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VISIT TO CHINA OF JOĂO BELCHIOR GOULART,
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITES STATES OF BRAZIL.
THE CENTRAL STUDIOS OF NEWS AND DOCUMENTARIES
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. BEIJING, AUGUST 1961 .
In the afternoon of August 13th, Joăo GouIart,
the Vice-President of the Republic of the United States of BraziI arrives in Beijing.
I'm the bearer of a message to the Chinese people,
a message of friendship from the Brazilian people,
I am undoubtedly contributing towards a closer relationship between our peoples,
who can and should be good friends.
Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister of the State Council,
talks with Vice-President Joăo Goulart.
Liu Shaoqi, President of the People's Republic of China,
welcomes Vice-President Joăo Goulart.
The guests of honor visit the museum about the history of the Chinese revolution.
These Chinese characters mean:
" let's distribute the land, through the strike of the hatchet,
we shall unlock a new world;
with the strike of the scythe, we shall eliminate the old one."
On August 23rd, Vice-President Joăo Goulart
ends his visit to China and leaves Canton to return to Brazil.
Xeng Xeng, the vice-governor of the Guangzhou province,
and other officials of the province of the city,
together with a well-wishing crowd,
say goodbye to the guests of honor at the railway station.
The friendship, closeness and cooperation between the peoples of China and Brazil
are ever increasing.
Greetings to the Brazilian people.
May the guests of honor have a safe trip.
BRASÍLlA, August 25th, 1961
It was a little past 6 in the morning
when president Jânio Quadros, as usual,
locked himself up in his office.
That day, however, he drafted the terms of his resignation,
which would be sent to the National Congress a few hours later,
stirring up a lethargic Friday session.
With expression and gestures that did not betray his decision,
Jânio attended the Soldier Day Service.
Defeated by what he called " terrible forces" in his resignation note,
Jânio was photographed for the last time as president alongside the " occuIt forces" .
Minister of Navy Sílvio Heck warned:
if Vice-President Joăo Goulart were to be inaugurated in office,
a civiI war would erupt in the country.
The backdrop for the coup was set.
I was informed of the resignation
by a phone call from the chief of staff of the presidency of the republic,
minister Macedo Soares.
And immediately I though of calling a meeting in Itamaraty
with those friends I could talk to immediately,
in order to pay homage to the resigning president.
And I was glad that idea was well-accepted,
because, not only my personal friends met in Itamaraty
but also the diplomats that were then in Rio de Janeiro -
Few had moved to Brasília yet, the transfer of the capital had just happened -
and many workers.
From the most humble employees, door-keepers, office-boys,
The drivers of the ministry,
to diplomats who were then in Rio de Janeiro.
So we opened a bottle of Champagne in honor of the president
And, in a moment of conservative traditionalism,
we offered to those present one last Itamaraty reception.
He received the news in Singapore,
at the Raffles hotel, in the middle of the night.
An American telegraphic agency called
seeking his comments on the resignation of Jânio Quadros.
He had not been aware of such resignation untiI just then.
He was surprised.
And I remember, I mean, I was told later,
that one of the participants In that mission,
senator Barros de Carvalho, of PTB,
Said right away: " Dr. Jango, Let's open a bottle of champagne
to celebrate the future president."
But Jango was a very cautious man,
very down-to-earth.
He said: " Look, Barros, if you want to have champagne
there's nothing wrong with that. We'll have the bar send up some.
Now, we will not be celebrating my presidency,
but rather paying homage to unpredictability."
Săo Borja, a frontier town, at the Missions ŕrea,
is the birth and resting place of two presidents:
Getúlio Dornelles Vargas and Joăo Belchior Marques Goulart.
Joăo Goulart's bedroom at Granja Săo Vicente
displays moments of his public life, started with president Vargas' help.
The 1 7 years in between his swearing in as state congressman in '47
and his overthrowing from power in '64,
only deepened his nationalism and commitment to social justice,
the tragic reasons behind the common destiny of both men.
By putting a gun to his chest on the morning of August 24th, 1954,
Getúlio Vargas brought an end to his own life
and also to the plans of his opponents who wanted to achieve power,
following the trail torn open by the coup.
Everything changed in those hours between Vargas' suicide
and the resignation that had been demanded the day before by a military uItimatum.
When Jango left for Porto Alegre to bury his friend,
he took with him the will and the political heritage of Getúlio.
Born on March 1st, 1918,
Jango, the seventh child of Vicente and Vicentina Goulart,
affluent landowners,
spontaneously lived in close contact with farm workers.
His youth years in Porto Alegre
were spent between the bliss of bohemian life and the rigors of the academy.
In the country of lawyers, Jango also got a law degree
and quickly climbed the steps of a life in politics.
State congressman in 1947, Federal congressman in 1950,
secretary of interior and justice in Rio Grande do Sul,
national chairman for PTB.
In 1954, when Getúlio had to replace his waves to the people
for commitments with the working classes,
Jango stepped out of the shadows, joining the Ministry of Employment.
Side-by-side in the ministry sat people from the old-republic,
Getúlio's comrades from the 1930 Revolution, seasoned politicians.
Joăo Goulart, at age 36,
personified Vargas' wish to inject new blood into Brazilian politics.
Jango became minister when seamen were carrying out a strike
for better pay.
He mediated the conflict and used his influence to
grant their claims.
To celebrate May 1st, he prepared a fair gift to workers:
a 100% -increase in minimum wage.
Getúlio granted the increase but dismissed Jango,
because the salary increase reignited a military crisis,
that exploded in a manifesto signed by 42 colonels.
BraziI and its army had been closely following
the ongoing ideological battle for a long time.
And this battle was greatly strengthened
when Mr. Joăo Goulart was minister of employment
in the Getúlio administration.
Surrounded by leftists in his ministry,
Jango started adopting measures that caused concern among the military.
And the colonels, in light of the Brazilian atmosphere,
decided to warn their military chiefs, generals,
and signed a manifesto.
To communicate their concern
about the path that BraziI was following towards the left.
That was the purpose of the manifesto.
this manifesto was written by a group of military officers
at the Superior War College and at the General Command of the Military Forces.
The writer was General Golbery.
The man doing the lobbying was then General Ademar de Queiroz.
The campaign against Getúlio was unrelenting.
Gregório Fortunato, head of the president's Personal guard
tried to silence the opposition with a gun.
The attack, wich injured Journalist Carlos Lacerda
and killed air force major Rubem Vaz, in the small hours of August 5th,
strengthened the conspiracy against the government.
The dramatic outcome of the crisis, with the president's suicide,
robbed the conspirators of the thrill of victory
A defeated candidate for a senate seat in '54,
during the '55 elections, Jango received the votes from the labor class
which elected him Vice-President
and gave to Juscelino Kubitschek the presidency of the republic.
Before the inauguration, the wedding.
On May 12nd, 1955, Jango got married to Maria Teresa Fontela,
who had also been born in his hometown of Săo Borja.
As vice-president, Jango represented the always smiling JK
in dealings with the working class.
Securing the necessary stability to allow JK to apply his Plan of Goals
and to increase industrialization,
PTB's political support protected the salaries and the freedom of the workers.
With peace underway,
the constitutional rules govern Brazil.
While occupying the office of President, during JK's absences,
Jango combined administrative know-how and political expertise.
The visit to the Soviet Union in late 1960
turned Vice-President Joăo Goulart into the first Latin-American leader
to pierce the ideological barrier buiIt by western countries around Moscow.
Welcomed by Alexei Kosygin and Leonid Brejnev,
high-ranking soviet officials,
Jango broadened Brazil's political horizons.
Breaching the automatic alignment with the United States,
he included the country among the frontline of non-aligned nations.
Jango could not go to the Soviet Union and not see the burial place of Lenin,
the hero of the 191 7 communist revolution.
The protocoI visit displeased the military
which, in 1961 , tried to prevent his inauguration.
When visiting Leningrad,
the port where Russia's feudal history began to sink,
Jango went onboard the Aurora cruiser,
from which the first shots of the Bolshevik revolution were fired.
Jango would be reminded of those images when granting freedom to Brazilian mariners
after the 1964 revoIt.
The trip's joyfuI and informal tone,
caused a meIting of the " cold war" .
Robots, mechanical arms, atoms.
Jango discovered in Russia a world on the brink of the Sputnik age.
BraziI was on the brink of the " Broom age."
Jânio Quadros' victory in the 1960 presidential elections
enabled UDN to quench its thirst for power.
Carlos Lacerda, Afonso Arinos and Magalhăes Pinto
were the hosts of a party that turned Jânio into a born-again UDN member.
Banners, waves,
hugs and applause
surrounded the conversion ritual.
BraziI had caught the "Jânio fever" .
Jânio Quadros is the hope Of this abandoned people
Sweep, sweep, sweep, sweep...
Sweep, sweep little broom
Sweep away all this shamefuI behavior
Because the people is tired
Of so much suffering
In the eyes of the PTB and of the leftist groups, Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott
was the ideal presidential candidate.
Well-respected by the Armed Forces,
he had conquered the admiration of civilians on November 1 1st, 1955,
when, as ministry of defense, he guaranteed
the inauguration of JK and Jango.
His candidacy had been launched in 1956,
when he received the " golden sword " ,
during a ceremony promoted by sergeants and officers.
Jango was a candidate for reelection.
BraziI needs a strong arm
I am, you are, we are voting for Lott
The bond between military nationalism and the labor party
included government plans for agricuItural reform and illiterate vote.
When its time to vote I'll "Jang", I'll "Jang"
Jango, Jango Jango Goulart
For Vice-President Will "Jang" Jorge Freitas
Jango, Jango Jango Goulart
PSB, aiming to maintain its successfuI alliance with PTB,
supported the Lott-Joăo Goulart slate.
Perpetual candidate Ademar de Barros,
and his same old Social Progressive Party,
pilfered popular votes.
First from Juscelino, now from Lott.
A solemn MiIton Campos was UDN's bet for Jânio's slate.
In an attempt to free up his hands, Jânio connived towards
a " Jan-Jan" slate, which ended up being successful.
The 5 years of the JK administration rocked Brazil.
Modernization trends ran rampant in the country, as part of a " new" fever:
Bossa Nova, New Cinema, a new capital city.
The city's bold architecture became a futurist frame
for a country full of age-old contrasts.
JK left office feeling certain he would come back.
Almost 6 million votes brought Jânio to power.
Soon he'd pull a rabbit out of his hat.
Jânio initiated a program of moral reforms.
Prohibited horse racing during the week,
adopted slack suits as uniform,
prohibited cock fighting and banned bikini-clad women from TV.
The country, in dire need of a leader, had, at last, found its vice-policeman.
The government staggered in ambiguity.
Moralist internal policies sealed its commitments
with middle-class standards.
Economic measures, such as instruction 204,
which created a single tax assessed on dollar transactions,
benefited exporters and foreign investors.
The end of agricuItural subventions
caused increased food prices and inflation.
Foreign policies followed a different mould,
The visit of president Sukarno inaugurated a new possibility of talks
with the non-aligned block, that was formed in the early 60s.
The president had this contradiction
between the expansion of the Brazilian personality abroad
and a limitation on the country's economic-financial status.
He had to advance policies that were not contradictory,
but that had to abide by those two contingencies,
those two requirements.
BraziI was ready to strengthen its international identity,
but the country, at that time, really depended on the countries
with which it had economic-financial relations
in order to maintain its internal financial stability.
The decoration of Ernesto " Che" Guevara
was too bold a gesture for the Government's internal allies.
Carlos Lacerda, a fierce ally up to then,
turned his back on Jânio and started a crisis that would lead to his resignation.
In August 1961 ,
a handshake with Mao Tsę-Tung turned Joăo Goulart into a pioneer again,
this time bringing BraziI closer to the 3rd world.
Jango broke the barriers that separated the western countries
from the People's Republic of China.
In Beijing he repeated the " meIting" ritual that had taken place in Moscow.
For Jango, friendship between people went beyond ideological frontiers
The visit acknowledged the Chinese people's right to self-determination.
My Chinese friends,
during these last few days with the Chinese people
and its officials,
I was able to see that this is not the old China, full of legends and superstitions,
which westerners regard with a mixture of vague fright
and reverential admiration for the unknown.
Your country exhibits a renewed youthfuIness
in and on itself.
In the first contact with your people,
in light of the warm welcome extended to us,
I feIt like I was being hosted by an old friend.
Let friendship grow ever closer,
between the People's Republic of China and the United States of Brazil.
Let the friendship among Asian, African
and Latin-American people grow.
On August 25th, 1961 ,
news of the president's resignation were everywhere.
Jânio left Brasília and took refuge at the Cumbica Airbase in Săo Paulo,
where he awaited the outcome of the events.
In doubt, one of his assistants
brought the presidential ribbon.
With the Vice-President abroad,
Congress chairman Ranieri Mazzilli
became interim head of state.
The military ministers tried to avoid Jango's return and inauguration.
And those that were involved with the problem of the ongoing
battle in Brazil,
were against Jango's ascension,
even though we were not
against Jango himself,
but against the men that surrounded him
and that were leading him into adopting a leftist standing
that was not what we wanted.
And it is important to note:
at that point, a revolutionary war was underway in Brazil
urging a peaceful take over of power.
And that was what we wanted to avoid in Brazil.
We did not want BraziI to follow in the steps of the Czech-Slovak republic.
My first gesture was to offer guarantees to president Jânio Quadros,
because we believed, at first,
that he had been the victim of a coup.
Finally, we were able to get in contact,
via the journalist Castello Branco,
with the Cumbica airbase, in Săo Paulo.
And president Quadros told me that he had actually resigned.
From then on, we protested incessantly.
for the inauguration of the Vice-President.
I took all actions that were incumbent on the state
in terms of mobilization
so as to ensure public order.
I got in touch with the 3rd Army Commander
and said that, in view of the situation, which I was also aware of,
the State had to take all actions
to ensure pubic order.
And that, according to the Constitution,
only if we were unable to ensure public order,
would we request help and protection from the federal forces.
He agreed and I took all actions.
We mobilized all available weapons
and got ready for resistance.
And we feIt that the entire country was closed.
All other states accepted the military counciI rule,
except for governor Mauro Borges.
Here in Rio de Janeiro, governor Lacerda gave repression a free rein.
In Săo Paulo, governor Carvalho Pinto was also absent
and repression ensued. The same happened in Minas.
And I sought to contact all Generals and military chiefs
that I could, directly or indirectly.
It was, in fact, at that time that I had a very harsh conversation
with General Costa e Silva, the commander of the 4th Army in Recife.
I'll tell you, in summary, that it was a very spontaneous movement,
a very natural movement, that got stronger;
we attempted to use all available means,
especially the media,
which was our salvation. We were able to bring information
not only to the public opinion of the state and country,
I mean, we essentially won that fight
via a public-opinion battle,
but also we managed to inform the military themselves,
to a point when the military council that took over the government
sent an order to a military unit to go against the south
and it was the officers themselves who met and refused to follow the order.
When I was its president, the National Union of Students (UNE) called a national strike
and students were widely mobilized.
The Union's board decided to relocate its headquarters
to Rio Grande do Sul, where,
together with the people of Rio Grande do SuI and of Brazil,
they could take part in the campaign for legality.
I had the opportunity to talk to Brazilian university students
throught the chain of legality
and to take part in the entire mobilization process of the population
to oppose the military coup against president Joăo Goulart.
The people in the streets, the resistance in the South,
the split in the armed forces,
gave back to the national congress the controI over the political process.
this time politicians were not discussing Jango's unseating,
but rather his inauguration.
Legality was reestablished with a compromise.
The congress approved the parliamentary amendment.
In the course of the voting process, some were still undecided.
In his journey back, Joăo Goulart exhibited aptitude and patience.
Upon hearing of the resignation, he returned immediately to Brazil
through the longest route:
Paris, New York, Buenos Aires and Montevideo.
The Pacific Route.
From the balcony of Piratini palace
he saluted the crowd calling his name.
Upon arriving in Brasília, politicians and military officers celebrated
the peacefuI solution to the crisis.
Even those who had sided with a military veto
welcomed the new president.
The Colonels of '54 were split.
ColoneI Antônio Carlos Muricy was forced to leave his position
in Rio Grande do Sul due to his opposition to Brizola.
General Golbery, frustrated with Jânio's resignation,
left the army to set up lPES.
General Ernesto Geisel, the military commander of Planalto,
aborted the " Mosquito Operation" , that had been devised by the FAB officers,
to bring down the plane that was flying Jango back to Brasília.
On September 7th, 1961 ,
Jango was inaugurated as president and announced that his administration
intended to be the marker of a new independence of Brazil.
Political parties, congressmen,
everybody knows that, due to my very nature,
I tend to bring together and not to set apart,
I'm a peacemaker, not an instigator,
I prefer to harmonize rather than stimulate resentment.
We shall promote internal peace, peace with dignity,
peace leading to the safety of our institutions,
ensuring our democratic rights,
the permanent observance of the will of the people
and the inviolability of the national sovereignty.
Congressman Ranieri Mazzilli of PSB
returned the presidential ribbon to Joăo Goulart.
However, the president would still be under the rule of PSB
during the new regime.
The first parliamentary cabinet
was moderate and followed the style of Prime Minister Tancredo Neves.
UDN and the Christian Democratic Party made up the conciliation cabinet.
President Goulart's PTB was in the minority.
Pressure from the population would be used
to change the cadence of ministerial decision-making.
The government met old nationalist claims.
Cancelled the agreement with Hanna Mining Corporation,
a muItinational mining company, and signed the rural act.
When Mr. Joăo Goulart became president of the republic,
we worked the fields
organizing peasant leagues, peasant associations
and other associations,
to fight for agricuItural reform,
rallying for the most important claims of poor countrymen in Brazil.
During his administration we had more freedom
because we strengthened our organizations,
especially our unions.
The first National AgricuItural Workers' Meeting was held,
which included all classes of poor countrymen,
in Belo Horizonte.
In attendance during the meeting were Mr. Magalhăes Pinto
and Mr. Joăo Goulart
as well as numerous senators and federal congressmen
and other administrative and political authorities
of the country.
Goulart was a supporter of base reforms.
AgricuItural reform, urban reform, tax reform
So we joined this fight.
What we wanted was the participation of rural workers
in the great mobilization process that was going on in Brazil
beginning in 1960.
In May 1962
the government announced the intention to amend article 1 41 of the Constitution
that determined the payment of previous cash indemnification
for expropriation.
Without that change, agricuItural reform
would become merely a good deal for speculators.
The ideological fight took to the streets.
Right-wing propaganda used Cuba
as a pretext to wear its old costumes in public.
Leftists believed in the success of the Cuban model.
Political mobilization to support FideI Castro
extended all over Brazil.
Chief of police, Sir,
we are in a democratic country...
We are in a country...
Chief of police, Sir,
It will be OK.
It will be OK because from now...
In Pernambuco, in the city of Caruaru,
communist leader David Capistrano,
who would suffer state-sponsored violence come the 70s,
was facing the intolerant 60s.
Workers of Caruaru!
I call to all communist leaders of Caruaru!
The escalating terrorist violence
would leave its mark on the soviet expo,
that exhibited in Brazil the new trends of the socialist world
and the new technology of Eastern Europe.
The inquiry that looked into the attack revealed that part of those actions
had been planned in the backrooms of the government of Guanabara.
The list of those involved, included the chief of the state police.
The National Union of Students was a target of the terrorist actions
of extreme-right groups.
The anti-communist movement gave rise to an action against
the National Union of Students with machine guns being shot at the headquarters of UNE.
In fact, what was going on was that in Brazil,
a fascist group was getting organized, forming paramilitary organizations,
the right-wing was getting organized, its activities funded by foreign organizations;
later, all that was revealed.
All of that had a very clear purpose:
to prevent the people from taking part in politics.
to curtaiI the participation of workers, of the working class,
to curtaiI the participation of rural workers,
to curtaiI the participation of students.
Because we were actually advancing
towards increased democratization.
Economic democratization, democratization of the land,
democratization of political power, democratization of knowledge.
And the Brazilian upper class, from the heights of its reactionary nature,
the large foreign groups, large muItinational companies,
the great landowners, the large bourgeoisie of Brazil,
could not accept even the basic reforms
that president Jango Goulart wanted to implement in Brazil.
The most audacious part of the Brazilian government was its foreign policy.
Itamaraty established a non-aligned diplomacy,
unfastening the knots that bound the interests of the country
to the decisions that came from Washington.
The government resumed relations with the Soviet Union,
voted against the colonialist policy in Africa,
and supported Cuba's right to self-determination.
The foreign policy got stuck in the frontiers of economic dependency.
Pressure from the U.S. caused minister Santiago Dantas to go to Washington,
where, in a cold weather,
he was to negotiate the limits of the Brazilian foreign debt.
I believe that those days
spent with American and international authorities in Washington
are part of the situation I had the opportunity to announce
to the Brazilian people before leaving Brazil
and that the resuIts of this visit will meet the expectations of the Brazilian people.
Those are: that BraziI has no intention of increasing its debt immoderately
instead, we seek to establish
conditions that will allow the country to face its commitments
according to its paying capabilities.
Joăo Goulart's trip to the U.S. in ApriI 1962
suspended temporarily the increase in the gap between both countries.
A priority in Jango's agenda was to renegotiate the foreign debt.
For Kennedy, the important thing was to redefine the political rules in Brazil.
Nationalization of U.S. companies and the program of reforms
sounded like communism.
One week before,
governor LeoneI Brizola expropriated in Rio Grande do Sul
the assets of Companhia Telefônica Nacional,
the Brazilian arm of lTT.
The U.S. welcomed Jango with open arms,
fearing that Brazil could move away from the western block.
In UN, Jango explained, in person to the international press
the meaning of the nationalizations.
The need we feIt
to talk about the expropriation of companies,
as part of the discussions, was caused exactly by the difficuIties
that they were creating, at the time, in my country.
We can encourage foreign-capital investments
if we pay fair remuneration on their capital.
When I say " fair" , I wish to express
the country's ideal of justice.
It cannot yield excessive profits either.
Profits that would lead to very fast enrichment
in detriment of the national interest
or at the expense of the country's economic stability.
So we wish to find a fair balance,
in which reasonable remuneration is paid on the capital,
yielding profits,
but as a resuIt of activities that are in the best interest of the nation,
so that the profits can also bring about benefits for the country.
The department of state sent two stars to Brazil.
The pale glamour of John Gavin
and the rehearsed faith of father Patrick Peyton,
Hollywood vicar, a favorite of 9 out of 10 movie stars.
To mobilize the middle classes,
father Peyton organized a religious crusade under the motto:
" The family that prays together stays together."
The purpose was to have Catholics unite against communists.
And, at the personal request of Jango, as press secretary,
I extended father Peyton all kinds of courtesies,
and even gave him television tapes
so that he could record his campaign.
The opposition transferred the capital to Washington.
Dollar loans that had been denied to the Brazilian government
funded directly the administration of anti-Joăo Goulart governors.
The Whitehouse was the headquarters of the government,
where Carlos Lacerda and Ademar de Barros feIt at home.
I looked into the problem of slums
and the president was clearly impressed
with the data I showed him.
Rio de Janeiro, for example, has an annual deficit
of 10 thousand homes,
and this deficit has been accruing over the last 10 years.
Which means that we have a deficit, in Rio de Janeiro alone,
of 100 thousand homes.
And not only was the president impressed, but he also got in touch with Mr. Goodman
to try and move forward the ongoing projects
relating to the slums in Guanabara.
We discussed a half-dozen matters;
the problem of the Port of Santos, the problem of the Săo Sebastiăo Port.
The problem of the water supply to the city of Săo Paulo;
we have water for 2.5 million inhabitants
and we need water for 4.5 million inhabitants.
We have huge problems,
new highways, electricity for railroads,
new hydroelectric plants,
many problems
relating to the economy of Săo Paulo and of the country.
The cabinet headed by Tancredo Neves came to an end
when the prime minister resigned to run in the elections.
The new cabinet, headed by Brochado da Rocha
survived two months of successive crisis.
The last prime minister, Hermes Lima, a member of the Socialist Party,
came to wind up parliamentarism in the country.
With presidentialism in sight,
the 1962 elections became more important.
As part of the elections, the right wing laid down its arms.
To stop the progress of the left,
Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action - lBAD -,
the advanced arm of lPES,
injected over 2 million dollars in the campaign
funding the campaign of 250 candidates to the federal congress
and several governors.
Will the democratic institutions prevaiI over the battle of relentless ambitions?
From crisis to chaos
The country can be dragged into an irreversible crisis.
What are we doing to prevent that the Brazilian people be faced
with the tragic choice between anti-democratic solutions?
We, the intellectuals, we, the company owners,
we, the men who have the responsibility to rule,
we, who believe in democracy and in free initiative,
we cannot remain silent while the situation deteriorates day by day.
Omission is a crime.!
lf we remain isolated, we'll be crushed. We must combine our efforts.
Let us direct the actions of the democrats into one single path
so that we shall not be victims of totalitarianism.
And it is exactly to coordinate the thoughts and actions
of all those that do not wish to remain silent
in light of the catastrophe that threatens us,
that we have created a new organism,
with a new message for the new reality of Brazil.
We have one basic purpose.:
To prevent the difficuIt situation that the country is facing
from compromising our democratic institutions
and christian traditions.
The Institute for Social Research and Study has these basic goals.
Its purposes are clear and well-defined.
The Institute shall execute a plan to achieve such purposes as.:
The strengthening of the democratic institutions,:
end of underdevelopment,:
currency stabilization,:
The moralization and efficiency of the governmental structure.
But lPES cannot be reduced to words.
Action is necessary.
All those dollars were not enough to prevent the triumph
of politicians committed to the reforms.
The number of congressmen from UDN dropped
while the number of congressmen from PTB increased.
PSB maintained the majority.
The new congress gained a different face.
Politicians regrouped in fronts.
On the one side, the Nationalist Parliamentary Front.
And on the other, the Parliamentary Democratic Action,
the lair of reaction against the reforms.
One of the most important aspects of that group of right-wing congressmen,
was the fact that, even though it was called " Parliamentary Democratic Action" ,
and had little or no democracy about it,
it managed to turn congress
into a stage for conflicts.
Conflicts that were certainly based on actual economic interests
but that were being presented as ideological battles.
When asked to decide the fate of parliamentarism,
the people returned to Jango the powers that had been stripped from him.
15 million people voted.
Almost 10 million said "no" to parliamentarism.
Jango had 3 more years of government ahead of him.
The president, with a minority in congress, organized a conciliatory cabinet
where PSB had a majority of the representatives
and the left-wing held the most influence.
Democratization in the use of land, illiterate vote,
rules to govern rents, fair basis for minimum wage.
Those were the highlights of a government program
that could achieve greater social harmony.
Jango intended to end hunger and misery,
in a country where justice had always been the dark side of democracy.
The situation in the northeast received special attention from the government.
The president's plan in '64 received
the same opposition he had attracted back in '54 as minister of employment.
Strike seeker, promoter of class battles
and enemy of capitalism.
The agricuItural workers, mobilized by the social transformation process,
received a wakeup call about the longstanding poverty in the fields.
The perspective of small changes in a country with great inequalities
brought about many illusions.
Thousands of workers, landless and jobless,
embarked aboard a train of hope,
leaping from the pages of a book onto the political scene.
With the reforms, Jango made the country live its utopia.
The president needed the support of the military.
The tradition of military intervention in the political life
no longer had the hues of adventure.
The improvisation of the 20s had been replaced by the ideology of the late 40s.
The Superior War College, created in 1950
to mirror the North-American War College,
assembled its own political model,
based on the concept of safety and development.
Challenging the disciplinary rule,
sergeants elected two representatives in the October '62 elections.
RevoIting against the legal decision
that prevented the investiture of the elected representatives,
the sergeants followed a military tradition and rebelled.
Jango had to punish them to prevent a breach of discipline
that could bring down the government itself.
Unions, students and politicians rallied for the rebelling sergeants.
The president pardoned the sergeants,
in a decision that usually was only granted to officers.
The political activities of the sergeants intimidated the military chiefs.
General Ozino Alves, a nationalist with a good reputation among the ranks
was personally trying, as head of the 1st army
to have the officers support the government.
Joăo Goulart would soon commit a fatal mistake.
As many other progressive heads of state in Latin America,
he paid the price for his na:ďvetę
in trying to settle the military dispute over lunch.
The plot against Goulart was well underway.
Telegrams confirmed that the minister of war of the Jango administration,
general Amaury Kruel, was, himself, part of the military group
plotting the coup d'etat.
Together at the palace, they once again swore
loyalty to the president and allegiance to the constitution.
The intention of the military chiefs
was exactly to have Jango reach the end of his term of office,
since we only intended to start an armed fight as a last resort.
We did prepare to be able to face
any government action.
But, by late '63,
we received notice that the government had been preparing a coup,
and those news were confirmed by an individual we held in high esteem
and trust,
so we contemplated the possibility of taking action before the government.
The armed forces tend to adopt interventionist actions,
because usually in Brazil social conflicts
are settled via the intervention of the armed forces.
So the political entities behind those conflicts
are the ones that invite the intervention of the armed forces.
The manner in which such intervention can be prevented
is to have the armed forces turn into a neutral entity,
which is only possible
with the political and ideological division of the armed forces.
The economic crisis, with an inflation threatening to go beyond the 100% mark
would be one of the obstacles affecting social development.
The general command of workers, the compact group of PTB,
LeoneI Brizola and the National Union of Students
called for basic reforms as the immediate solution.
The three-year plan of Celso Furtado and Santiago Dantas
suggested, first, the sanitizing of the economy.
This is a very important point,
since it touches the very nature of the Joăo Goulart administration.
Joăo Goulart had not been elected president of the republic,
he had actually been part of a PSD-PTB coalition.
And the head of the coalition was PSD, the majority party.
When Jango was sworn into office, he had to adjust such forces.
And l'd say that it led... not so much to a dichotomy,
but rather to a double orientation of the government,
or the forces that supported the government.
One group was intent on recovering controI over the situation.
I mean, the economy was in a state of disarray,
and, as I said, it faced a strong inflationary surge,
lack of payments, domestic and foreign problems.
And it was necessary to recover controI over that.
And my opinion, even back then,
is that it is impossible to recover controI without growth,
in an orderly fashion. Hence the three-year plan.
l'd say: if we recover the reigns of the situation, we'll make the economy grow
so we'll be able to introduce reforms,
that are the essence of the government's policies.
That is why the three-year plan ended with a list of the structural reforms
that were necessary.
But they resuIted from an increased controI over the economy
and, therefore, a consensus was necessary
to ensure a solid standing for the government.
What happened was that the different groups that supported the government
could not reach a consensus.
At least with regard to this strategy, they couldn't .
And there were powerfuI groups that believed that it was more important
to launch immediately the reform plans.
And that is what prevented a consensus.
And president Joăo Goulart was torn between the two groups.
Attacked by unions and business owners,
the three-year plan never left the drawer.
As a remedy for the economic crisis,
it had an effect that was unacceptable to the government:
limits on salaries.
The General Command of Workers,
completely immersed in institutional debates,
abandoned the strengthening of its union foundations.
CGT exchanged the work at production lines,
where it worked side-by-side with the workers,
for activities developed side-by-side with politicians.
Strike was a word of order,
heard only by employees of state-owned companies
sometimes with the cautious support of industrial and trade workers.
When the command of workers realized its mistake, it was too late.
March was around the corner.
ENOUGH EXPLOlTATlON
Jango intended to change the face of Brazilian capitalism
by reducing social inequalities, giving capitalism a more humanitarian, less
savage appearance.
Among his allies, his goals were often mistaken
for an intention to end capitalism.
Other times, his allies thought he had no intention of ending capitalism,
He had to put together a strategy while battling the personal discomfort
of being the rich president of a poor country.
The President was aware of the influence of the church.
It was up tp Jango to convince the high catholic hierarchy
that the social reforms that he intended to carry out in Brazil
would establish the principles of justice that were defended by Christianity.
The factions that supported Brizola, organized all over the country in groups of 1 1 ,
described Brizola's battle for power with the following slogan:
" A brother-in-law is not a relative. Brizola for president."
The family ties were an obstacle created by the constitution.
The proposed amendment
served as a weapon for the propaganda against the government.
Travestied as a defender of the constitution, the right wing got stronger.
The noisy campaign convinced the middle class, the military,
the church and business owners that the government wanted to change the constitution
to put an end to democracy.
In an interview to the Los Angeles Times,
Governor Carlos Lacerda announced that the Brazilian military
were setting the exact date to remove Joăo Goulart from power.
Military ministers, indignant, wanted to have Lacerda punished.
JANGO FLlES TODAY TO PROPERTY lN BRASÍLlA
Jango tried to use a state of emergency
to overcome, in a political manner, the military reaction against the governor
and reestablish the authority of his administration.
The left wing suspected that the action could adversely affect it.
One needs to look back on those difficuIt and complex days,
when the pressure mounted against us.
When it came from everywhere.
From our country and from abroad.
People truly didn't want
fundamental reforms to be made in Brazil.
We had been informed that, in Săo Paulo, Ademar de Barros,
and in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Carlos Lacerda,
were actively getting ready to carry out a revolution or coup d'etat.
The state of emergency was called in Rio de Janeiro
during a meeting between Jango, his ministry
and the military ministers.
The news that got to Brasília about the state of emergency
were really daunting for us.
We did not know at that time if the correlation of powers
allowed the installation of a state of emergency in this country
that would not be later changed by the majority forces,
by the reactionary part of PSD, in alliance with UDN,
into an instrument against workers.
An instrument against the labor rights that had been achieved.
Regardless of Joăo Goulart's will.
After Jango arrived in Brasília
and we found out that the project for state of emergency
had started to be amended, to enable violations of domicile,
and allowing all of the abuses that became commonplace after '64,
we came to the conclusion that we'd oppose the state of emergency.
To this day I'm not sure if that was the right decision.
To avoid defeat, Jango capitulated.
lsolated in congress,
opposed by governors Lacerda, Magalhăes and Ademar,
suffering an economic embargo on the part of the U.S., Jango had no alternative:
he tried to mobilize the citizens
by personally raising the flag of reform.
In January 1964,
the president revived and regulated the law on remittance of profits,
which had been approved by the Congress over one year before.
By March, a lunch party held at the Military Base
and the warm welcome extended by a number of officers
were not enough to erase the restlessness and doubts
from the worn-out expression of the president.
The adhesion of low-ranking
and military officers to the nationalist governmental project
expressed the efforts of most of the sectors of the Brazilian society
towards the construction of a fair democracy.
The menace represented by the reforms that threatened the Brazilian powerful,
came to life in March.
In its strategy of popular mobilization,
the government called a mass meeting in Rio de Janeiro.
The " meeting of the Central" , as it was called,
was scheduled for Friday, 13th.
Everything had been carefully planned.
From amplifiers to security, nothing could go wrong
when the president took the message of reform to the people.
The setting for the last act had been prepared.
March '64 was a month of intense activity
and many concerns.
Subversive activities promoted by the government were on the rise
and we had decided to face whatever the government could dish out.
When the meeting on the 13th was held,
we considered that meeting to be an intimidation,
a strike against the army. Carried out next door to the army headquarters,
with posters that were clearly subversive against the democratic order
That meeting deeply affected the military.
And a few days before the 13th,
one of my subordinates told me
that a group of officers were planning to put an end to that movement
in the most violent manner possible. I saw such an intention as alarming.
I brought the fact to the knowledge of General Castelo Branco
at the army headquarters
and to the knowledge of general Costa e Silva
at the department of production and construction works.
Both of them, general Castelo in particular,
were very concerned and said: "but that is unacceptable!
the meeting must take place, we should not interfere
we must stop this from happening."
It was really important that the meeting took place.
Because we were aware that the rebellion in the military ranks would increase
against a government that wanted to disestablish the democracy in Brazil.
Therefore, together with other officers,
including general Aragăo,
who had also been informed of the plan,
we took action and, on the morning of the 13th, after arriving at the headquarters,
I sought one of those officers that were part of the group and asked:
" How's it going? ls it settled? ls it going to happen?"
" General, no one is interfering. There is only one I couldn't talk to."
" Go out there and talk to this 'one'
The meeting is not to sustain any interference from us."
The immediate consequence:
the next day, in the ministry, the meeting was all that everyone talked about
and revoIt was widespread.
So we had gained the support of many people who, up to then,
still hadn't decided to part ways with legality.
Because it's very hard, as I said before.
So the meeting on the 13th meant that we got the support of many individuals...
upstanding, loyal individuals,
that up to then, had still been attached to the idea of absolute legality.
The meeting of the Central was a kind of...
attempt to speed up the project of reforms.
And many people advised him not to do that meeting.
That, from a certain point of view, it would mean an aggravation.
And that he should not announce those reforms,
many of which would not be possible to implement.
Then, I clearly remember Jango saying:
" I don't have a problem with staying in office or leaving,
my problem is that I have to carry out those reforms.
l'd rather fall, but fall with my chin up."
RAlMUNDO ALMElDA MUST GO!
LET'S GO, ARRAES THE PEOPLE CAN'T TAKE lT AN Y LONGER!
THlS TlME, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE ARE NOT ALONE!
HOUSEWlVES AGAlNST TAX DODGlNG
WOMEN'S LEAGUE lN THE STATE OF GUANABARA
FULL MONOPOLY NOW! ALL THE OlL BELONGS TO PETROBRAS.
SUPPORTlNG JANGO'S BASE REFORMS
By the late afternoon,
200 thousand people gathered at the Central Station square.
The crowd keyed the speakers up. Jango did not disappoint.
By his side, his wife Maria Teresa
soothed the tension of the moment.
On the same wooden stage
that Getúlio Vargas used for his public appearances,
Jango announced the execution of his program.
A few hours before, he had signed the decrees that expropriated unproductive lands
alongside federal highways and railroads and took over private refineries.
AgricuItural workers will find
that their most important and fairest claim
will have been met in many places.
The claim for a plot of land in which to work.
A plot of land to harvest crops.
Then, that worker and his family,
his dejected family, will be able to be their own bosses,
because up to now they've been working for the owner of the land they rent,
or for the owner of the land they loan.
Today, in the eyes of the nation,
with the solidarity of the people united in this square,
a square that belongs only to the people,
the government, that also belongs to the people,
and to the people alone,
reaffirms its unshakable goal
to fight with all its might
to improve the Brazilian society in a quest
Not only for agricuItural reform, but also for tax reform.
For full electorial reform, for illiterate vote,
for the eligibility of all Brazilians.
for the purity of democratic life, for economic emancipation,
for social justice
and, together with its people, for the progress of Brazil.
In Săo Paulo, the ruling class was also mobilized against the reforms.
With the support of the state government, the rural society and sections of the church,
the " family march, with God and for freedom" was organized.
Veterans of '32 and members of traditional families of Săo Paulo
held a rosary in one hand and banners on the other,
with a few of their slogans:
" Civism shall kill communism." " In defense of the Constitution and of legality."
Jango and his family went to Săo Borja
to spent the holy week holidays, in March 1964.
Earlier pictures in the family album
reveal the relaxed lifestyle of of a farmer president.
His life with Maria Teresa, the barbecues, the chimarrăo,
the horse riding along the fields,
all of which was tinted by an anxious mood this time around.
In fact, that would be the last time Jango and his family
spent time together at the ranch
where he'd briefly stay in April, lonely and on his way to the exile in Uruguay.
By late March,
after watching the movie about the battleship Potemkin,
the Brazilian navy was seduced by a dream.
Gathering in the steeI workers' union,
during the celebration of the 2nd anniversary of their association,
which had been kept a secret from the Navy,
hundreds of mariners claimed their rights:
freedom for mates held in confinement, better meals
and the right to get married.
In attendance, as a role modeI and witness, was an elderly Joăo Cândido,
a hero who had survived the rebellion
that brought an end to physical punishment back in 1910.
Like in the movie, the population supported the rebels.
Gathered in mutiny at the Navy Club,rallying for discipline,
officers called for the punishment of the rebellious mariners.
Back in Rio, Jango finds a solution:
the mariners are arrested and subsequently released.
The Minister of Navy quits.
Minister of the Army, Jair Dantas Ribeiro,
left office and was hospitalized, due to renal problems.
The impact of the events in the Armed Forces
caused the adhesion of legalist officers to the movement that deposed the president.
For them, it was intolerable to see hierarchy crumbling.
Rumors of a military rebellion had already been around
when the president attended, on March 30th,
at the headquarters of the Automobile Club,
a ceremony in his honor, sponsored by the Association of Sergeants
and sub-officers of the military police.
The president energetically prohibited any subversion in the name of order.
His improvised greeting to the subordinates
was a belated warning to higher-ranking officers.
JANGO: WE DO NOT WANT A CLOSED CONGRESS.
In the early hours of March 31st,
a few hours after the end of the celebration,
the troops of general Olímpio Mourăo Filho, commander of the 4th Military Region,
marched over Guanabara.
The rebellion, coming from Minas Gerais, triggered the coup.
In Guanabara, army tanks rolled into the cities
without resistance.
The middle class exorcized its ghosts
by setting the building of the National Union of Students on fire
In the afternoon of ApriI 1st, in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro,
victory was already being celebrated.
President Joăo Goulart had left Guanabara,
the enemy quarters, and gone to Brasília.
The Capital was not safe for the president either.
Jango went to Porto Alegre.
The battle in Congress would soon be over.
Presiding over the tumuItuous session of ApriI 1st,
senator Aldo de Moura Andrade,
in an act of solemn disregard for the destiny of the legal institutions,
declared the office of president of the republic to be vacant
while the head of state, Joăo Goulart, was still on Brazilian soil.
The president of the republic has left the headquarters of the government.
He left a headless nation behind.
That's not true.!
In a very grave time in our history.
When it is necessary that the head of state
remain in the command of the government.
He has abandoned the government.
And I hereby give notice to the National Congress...
This abandonment...
This abandonment configures...
the need to have the National Congress, as the civiI power,
immediately take the action expected from it
Under the Brazilian Constitution
in order to restore in this turbulent nation
the authority of the government...
and the existence of the government.
We cannot allow...
BraziI to remain without a government, abandoned.
Under our responsibility
is the people of Brazil. The people. The order.
That being so, I hereby declare the office of president of republic to be vacant.
Conspirator.!
In Rio Grande do Sul, the defeat was not yet consummated.
Former governor LeoneI Brizola used the radio as his best weapon.
People on the streets promised to repeat the resistance of '61 .
When president Joăo Goulart arrived in Porto Alegre,
in the middle of the full-blown crisis,
a meeting was held at the residence of the commander of the 3rd army,
who was general Ladŕrio Teles,
a great man and military chief.
President Joăo Goulart was in attendance together with eight generals and myself.
And my proposal was:
that the president retreated to the interior of Rio Grande do Sul,
precisely to Săo Borja,
and that, at that time, he appointed General Ladŕrio as minister of the army
and I would accept the appointment for the office of minister of justice.
And we would organize the resistance.
General Ladŕrio said
he agreed with my proposal completely.
And that the 3rd army had enough weapons to organize civil
corps that could include over 100 thousand men,
in addition to the army troops.
And that he considered the situation to be complex, difficuIt,
with a number of followers within the 3rd Army,
but he thought it was possible to defend legality.
The final decision of the meeting was to be made by the president.
Who decided that no resistance would be offered
because he considered it to be too high a price to be paid in blood
by the Brazilian people to restore its rights.
In fact, I got myself ready
for a potential reaction of the state of Minas Gerais,
one year and a half before March '64.
When I appointed ColoneI Josę Geraldo
to command the Military Police, I gave him the task
of preparing the police for a reaction.
Because I was sure,
that with the difficuIties I had with the government,
they would end up attempting an intervention in Minas.
And I would react.
So I got ready for a reaction to a potential intervention
rather than to depose a president.
Magalhăes had assumed a national responsibility.
And in this case he thought he should use Palŕcio da Liberdade to develop
a government that had a national characteristic as well
So he called MiIton Campos, Josę Maria de Alckmin and myself.
I was informed of that a few weeks beforehand.
And was told that I would be called
the day my presence was needed in Belo Horizonte.
My office, which was that of nonspecific minister -
the three of us, MiIton Campos, Josę Maria de Alckmin and l,
were appointed nonspecific secretaries.
And my duty as nonspecific secretary
was to attain potential international support
to have recognition of our belligerent status,
if the actual conditions of the movement we were expecting
came to that.
Recognition of a belligerent status, as you know,
entails the supply of elements that can support
the political movement underway.
It was not necessary.
We knew, we trusted we'd succeed.
And there was a meeting among ourselves,
during which we tried to estimate how long it would last.
The estimation was that the fight would last for six months. At least.
I was regarded as an optimist,
I thought that it would be over in one month.
The only one who got it right was Golbery,
who said: " it will fall apart like a castle of cards."
Despite the surprise,
despite the weakening that the government had been experiencing,
if president Joăo Goulart had decided to resist,
to counter-strike -
he still had troops, he still had elements here in Rio,
to take over the Guanabara palace, where Lacerda had been scheming -
he could have won that fight.
Or at least put up a longer fight.
But he decided not to resist,
which, in my opinion, was the right decision, because it avoided bloodshed,
and today, after those informations were released by the Americans,
we became aware of the involvement of the American government
in the military coup that was underway in Brazil.
The story that the U.S. had sent ships to Brazil
was old news.
It had even been mentioned in
an American talk show called "Firing Line" , with William Buckley.
He was interviewing at that time, in the early 70s,
governor - former governor at that time, Carlos Lacerda -,
when someone from the audience stood up and said: " look, that is not true,
I was in the Caribbean at the time, embarked, doing military work,
and the ship I was in was rerouted to the Brazilian coast
at the time of the revolution.
There were stories like that. And tales too
that maybe the U.S. had actually sent ships to the Brazilian coast,
but that they were only tankers.
What was discovered about Operation " Brother Sam"
is that it was much bigger.
I mean, in fact, it included the four tankers,
the four tankers were full
to ensure the supply of fuel for the revolution
if the movement had to last, if it faced too much resistance
and had to last for over one month.
There were 136 thousand barrels of regular gas,
aviation kerosene, all that.
Battleships were also involved,
six destroyers if I'm not mistaken
One aircraft carrier was sent to the Brazilian coast,
a ship that specialized in carrying helicopters,
24 combat and transport planes.
A large amount of ammunition was embarked,
which never made it to Brazil,
but that was loaded into ships in the U.S..
Those ships, from different points in the Atlantic,
converged at the Brazilian coast.
A few hours before sunrise on ApriI 2nd,
the entire operation was demobilized when news came
that the military had already taken over.
This was the Operation " Brother Sam" .
On ApriI 2, with the people of Rio Grande do SuI demobilized,
Jango went to Săo Borja and, from there, to his exile in Uruguay.
ENLlST HERE.
In Rio, the police of Carlos Lacerda arrested a Chinese trade mission,
under charges of terrorism.
It was up to Sobral Pinto, the old advocate of political prisoners
to prove the innocence of the diplomats.
Communist leader Gregório Bezerra, was dragged through the streets of Recife,
and arrested.
Among the prisoners, one traitor:
soldier Josę Alselmo dos Santos, known as corporal Anselmo.
A leader of the association of mariners
and head of the rebellion at the metal workers' union,
years later he would be exposed as a police undercover agent
by the armed activists.
In Rio de Janeiro, the middle class would perform its version
of the " march, with God and for freedom" ,
with the victory guaranteed.
" The right to be born. "
This civic furor would soon be used to support the campaign
" Donate gold for the good of Brazil" ,
an attempt at solving the economic problems of the country
with acts of patriotic charity.
After their arrival in Rio,
Mourăo and Magalhăes were commended for the triumph
of a movement that they apparently headed.
The way I see it, there were two coups in '64.
The first was a typical Latin-American coup.
Certain civiI forces supporting a military movement
that was initiated in Minas Gerais
and that actually,
in its exterior appearance,
was actually what we know about Latin-American history.
Now, during the course of that coup, another one took place.
On the inside.
That was the one that lingered
and expelled all civiI and military characters,
that took part in the first coup.
That was the coup that remained,
it was this coup that buiIt a military core
and an economic system.
Because, in fact, there were two movements.
The one from Minas, which I refer to as a na:ďve, patriotic movement,
that wanted only to bring order to the country,
and wanted nothing for itself. I never did.
So much so that, after my arrival in Rio de Janeiro,
Carlos Lacerda and Juscelino came to me,
saying it was time I took over and I told them
I had not carried out the movement to become president of the republic.
It was not to claim anything for myself.
What I wanted was to have BraziI find its true way
of order, of tranquility.
In Rio de Janeiro there was a group that got ready.
That really got ready.
It seems that LincoIn Gordon was connected to this group.
Because this group had money.
We, back in Minas, did it with our own funds.
Which was not much.
And we never got any indemnification.
Because president Castelo...
was part of the other group.
The appointment of general Castelo Branco
instituted in BraziI the system of indirect elections for president
with a single candidate protected by institutional acts.
I hereby declare the Honorable Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco
vested in office of president of the republic
of the United States of Brazil
I shall defend and fulfill, with honor and loyalty the Constitution of Brazil.
We shall plunge ahead knowing that the remedy
against the ill effects of the extreme left
shall not be the birth of a reactionary right.
My deeds shall be those
of an uncompromised head of state
during the process of election of the Brazilian
to whom I shall convey this office on January 31 , 1966.
1964 closes the '54 cycle of colonels.
This time they were united and had a plan.
The concepts developed in the Superior War College
replaced social justice for development
and democracy for security.
Castelo Branco's cabinet had politicians from UDN
and technocrats, now at the service of the new order.
But the true core of power after '64
laid in the hands of the brothers in arms.
General Costa e Silva in the ministry of war,
General Ernesto Geisel as Head of the Military Household
and General Golbery do Couto e Silva, who used lPES records
to set up the National Information Service.
During the Castelo Branco administration, old alliances were recovered.
The law on remittance of profits was revoked,
and the trust of the United States in the Brazilian democracy was reestablished.
Annulling the decree on expropriation of unproductive lands,
the new president put the minds of large land owners at ease.
With the new economic guidelines,
the International Monetary Fund came to the assistance of its ally.
A rigorous controI on salaries
would fund development and the fight against inflation.
After sending to prison or to exile
the main leaders of the left and of the union movement,
the military put an end to the ambitions of their civiI allies.
Ademar de Barros, Governor of Săo Paulo,
was an ally of Castelo Branco but ended up being discharged and unseated,
charged with bribery.
Lacerda's dreams of becoming president
were over when marshal Castelo Branco extended his own term of office,
and cancelled the presidential election of 1965.
lRREVERSlBLE DEClSlON: GOVERNORS-ELECT TO BE VESTED lN OFFlCE.
The elections for state governor turned JK into the heart of the civiI resistance.
The victory of the opposition for state governor
in Minas and in Guanabara alarmed the government.
Pressured by the hard-core segment of the armed forces,
Castelo Branco enacted Institutional Act No. 2,
banning political parties
and turning the elections for governor into indirect ones.
A cordial JK, after being unseated, followed the same lPM ritual,
walking the same path that many other Brazilians would follow.
Jango the farmer, exiled in Uruguay,
lived in angst over the uncertainties of the wait.
His most wanted return had no scheduled date.
The anguish of those days
caused his children's birthdays to go almost uncelebrated.
The desire to see Brazil become a democracy again
led Jango, in exile, to unite with Carlos Lacerda and JK
to structure the Ample Front, a movement that was banned soon thereafter.
Opposition movements had less and less freedom
Lacerda would be the most illustrious name in the next list of unseated politicians.
The successor of Marshal Castelo Branco was General Costa e Silva.
Against the will of Castelo, the minister of war was made candidate.
In the Congress, under the applause of Arena and before a silent MDB,
Costa e Silva was inaugurated.
The new president was sworn in under a new Constitution,
enacted in 1967 with deep restrictions on the liberal principles
of the previously untouched Constitution of 1946.
Marginalization of the people and failed political solutions
led the way to opposition marches.
Protests promoted by students,
intellectuals and professionals, under violent repression,
led the way to radicalization.
The defeat of populism
caused disenchantment with traditional political formulas
and launched a new motto: "armed fight."
From the Caraíbas area to the southern mountains,
stretched the revolutionary wave of the 60s.
Tupamaros in Uruguay, Douglas Bravo in Venezuela
and father Camilo Torres in Colombia started guerrilla activities.
Rangers trained in the U.S.
were chasing Ernesto Che Guevara.
The formidable shadow of Che
would disappear on October 8, 1967.
The death of the guerilla commander, that had been announced so many times,
would soon be acknowledged by FideI Castro in Havana.
...also a dark photograph.
This is the picture.
You can be sure
that I wish Che had adopted
at least certain preventive measures.
He often led the way on exploration units.
On the other hand, it is also possible that he
was very conscious of the mission he had chosen
and of the subjective value of men.
In the heart of America, in the province of La Higuera, in Bolivia,
a helicopter brought the tied-up body of Guevara.
General Hugo Bŕnzer inspected the operation in person.
He was nervous, as a hunter feeling inferior to his prey.
Ernesto Che Guevara, the exemplary activist, was dead.
His image holding a shotgun, with a star on his cap
would reemerge not only in the 3rd world,
but also in the '68 rebellions in Paris, Prague, Berlin, Berkeley.
Édson Luiz, a young man shot to death in Rio de Janeiro,
would be the first victim of the clash between the police and students.
Those who remain silent over your body
Agree to your death
THE YANKEES HAVE MURDERED A BRAZlLlAN MAN
By sword and fire
Deep down in the tear
Shot in the chest
OUR PEOPLE ARE BLEEDlNG Those who remain silent die with you
Deader than you are now
ARM Y GO HOME
A watch on the floor of the square
Ticking, telling the time
Set by anger
MURDERS. VENGEANCE
In the fire, mirroring
The shine of your hair
Those who shouted live on with you
His death prompted great movements of protest on the streets.
On the other hand, it was decided by the meeting of intellectuals
that they would attend the march en masse.
I'll be there and hope you will too.
- How about you, Tônia? - We will all be there.
I'll go as a woman, as an actress, as a mother, as a citizen.
I'll go because I want the pubic opinion
to known that we have a lot of courage to unmask the myth
that the students are doing something wrong, that they are troublemakers.
They are our hope and we have our arms open for them,
to accept their claims.
I'm very proud that my kids are taking part in it.
I'll be on the streets. I have two kids who are university students.
l'd rather they be on the streets than smoking marijuana.
Partying and smoking marijuana.
Let's take a walk on the hidden forest, My love
Let's take a walk down the avenue
Let's take a walk through the high path, My love
There are mountains looming over the asphalt
The pretext for the toughening up of the regime
was the speech by opposition congressman Mŕrcio Moreira Alves,
the government's attempt to sue him and the denial of the Congress,
to protect its sovereignty.
President Vargas
Let's go for a walk In the United States of Brazil
Let's go for a walk in disguise
In December 1968, again on a Friday 13th,
the government closed the Congress and enacted Institutional Act No. 5.
The toughening up of the regime and the repression of civiI organizations
neutralized the opposition.
Censorship on newspapers, radio and TV concealed any sign of protest.
The church, which had supported the forces that removed Jango from power,
reappeared in the late 60s as the only organized institution
to defend justice and human rights.
The murder of father Henrique, a direct assistant to D. Hęlder Câmara,
marked with blood the new standing of the Church.
The repression, the ban on people's movements,
the obstruction of union movements,
caused the Church to be the last remaining place
where people's movements can get organized.
In a way, the Church is the only institution to which
a retired general could not be appointed
chairman of the Episcopal Conference
or Archbishop of Săo Paulo.
So that brought people to the Church.
After the initial success,
marked by kidnappings and bank robberies,
the urban guerrilla, isolated from the people, began to crumble.
Former congressman Carlos Marighella, who used to head the Communist Party,
the founder of the National Action for Liberty, ALN,
died in Săo Paulo in an ambush put together by police forces.
ALLENDE'S LAST SPEECH SEPTEMBER 1 1 , 1973
All I can say to the workers is: I shall not resign.
Standing at a historical crossroads,
I shall repay the loyalty of the people with my life.
In Chile, another alternative was attempted:
one coalition that brought together communists, socialists,
liberals and progressive Catholics elected senator Salvador Allende.
The defeated candidate in the '52, '58 and '64 elections,
Allende came to power in 1970
proposing a pacific route towards socialism.
lMAGES OF ALLENDE'S CAMPAlGN - 1964
The elation of Allende's administration,
the attempt to conciliate socialism and liberty,
ended up in a bloodbath sponsored by the U.S.
Long live Chile. Long live the people.
Long live the workers.
In 1973, the CIA and ITT
financed the overthrowing and assassination of Allende.
In 1975 no democracy was left standing in the southern cone.
But the scenario would get even more somber.
Police and paramilitary organizations organized Operation Condor,
with the purpose of preventing all political and oppositional actions in the continent.
In Washington, a bomb brought to an end the life of Orlando Letelier,
a former minister of the Allende administration.
In Buenos Aires, senator Michelini of Uruguay was kidnapped and killed.
General Juan Josę Torres, the president of Bolivia,
and general Carlos Prates, former commander-in-chief of the Chilean army,
were killed in bombings.
President Joăo Goulart knew that his name was
on that list of doomed presidents.
His greatest dream, his greatest wish
was to go back to Brazil.
I believe deep down he couldn't stand that instability any longer,
To go from country to country in Latin America,
and later even thinking about moving to Europe...
Because his wish, his hope
was to be able to go back to Brazil.
His dreams were halted on December 6, 1976.
At his farm in Mercedes, Argentina,
where he lived with Maria Tereza, Jango died of a heart attack.
SĂO VICENTE RANCH
Journalist Carlos Castello Branco described his death:
President Joăo Goulart, unable to return to Brazil,
compelled to leave Argentina and advised not to stay in Uruguay,
died like a lost cowboy,
looking for a way back home.
His desire to go home was very strong.
In the split second that separates life from death,
the images of his youth in Săo Borja were relived,
his inauguration in Brasília, the images of March 13th in the Central Station,
of Vargas' funeral.
The kind gestures from the people
and his role in the fight for a better society,
which caused him to be the only Brazilian president to die in exile.
WELCOME TO BRAZlL.
On December 7,
the body of Joăo Goulart crossed the border back to Brazil
to be buried in Săo Borja.
12 years had elapsed since he left for the exile.
The family, friends, former assistants
spread over the casket of the former president of the republic
the flag of amnesty.
Silence was the official version of the government.
JANGO WILL REMAIN WlTH US
CENTRAL CEMETERY
THE EVENTS OF THAT DAY ARE STlLL CLEAR lN M Y MEMORY:
IN A DARK BEDROOM,
TRYlNG TO ESCAPE THE WORLD THAT REACHED ME THROUGH THE RADlO,
I WAS LITTLE MORE THAN A BOY, CRYING TO DEATH
OVER PRESlDENT JANGO'S JOURNE Y-ESCAPE.
THE YEARS WENT B Y, MATURlTY CAME, AND A DAlLY DOSE OF lNJUSTlCE AND HATRED,
OPPRESSlON, LlES AND FEAR, HAVE MADE ME NOW, AS AN ADULT,
ON BEHALF OF THE TRUTH AND HlSTORY, REAFFlRM THE BO Y:
THE TEARS THAT WERE SHED lN 64 ARE STlLL FAlR. - FERNANDO BRANT