WEBVTT

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I'm going to talk
about the strategizing brain.

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We're going to use
an unusual combination of tools

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from game theory and neuroscience

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to understand how people interact socially
when value is on the line.

NOTE Paragraph

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So game theory is a branch
of, originally, applied mathematics,

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used mostly in economics
and political science,

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a little bit in biology,

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that gives us a mathematical
taxonomy of social life

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and it predicts
what people are likely to do

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and believe others will do

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in cases where everyone's actions
affect everyone else.

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That's a lot of things:
competition, cooperation, bargaining,

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games like hide-and-seek and poker.

NOTE Paragraph

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Here's a simple game to get us started.

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Everyone chooses a number
from zero to 100,

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we're going to compute
the average of those numbers,

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and whoever's closest to two-thirds
of the average wins a fixed prize.

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So you want to be
a little bit below the average number,

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but not too far below,

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and everyone else wants to be

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a little bit below
the average number as well.

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Think about what you might pick.

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As you're thinking,

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this is a toy model of something
like selling in the stock market

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during a rising market. Right?

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You don't want to sell too early
and miss out on profits,

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but you don't want to wait too late

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to when everyone else sells,
triggering a crash.

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You want to be a little bit
ahead of the competition,

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but not too far ahead.

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OK, here's two theories
about how people might think about this,

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then we'll see some data.

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Some of these will sound familiar

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because you probably
are thinking that way.

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I'm using my brain theory to see.

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A lot of people say, "I really don't know
what people are going to pick,

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so I think the average will be 50."

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They're not being really strategic at all.

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"And I'll pick two-thirds of 50.
That's 33." That's a start.

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Other people who are
a little more sophisticated,

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using more working memory,

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say, "I think people will pick 33

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because they're going to pick
a response to 50,

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and so I'll pick 22,
which is two-thirds of 33."

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They're doing one extra step
of thinking, two steps.

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That's better.

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And in principle,
you could do three, four or more,

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but it starts to get very difficult.

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Just like in language and other domains,

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we know it's hard for people
to parse very complex sentences

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with a recursive structure.

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This is called the cognitive
hierarchy theory.

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It's something that I've worked on
and a few other people,

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and it indicates a hierarchy
along with some assumptions

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about how many people
stop at different steps

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and how the steps of thinking are affected
by lots of interesting variables

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and variant people,
as we'll see in a minute.

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A very different theory,
a much more popular one, and an older one,

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due largely to John Nash
of "A Beautiful Mind" fame,

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is what's called equilibrium analysis.

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So if you've ever taken
a game theory course at any level,

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you will have learned
a little bit about this.

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An equilibrium is a mathematical state

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in which everybody has figured out
exactly what everyone else will do.

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It is a very useful concept,

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but behaviorally, it may not
exactly explain what people do

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the first time they play
these types of economic games

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or in situations in the outside world.

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In this case, the equilibrium
makes a very bold prediction,

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which is everyone wants
to be below everyone else,

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therefore they'll play zero.

NOTE Paragraph

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Let's see what happens.

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This experiment's been done
many, many times.

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Some of the earliest ones
were done in the '90s

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by me and Rosemarie Nagel and others.

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This is a beautiful data set
of 9,000 people

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who wrote in to three newspapers
and magazines that had a contest.

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The contest said, send in your numbers

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and whoever is closer to two-thirds
of the average will win a big prize.

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And as you can see,
there's so much data here,

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you can see the spikes very visibly.

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There's a spike at 33.
Those are people doing one step.

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There is another spike visible at 22.

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And notice that most people
pick numbers right around there.

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They don't necessarily pick
exactly 33 and 22.

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There's something
a little bit noisy around it.

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But you can see those spikes.

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There's another group of people

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who seem to have
a firm grip on equilibrium analysis,

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because they're picking zero or one.

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But they lose, right?

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Because picking a number that low
is actually a bad choice

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if other people aren't
doing equilibrium analysis as well.

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So they're smart, but poor.

NOTE Paragraph

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(Laughter)

NOTE Paragraph

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Where are these things
happening in the brain?

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One study by Coricelli and Nagel
gives a really sharp, interesting answer.

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So they had people play this game
while they were being scanned in an fMRI,

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and two conditions:
in some trials, they're told

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you're playing another person
who's playing right now

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and we're going to match up your behavior
and pay you if you win.

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In the other trials, they're told,
you're playing a computer.

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They're just choosing randomly.

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So what you see
here is a subtraction of areas

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in which there's more brain activity
when you're playing people

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compared to playing the computer.

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And you see activity
in some regions we've seen today,

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medial prefrontal cortex,
dorsomedial, up here,

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ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
anterior cingulate,

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an area that's involved
in lots of types of conflict resolution,

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like if you're playing "Simon Says,"

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and also the right and left
temporoparietal junction.

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And these are all areas
which are fairly reliably known

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to be part of what's called
a "theory of mind" circuit,

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or "mentalizing circuit."

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That is, it's a circuit that's used
to imagine what other people might do.

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So these were some
of the first studies to see this

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tied in to game theory.

NOTE Paragraph

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What happens with these
one- and two-step types?

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So we classify people by what they picked

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and then we look at the difference between
playing humans versus playing computers,

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which brain areas
are differentially active.

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On the top you see the one-step players.
Almost no difference.

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They're treating other people
like a computer, and the brain is too.

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The bottom players, you see
all the activity in dorsomedial PFC.

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So those two-step players
are doing something differently.

NOTE Paragraph

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You could say, "What can we do
with this information?"

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You might be able to say,

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"This person's going to be
a good poker player,"

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or, "This person's socially naive,"

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and we might also be able to study things

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like development of adolescent brains

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once we have an idea
of where this circuitry exists.

NOTE Paragraph

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OK. Get ready.

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I'm saving you some brain activity,

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because you don't need
to use your hair detector cells.

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You should use those cells
to think carefully about this game.

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This is a bargaining game.

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Two players who are being scanned
using EEG electrodes

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are going to bargain
over one to six dollars.

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If they can do it in 10 seconds,
they're going to actually earn that money.

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If they don't make a deal,
they get nothing.

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That's a mistake together.

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The twist is that one player, on the left,

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is informed about how much
on each trial there is.

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They play lots of trials
with different amounts each time.

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In this case, they know
there's four dollars.

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The uninformed player doesn't know,
but they know the informed player knows.

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So the uninformed player's
challenge is to say,

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"Is this guy really being fair
or are they giving me a very low offer

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in order to get me to think

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that there's only one
or two dollars available to split?"

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In which case they might reject it
and not come to a deal.

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So there's some tension
between trying to get the most money

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but trying to goad the other player
into giving you more.

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And the way they bargain
is to point on a number line

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that goes from zero to six dollars,

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and they're bargaining
over how much the uninformed player gets,

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and the informed player gets the rest.

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So this is like
a management-labor negotiation

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in which the workers don't know

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how much profits
the privately held company has,

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and they want to maybe
hold out for more money,

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but the company might want
to create the impression

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that there's little to split:
"I'm giving you the most that I can."

NOTE Paragraph

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First some behavior.

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So a bunch of the subject pairs
play face to face.

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We have other data
where they play across computers.

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That's an interesting difference.

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But a bunch of the face-to-face pairs

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agree to divide the money evenly
every single time.

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Boring. It's just
not interesting neurally.

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It's good for them.
They make a lot of money.

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But we're interested in,

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can we say something about when
disagreements occur versus don't occur?

NOTE Paragraph

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So this is the other group of subjects
who often disagree.

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So they have a chance of --

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they bicker and disagree
and end up with less money.

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They might be eligible
to be on "Real Housewives," the TV show.

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You see on the left,

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when the amount to divide
is one, two or three dollars,

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they disagree about half the time,

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and when the amount is four, five, six,
they agree quite often.

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This turns out to be
something that's predicted

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by a very complicated type of game theory

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you should come to graduate school
at CalTech and learn about.

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It's a little too complicated
to explain right now,

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but the theory tells you
that this shape kind of should occur.

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Your intuition might tell you that too.

NOTE Paragraph

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Now I'll show you
the results from the EEG recording.

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Very complicated. The right brain
schematic is the uninformed person,

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and the left is the informed.

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Remember that we scanned
both brains at the same time,

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so we can ask about time-synced activity

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in similar or different
areas simultaneously,

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just like if you wanted
to study a conversation

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and you were scanning
two people talking to each other

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and you'd expect common activity
in language regions

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when they're actually
listening and communicating.

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So the arrows connect regions
that are active at the same time,

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and the direction of the arrows flows

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from the region
that's active first in time,

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and the arrowhead goes
to the region that's active later.

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So in this case, if you look carefully,

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most of the arrows
flow from right to left.

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That is, it looks as if the uninformed
brain activity is happening first

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and then it's followed
by activity in the informed brain.

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And by the way, these were trials
where their deals were made.

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This is from the first two seconds.

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We haven't finished analyzing this data,
we're still peeking in,

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but the hope is that we can say
something in the first couple of seconds

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about whether they'll make a deal or not,

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which could be useful
in avoiding litigation,

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ugly divorces and things like that.

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Those are all cases

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in which a lot of value
is lost by delay and strikes.

NOTE Paragraph

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Here's the case
where the disagreements occur.

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You can see it looks different
than the one before.

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There's a lot more arrows.

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That means that the brains are synced up

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more closely in terms
of simultaneous activity,

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and the arrows flow clearly
from left to right.

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That is, the informed brain
seems to be deciding,

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"We're probably
not going to make a deal here."

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And then later there's activity
in the uninformed brain.

NOTE Paragraph

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Next I'm going to introduce you
to some relatives.

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They're hairy, smelly, fast and strong.

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You might be thinking back
to your last Thanksgiving.

NOTE Paragraph

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(Laughter)

NOTE Paragraph

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Maybe if you had a chimpanzee with you.

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Charles Darwin and I and you broke off
from the family tree, from chimpanzees,

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about five million years ago.

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They're still our closest genetic kin.

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We share 98.8 percent of the genes.

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We share more genes with them
than zebras do with horses.

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And we're also their closest cousin.

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They have more genetic relation
to us than to gorillas.

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So how humans and chimpanzees
behave differently

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might tell us a lot about brain evolution.

NOTE Paragraph

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So this is an amazing memory test

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from Nagoya, Japan,
Primate Research Institute,

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where they've done a lot of this research.

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This goes back quite a ways.

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They're interested in working memory.

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The chimp is going to see
200 milliseconds' exposure --

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that's fast, that's eight movie frames --

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of numbers one, two, three, four, five.

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Then they disappear
and they're replaced by squares,

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and they have to press the squares

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that correspond to the numbers
from low to high to get an apple reward.

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Let's see how they can do it.

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This is a young chimp.

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The young ones are better
than the old ones, just like humans.

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And they're highly experienced,

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so they've done this
thousands and thousands of time.

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Obviously there's a big training effect,
as you can imagine.

NOTE Paragraph

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(Laughter)

NOTE Paragraph

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You can see they're very blasé
and kind of effortless.

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Not only can they do it very well,
they do it in a sort of lazy way.

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Who thinks you could beat the chimps?

NOTE Paragraph

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(Laughter)

NOTE Paragraph

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Wrong.

NOTE Paragraph

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(Laughter)

NOTE Paragraph

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We can try. Maybe we'll try.

NOTE Paragraph

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OK, so the next part of this study
I'm going to go quickly through

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is based on an idea of Tetsuro Matsuzawa.

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He had a bold idea --

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what he called the cognitive
trade-off hypothesis.

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We know chimps are faster and stronger.
They're also very obsessed with status.

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His thought was, maybe
they've preserved brain activities,

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and they practice them in development,

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that are really important to them
to negotiate status and to win,

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which is something like strategic thinking
during competition.

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So we're going to check that out
by having the chimps actually play a game

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by touching two touch screens.

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The chimps are interacting
with each other through the computers.

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They're going to press left or right.
One chimp is called a matcher.

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They win if they press left, left,

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like a seeker finding someone
in hide-and-seek, or right, right.

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The mismatcher wants to mismatch.

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They want to press
the opposite screen of the chimp.

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And the rewards are apple cube rewards.

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So here's how game theorists
look at these data.

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This is a graph of the percentage of times
the matcher picked right on the x-axis,

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and the percentage of times
they predicted right

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by the mismatcher on the y-axis.

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So a point here is the behavior
by a pair of players,

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one trying to match,
one trying to mismatch.

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The NE square in the middle --
actually NE, CH and QRE --

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those are three different theories
of Nash equilibrium, and others --

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tells you what the theory predicts,

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which is that they should match 50-50,

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because if you play
left too much, for example,

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I can exploit that if I'm the mismatcher
by then playing right.

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And as you can see, the chimps --
each chimp is one triangle --

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are circled around,
hovering around that prediction.

NOTE Paragraph

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Now we move the payoffs.

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We're going to make the left, left payoff
for the matcher higher.

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Now they get three apple cubes.

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Game theoretically, that should
make the mismatcher's behavior shift,

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because the mismatcher will think,

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this guy's going to go for the big reward,

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so I'm going to go to the right,
make sure he doesn't get it.

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And their behavior moves up

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in the direction of this change
in the Nash equilibrium.

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Finally, we changed
the payoffs one more time.

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Now it's four apple cubes,

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and their behavior again
moves towards the Nash equilibrium.

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It's sprinkled around,
but if you average the chimps out,

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they're really close, within .01.

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They're actually closer
than any species we've observed.

NOTE Paragraph

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What about humans?

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You think you're smarter
than a chimpanzee?

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Here's two human groups in green and blue.

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They're closer to 50-50.

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They're not responding
to payoffs as closely,

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and if you study their learning,

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they aren't as sensitive
to previous rewards.

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The chimps are playing better
than the humans,

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in the sense of adhering to game theory.

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These are two different groups
of humans from Japan and Africa.

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They replicate quite nicely.

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None of them are close
to where the chimps are.

NOTE Paragraph

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OK, so here are some things
we learned today.

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People seem to do a limited
amount of strategic thinking

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using theory of mind.

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We have some evidence from bargaining

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that early warning signs in the brain
might be used to predict

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whether there will be
a bad disagreement that costs money,

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and chimps are better
competitors than humans,

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as judged by game theory.

NOTE Paragraph

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Thank you.

NOTE Paragraph

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(Applause)