 20th century
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12:31 - 12:32was, as I said,
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12:32 - 12:35destruction, taxation of capital,
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12:35 - 12:37so this is the pre-tax rate of return.
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12:37 - 12:40This is the after-tax rate of return,
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12:40 - 12:42and after destruction,
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12:42 - 12:44and this is what brought
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12:44 - 12:45the average rate of return
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12:45 - 12:47after tax, after destruction,
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12:47 - 12:50below the growth rate during a long time period.
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12:50 - 12:51But without the destruction,
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12:51 - 12:54without the taxation, this
would not have happened. -
12:54 - 12:57So let me say that the balance between
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12:57 - 12:59returns on capital and growth
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12:59 - 13:01depends on many different factors
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13:01 - 13:03that are very difficult to predict:
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13:03 - 13:05technology and the development
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13:05 - 13:08of capital-intensive techniques.
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13:08 - 13:11So right now, the most capital-intensive sectors
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13:11 - 13:14in the economy are the real estate sector, housing,
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13:14 - 13:17the energy sector, but it could be in the future
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13:17 - 13:21that we have a lot more robots in a number of sectors
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13:21 - 13:23and that this would be a bigger share
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13:23 - 13:25of the total capital stock that it is today.
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13:25 - 13:27Well, we are very far from this,
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13:27 - 13:28and from now, what's going on
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13:28 - 13:30in the real estate sector, the energy sector,
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13:30 - 13:32is much more important for the total capital stock
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13:32 - 13:34and capital share.
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13:34 - 13:36The other important issue
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13:36 - 13:38is that there are scale effects
in portfolio management, -
13:38 - 13:40together with financial complexity,
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13:40 - 13:42financial deregulation,
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13:42 - 13:44that make it easier to get higher rates of return
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13:44 - 13:46for a large portfolio,
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13:46 - 13:49and this seems to be particularly strong
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13:49 - 13:51for billionaires, large capital endowments.
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13:51 - 13:53Just to give you one example,
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13:53 - 13:56this comes from the Forbes billionaire rankings
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13:56 - 14:00over the 1987-2013 period,
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14:00 - 14:02and you can see the very top wealth holders
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14:02 - 14:05have been going up at six, seven percent per year
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14:05 - 14:08in real terms above inflation,
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14:08 - 14:10whereas average income in the world,
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14:10 - 14:12average wealth in the world,
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14:12 - 14:15have increased at only two percent per year.
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14:15 - 14:17And you find the same
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14:17 - 14:18for large university endowments —
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14:18 - 14:20the bigger the initial endowments,
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14:20 - 14:22the bigger the rate of return.
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14:22 - 14:24Now, what could be done?
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14:24 - 14:26The first thing is that I think we need
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14:26 - 14:28more financial transparency.
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14:28 - 14:32We know too little about global wealth dynamics,
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14:32 - 14:34so we need international transmission
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14:34 - 14:35of bank information.
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14:35 - 14:38We need a global registry of financial assets,
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14:38 - 14:41more coordination on wealth taxation,
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14:41 - 14:44and even wealth tax with a small tax rate
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14:44 - 14:46will be a way to produce information
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14:46 - 14:49so that then we can adapt our policies
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14:49 - 14:51to whatever we observe.
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14:51 - 14:52And to some extent, the fight
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14:52 - 14:54against tax havens
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14:54 - 14:56and automatic transmission of information
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14:56 - 14:57is pushing us in this direction.
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14:57 - 15:00Now, there are other ways to redistribute wealth,
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15:00 - 15:03which it can be tempting to use.
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15:03 - 15:04Inflation:
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15:04 - 15:06it's much easier to print money
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15:06 - 15:08than to write a tax code, so that's very tempting,
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15:08 - 15:10but sometimes you don't know
what you do with the money. -
15:10 - 15:12This is a problem.
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15:12 - 15:14Expropriation is very tempting.
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15:14 - 15:16Just when you feel some people get too wealthy,
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15:16 - 15:17you just expropriate them.
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15:17 - 15:19But this is not a very efficient way
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15:19 - 15:22to organize a regulation of wealth dynamics.
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15:22 - 15:24So war is an even less efficient way,
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15:24 - 15:27so I tend to prefer progressive taxation,
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15:27 - 15:29but of course, history — (Laughter) —
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15:29 - 15:31history will invent its own best ways,
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15:31 - 15:33and it will probably involve
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15:33 - 15:34a combination of all of these.
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15:34 - 15:36Thank you.
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15:36 - 15:38(Applause)
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15:38 - 15:44Bruno Giussani: Thomas Piketty. Thank you.
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15:44 - 15:46Thomas, I want to ask you two or three questions,
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15:46 - 15:50because it's impressive how you're
in command of your data, of course, -
15:50 - 15:53but basically what you suggest is
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15:53 - 15:55growing wealth concentration is kind of
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15:55 - 15:57a natural tendency of capitalism,
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15:57 - 16:00and if we leave it to its own devices,
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16:00 - 16:03it may threaten the system itself,
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16:03 - 16:04so you're suggesting that we need to act
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16:04 - 16:07to implement policies that redistribute wealth,
-
16:07 - 16:09including the ones we just saw:
-
16:09 - 16:11progressive taxation, etc.
-
16:11 - 16:13In the current political context,
-
16:13 - 16:15how realistic are those?
-
16:15 - 16:17How likely do you think that it is
-
16:17 - 16:18that they will be implemented?
-
16:18 - 16:19Thomas Piketty: Well, you know, I think
-
16:19 - 16:21if you look back through time,
-
16:21 - 16:24the history of income, wealth and taxation
-
16:24 - 16:26is full of surprise.
-
16:26 - 16:28So I am not terribly impressed
-
16:28 - 16:30by those who know in advance
-
16:30 - 16:31what will or will not happen.
-
16:31 - 16:33I think one century ago,
-
16:33 - 16:35many people would have said
-
16:35 - 16:37that progressive income taxation would never happen
-
16:37 - 16:38and then it happened.
-
16:38 - 16:40And even five years ago,
-
16:40 - 16:43many people would have said that bank secrecy
-
16:43 - 16:45will be with us forever in Switzerland,
-
16:45 - 16:46that Switzerland was too powerful
-
16:46 - 16:48for the rest of the world,
-
16:48 - 16:51and then suddenly it took a few U.S. sanctions
-
16:51 - 16:53against Swiss banks for a big change to happen,
-
16:53 - 16:55and now we are moving toward
-
16:55 - 16:57more financial transparency.
-
16:57 - 17:01So I think it's not that difficult
-
17:01 - 17:04to better coordinate politically.
-
17:04 - 17:06We are going to have a treaty
-
17:06 - 17:09with half of the world GDP around the table
-
17:09 - 17:11with the U.S. and the European Union,
-
17:11 - 17:13so if half of the world GDP is not enough
-
17:13 - 17:16to make progress on financial transparency
-
17:16 - 17:20and minimal tax for multinational corporate profits,
-
17:20 - 17:21what does it take?
-
17:21 - 17:25So I think these are not technical difficulties.
-
17:25 - 17:27I think we can make progress
-
17:27 - 17:29if we have a more pragmatic
approach to these questions -
17:29 - 17:31and we have the proper sanctions
-
17:31 - 17:34on those who benefit from financial opacity.
-
17:34 - 17:36BG: One of the arguments
-
17:36 - 17:37against your point of view
-
17:37 - 17:39is that economic inequality
-
17:39 - 17:42is not only a feature of capitalism
but is actually one of its engines. -
17:42 - 17:45So we take measures to lower inequality,
-
17:45 - 17:48and at the same time we lower growth, potentially.
-
17:48 - 17:49What do you answer to that?
-
17:49 - 17:51TP: Yeah, I think inequality
-
17:51 - 17:53is not a problem per se.
-
17:53 - 17:55I think inequality up to a point
-
17:55 - 17:58can actually be useful for innovation and growth.
-
17:58 - 18:00The problem is, it's a question of degree.
-
18:00 - 18:02When inequality gets too extreme,
-
18:02 - 18:05then it becomes useless for growth
-
18:05 - 18:07and it can even become bad
-
18:07 - 18:10because it tends to lead to high perpetuation
-
18:10 - 18:11of inequality over time
-
18:11 - 18:13and low mobility.
-
18:13 - 18:16And for instance, the kind of wealth concentrations
-
18:16 - 18:19that we had in the 19th century
-
18:19 - 18:21and pretty much until World War I
-
18:21 - 18:23in every European country
-
18:23 - 18:25was, I think, not useful for growth.
-
18:25 - 18:27This was destroyed by a combination
-
18:27 - 18:30of tragic events and policy changes,
-
18:30 - 18:32and this did not prevent growth from happening.
-
18:32 - 18:35And also, extreme inequality can be bad
-
18:35 - 18:37for our democratic institutions
-
18:37 - 18:40if it creates very unequal access to political voice,
-
18:40 - 18:42and the influence of private money
-
18:42 - 18:44in U.S. politics, I think,
-
18:44 - 18:46is a matter of concern right now.
-
18:46 - 18:49So we don't want to return to that kind of extreme,
-
18:49 - 18:51pre-World War I inequality.
-
18:51 - 18:55Having a decent share of the national wealth
-
18:55 - 18:58for the middle class is not bad for growth.
-
18:58 - 19:00It is actually useful
-
19:00 - 19:03both for equity and efficiency reasons.
-
19:03 - 19:05BG: I said at the beginning
-
19:05 - 19:07that your book has been criticized.
-
19:07 - 19:08Some of your data has been criticized.
-
19:08 - 19:10Some of your choice of data sets has been criticized.
-
19:10 - 19:12You have been accused of cherry-picking data
-
19:12 - 19:15to make your case. What do you answer to that?
-
19:15 - 19:17TP: Well, I answer that I am very happy
-
19:17 - 19:19that this book is stimulating debate.
-
19:19 - 19:22This is part of what it is intended for.
-
19:22 - 19:25Look, the reason why I put all the data online
-
19:25 - 19:27with all of the detailed computation
-
19:27 - 19:29is so that we can have
an open and transparent -
19:29 - 19:31debate about this.
-
19:31 - 19:33So I have responded point by point
-
19:33 - 19:35to every concern.
-
19:35 - 19:38Let me say that if I was to rewrite the book today,
-
19:38 - 19:39I would actually conclude
-
19:39 - 19:41that the rise in wealth inequality,
-
19:41 - 19:43particularly in the United States,
-
19:43 - 19:46has been actually higher
than what I report in my book. -
19:46 - 19:49There is a recent study by Saez and Zucman
-
19:49 - 19:51showing, with new data
-
19:51 - 19:52which I didn't have at the time of the book,
-
19:52 - 19:55that wealth concentration in the U.S. has risen
-
19:55 - 19:57even more than what I report.
-
19:57 - 19:59And there will be other data in the future.
-
19:59 - 20:01Some of it will go in different directions.
-
20:01 - 20:05Look, we put online almost every week
-
20:05 - 20:08new, updated series on the
World Top Income Database -
20:08 - 20:10and we will keep doing so in the future,
-
20:10 - 20:12in particular in emerging countries,
-
20:12 - 20:15and I welcome all of those who want to contribute
-
20:15 - 20:17to this data collection process.
-
20:17 - 20:20In fact, I certainly agree
-
20:20 - 20:22that there is not enough
-
20:22 - 20:24transparency about wealth dynamics,
-
20:24 - 20:26and a good way to have better data
-
20:26 - 20:28would be to have a wealth tax
-
20:28 - 20:29with a small tax rate to begin with
-
20:29 - 20:31so that we can all agree
-
20:31 - 20:33about this important evolution
-
20:33 - 20:36and adapt our policies to whatever we observe.
-
20:36 - 20:38So taxation is a source of knowledge,
-
20:38 - 20:41and that's what we need the most right now.
-
20:41 - 20:43BG: Thomas Piketty, merci beaucoup.
-
20:43 - 20:47Thank you.
TP: Thank you. (Applause)
- Title:
- New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century
- Speaker:
- Thomas Piketty
- Description:
-
French economist Thomas Piketty caused a sensation in early 2014 with his book on a simple, brutal formula explaining economic inequality: r > g (meaning that return on capital is generally higher than economic growth). Here, he talks through the massive data set that led him to conclude: Economic inequality is not new, but it is getting worse, with radical possible impacts.
- Video Language:
- English
- Team:
- closed TED
- Project:
- TEDTalks
- Duration:
- 21:00
Morton Bast edited English subtitles for New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century | ||
Morton Bast edited English subtitles for New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century | ||
Morton Bast approved English subtitles for New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century | ||
Morton Bast edited English subtitles for New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century | ||
Morton Bast edited English subtitles for New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century | ||
Morton Bast edited English subtitles for New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century | ||
Madeleine Aronson accepted English subtitles for New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century | ||
Madeleine Aronson edited English subtitles for New thoughts on capital in the twenty-first century |