0:00:09.960,0:00:12.004 Hi everybody. My name is Brad 0:00:12.004,0:00:14.006 and I'm here to talk to you about privacy. 0:00:14.006,0:00:15.633 So just a quick caveat 0:00:15.633,0:00:19.428 my views expressed are my own [br]not either of my employers, 0:00:19.428,0:00:21.722 so impute the crazy only to me. 0:00:21.722,0:00:23.933 So I wanna talk to you a little about how 0:00:23.933,0:00:26.268 privacy is changing and how the ways 0:00:26.268,0:00:28.437 that we think about what is private 0:00:28.437,0:00:31.065 has started to morph [br]and where I think it's going. 0:00:31.065,0:00:33.275 And so my premise to you is we've gone 0:00:33.275,0:00:35.986 from the society of privacy[br]laws to privacy norms 0:00:35.986,0:00:38.572 and that we can encapsulate this 0:00:38.572,0:00:42.451 with a simple phrase of [br]"Not cool bro" or 0:00:42.451,0:00:45.246 "bro act" or whatever [br]the proper term is 0:00:45.246,0:00:48.249 as the case may be. [br]So, now, you gonna ask, 0:00:48.249,0:00:50.334 What do I mean when I say 0:00:50.334,0:00:52.586 "Not cool bro"? So, when I say, 0:00:52.586,0:00:54.713 "Not cool bro",[br]I'll give you an example: 0:00:54.713,0:00:56.382 You are on Facebook and 0:00:56.382,0:00:58.342 you have a bad break-up or fight with 0:00:58.342,0:01:00.017 one of your friends.[br]And you block 0:01:00.017,0:01:01.679 that person and so they [br]can no longer see your wall. 0:01:01.679,0:01:05.391 Someone else who still has access to your 0:01:05.391,0:01:07.247 Facebook wall, goes in, and either 0:01:07.247,0:01:09.436 copies and pastes the entire thing, 0:01:09.436,0:01:12.314 or takes a screenshot every day 0:01:12.314,0:01:13.565 and mails it to that person. 0:01:13.565,0:01:15.734 OK, so our initial response is: 0:01:15.734,0:01:19.071 That's not cool. Not cool bro! Not cool! 0:01:19.071,0:01:21.615 We get the visceral feeling 0:01:21.615,0:01:24.076 that that's somehow privacy violation. 0:01:24.076,0:01:25.911 We get the feeling that that something 0:01:25.911,0:01:28.497 unseemly is happening but we don't know 0:01:28.497,0:01:30.332 how to quite talk about it. 0:01:30.332,0:01:32.167 And that is what I am talking about by 0:01:32.167,0:01:33.711 "Not cool bro" privacy, because the law 0:01:33.711,0:01:35.671 doesn't recognize that as a real 0:01:35.671,0:01:37.464 privacy interest. 0:01:37.464,0:01:39.425 So it first makes a little sense 0:01:39.425,0:01:40.968 to talk about what the law does recognize. 0:01:40.968,0:01:43.429 And most of our privacy comes from 0:01:43.429,0:01:45.420 the criminal context. 0:01:45.420,0:01:48.809 All privacy was literally --[br]you had to sneak up to 0:01:48.809,0:01:50.807 someones house and eavesdrop. 0:01:50.807,0:01:52.990 So the eaves of the house where water falls. 0:01:52.990,0:01:54.773 So you would stand outside 0:01:54.773,0:01:55.637 and you would listen. 0:01:55.637,0:01:57.359 You would climb over their fence, 0:01:57.359,0:01:58.736 shimmy across their lawn, 0:01:58.736,0:02:00.404 nozzle up to the side of the house, 0:02:00.404,0:02:01.655 maybe like you know poke a hole 0:02:01.655,0:02:04.033 on a window and then [br]you can eavesdrop. 0:02:04.033,0:02:05.075 That's what you had to do 0:02:05.075,0:02:06.618 to violate someone's privacy. 0:02:06.618,0:02:08.411 So privacy was really about access 0:02:08.411,0:02:09.913 to information. 0:02:09.913,0:02:11.749 And we didn't need special rules 0:02:11.749,0:02:14.043 regulating access to information because 0:02:14.043,0:02:16.337 you couldn't violate someone's privacy 0:02:16.337,0:02:18.422 in the 1700's, unless you showed up 0:02:18.422,0:02:20.257 at their front gate. 0:02:20.257,0:02:22.108 Right? There was no Facebook. 0:02:22.108,0:02:24.709 The only wall that happened in 1700 0:02:24.709,0:02:26.195 was literally the wall 0:02:26.195,0:02:28.145 outside the carriage house. 0:02:28.145,0:02:32.511 So we go from that to this modern era 0:02:32.511,0:02:35.297 or pre-modern era in which we have 0:02:35.297,0:02:37.155 ways of getting information 0:02:37.155,0:02:39.337 that don't necessarily involve 0:02:39.337,0:02:41.737 the traditional structures of space. 0:02:41.737,0:02:43.447 So there is a very famous case 0:02:43.447,0:02:44.656 involving a guy 0:02:44.656,0:02:46.200 who walks into the phone booth 0:02:46.200,0:02:49.004 and he closes the door behind him[br]and then he does some illegal activity 0:02:49.004,0:02:51.448 and the police are listening[br]and they don't have a warrant. 0:02:51.448,0:02:53.559 And by the way in the law[br]you need to get a warrant 0:02:53.559,0:02:54.917 before you can listen to any of this stuff. 0:02:54.917,0:02:56.168 And for those of you who've seen 0:02:56.168,0:02:57.169 CSI or Law and Order - 0:02:57.169,0:03:00.190 Big judges who give out warrants[br]are sometimes like Oprah: 0:03:00.190,0:03:01.840 You get a warrant and You get a warrant 0:03:01.840,0:03:04.005 and everybody gets a warrant. 0:03:04.005,0:03:05.777 (Laughter) 0:03:05.777,0:03:07.596 But at least we still have that 0:03:07.596,0:03:09.378 nominal process, that the privacy 0:03:09.378,0:03:11.392 is still being protected, 0:03:11.392,0:03:12.913 right, there is a reasonableness here. 0:03:12.913,0:03:15.049 Well, this guy and his name is Kats, 0:03:15.049,0:03:17.518 so you can have all sorts of phonetics --[br]it's spelled with a K. 0:03:17.523,0:03:20.401 He had a reasonable expectation 0:03:20.401,0:03:21.777 of privacy here. Two types: 0:03:21.777,0:03:23.695 It was subjected: meaning 0:03:23.695,0:03:25.531 he personally believed that it was private 0:03:25.531,0:03:26.824 because he closed the booth behind him. 0:03:26.824,0:03:29.660 And then two: objective. 0:03:29.660,0:03:31.286 Society as a whole is willing to say, 0:03:31.286,0:03:33.455 You know what, yeah, if you are going 0:03:33.455,0:03:36.553 into a telephone booth and close the door[br]that should be private. 0:03:36.553,0:03:39.002 Now, what about if we apply this to Facebook? 0:03:39.002,0:03:42.078 Right? This is the "not cool bro"[br]version of privacy. 0:03:42.078,0:03:44.007 You just take it one more step. 0:03:44.007,0:03:45.653 In the old version of privacy, 0:03:45.653,0:03:48.254 it's all about control over 0:03:48.254,0:03:50.390 the means of accessing information. 0:03:50.390,0:03:52.666 In the new version of privacy, 0:03:52.666,0:03:54.152 it's all about control over 0:03:54.152,0:03:57.593 who can get the information[br]that you give it to? 0:03:57.593,0:04:00.213 So in the old version of privacy,[br]if I tell someone, 0:04:00.236,0:04:02.568 "Hey I got an F on a test." 0:04:02.568,0:04:04.914 That person can tell anyone else 0:04:04.914,0:04:06.488 and it's not really considered 0:04:06.488,0:04:07.906 a violation of privacy. 0:04:07.906,0:04:09.241 I didn't keep it private, 0:04:09.241,0:04:11.195 because I allowed someone else access. 0:04:11.210,0:04:13.245 In the new version of privacy, 0:04:13.245,0:04:16.071 when you post something[br]to your Facebook wall, 0:04:16.080,0:04:19.085 if you prevented the rest of the world[br]from seeing it, 0:04:19.085,0:04:22.259 is there an implied understanding to[br]anyone else you've given access to 0:04:22.259,0:04:24.006 that they shouldn't re-share it? 0:04:24.006,0:04:27.056 Or another example:[br]If you are on Twitter 0:04:27.056,0:04:28.927 and you've got a protected Twitter stream 0:04:28.927,0:04:30.304 that no one can see 0:04:30.304,0:04:32.926 unless they expressly follow you[br]and you allow them. 0:04:32.931,0:04:34.475 And someone just sort of re-tweeting 0:04:34.475,0:04:36.041 all of your protected tweets. 0:04:36.041,0:04:37.573 You would say the exact same thing. 0:04:37.573,0:04:39.291 But the understanding would've been: 0:04:39.291,0:04:41.482 Wait a minute, I only let you see 0:04:41.482,0:04:42.900 my Twitter stream, because 0:04:42.900,0:04:44.776 I thought you weren't going to re-tweet it. 0:04:44.776,0:04:48.184 You violated some sort of implied understanding[br]we had. 0:04:48.184,0:04:49.990 So, now we have our modern eavesdropper, 0:04:49.990,0:04:52.034 who is in your Facebook wall 0:04:52.034,0:04:53.952 posting again. So this is 0:04:53.952,0:04:55.871 our modern eavesdropper overhearing 0:04:55.871,0:04:58.285 in conversation. So how do we get 0:04:58.285,0:05:00.004 to a place in which the law 0:05:00.004,0:05:01.676 can come up to where we are. 0:05:01.676,0:05:05.512 Because we think of this,[br]new norm, this new idea 0:05:06.165,0:05:08.091 you won't re-share something 0:05:08.091,0:05:09.632 I only share with you. 0:05:09.632,0:05:11.178 How do we get there? 0:05:11.178,0:05:12.721 And there is actually an interesting way 0:05:12.721,0:05:16.349 and I'll take it back a little bit[br]to give you an example. 0:05:16.351,0:05:17.697 When Facebook started out 0:05:17.697,0:05:20.019 you had to be a member of a network 0:05:20.019,0:05:22.063 to just look at someone's profile. 0:05:22.063,0:05:24.628 And I remember having a job, 0:05:24.628,0:05:27.935 where someone in HR knew[br]that I went to Yale 0:05:27.935,0:05:30.230 and sent me an e-mail[br]and said: 0:05:30.239,0:05:31.490 Brad, we know you went to Yale, 0:05:31.490,0:05:34.961 could you log into Facebook[br]and print out a copy 0:05:34.961,0:05:37.246 of this applicant's Facebook page? 0:05:37.246,0:05:38.997 We'd like to see it. 0:05:38.997,0:05:40.082 So, by the way, for those of you 0:05:40.082,0:05:42.585 who thought that didn't happen,[br]it was happening in 2004. 0:05:42.585,0:05:44.461 So you better believe it's happening now. 0:05:44.461,0:05:48.589 That said, I recoiled in like[br]shock and horror. 0:05:48.590,0:05:51.684 I was like that would be a violation[br]of that person's privacy. 0:05:51.692,0:05:53.011 It would be a betrayal of trust. 0:05:53.011,0:05:56.929 But the idea was back then,[br]what happened in the Yale network, 0:05:56.929,0:05:58.100 stayed in the Yale network. 0:05:58.100,0:05:59.823 It's kind of like Vegas. [br](Laughter) 0:05:59.823,0:06:02.919 And so, there was a knowledge[br]that was like, 0:06:02.919,0:06:04.748 Hey, not cool, bro! 0:06:04.748,0:06:06.024 You knew that you only had access to this. 0:06:06.024,0:06:08.606 There was a reciprocal understanding. 0:06:08.606,0:06:11.327 You won't tell other people[br]what goes on in the Yale network, 0:06:11.327,0:06:13.928 and I won't tell other people[br]what goes on in the Yale network. 0:06:13.928,0:06:15.117 And so, if you think about it 0:06:15.117,0:06:16.702 there is an implied commitment 0:06:16.702,0:06:18.203 when you join any of these social networks, 0:06:18.203,0:06:20.122 that if you are not supposed 0:06:20.122,0:06:22.165 to re-share information, you won't. 0:06:22.165,0:06:23.917 And there is another area of the law 0:06:23.917,0:06:26.513 that actually has really[br]had this transformation, 0:06:26.513,0:06:29.374 where they went from a very formal --[br]you have to be explicit understandings -- 0:06:29.381,0:06:31.091 to just anything goes. 0:06:31.091,0:06:32.426 And that's products liability. 0:06:32.426,0:06:33.677 As crazy as this may sound 0:06:33.677,0:06:35.012 there was a time where if you bought 0:06:35.012,0:06:38.641 a can of coca-cola and it blew up[br]in your hand as you were drinking it. 0:06:38.641,0:06:40.175 The only person you could sue 0:06:40.175,0:06:41.754 was the bodega or bodegua, 0:06:41.754,0:06:45.051 as the case may be, that you bought it from. 0:06:45.051,0:06:47.829 And over time courts sort of didn't like this. 0:06:47.837,0:06:50.294 They said, Well, there is an implied contract 0:06:50.294,0:06:52.457 between the original manufacturer[br]and each step in the chain 0:06:52.457,0:06:54.060 of distributions until to the ultimate consumer 0:06:54.060,0:06:56.732 does not need to be[br]in contractual privity 0:06:56.742,0:06:58.076 with the original manufacturer. 0:06:58.076,0:07:00.094 Which is the fancy way of saying: 0:07:00.099,0:07:01.881 We are going to say [br]that there is an implied contract 0:07:01.881,0:07:03.749 that runs all the way[br]through all these steps in the middle. 0:07:03.749,0:07:06.175 And when you finally buy[br]that can of coke, 0:07:06.175,0:07:09.232 you get an implied contract from Coke. 0:07:09.254,0:07:12.009 Finally a court in California said,[br]Enough, is enough. 0:07:12.009,0:07:14.169 We are done pretending,[br]we are done making up 0:07:14.176,0:07:15.802 these implied contracts. 0:07:15.802,0:07:18.416 We are just gonna say[br]strict liability applies 0:07:18.430,0:07:21.679 if you make a product[br]and you put it out in the universe. 0:07:21.683,0:07:23.352 You have a reasonable understanding 0:07:23.352,0:07:25.288 that if somebody gets hurt[br]by that product 0:07:25.288,0:07:26.661 they are going to sue you. 0:07:26.661,0:07:29.469 We can do the exact same thing[br]with privacy. 0:07:29.469,0:07:30.776 If you join a social network, 0:07:30.776,0:07:33.257 Facebook, Twitter, Google+ 0:07:33.257,0:07:36.655 and you join that network[br]knowing that there are privacy settings 0:07:36.655,0:07:40.313 and knowing that other people[br]are sharing information with you, 0:07:40.328,0:07:44.167 but at the same time[br]prohibiting other people 0:07:44.167,0:07:45.749 from accessing that information. 0:07:45.749,0:07:49.395 It's a violation of whatever[br]you wanna phrase it as. 0:07:49.395,0:07:51.809 Wouldn't that person's[br]expressed understanding 0:07:51.838,0:07:53.923 that they would only share[br]the information with you 0:07:53.924,0:07:55.425 if you didn't re-share it. 0:07:55.425,0:07:58.039 Now, we can get there without[br]waiting, for example, 0:07:58.039,0:08:01.907 Facebook could put a little lock[br]or a hash icon on every post 0:08:01.909,0:08:05.060 on every element of Facebook[br]that's been shared with you 0:08:05.067,0:08:07.580 that would let you know[br]whether or not it was public, 0:08:07.580,0:08:09.014 whether or not it was OK to re-share. 0:08:09.014,0:08:10.407 Twitter already does this. 0:08:10.407,0:08:13.341 You can not one click re-tweet[br]a protected tweet. 0:08:13.341,0:08:17.646 And Craigslist has code-matching that[br]will actually look at posts 0:08:17.656,0:08:20.392 you've previously made[br]and if you're re-posting 0:08:20.392,0:08:21.910 similar content it will stop you. 0:08:21.910,0:08:24.407 Facebook and Twitter[br]could do the exact same thing 0:08:24.413,0:08:27.048 if they see you trying[br]to use copy and paste 0:08:27.048,0:08:28.567 to get around these mechanisms. 0:08:28.567,0:08:30.001 The other thing they could do is, 0:08:30.001,0:08:31.420 we could amend our terms of service, 0:08:31.420,0:08:33.213 we could make an expressed term of service 0:08:33.213,0:08:36.804 to re-share information[br]that is not supposed to be re-shared. 0:08:36.804,0:08:39.351 Like on Google+,[br]where you can actually click 0:08:39.351,0:08:41.483 "Disable re-sharing"[br]and then no one else can. 0:08:41.483,0:08:44.605 So there is a sense[br]that we can get there. 0:08:44.605,0:08:47.978 We also can maybe get there in law. 0:08:47.978,0:08:49.788 It won't necessarily happen 0:08:49.788,0:08:51.553 right away, but in a recent case 0:08:51.553,0:08:53.899 the Supreme Court is starting[br]to go there. 0:08:53.899,0:08:56.930 In the Jones case,[br]which dealt with GPS. 0:08:56.940,0:08:58.822 Justice Sotomayor said maybe it's time 0:08:58.822,0:09:02.767 that we start to rethink this notion 0:09:02.767,0:09:04.460 that if you share something 0:09:04.460,0:09:07.161 with one person it is no longer private. 0:09:07.161,0:09:10.567 Because our societal expectations[br]have changed. 0:09:10.584,0:09:13.837 We've moved from law to norms. 0:09:13.837,0:09:19.122 The norms of not-cool-bro-to-re-share[br]are how we now think about privacy. 0:09:19.134,0:09:21.850 And as a result our law[br]is lagging behind a little bit. 0:09:21.850,0:09:24.904 And although we are not there yet[br]with our laws, 0:09:24.904,0:09:27.339 we have inter measures[br]we can use from code. 0:09:27.350,0:09:31.227 So the interesting thing[br]to see is where we head 0:09:31.227,0:09:33.529 now that we are a society of norms 0:09:33.529,0:09:36.295 and when we think about privacy[br]as norm-based. 0:09:37.483,0:09:39.895 (Applause)