♪ (Intro music) ♪
Welcome. This is James Corbett of the Corbett Report
with your EyeOpener Report for BoilingFrogsPost.com.
And this week we're taking a break
out of our whistleblower series
to talk with our friend
and the owner of BoilingFrogsPost.com, Sibel Edmonds,
about the breaking news regarding
the Boston Marathon bombing and the suspects
and all of the information that's swirling around now
about the Chechnya/Dagestan /North Caucausus region
-- which is very interesting,
because those of you who have been following our recent Gladio series
know that this is something that we've been talking about,
specifically this region.
And we've been saying that this is a region
that Americans are going to be more familiar with in the future:
well, it looks like the future is now,
as people are now talking about the North Caucasus region
and Islamic terrorism there.
So, Sibel: first of all,
thank you very much for coming on the program again today.
It's always a pleasure to have you here.
And why don't we jump straight into it
by talking about the recent post
that you put up on Boiling Frogs Post
to let people know a little bit more
about this region and the terror threat:
"USA: The Creator & Sustainer of Chechen Terrorism."
Why don't you tell us a little bit about
the connections there between the USA, Turkey, NATO,
and the Islamic terrorism in Chechnya?
Absolutely, James.
And as you mentioned,
we have been covering this region with our series, Gladio series;
and I have been writing and talking about it
for almost 11 years now
since my FBI whistleblowing days.
Talking about Central Asia/Caucasus,
talking about joint operation
between the CIA, NATO, and the factions in this region
-- including, most importantly, the Chechens.
So this is something that I have been pounding and pounding and pounding
for over a decade.
And it is so interesting:
suddenly you wake up and the newspapers,
the mainstream media, the quasi-alternative media --
suddenly they have discovered
this never-talked-about-before region, Chechnya.
In fact, it was really interesting:
they started talking about Chechnya,
and then people
-- because Americans are not even famlliar with the region,
thanks to the mainstream media --
they started saying "Czech Republic" [laughs]
Even the Czech Republic had to come and say,
"Look, Chechnya is a different place. Don't look at us!"
So it just tells you where American people
-- we, the Americans --
are, as far as knowledge
of this incredibly important region is concerned.
And the fact that so much has been brewing
for the past two-and-a-half decades in the region;
and while we have had coverage in Russia,
in some parts of Europe
-- in the Middle East, even --
we have had zero coverage in this region,
except for positive PR.
Just like with the mujahideens in Afghanistan
in late 1970s and 1980s, we have been
-- our media, taking their script directly
from the State Department and the CIA, our government --
been portraying the Chechens
as freedom fighters, heroic people;
and Russia as the abusers in their pursuit of...
not recognizing their independece, et cetera, et cetera.
So, it's been always in a semi-positive light,
the portrayal of this region:
Chechnya, Dagestan.
And I want to also emphasize
a very, very powerful lobby group in the United States
established by the very, very powerful people
to represent Chechnya.
You would think...
-- it's not even really a country, OK? It's a little region within Russia;
it is within Russian terrrtory: you're not talking about ex-Soviet Bloc,
it's in Russian territory --
yet, there is a lobby group for Chechnya.
And in my piece, I put a link
to this organization, to this lobby group.
But if you just look at
even the lobby group, this lobby group --
which is the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya...
Chechnya! All these places bogged down by wars,
and here are all these powerful people
such as the former director of the CIA, James Woolsey.
He is one of the lobbyists with this committee for Chechnya.
Of all the places in the world bogged down with war -- but Chechnya?
You have individuals...
I mean, you have some really big names.
I don't want to take up a lot of time here,
and people can go and read my article on this,
but you have people like Richard Perle --
remember Richard Perle, Pentagon advisor?
You have Ledeen, you have Frank Gaffney.
I mean, if you look at this lobby,
Chechen lobby group
-- the American-Chechen lobby group --
you will see CIA, DIA, NATO, and the very well-known
-- all the well-known, actually; the top-tier --
neocons.
The major players,
even during the previous administration.
So that tells you about what Chechnya was
to the US media and to our government.
And now, suddenly,
the mainstream media with this incident
started pairing up the region
as the hottest spot currently for al-Qaeda
and radical Islamic activities and terrorism.
Just overnight:
up until this point, it was never mentioned
in light of that kind of strategic importance:
"OK, they are radical."
No, it was not.
And now, suddenly it became.
So, what happened?
Because what we covered during our series was
-- and this is both from my first-hand experience
and all the research, everything we put together for the series --
but since early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union,
how the United States, NATO had been carrying out
this second phase of Operation Gladio
specifically targeting that region:
and that is Central Asia and Caucasus.
You know, Uzbekistan
-- all the 'stans --
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.
And if you look at the region saying...
well, the success stories:
well, we are looking at Georgia;
we are looking at Azerbaijan
-- it's almost a NATO member.
And then you're looking at some brand-new
-- since 1990 --
created Islamic factions
that have been growing in the region,
receiving fundings from United States,
Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
the United [Arab] Emirates.
And with the US, as always, it's not direct:
they are not sending checks.
We are not
-- our government is not --
sending checks to them.
It's usually done, as always, through proxies, OK?
Either through illegal activities,
CIA's heroin operations,
or it is through proxies by NATO member, partner, Turkey
-- right there with the Turkic language.
Well, when we talk about the United [Arab] Emirates,
what are we talking about?
United [Arab] Emirates is our very direct puppet there in the region.
So we have been carrying these operations,
and our series covered that;
and now, suddenly, we have this situation.
We have this so-called terror incident,
and suddenly this becomes the hot region.
And the first question people should be asking in this latest is, "Why?"
You know, I see...
the first two, three days of this terror incident,
I did not post anything.
I didn't even include it in my nightly news,
because I know what happens:
you get lots of info, a lot of it false info;
a lot of it contradicting, conflicting stories.
And it's really a waste of time
trying to focus on those little details
and not to take a deep breath, step back,
and say, "Let's take a look at this."
I mean, let's take a look at it as a whole,
and let's wait and put together some of this information,
at least those that we deem credible.
And I guess we have enough to run
this particular episode on this.
And actually, the article I posted
had a new introduction based
on the latest so-called terror incident,
but the rest of it was what I wrote
and published two years ago:
and talking about the Chechen group,
talking about our operations,
and talking about the region brewing
with these factions and Islamizations,
and the Chechens being funded.
Actually, the headquarters
of the top Chechen terrorist leaders
-- I'm not talking about the little peons, the pawns; but the leaders --
are, have been, in Turkey.
And we talked about, during one of our episodes,
about the latest assassinations in Turkey,
where the Russian FSB have been going
and taking out these Chechen terrorist leaders.
One incident happened in Qatar, and we listed that.
In Dubai, the bank accounts that they used:
they are in Dubai and they are in Cyprus.
So this was written two years ago,
and then -- well?
As we predicted and as we expected,
now it is happening.
So the question is what is happening,
why it's happening,
what kind of implications we are looking at,
and how it fits within this entire Great Game context.
Well, you are exactly right that there's all sorts
of conflicting information coming out now
about the Tsarnaev Brothers and their travels,
and what they were involved in
and what they weren't involved in.
And as you say, it's very difficult
-- if not impssible, at this point --
to sort through all of that conflicting information.
But something, a little nugget
that came out last week that was extremely important,
was RT's interview with the brothers' mother
where she asserted that her sons were innocent,
that they were being set up,
and they had been in contact with the FBI
for three, five years.
So, there is some problems there in terms
of exactly what she was saying;
but at any rate, RT aired that interview;
and afterwards, the FBI confirmed
that they had, in fact,
talked to the brothers earlier.
So that was an important piece
of this puzzle that came out.
And let's talk a little bit about that information
and what that may or may not indicate
about what was actually happening there.
I believe that is the most important clue,
piece, that we have so far.
Because what happened was, as you just said,
this is what the parents said.
And FBI was denying, and later they came and said,
"Oh, well, in 2011 a foreign government,"
"a foreign nation, tipped us about these individuals."
And this would be, actually, mid- to late-2011.
And at that point I
-- right away I predicted --
I said, "That is Russia that provided that tip through the FBI."
But if you compare the timelines,
the parents keep talking about three to five years ago:
well, the first tip didn't come until two years ago.
It's actually less than two years ago.
And now we find out that a second tip came
after one of the brothers supposedly
came back from Dagestan region,
and Russia provided the second tip in late 2012
-- which would be about five months,
six months before this incident.
And the parents are talking about the US government,
the FBI being in touch,
working with the two brothers three to five years ago.
So we have that very, very big discrepancy here.
And the other most important thing is
-- and I want to emphasize, especially with people with second language,
English as second language, and I'm really familiar with that; especially
people who come from that part of the world, whether it's the Middle East --
usually, you have one intelligence agency.
You know, it's either KGB,
or
-- in Turkey --
it's MIT.
That's how it works.
You don't have all these different players
like it is in the United States
or is in the United Kingdom.
You don't have the CIA and FBI and DIA;
you just have one government intelligence agency.
So in this case, I am not sure what, exactly, they meant
-- the parents.
Did they mean the government was in touch
-- the government people, the intelligence agencies were in touch --
with the brothers?
Or were they specifically shown the FBI badge
three to five years ago?
And were these people really FBI?
Because my inclination would be that,
considering the linguistic abiliities
and the roots of the brothers
-- especially the older brother --
being from the very important area...
and we don't have many people
from the Caucasus in the United States.
And here is this individual who speaks fluent Russian;
he speaks fluent Chechen;
familiar with Turkic languages;
speaks fluent English;
been here long enough:
he would be the perfect target to approach
to recruit for the State Department,
or CIA a.k.a. State Department.
It happened to me in 1997
while I was studying in George Washington University:
one of my professors tried to recruit me
for the CIA/State Department.
Why? Farsi, Turkish, the background, Azerbaijani, et cetera.
So I could see as a pretty plausible hypothesis here
the CIA/State Department approaching and recruiting the brothers, OK?
And then FBI later, in 2011,
getting a tip from the Russians.
And you know, FBI is domestic.
FBI doesn't send people overseas to go to Dagestan
to collect information and play as assets.
That is not the way FBI operates.
They do a lot of screw-ups around,
but that is not one of them.
A lot of stuff that I've described here
fits wtihin the recruitment
from the CIA, State Department
for the overseas operation.
This also fits with the trip
-- or the trips, plural --
that their older brother took
and went to the region.
Now FBI, unaware of these,
may have received, as they say
-- and it's probably correct --
a tip from the Russians,
the Russian intelligence services.
And they went and followed up,
and then they were told by the CIA
to close and just zip-zip and go away,
because those guys were under
-- or at least one of them was under --
the CIA control: assets, operatives.
Because you can't get this tip...
the story doesn't add up.
They go look and they find nothing,
and yet the brother goes to the region,
supposedly, in 2012;
then Russia contacts them again.
And again, I believe Russia knows a lot;
and right now Russia has been very, very quiet.
If Russians, the Russian government,
the Russian intelligence agency wanted to,
right now, you would be finding a lot of answers.
They could give us a lot.
Right now, they are not playing any of those cards;
they are sitting in silence.
Which brings us to that next issue:
and that is why this is happening,
and what are the factors behind this entire
badly-scripted, B-grade scripted incident.
Well, that's exactly right.
But before we get to that part,
which extremely important:
just dwelling on the brothers for a moment, then.
So, what
-- I realize this is speculation --
but what would be a hypothesis
for how that would play out if they were...
for example, had been contacted
and recruited by the CIA earlier?
What would be the point of using them
in an operation like this?
Are they simply patsies in this operation
that have been framed for this as convenient tools?
Were they consciously set up for something like this?
What is the point of using assets like this in an operation
-- if that is, in fact, what took place?
Sometimes it's easier, actually, to look
and say it could be all of the above.
For example, if
-- which I still believe is very likely --
CIA recruited them
and this is why they went to the region...
one of the things, maybe, we will do later
is we will show the graph of the violence
and terrorism in the region
-- and this is Dagestan and Chechnya.
And if you look at the peak period,
which would be up until 2002,
and if people go and just do their own little research
from a lot of scholarly papers,
the Chechen leaders
-- not the anti-Russian, but the ones that are more dialogue-oriented --
they make semi-peace with Russian government.
And if you look at the violence level, you see that...
you see a drop from 2002 until about mid- to end of 2010.
It actually was a pretty, fairly quiet period
compared to what we had in the late 1990s until 2002, 2003.
So, and then you would see another peak
going up starting in 2010, the incidents.
And you see, actually, a lot of it
happening in Dagestan, OK?
So, keep that in mind.
And then take a look at, like --
OK, I'm aware of two trips
that I'm being told the brothers took:
that there was one short trip in 2010,
but there was another longer trip in 2012.
Now, I'm waiting for further confirmation on this;
but again, that goes along with what we have been discussing.
That is bad business for us, our operation
-- by us, I mean CIA, NATO, the West --
and what they would like to see
on the ground in Russia.
They like this territory to be sliced up
and taken away from the Russians.
We want to get closer and closer to the region.
This is why it would be great to have our map
and look at Dagestan and look at Chechnya.
Also, remember what happened and what took place in 2008.
In 2008 we had the Georgian-Russian wars, remember?
And you're looing at South Ossetia,
and you're looking at Abkhazia.
So... and again, this is all basically same region:
Chechnya, Dagestan, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
So, we have Georgia in our hand;
we have Azerbaijan.
And then you take a look at what has been happening
-- but again, I'm gonna go back again
to what you said about the hypothesis.
So, with the linguistic abilities, with their roots
-- they still had their own foreign passports;
they didn't have... and in fact, this guy
didn't even have US passport:
supposedly, it was rejected.
So, it's one thing for an English-speaking
American blue-eyed blond guy from CIA
to go to the region to organize some of these factions
-- whether it's the Chechens or other factions, Islamic factions --
that we have been training and we have been arming,
we have been putting in place.
It would be far better to implement some of those tasks
through the lower-level but local people.
And here you have a perfect...
I mean, you have a perfect operative here in your hands,
someone that you can have implement this stuff.
And again, you look at the violence level
going up starting in mid-2010,
in that particular region we are talking about.
So this is happening, OK?
And of course, our foreign policy sometimes
-- no: all the time, actually --
changes based on what is taking place.
In 2010, we didn't have the Syria thing.
Maybe we had, in 2011, Libya.
But with what's happening right now with Syria,
and Russia being the major obstacle
-- the only obstacle, roadblock --
for our invasion...
Even though we've been really closing in,
we've been building up our troops:
Jordan, Tunisia, Turkey.
The only reason we haven't done the final cut,
the final invasion,
is Russia. That's the only reason.
So with that brewing in the background...
so, we have that.
Two, we have had the Russians
shutting down the NGOs in Russia.
These are, most of them, US NGOs;
and we know that a lot of these NGOs
are the extension of the CIA.
This is one way to get into Russia.
And then we have this whole thing of Americans, US government,
sanctioning 18 Russians recently in retaliation.
And then, also
-- just a few weeks ago --
Russia sent a very, very strong message, response,
to the latest joint military exercise
between the United States and Georgia, OK?
And they said, "We don't like this."
And based on their intelligence,
things were not as innocent
as the US wanted to portray
-- which was, this was geared towards Afghanistan.
It was far more than that,
and it has been far more than that with Georgia.
And again, let's recall 2008:
Georgian-Russian War.
So with all these things,
the scenario can change.
These guys could have been assets.
FBI gets the tips from the Russians,
then they get a tip again
for the second time from the Russians.
Then the question becomes, well,
how have things changed
between 2009, 2010, to 2012?
"How to get rid of them?" OK?
-- possibility.
Two, "How to get rid of them
while we achieve several other objectives."
And one of those objectives may be
-- we will get into it --
what is going on with Syria.
Is there a possibility that we want to actually,
maybe, give some deals to the Russians
or leeways with the Chechens?
Is it the time?
We have done it a lot.
You know, mujahideens are our best friends
and then our worst enemies.
We did it in the Balkans:
KLAs were terrorists;
then they were our freedom fighters,
our friends;
then they were put back again.
So, Chechens have been our freedom fighters,
our friends, our operatives.
We have been doing, arming them.
So, for a while, we may call it off and say,
"Chechens are terrorists;
there are a lot of radicalization going on there;
they are working with the al-Qaeda."
And three years down the road,
we may bring them back as friends again
and lift the terrorist adjective or title from them:
that's a possibilit.
And meanwhile, give time to Russians
to do... to achieve certain objectives in the region
when it comes to the problem with Dagestan and Chechnya,
and in return maybe
-- get their wars --
to back off from the Syria situation.
And if that's the case...
for example, if this hypothesis
-- and I'm emphasizing hypothesis --
if that's accurate,
then within the next week or so,
we are going to see a change
in the Russians' attitude with Syria.
They may back off,
and the invasion of Syria may come into fruition.
And if that is the case,
if this prediction comes true and becomes a reality,
then we would have to go back
-- because the mainstream media is not going to do it, James --
would have to come back and bring...
extract this, and say,
"This happened, that; and within two weeks, Russia backed off. Why?"
OK? This is how a lot of these foreign games,
especially within this zone,
gets to be played.
Again, the public are always kept outside of it.
The mainstream media, they only get their script,
take their script from the State Department.
Their transcript, they just run it there.
So, that's one possibility.
The other possibility,
if it's not Syria,
it would be what we have been doing with Georgia.
Because after the election of Ivanishvili,
things have been a bit different.
I mean, people have been saying
he's siding with the Russians
because he was Russian-educated.
But on the other hand, we know about
all his accounts in the British Virgin Islands.
We know he has actually become
much closer to our side.
And if you look at the latest
joint NATO and Georgia agreements,
and operations, and communications,
and et cetera,
you will see that Georgia
-- especially in the past year or so --
hasn't been very close to the Russians.
It's been slipping away.
And we may see a repeat
of what we saw in 2008
between Georgia and Russia
over the South Ossetian, Abkhazia region.
The third possibilty would be using this,
what has been created and scripted here,
and by making it...
it gets repeated enough times with the media
in the next three, four weeks,
nobody will even utter a word
when we come and say,
"We need to focus our attention in the region,
the new hotbed for al-Qaeda,
which is the Caucasus."
What do we do when that's the case, right?
We want to have more intelligence-gathering power,
power on the ground:
and you are looking at inside Russia's territory.
I don't know:
I don't think it's very likely,
but it's a possibility that I would keep in mind.
Well, then, let's talk about Russia's role in this.
Because as you indicated,
the FSB did contact the FBI, allegedly,
in 2011 to investigate these brothers
for their potential links to terrorism
-- which indicates that they were on the radar two years ago,
even before their second, longer trip to Dagestan.
So that must be significant, at the very least,
in terms of... even if they were, for example,
CIA assets in some way creating a legend,
at the very least they were getting the attention
of the FSB and others.
What does that indicate about what was known,
or potentially known,
about these brothers,
and how that information was passed on to the FBI?
What can we derive from that,
and what does that mean about
what Russia may or may not have up their sleeve
regarding these brothers?
Well, my position is they have a lot up their sleeves:
because they know what's going on.
We covered this whole thing with Zawahiri, for example, from 1990s.
I mean, this is very important.
And people say, "What is the relation?"
There are so many parallels here.
They kept them in jail, in Russia.
And guess where he was travelling, Zawahiri?
Dagestan. Dagestan, OK?
He had the laptop... we covered all this.
Now, with these brothers, all these operations
that we are conducting in the region:
they are all within
the Russian intelligence, FSB's, radar.
They know what's going on.
And as I have mentioned in the past episodes,
for me that is the most puzzling thing:
and that is Russia's utter silence.
And we also talked about having
an episode on Putin, because...
one of... the psychology of the political leaders in this region
-- and not only Russia, but even in Turkey.
Like, in Turkey, Erdogan, the Prime Minister,
has to really talk tough when it comes to Israel.
Well, with the Muslim population,
people being really anti-Zionist in Turkey...
and so, on the other hand, in the background,
they are completely the United States' puppet.
And everybody
-- all the actors, players --
they are aware of this.
Now, with Putin, that is another question.
Because again, I am never 100 percent certain
of where Putin is in all this.
On the one hand,
we know that if it were to be obvious,
if it were to get out... let's say, if Putin
is behind the scenes very close to our players
-- to our side, to the Western side.
Then you have the nationalists in Russia,
you have all the other factions:
Putin will be a goner, OK?
He's enjoying his support mainly because
he's also seen as, number one, Russian and pro-Russia;
and he has to play tough.
And there are other factions within Russia
that would gain the momentum,
and that would be the end of it.
And then you come in to this reverse-psychology thing,
even during the elections.
If you want the Russians to increase their faith
or maintain their faith in a leader like Putin,
what do you do?
You play as if you don't want Putin to be elected,
or you are actually disputing the elections process.
All it does is, it actually gives more power
and strengthens the position of your puppet there.
We used to do that with Bashar Assad.
Before all the stuff with Assad,
even though Axis of Evil and all this stuff were being talked about,
FBI was closely working with Assad's intelligence after 9/11.
Even, we sent our detainees to Syria to be tortured.
So a lot of BS, but our puppet:
we want the people there to keep him,
we don't want any revolution there.
So it must look like he's tough on us, and we don't like him.
That's... in reverse psychology, it's a very, very simple concept.
So I don't know how much of it is due to Putin;
and one of the things I am hoping to achieve
with everything we are doing here
is for other factions
-- there are other, semi-other political parties there --
to put the pressure
to put out more information
on what's going on.
Because that information is also extremely important
for our people here, for us, for the rest of the world,
on all these operations:
creation of terror;
training of terrorism;
arming, financing the terrorism
by the United States.
And the other thing I want to mention in this is this...
and I keep hearing
from some of the more awake people in the United States,
alternative -- real alternative -- media:
they keep going back to this theory
or hypothesis of blowback, OK?
You can't do that.
It gets old after a while.
It's like, "Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me."
You can't use that and say, well,
"OK, with Afghans it was a blowback -- was 9/11," right?
Well, don't we learn?
If that's the case, you want
-- like, you don't want to ever commit that, right?
What have we been doing in Syria?
We are creating and using a radical faction,
working with them,
and that's what we want to plant there.
Same thing with Egypt.
Same thing with Central Asia/Caucasus
and even after 9/11.
So if it was for the first time
-- as it was the case with Afghanistan, with Taliban, with al-Qaeda
in Afghanistan and supposed Bin Laden plan, and putting 9/11 on that --
I can understand people doing it once.
But once you see this as a repeated thing,
no matter what the consequences
-- or maybe the consequences are not relevant;
maybe the consequences are not the consequences --
then stop talking about blowback.
Because I know that a lot of people
within the intelligence agencies,
especially the FBI: they are idiots, OK?
And I'm not saying in a derogatory way:
not the smartest people.
Not the most critical-thinking, alert, or educated people.
But you can't put that all these people in the CIA,
all these analysts, all these neocons,
all of these people are stupid:
"They keep doing the same thing,"
"they get blowback,"
"and then they go and do it again."
So I'm kind of sensitive to that characterization of,
"Well, maybe this was another case of: "
"we work with these people,"
"we train them, we put them in there;"
"it came back and haunted us."
And that just doesn't add up.
It doesn't wash.
It... after 9/11,
I hope I won't hear this [laughs] more and more,
because... and unfortunately, I'm hearing from those people
who are actually not buying the mainstream media line of reporting,
and they are coming with their own version
-- but then they put this label of "blowback" again.
And that is, sure is, the CIA's favorite lines.
Come and point at them;
say, "Yeah, we did that
-- and then it came back and haunted us." [laughs]
I think we are all a bit sick of that particular line of reasoning
and how it's trotted out every time that the connections are inevitably found
between the intelligence agents and these types of events.
But I think we should also keep room for some skepticism
over the entire story that's being presented,
including whether or not these brothers were in any way involved:
whether they actually were guilty of this.
And just the latest on that, for example:
The Blaze has a story up about Governor Deval Patrick,
who apparently was talking about the video
showing the bombing suspects dropping their bags and taking cover,
and he described it as "chilling."
And then down in the fourth or fifth paragraph of that story,
they admit that in fact he hadn't seen the videotape:
he was just describing what had been described to him.
So again, we still haven't seen the evidence
that would even truly indicate they were involved.
You're absolutely right.
And I know we are mostly focusing here, now
-- with our coverage --
on the international aspects:
the Great Game and what we have been covering.
And then I was talking about various objectives
that could be achieved with this.
It's like, "Why?" OK?
So we know that it's not true what happened.
This is, one way or another...
and I don't buy the FBI's creation on this,
even though I know they do a lot
of false flag in their different ways.
This has the footprint of the other
[laughs] the real evil, evil agency
-- is... the domestic objectives.
And that is, we...
they implemented very successfully
the martial laws there in Boston.
And it was very...
-- I mean, truly disgusting --
to see how successful it was
for the United States government.
You mean, you are looking at one teenager dead,
the other one on the run: a 19-year-old
that has no paramilitary training,
no military training.
A 19-year-old boy running around loose,
and they lock down;
they... the retails;
and they go and they invade people's homes.
And it achieved another...
I mean, domestically it achieved several objectives.
And one of them is
-- that is the most important one --
is basically the graduation, I would call it:
the graduation of our police state status.
Meaning: we were climbing, climbing, getting in there;
and basically, this was graduation.
And I was really disgusted:
I was truly disgusted.
Very successful for the government.
It was a great success for the police state.
And it was a... it's huge blow to us.
And also, with all that brewing there,
no emphasis was placed on CISPA, which was happening.
So, domestic agendas that were achieved automatically...
so, I don't know if those were the positive externalities:
"As part of it, we get this thing, too;"
"so it's a win-win situation."
As far as the international objectives
-- what is going to be achieved with this, by this --
I would say the next ten days to two weeks going to show us.
I will keep a close watch on Syria
and what's going to happen with Russia's position on Syria.
I will also watch very closely the region
as far as one of the players there, Georgia
-- one of our current puppets --
Georgia, there, within that region; and Ossetia.
We may be seeing something very close to 2008,
Georgian-Russian incidents,
and I wouldn't be surprised.
And that, paired up with the new hotbed for al-Qaeda,
we want to use all this
to get closer and closer and closer to our objective
of, as we said, basically surrounding this region.
To a certain degree, we are doing it with China;
much bigger degree with Russia.
Considering the importance of the region
for our natural resources
-- gas, oil, minerals --
and... far more important than the entire Middle East
as far as the future is concerned.
And for decades,
it's been within the plans, the objectives.
It's the region we've been...
our government has set its sight
-- the real government, the top ones --
on this particular region.
Can you spell out, in some more detail,
how you think this might play into the Syria situation?
Because my understanding would be something along the lines
of the US, perhaps, threatening Russia
to move into the North Caucasus region more
unless they got some pay-for-play with
-- leeway on -- Syria?
Is that what you're talking about,
or would there be some other kind of...
I don't think that would be very likely.
Because one thing...
I mean, we have Syrian side.
We have Iran there, that...
its turn is coming; it hasn't come yet.
I don't think we want to have that kind of, really, confrontation
-- direct confrontation --
with Russia.
But as far as, you mean...
not "the bribery." The "carrots dangling?"
Is that what you're asking?
It's... as I said, it's...
we had a drop in violence,
terrorism incidents in the region,
Dagestan and Chechnya, in 2000
-- between 2002-2003, and 2010,
since the semi-peace accord
between the more dialogue-oriented Chechens
and the Russian government.
And then in 2010 we start seeing the graph going up.
Now, even though...
I mean, especially from economic aspects as well,
because Russia also has pretty economically-important relationship
with the entire Europe as well,
it has acted as a restraint on Russia to really tackle...
because there are cells there, a lot of them.
These are our creation, cells.
And I keep saying, The United States of America, NATO, Operation Gladio:
in the region, and with Chechens.
Because we have been arming them;
we have been protecting them.
And there is also the PR aspects of it worldwide:
and that is, if Russia responds as is required for
this radical terrorism inside
-- even though it's within its borders in Dagestan and Chechnya --
there will be our mainstream media everywhere.
Europe, United States:
"The Russians abusing it..."
"This is the suffocation of the minority in Russia."
And it can get, really, portrayed awfully.
And that provides more excuse, reason,
for us in the region to try to interfere.
You're gonna start seeing Amnesty International and the United Nations.
This is something that Russia doesn't want, OK?
They just don't want that.
They want more free hand to do it
with lesser degree of international bad PR.
So it is possible that by now
-- as I said, being our friends, freedom fighters for a while --
the United States would declare that area
-- Dagestan and Chechnya, and Chechens --
as the real bad guys:
"There are some al-Qaeda cells there."
Give the Russians the, you know, wink-wink:
"Here: you have the leeway;"
"go and do some of the operations you like to do."
And because this is right after this incident,
it won't generate that kind of publicity,
that kind of bad PR. Because,
"Hey! Actually, Russia's doing a good thing."
"Those guys, aren't they working with al-Qaeda?"
"Good for the Russians!"
Suddenly they are not freedom fighters.
For a while, we're gonna have Chechens to be our al-Qaeda:
bad-bad-boogeyman terrorists, OK?
And just like with Mujahideen e-Khalq
-- the MEK, KLA --
later, we may lift it.
And we may say,
"Let's go back to normal." [laughs]
"And they will be the good guys;"
"we'll no longer designate them as terrorists."
So if that's the case, Russians would say,
"OK, wall torn down on Syria. Go ahead, do this."
And this doesn't apply to Iran.
And then, Russia:
we will be seeing some activities by Russians there
conducting operations to clean up the regions of some of the cells.
That's a collateral damage for the CIA and the NATO.
"They are our guys; but hey, what: kill thousands of them."
"We will look the other way."
"In a couple of years we can put to thousand more in place there."
That's how it's usually played.
That is one hypothesis that I'm leaning towards.
All right, there is an awful lot to digest.
And as you say, this is a developing story:
so we will see in the coming weeks
how this does play out or does not play out internationally
on the geopolitical scene.
So we'll have to keep our eye on that,
and I would suggest people keep their eye
on BoilingFrogsPost.com for more on that,
and be following the nightly news and editorials
as this continues to play out in the headlines.
But before we go,
just one other domestic aspect of this that I wanted to talk about
is the issue over Mirandizing Dzhokar
and whether or not he should have been Mirandized,
and the public safety exemption,
and all of this that's now raging, right now.
What's your take on that?
It goes right along with the martial law that was implemented.
And this is the test for the designation of enemy combatants.
And this is...
this is, unfortunately, a very successful test-drive
for the police state practices,
for what we're gonna be seeing more and more.
Because as we know, it doesn't happen overnight.
With these two, once they set precedents
-- and this is what's going to happen, it's gonna set precedents --
and then we're gonna be seeing more and more.
And as we know, the federal courts,
they have been hands-off since 9/11
with all these issues.
And we are not gonna see, unfortunately, public outcry, outrage.
As we have seen, they're busy right now
singing Neil Diamond's "Sweet Caroline,"
and they thought this was a...
unfortunately, they see it as a case
of government protecting them.
And this is what, exactly, happens
in every single instance of a police state.
And it goes right there with martial law;
and it was successful for them.
And I mean, if it would have happened somewhere in the South,
I could even understand more.
But now I'm thinking Boston's maybe
a lesser-degree of libertarian-minded.
I'm not talking about libertarian party:
you're looking at those Harvard, Yale guys and women
and all the manicured people.
And so obviously it's happening in an educated...
I mean, come on, Boston, OK?
You know, Ivy League colleges there.
If they can do it and so successfully implement it in Boston,
it's going to be slam-dunk in elsewhere.
And I'm still keeping some high hopes
for more libertarian-minded states
where they can say,
"You are not getting into my house. Go, bring your warrant."
We are not gonna see it in New England, I guess.
And we have some very nice supporters, friends from New England:
I'm not including you.
But I've really never had that much of high opinion
of a lot of these analysts that pop out of
Boston colleges and universities there. [laughs]
Well, they proved themselves;
so I think they are busy with their Neil Diamond and celebrations
instead of grieving their losses.
Absolutely. Well, we will have to...
again, we'll have to see if the public
will start to question any of what went on,
or whether this will all just become part of the lore.
At any rate, again,
there's an awful lot to go through in this,
and we'll have to continue to keep our eye on it.
Once again, I recommend BoilingFrogsPost.com
for people out there to keep their eye on all of this,
and we'll continue to keep in touch
on this and other issues.
So Sibel, thank you so much for your time today.
And thank you, James.
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