0:00:01.527,0:00:04.315 Something happened in the early morning hours 0:00:04.315,0:00:07.900 of May 2nd, 2000, that had a profound effect 0:00:07.900,0:00:10.206 on the way our society operates. 0:00:10.206,0:00:13.484 Ironically, hardly anyone noticed at the time. 0:00:13.484,0:00:16.144 The change was silent, imperceptible, 0:00:16.144,0:00:18.989 unless you knew exactly what to look for. 0:00:18.989,0:00:21.340 On that morning, U.S. President Bill Clinton 0:00:21.340,0:00:23.612 ordered that a special switch be thrown 0:00:23.612,0:00:27.045 in the orbiting satellites of the Global Positioning System. 0:00:27.045,0:00:30.909 Instantaneously, every civilian GPS receiver 0:00:30.909,0:00:35.471 around the globe went from errors the size of a football field 0:00:35.471,0:00:39.406 to errors the size of a small room. 0:00:42.314,0:00:46.105 It's hard to overstate the effect that this change 0:00:46.105,0:00:48.657 in accuracy has had on us. 0:00:48.657,0:00:50.904 Before this switch was thrown, we didn't have 0:00:50.904,0:00:53.163 in-car navigation systems giving turn-by-turn 0:00:53.163,0:00:55.755 directions, because back then, GPS couldn't tell you 0:00:55.755,0:00:58.449 what block you were on, let alone what street. 0:00:58.449,0:01:01.697 For geolocation, accuracy matters, 0:01:01.697,0:01:04.955 and things have only improved over the last 10 years. 0:01:04.955,0:01:07.074 With more base stations, more ground stations, 0:01:07.074,0:01:10.043 better receivers and better algorithms, 0:01:10.043,0:01:13.106 GPS can now not only tell you what street you are on, 0:01:13.106,0:01:17.608 but what part of the street. 0:01:17.608,0:01:19.854 This level of accuracy 0:01:19.854,0:01:22.780 has unleashed a firestorm of innovation. 0:01:22.780,0:01:25.451 In fact, many of you navigated here today 0:01:25.451,0:01:29.044 with the help of your TomTom or your smartphone. 0:01:29.044,0:01:32.269 Paper maps are becoming obsolete. 0:01:32.269,0:01:36.408 But we now stand on the verge of another revolution 0:01:36.408,0:01:38.403 in geolocation accuracy. 0:01:38.403,0:01:41.136 What if I told you that the two-meter positioning 0:01:41.136,0:01:44.567 that our current cell phones and our TomToms give us 0:01:44.567,0:01:48.464 is pathetic compared to what we could be getting? 0:01:48.464,0:01:51.297 For some time now, it's been known that if you pay attention 0:01:51.297,0:01:53.832 to the carrier phase of the GPS signal, 0:01:53.832,0:01:56.313 and if you have an Internet connection, 0:01:56.313,0:01:59.129 then you can go from meter level to centimeter level, 0:01:59.129,0:02:02.096 even millimeter-level positioning. 0:02:02.096,0:02:05.376 So why don't we have this capability on our phones? 0:02:05.376,0:02:09.746 Only, I believe, for a lack of imagination. 0:02:09.746,0:02:12.913 Manufacturers haven't built this carrier phase technique 0:02:12.913,0:02:15.019 into their cheap GPS chips 0:02:15.019,0:02:17.173 because they're not sure what the general public would do 0:02:17.173,0:02:20.749 with geolocation so accurate that you could pinpoint 0:02:20.749,0:02:24.587 the wrinkles in the palm of your hand. 0:02:24.587,0:02:26.974 But you and I and other innovators, 0:02:26.974,0:02:31.014 we can see the potential in this next leap in accuracy. 0:02:31.014,0:02:33.726 Imagine, for example, an augmented reality app 0:02:33.726,0:02:37.263 that overlays a virtual world to millimeter-level precision 0:02:37.263,0:02:39.271 on top of the physical world. 0:02:39.271,0:02:42.158 I could build for you a structure up here in 3D, 0:02:42.158,0:02:44.526 millimeter accurate, that only you could see, 0:02:44.526,0:02:47.419 or my friends at home. 0:02:47.419,0:02:51.934 So this level of positioning, this is what we're looking for, 0:02:51.934,0:02:55.858 and I believe that, within the next few years, I predict, 0:02:55.858,0:03:00.841 that this kind of hyper-precise, carrier phase-based positioning 0:03:00.841,0:03:04.065 will become cheap and ubiquitous, 0:03:04.065,0:03:06.610 and the consequences will be fantastic. 0:03:06.610,0:03:11.266 The Holy Grail, of course, is the GPS dot. 0:03:11.266,0:03:13.946 Do you remember the movie "The Da Vinci Code?" 0:03:13.946,0:03:17.394 Here's Professor Langdon examining a GPS dot, 0:03:17.394,0:03:20.771 which his accomplice tells him is a tracking device 0:03:20.771,0:03:23.832 accurate within two feet anywhere on the globe, 0:03:23.832,0:03:26.738 but we know that in the world of nonfiction, 0:03:26.738,0:03:29.602 the GPS dot is impossible, right? 0:03:29.602,0:03:32.226 For one thing, GPS doesn't work indoors, 0:03:32.226,0:03:35.410 and for another, they don't make devices quite this small, 0:03:35.410,0:03:37.738 especially when those devices have to relay 0:03:37.738,0:03:40.713 their measurements back over a network. 0:03:40.713,0:03:43.051 Well, these objections were perfectly reasonable 0:03:43.051,0:03:46.065 a few years ago, but things have changed. 0:03:46.065,0:03:48.921 There's been a strong trend toward miniaturization, 0:03:48.921,0:03:52.640 better sensitivity, so much so that, a few years ago, 0:03:52.640,0:03:55.344 a GPS tracking device looked like this clunky box 0:03:55.344,0:03:57.520 to the left of the keys. 0:03:57.520,0:04:00.171 Compare that with the device released just months ago 0:04:00.171,0:04:03.963 that's now packaged into something the size of a key fob, 0:04:03.963,0:04:06.516 and if you take a look at the state of the art 0:04:06.516,0:04:09.262 for a complete GPS receiver, which is only a centimeter 0:04:09.262,0:04:11.349 on a side and more sensitive than ever, 0:04:11.349,0:04:14.858 you realize that the GPS dot will soon move 0:04:14.858,0:04:19.257 from fiction to nonfiction. 0:04:19.257,0:04:23.499 Imagine what we could do with a world full of GPS dots. 0:04:23.499,0:04:26.405 It's not just that you'll never lose your wallet or your keys 0:04:26.405,0:04:30.976 anymore, or your child when you're at Disneyland. 0:04:30.976,0:04:34.757 You'll buy GPS dots in bulk, and you'll stick them on 0:04:34.757,0:04:38.724 everything you own worth more than a few tens of dollars. 0:04:38.724,0:04:41.196 I couldn't find my shoes one recent morning, 0:04:41.196,0:04:44.564 and, as usual, had to ask my wife if she had seen them. 0:04:44.564,0:04:48.356 But I shouldn't have to bother my wife with that kind of triviality. 0:04:48.356,0:04:50.967 I should be able to ask my house where my shoes are. 0:04:50.967,0:04:53.106 (Laughter) 0:04:53.106,0:04:56.614 Those of you who have made the switch to Gmail, 0:04:56.614,0:04:59.492 remember how refreshing it was to go from 0:04:59.492,0:05:03.636 organizing all of your email to simply searching it. 0:05:03.636,0:05:08.138 The GPS dot will do the same for our possessions. 0:05:08.138,0:05:12.824 Now, of course, there is a flip side to the GPS dot. 0:05:12.824,0:05:15.213 I was in my office some months back 0:05:15.213,0:05:17.756 and got a telephone call. 0:05:17.756,0:05:21.377 The woman on the other end of the line, we'll call her Carol, 0:05:21.377,0:05:23.456 was panicked. 0:05:23.456,0:05:26.249 Apparently, an ex-boyfriend of Carol's from California 0:05:26.249,0:05:29.564 had found her in Texas and was following her around. 0:05:29.564,0:05:33.401 So you might ask at this point why she's calling you. 0:05:33.401,0:05:34.800 Well, so did I. 0:05:34.800,0:05:38.791 But it turned out there was a technical twist to Carol's case. 0:05:38.791,0:05:41.525 Every time her ex-boyfriend would show up, 0:05:41.525,0:05:45.875 at the most improbable times and the most improbable locations, 0:05:45.875,0:05:48.571 he was carrying an open laptop, 0:05:48.571,0:05:51.414 and over time Carol realized that he had planted 0:05:51.414,0:05:53.962 a GPS tracking device on her car, 0:05:53.962,0:05:56.871 so she was calling me for help to disable it. 0:05:56.871,0:05:58.859 "Well, you should go to a good mechanic 0:05:58.859,0:06:02.143 and have him look at your car," I said. 0:06:02.143,0:06:04.847 "I already have," she told me. 0:06:04.847,0:06:06.991 "He didn't see anything obvious, 0:06:06.991,0:06:10.528 and he said he'd have to take the car apart piece by piece." 0:06:10.528,0:06:13.849 "Well then, you'd better go to the police," I said. 0:06:13.849,0:06:16.953 "I already have," she replied. 0:06:16.953,0:06:19.399 "They're not sure this rises to the level of harassment, 0:06:19.399,0:06:23.152 and they're not set up technically to find the device." 0:06:23.152,0:06:24.658 "Okay, what about the FBI?" 0:06:24.658,0:06:28.821 "I've talked to them too, and same story." 0:06:28.821,0:06:30.491 We then talked about her coming to my lab 0:06:30.491,0:06:33.039 and us performing a radio sweep of her car, 0:06:33.039,0:06:35.538 but I wasn't even sure that would work, 0:06:35.538,0:06:37.589 given that some of these devices are configured 0:06:37.589,0:06:39.823 to only transmit when they're inside safe zones 0:06:39.823,0:06:43.127 or when the car is moving. 0:06:43.127,0:06:44.621 So, there we were. 0:06:44.621,0:06:47.590 Carol isn't the first, and certainly won't be the last, 0:06:47.590,0:06:52.525 to find herself in this kind of fearsome environment, 0:06:52.525,0:06:58.410 worrisome situation caused by GPS tracking. 0:06:58.410,0:07:00.213 In fact, as I looked into her case, 0:07:00.213,0:07:03.675 I discovered to my surprise that it's not clearly illegal 0:07:03.675,0:07:08.108 for you or me to put a tracking device on someone else's car. 0:07:08.108,0:07:11.988 The Supreme Court ruled last month that a policeman 0:07:11.988,0:07:16.320 has to get a warrant if he wants to do prolonged tracking, 0:07:16.320,0:07:19.836 but the law isn't clear about civilians doing this to one another, 0:07:19.836,0:07:22.466 so it's not just Big Brother we have to worry about, 0:07:22.466,0:07:25.737 but Big Neighbor. (Laughter) 0:07:25.737,0:07:30.385 There is one alternative that Carol could have taken, 0:07:30.385,0:07:36.088 very effective. It's called the Wave Bubble. 0:07:36.088,0:07:39.023 It's an open-source GPS jammer, 0:07:39.023,0:07:41.578 developed by Limor Fried, 0:07:41.578,0:07:45.371 a graduate student at MIT, and Limor calls it 0:07:45.371,0:07:49.256 "a tool for reclaiming our personal space." 0:07:49.256,0:07:51.521 With a flip of the switch you create a bubble around you 0:07:51.521,0:07:53.768 within which GPS signals can't reside. 0:07:53.768,0:07:56.124 They get drowned out by the bubble. 0:07:56.124,0:07:59.771 And Limor designed this, in part, because, like Carol, 0:07:59.771,0:08:02.417 she felt threatened by GPS tracking. 0:08:02.417,0:08:04.993 Then she posted her design to the web, 0:08:04.993,0:08:08.735 and if you don't have time to build your own, 0:08:08.735,0:08:09.509 you can buy one. 0:08:09.509,0:08:11.567 Chinese manufacturers now sell thousands 0:08:11.567,0:08:15.340 of nearly identical devices on the Internet. 0:08:15.340,0:08:19.492 So you might be thinking, the Wave Bubble sounds great. 0:08:19.492,0:08:23.145 I should have one. Might come in handy if somebody ever puts a tracking device on my car. 0:08:23.145,0:08:26.927 But you should be aware that its use is very much illegal 0:08:26.927,0:08:28.726 in the United States. 0:08:28.726,0:08:29.473 And why is that? 0:08:29.473,0:08:32.566 Well, because it's not a bubble at all. 0:08:32.566,0:08:34.965 Its jamming signals don't stop at the edge 0:08:34.965,0:08:37.437 of your personal space or at the edge of your car. 0:08:37.437,0:08:43.673 They go on to jam innocent GPS receivers for miles around you. (Laughter) 0:08:43.673,0:08:46.424 Now, if you're Carol or Limor, 0:08:46.424,0:08:49.049 or someone who feels threatened by GPS tracking, 0:08:49.049,0:08:52.824 it might not feel wrong to turn on a Wave Bubble, 0:08:52.824,0:08:56.804 but in fact, the results can be disastrous. 0:08:56.804,0:08:59.524 Imagine, for example, you're the captain of a cruise ship 0:08:59.524,0:09:02.043 trying to make your way through a thick fog 0:09:02.043,0:09:05.883 and some passenger in the back turns on a Wave Bubble. 0:09:05.883,0:09:08.598 All of a sudden your GPS readout goes blank, 0:09:08.598,0:09:11.884 and now it's just you and the fog 0:09:11.884,0:09:14.484 and whatever you can pull off the radar system 0:09:14.484,0:09:17.608 if you remember how to work it. 0:09:17.608,0:09:23.544 They -- in fact, they don't update or upkeep lighthouses 0:09:23.544,0:09:28.197 anymore, and LORAN, the only backup to GPS, 0:09:28.197,0:09:30.617 was discontinued last year. 0:09:30.617,0:09:35.530 Our modern society has a special relationship with GPS. 0:09:35.530,0:09:37.800 We're almost blindly reliant on it. 0:09:37.800,0:09:41.451 It's built deeply into our systems and infrastructure. 0:09:41.451,0:09:45.079 Some call it "the invisible utility." 0:09:45.079,0:09:48.801 So, turning on a Wave Bubble might not just cause inconvenience. 0:09:48.801,0:09:53.171 It might be deadly. 0:09:53.171,0:09:57.379 But as it turns out, for purposes of protecting your privacy 0:09:57.379,0:10:00.868 at the expense of general GPS reliability, 0:10:00.868,0:10:03.028 there's something even more potent 0:10:03.028,0:10:06.820 and more subversive than a Wave Bubble, 0:10:06.820,0:10:10.209 and that is a GPS spoofer. 0:10:10.209,0:10:13.034 The idea behind the GPS spoofer is simple. 0:10:13.034,0:10:17.011 Instead of jamming the GPS signals, you fake them. 0:10:17.011,0:10:20.129 You imitate them, and if you do it right, the device 0:10:20.129,0:10:23.296 you're attacking doesn't even know it's being spoofed. 0:10:23.296,0:10:24.928 So let me show you how this works. 0:10:24.928,0:10:27.653 In any GPS receiver, there's a peak inside 0:10:27.653,0:10:30.288 that corresponds to the authentic signals. 0:10:30.288,0:10:33.103 These three red dots represent the tracking points 0:10:33.103,0:10:35.982 that try to keep themselves centered on that peak. 0:10:35.982,0:10:39.047 But if you send in a fake GPS signal, 0:10:39.047,0:10:43.513 another peak pops up, and if you can get these two peaks 0:10:43.513,0:10:48.231 perfectly aligned, the tracking points can't tell the difference, 0:10:48.231,0:10:51.542 and they get hijacked by the stronger counterfeit signal, 0:10:51.542,0:10:55.502 with the authentic peak getting forced off. 0:10:55.502,0:10:57.669 At this point, the game is over. 0:10:57.669,0:11:01.406 The fake signals now completely control this GPS receiver. 0:11:01.406,0:11:02.901 So is this really possible? 0:11:02.901,0:11:04.624 Can someone really manipulate 0:11:04.624,0:11:06.606 the timing and positioning of a GPS receiver 0:11:06.606,0:11:09.485 just like that, with a spoofer? 0:11:09.485,0:11:11.500 Well, the short answer is yes. 0:11:11.500,0:11:14.304 The key is that civil GPS signals 0:11:14.304,0:11:15.406 are completely open. 0:11:15.406,0:11:19.397 They have no encryption. They have no authentication. 0:11:19.397,0:11:22.892 They're wide open, vulnerable to a kind of spoofing attack. 0:11:22.892,0:11:25.467 Even so, up until very recently, 0:11:25.467,0:11:27.859 nobody worried about GPS spoofers. 0:11:27.859,0:11:29.837 People figured that it would be too complex 0:11:29.837,0:11:32.652 or too expensive for some hacker to build one. 0:11:32.652,0:11:36.604 But I, and a friend of mine from graduate school, 0:11:36.604,0:11:38.756 we didn't see it that way. 0:11:38.756,0:11:41.229 We knew it wasn't going to be so hard, 0:11:41.229,0:11:43.157 and we wanted to be the first to build one 0:11:43.157,0:11:45.237 so we could get out in front of the problem 0:11:45.237,0:11:49.343 and help protect against GPS spoofing. 0:11:49.343,0:11:52.688 I remember vividly the week it all came together. 0:11:52.688,0:11:56.137 We built it at my home, which means that 0:11:56.137,0:12:00.526 I got a little extra help from my three-year-old son Ramon. 0:12:00.526,0:12:02.944 Here's Ramon — (Laughter) — 0:12:02.944,0:12:06.629 looking for a little attention from Dad that week. 0:12:06.629,0:12:08.899 At first, the spoofer was just a jumble of cables 0:12:08.899,0:12:11.781 and computers, though we eventually got it packaged 0:12:11.781,0:12:13.453 into a small box. 0:12:13.453,0:12:16.262 Now, the Dr. Frankenstein moment, 0:12:16.262,0:12:18.989 when the spoofer finally came alive 0:12:18.989,0:12:21.590 and I glimpsed its awful potential, 0:12:21.590,0:12:24.326 came late one night when I tested the spoofer 0:12:24.326,0:12:26.412 against my iPhone. 0:12:26.412,0:12:28.029 Let me show you some actual footage from that 0:12:28.029,0:12:29.965 very first experiment. 0:12:29.965,0:12:33.559 I had come to completely trust this little blue dot 0:12:33.559,0:12:35.194 and its reassuring blue halo. 0:12:35.194,0:12:36.269 They seemed to speak to me. 0:12:36.269,0:12:40.929 They'd say, "Here you are. Here you are." (Laughter) 0:12:40.929,0:12:43.799 And "you can trust us." 0:12:43.799,0:12:48.917 So something felt very wrong about the world. 0:12:48.917,0:12:51.500 It was a sense, almost, of betrayal, 0:12:51.500,0:12:55.691 when this little blue dot started at my house, 0:12:55.691,0:12:57.303 and went running off toward the north 0:12:57.303,0:13:01.198 leaving me behind. I wasn't moving. 0:13:01.198,0:13:05.431 What I then saw in this little moving blue dot 0:13:05.431,0:13:08.149 was the potential for chaos. 0:13:08.149,0:13:12.291 I saw airplanes and ships veering off course, with the captain 0:13:12.291,0:13:16.565 learning only too late that something was wrong. 0:13:16.565,0:13:19.065 I saw the GPS-derived timing 0:13:19.065,0:13:20.796 of the New York Stock Exchange 0:13:20.796,0:13:22.746 being manipulated by hackers. 0:13:22.746,0:13:25.714 You can scarcely imagine the kind of havoc 0:13:25.714,0:13:28.364 you could cause if you knew what you were doing 0:13:28.364,0:13:31.717 with a GPS spoofer. 0:13:31.717,0:13:36.861 There is, though, one redeeming feature 0:13:36.861,0:13:39.317 of the GPS spoofer. 0:13:39.317,0:13:43.918 It's the ultimate weapon against an invasion of GPS dots. 0:13:43.918,0:13:47.005 Imagine, for example, you're being tracked. 0:13:47.005,0:13:49.529 Well, you can play the tracker for a fool, 0:13:49.529,0:13:52.490 pretending to be at work when you're really on vacation. 0:13:52.490,0:13:55.205 Or, if you're Carol, you could lure your ex-boyfriend 0:13:55.205,0:13:56.522 into some empty parking lot 0:13:56.522,0:13:58.823 where the police are waiting for him. 0:13:58.823,0:14:04.026 So I'm fascinated by this conflict, a looming conflict, 0:14:04.026,0:14:06.691 between privacy on the one hand 0:14:06.691,0:14:10.890 and the need for a clean radio spectrum on the other. 0:14:10.890,0:14:13.935 We simply cannot tolerate GPS jammers and spoofers, 0:14:13.935,0:14:17.671 and yet, given the lack of effective legal means 0:14:17.671,0:14:21.770 for protecting our privacy from the GPS dot, 0:14:21.770,0:14:23.642 can you really blame people for wanting to turn them on, 0:14:23.642,0:14:26.058 for wanting to use them? 0:14:26.058,0:14:29.111 I hold out hope that we'll be able to reconcile 0:14:29.111,0:14:32.297 this conflict with some sort of, 0:14:32.297,0:14:37.727 some yet uninvented technology. 0:14:37.727,0:14:40.853 But meanwhile, grab some popcorn, 0:14:40.853,0:14:42.980 because things are going to get interesting. 0:14:42.980,0:14:44.320 Within the next few years, 0:14:44.320,0:14:48.574 many of you will be the proud owner of a GPS dot. 0:14:48.574,0:14:50.922 Maybe you'll have a whole bag full of them. 0:14:50.922,0:14:54.374 You'll never lose track of your things again. 0:14:54.374,0:14:58.403 The GPS dot will fundamentally reorder your life. 0:14:58.403,0:15:01.085 But will you be able to resist the temptation 0:15:01.085,0:15:04.077 to track your fellow man? 0:15:04.077,0:15:05.909 Or will you be able to resist the temptation 0:15:05.909,0:15:09.204 to turn on a GPS spoofer or a Wave Bubble 0:15:09.204,0:15:11.972 to protect your own privacy? 0:15:11.972,0:15:15.604 So, as usual, what we see just beyond the horizon 0:15:15.604,0:15:18.944 is full of promise and peril. 0:15:18.944,0:15:22.132 It'll be fascinating to see how this all turns out. 0:15:22.132,0:15:24.766 Thanks. (Applause)