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>> Good afternoon again
and welcome to GW.

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My name is David Dolling and
I'm the Dean of the School

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of Engineering and
Applied Science here

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at the George Washington
University.

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I don't think it would
be news to anybody

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that there's been a lot of
documents out there recently

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with respect to cyber security.

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We've seen the White
House's executive order aimed

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at protecting our
critical infrastructure.

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We've seen a report from the
Security Company Mandiant

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that exposed a Chinese
military hacking group.

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And very much in the news
now although it's faded

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after the press conference
yesterday afternoon have been

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documents related
to NSA's prison

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and telephone surveillance
programs.

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Well today, we are
very fortunate

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that have several
experts with us

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to discuss their various
view points on surveillance

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on cyber security and the
future of the internet.

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As we try to be secure
while protecting privacy,

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we do need to be guided by
knowledge from many disciplines

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and in fact, this was stated
quite explicitly last December

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at the launch of the GW
Cyber Security Initiative.

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The initiative's chairman,

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former DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff spoke of the need

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for university's
like ours and others

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to give students an
understanding of the triad

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of technology, business
policy and how they interact

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to create difficult cyber
security challenges.

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While I'm on the podium here,
I'd like to just take advantage

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of a captive audience because I
know you all too polite to cheer

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or get up and move out to say
a few things about the School

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of Engineering and
Applied Science here at GW

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which is a very thriving
and growing enterprise.

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Our Department of
Computer Science

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in fact anticipated
Secretary Chertoff's remarks

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by launching last fall
the Master of Science

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in Cyber security in our
Computer Science Department.

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It's the first program

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in Washington DC designed
specifically to respond

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to the large and
fast growing need

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for technical cyber
security experts locally,

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nationally, and internationally.

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Underscoring our commitment
here to cyber security education

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and public service, our NSF

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and DHS sponsored CyberCorps
scholarship programs.

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These programs fund students who
are going to be future leaders

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in the federal government
on cyber security

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and indeed some of
them already are.

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Each week, the CyberCorps
students meet in class often

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with current or former
federal employees as well

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as industry experts to learn

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about the major cyber security
issues so they're prepared

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to meet the challenges that
will certainly great them

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after they graduate
here and take jobs.

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This course which was
previously only available

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to CyberCorps students is now
available to all GW students

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as a hybrid cause
conducted mostly online

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with the short intensive

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in person learning
experience or the beginning.

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Starting next year,
some doctor or students

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in the graduate school
of education

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and human development
here at GW on human

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and organizational learning
will also be taking this class a

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required part of their
cyber security focus.

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Well, let me say that
today's event which looks

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to be very well populated
and looks like it's going

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to be very interesting
is sponsored

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by the cyber security policy
in research institute.

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We abbreviate that around
here to CSPRI of the School

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of Engineering and
Applied Science.

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In addition to overseeing
the CyberCorps program,

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it facilitates and execute
into disciplinary research

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in education in cyber
security across GW.

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One example of this is its
work with the graduate school

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of education in human
development supporting the

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national cyber watch
center in a joint project

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to develop the nation
cyber security workforce.

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More information on that program

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on CSPRI Cyber Security
Scholarships and School

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of Engineering and Applied
Science can be found

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in the material available
the registration desk.

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We're happy to have
as a cosponsor

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of this event today the internet
society and it's my pleasure

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to now introduced Paul
Brigner, Regional Director

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of the North American Bureau at
the Internet Society to come up

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and tell you a few
words about it

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and its role and
in today's event.

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So, on behalf of GW, the
School of Engineering

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and Applied Science,
CSPRI and the Department

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Of Computer Science,
welcome to GW

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and I hope you have
a great afternoon.

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Thank you.

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[ Applause ]

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[ Pause ]

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>> Thank you Dr.
Dolling and thank you

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to the George Washington
Cyber Security Policy

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And Research Institute
for partnering

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with us on this event today.

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And thanks to all of
you for joining us

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and that means not everyone here
in the room but also to those

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who are at a remote
hub in New York City.

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That remote hub is
being sponsored

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by the internet societies
New York chapter.

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I know we don't have
a good view of them

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with the camera right
now but what's going

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to happen is they
will walk up to

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that camera and ask questions.

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And by the way, they've
been meeting

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on this topic already
this morning.

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They've had their
own meetings today,

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so maybe that gives you an idea
of how passionate that group

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of individual is about
the topics we will be

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discussing though.

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So, thank you to the New York
chapter for getting together

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to join us as remote hub.

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And definitely, thank you
to all those on live stream.

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We have a very good crowd
already gathering on live stream

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to watch us from
all over the world.

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My first order of business today
is makes sure that you're aware

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of the internet society.

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If this is the first time you're
joining from one of our events,

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we are a global nonprofit
cost driven organization

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with a very straight
forward vision.

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That is the internet
is for everyone.

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We work to achieve that vision

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by promoting the open
development evolution and use

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of the internet for the benefit

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of tall people throughout
the world.

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Some of our key functions
involve facilitating the open

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development of standards,
protocols, administration

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and a technical infrastructure
of the internet.

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Supporting internet education
in developing countries.

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Promoting professional
development in community meeting

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to faster greater
participation and leadership

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in areas important to the
evolution of the internet

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and fostering an environment
for international cooperation,

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community and a culture

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that enables internet
self governance.

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Well, I saw staff lead specific
projects on these topics.

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Much of our work is achieved
through the work of our members

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and chapters around the world.

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And speaking of chapters,

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I would like to give
special recognition

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to the local DC chapter.

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I am very fortunate that our
headquarters is just not far

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away in western Virginia so
I'm able to interact personally

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with our DC chapter
on a regular basis.

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And I can attest to the fact

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that they are really a
first class group of people

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that regularly hold very
interesting meetings related

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to the internet societies
mission.

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So, if you're a local
and you're not involve,

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you're really missing out, I
do hope you will get involved.

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And if the leaders who are here

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from the internet society DC
chapter would stand briefly,

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I just want to make sure
that you're recognized.

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So, great.

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So, you know who they are.

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Please make a special
effort to talk

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to them today during
this event if you'd

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like to get involve
with the chapter.

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[ Pause ]

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One of my key functions
at the internet society is

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to work closely with our
chapters in the region not only

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to plan iNET events like this
but to assist with their events

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and to have an open
dialogue on policy issues.

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That dialogue in turn
helps me and my colleagues

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at the internet society to form
our policy positions and help

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to set the agenda for
our regional meetings

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like the one we are
attending today

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and that brings me
to today's agenda.

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The topic of this iNET
has really been driven

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by the interest of our members

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in the North American
region and around the world.

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It so happens today that one of
our panelist is the President

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and Chief Executive Officer

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of the internet society
that's Lynn St. Amour.

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So, she will have
the opportunity

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to address the concerns
of our constituency today.

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Now, without further delay,

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I would like to introduce
Professors Lance Hoffman.

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He is the Director of the Cyber
Security Research and Policy--

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I'm sorry, the Cyber
Security Policy

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and Research Institute here at
George Washington University.

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I first met Professor Hoffman
when he sponsored a debate

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on PIPA and SOPA and
I knew that he was,

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based on that experience, I
knew that he was game to talk

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about some very controversial
topics.

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So, I guessed right, he
was interested in talking

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about this one as well and
it's been really a pleasure

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to partner with him
on this event.

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So, I want to sincerely
thank you for that.

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It's really been a
great experience.

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I'd also like to thank all
of our fantastic panelist

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who have agreed to
speak here today.

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We really have an all
star group of people

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who have taken their time out
to share their views with you.

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I'd like them all to come up
and take their sits on stage now

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if they would and I
will turn this event

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over to Professor Hoffman.

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One thing I forgot to mention
is that if you want to Twitter

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or tweet about this event,

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please use the hashtag
iNET DC, iNET DC.

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Thank you all over much.

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[ Applause ]

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[ Noise ]

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[ Inaudible Discussion ]

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>> Good afternoon everybody.

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Let me add my welcome to that of
Dean Dolling and to Paul Brigner

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and let me also thank the
internet society, our cosponsor

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for this event for
their programmatic

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and financial assistance
in making it possible.

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I also want to thank from
CSPRI, my Associate Director,

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Dr. Costis Toregas and our
intern and research assistance

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who have worked on this and are
helping here today tray hair

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[phonetic] Dustin
Benanberg [assumed spelling],

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00:11:03,929 --> 00:11:04,896
Jaime Moore [assumed spelling],

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and Greg Ziegler
[assumed spelling].

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My role today is to set the
stage for our excellent panel

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and into moderate that panel
discussion on cyber security

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in the future of the internet
given the recent revelations

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about prism and other
surveillance programs.

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The panelist of each degree
to summarize their thoughts

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in a four minute statements
so we could have lots of time

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for questions from the
audience including the audience

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in cyber space.

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After the audience question and
answer session in a short break,

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participants will return for
a very interesting session

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around table discussion where
we will see their world views

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on this, where there
world views agree,

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and where there are tensions and
talk about this in a round table

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which will be informed by
their previous statements

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and the audience
questions before hand.

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I'm delighted that
for this event,

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we will have an experience
moderator Professor Steve

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Roberts leading the
round table discussion.

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Many of the students and
faculty here may recognize Steve

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00:12:06,124 --> 00:12:07,659
as the superior professor
of media

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and public affairs here at GW.

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But others including
those viewing on this

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on the internet maybe
more familiar with him

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from his appearances
as a commentator

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on many Washington
based television shows,

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as a political analyst
on the ABC radio network,

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and as a substitute host
on NPR Diane Rehm Show.

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Another rule where he-- this
is material from experts

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and clarifies it to facilitate
informed public discussion.

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But before the round table,

250
00:12:36,087 --> 00:12:38,056
let me identify the
participants on stage.

251
00:12:38,056 --> 00:12:40,792
We will not have lengthy
introductions here

252
00:12:40,792 --> 00:12:44,329
since their bio sketches have
been made available to you

253
00:12:44,329 --> 00:12:48,700
in the brochure which you
have gotten or can get

254
00:12:48,700 --> 00:12:50,702
at the registration desk.

255
00:12:50,702 --> 00:12:55,841
But anyway, let me
introduce very briefly

256
00:12:55,841 --> 00:12:59,411
and you see their name
tags in front of you,

257
00:12:59,411 --> 00:13:02,480
Danny Weitzner is the
Director and Cofounder

258
00:13:02,480 --> 00:13:04,216
of the MIT Computer Science

259
00:13:04,216 --> 00:13:07,252
and Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory.

260
00:13:07,252 --> 00:13:10,255
>> Not the whole lab.

261
00:13:10,255 --> 00:13:13,024
>> Not the whole lab?

262
00:13:13,024 --> 00:13:15,260
>> I'll explain.

263
00:13:15,260 --> 00:13:18,430
>> OK. Lynn St. Amour
is the President and CEO

264
00:13:18,430 --> 00:13:20,432
of the Internet Society.

265
00:13:20,432 --> 00:13:23,335
Let's see, who's next.

266
00:13:23,335 --> 00:13:25,604
Laura, Laura DeNardis
is professor of School

267
00:13:25,604 --> 00:13:28,573
of Communication at
American University.

268
00:13:28,573 --> 00:13:32,611
Melissa Hathaway is President of
the Hathaway Global Strategies.

269
00:13:32,611 --> 00:13:33,912
Let's see.

270
00:13:33,912 --> 00:13:35,747
Who's down there?

271
00:13:35,747 --> 00:13:38,183
I don't have you on my list.

272
00:13:38,183 --> 00:13:39,618
>> Oh no.

273
00:13:39,618 --> 00:13:40,886
>> I apologize.

274
00:13:40,886 --> 00:13:42,020
>> That would me.

275
00:13:42,020 --> 00:13:43,088
>> Oh Randy, of course.

276
00:13:43,088 --> 00:13:45,757
Randy from-- I don't have here.

277
00:13:45,757 --> 00:13:47,826
I mean, OK.

278
00:13:47,826 --> 00:13:50,295
Randy-- where are you from?

279
00:13:50,295 --> 00:13:51,363
I'll let you introduce yourself.

280
00:13:51,363 --> 00:13:51,997
I'm sorry.

281
00:13:51,997 --> 00:13:53,098
[Inaudible Remark]

282
00:13:53,098 --> 00:13:53,999
>> I'm the University
IT Security Officer

283
00:13:53,999 --> 00:13:54,933
at Virginia Tech.

284
00:13:54,933 --> 00:13:56,134
>> I didn't want
it to get it wrong

285
00:13:56,134 --> 00:13:58,270
and say something
wrong-- wrong university.

286
00:13:58,270 --> 00:13:59,638
Sorry Randy.

287
00:13:59,638 --> 00:14:01,573
OK, let's see.

288
00:14:01,573 --> 00:14:04,809
Leslie Harris is from Center
for Democracy and Technology.

289
00:14:04,809 --> 00:14:07,512
And last but not the least,
John Curran, President and CEO

290
00:14:07,512 --> 00:14:10,615
of American Registry
for Internet Numbers.

291
00:14:10,615 --> 00:14:15,687
OK, so without further ado, I am
going to suggest to be each go

292
00:14:15,687 --> 00:14:19,257
down the-- I have to
decide, I'm going to leave it

293
00:14:19,257 --> 00:14:24,896
to I guess either Danny or
John on who wants to go first.

294
00:14:24,896 --> 00:14:25,397
>> No, no, no.

295
00:14:25,397 --> 00:14:25,830
Go ahead.

296
00:14:25,830 --> 00:14:26,264
>> John?

297
00:14:26,264 --> 00:14:26,698
>> OK.

298
00:14:26,698 --> 00:14:27,332
>> OK?

299
00:14:27,332 --> 00:14:28,333
>> OK John, go on.

300
00:14:28,333 --> 00:14:29,134
Four minutes please.

301
00:14:29,134 --> 00:14:30,468
>> Well, thank you.

302
00:14:30,468 --> 00:14:33,471
I'm happy to be here and I
want to thank the opportunity

303
00:14:33,471 --> 00:14:35,607
to present at this panel.

304
00:14:35,607 --> 00:14:38,610
Keeping my remark short,
I will say that we're

305
00:14:38,610 --> 00:14:43,081
in an interesting period of
time with respect to the future

306
00:14:43,081 --> 00:14:46,151
of the internet and
how it's governed.

307
00:14:46,151 --> 00:14:49,354
People may not realize
it but the fact is,

308
00:14:49,354 --> 00:14:52,424
there is a coordination
function that's existed

309
00:14:52,424 --> 00:14:55,994
since the earliest days of the
internet which is necessary

310
00:14:55,994 --> 00:14:58,563
so that we can actually
use the internet

311
00:14:58,563 --> 00:15:00,265
so that it actually functions.

312
00:15:00,265 --> 00:15:01,800
For example, computers

313
00:15:01,800 --> 00:15:04,769
on the internet have
unique identifiers.

314
00:15:04,769 --> 00:15:07,505
Several, actually, one of
them is the IP addresses

315
00:15:07,505 --> 00:15:08,773
which is part of what
Aaron [assumed spelling] is

316
00:15:08,773 --> 00:15:10,008
involved in.

317
00:15:10,008 --> 00:15:12,877
We can't have computers
using the same IP addresses.

318
00:15:12,877 --> 00:15:15,313
Every computer needs
its own IP address.

319
00:15:15,313 --> 00:15:18,583
Likewise, there's coordination
of things like domain names

320
00:15:18,583 --> 00:15:20,385
to make sure that a
domain name is a sign

321
00:15:20,385 --> 00:15:23,154
to one organization,
et cetera, et cetera.

322
00:15:23,154 --> 00:15:25,724
This is called technical
coordination

323
00:15:25,724 --> 00:15:29,594
and it's been a function of the
internet, necessary function

324
00:15:29,594 --> 00:15:32,364
for the protocols
to work as designed

325
00:15:32,364 --> 00:15:33,865
since the very beginning.

326
00:15:33,865 --> 00:15:36,634
People may not realize that
this use to all be done

327
00:15:36,634 --> 00:15:41,639
by one gentlemen, Dr. Jon Postel
who we no longer have with us

328
00:15:41,639 --> 00:15:43,541
but was an amazing individual.

329
00:15:43,541 --> 00:15:46,878
And in the late '90s, we
actually went about setting

330
00:15:46,878 --> 00:15:51,149
up infrastructure to enable
this technical coordination

331
00:15:51,149 --> 00:15:56,054
so that IP addresses and
domain names could be available

332
00:15:56,054 --> 00:15:59,657
to everyone globally for
their use on the internet

333
00:15:59,657 --> 00:16:02,293
but coordinated so that
they actually interoperated

334
00:16:02,293 --> 00:16:05,764
so that they work as expected.

335
00:16:05,764 --> 00:16:08,266
This structure involves
a lot of organizations.

336
00:16:08,266 --> 00:16:11,503
Aaron is one, there're five
regional registries throughout

337
00:16:11,503 --> 00:16:12,904
the globe.

338
00:16:12,904 --> 00:16:15,373
Aaron is the one that handles
North America, so with Canada,

339
00:16:15,373 --> 00:16:17,742
the United States and about
half of the Caribbean.

340
00:16:17,742 --> 00:16:20,311
Though there are four
other regional registries

341
00:16:20,311 --> 00:16:22,914
and then there is the DNS
coordination that goes

342
00:16:22,914 --> 00:16:25,784
on through organizations
such as ICANN.

343
00:16:25,784 --> 00:16:27,419
The international
coo-- [laughs].

344
00:16:27,419 --> 00:16:32,424
Sorry. International--
[Noise] --

345
00:16:32,424 --> 00:16:34,826
Organization for assigned
Names and Numbers.

346
00:16:34,826 --> 00:16:39,064
So, the fact is that these
bodies all work doing technical

347
00:16:39,064 --> 00:16:41,399
coordination is very important.

348
00:16:41,399 --> 00:16:46,438
But, they've been doing it based
on a historical trajectory.

349
00:16:46,438 --> 00:16:49,874
A trajectory that originated
with projects and programs

350
00:16:49,874 --> 00:16:51,643
out of the US government
which have

351
00:16:51,643 --> 00:16:55,346
since been increasingly
moved out to independence

352
00:16:55,346 --> 00:16:56,748
but were not quite there yet.

353
00:16:56,748 --> 00:17:02,787
In fact, some of you maybe aware
that these organizations were

354
00:17:02,787 --> 00:17:07,959
under supervision somewhat
indirect but still supervision

355
00:17:07,959 --> 00:17:12,564
of program such as NTIA in
the department of commerce.

356
00:17:12,564 --> 00:17:16,501
And so, one of the things that
we now find ourselves facing is

357
00:17:16,501 --> 00:17:19,771
that there is a unique
role in the US government

358
00:17:19,771 --> 00:17:21,372
with respect to the internet.

359
00:17:21,372 --> 00:17:26,344
And this unique role is one that
is based on-- it's experienced.

360
00:17:26,344 --> 00:17:29,581
It's a steady hand,
behind the scenes,

361
00:17:29,581 --> 00:17:31,449
helping the internet
mature and grow.

362
00:17:31,449 --> 00:17:35,487
Recently however, we've now
seen that there's another hand

363
00:17:35,487 --> 00:17:37,455
that maybe busy doing
other things

364
00:17:37,455 --> 00:17:41,326
such as surveillance
in cyber security.

365
00:17:41,326 --> 00:17:44,662
And so, the question that comes
up is how do we reconcile those?

366
00:17:44,662 --> 00:17:50,535
How do we reconcile an open
global transparent internet run

367
00:17:50,535 --> 00:17:53,805
for everyone with
the possibility

368
00:17:53,805 --> 00:17:58,309
that there is also surveillance
going on and other things

369
00:17:58,309 --> 00:18:00,578
that may not meet
the expectations

370
00:18:00,578 --> 00:18:02,280
of global internet users.

371
00:18:02,280 --> 00:18:05,483
And so, this is the
challenge in front of us.

372
00:18:05,483 --> 00:18:08,820
It's particularly
highlighted because of the fact

373
00:18:08,820 --> 00:18:12,257
that the US governments
unique oversight role in this

374
00:18:12,257 --> 00:18:14,159
and it's brought
to the forefront

375
00:18:14,159 --> 00:18:19,597
by the recent discussions where
we now say that it is not simply

376
00:18:19,597 --> 00:18:21,533
for the benefit of
all the internet,

377
00:18:21,533 --> 00:18:24,836
but there's also some
national priorities

378
00:18:24,836 --> 00:18:29,040
and national initiatives that
the US government also pursues

379
00:18:29,040 --> 00:18:30,708
over the same infrastructure.

380
00:18:30,708 --> 00:18:34,312
I think that's the challenge
that we will now face more

381
00:18:34,312 --> 00:18:36,481
so than ever in light
of the revelations

382
00:18:36,481 --> 00:18:40,151
for the last few months and
the net result would be a lot

383
00:18:40,151 --> 00:18:42,086
of the discussion in
forum such as this.

384
00:18:42,086 --> 00:18:43,521
Thank you.

385
00:18:43,521 --> 00:18:44,622
>> Thank you and I'll try

386
00:18:44,622 --> 00:18:46,724
to make this iPhone
behave a little better--

387
00:18:46,724 --> 00:18:47,292
>> OK.

388
00:18:47,292 --> 00:18:48,126
>> Although--

389
00:18:48,126 --> 00:18:48,960
>> I thought I was over on time.

390
00:18:48,960 --> 00:18:50,061
>> Yes.

391
00:18:50,061 --> 00:18:51,396
>> You were right on
time, you were great.

392
00:18:51,396 --> 00:18:51,896
>> OK.

393
00:18:51,896 --> 00:18:52,597
>> Leslie?

394
00:18:52,597 --> 00:18:55,099
>> It's time, I guess.

395
00:18:55,099 --> 00:18:58,970
So, I also want to get us out
of the DC bubble and the focus

396
00:18:58,970 --> 00:19:01,573
on the rights of people
in the United States.

397
00:19:01,573 --> 00:19:04,275
I've been talking about
that for the last six weeks.

398
00:19:04,275 --> 00:19:08,079
And congresses about to
considering an amendment that's

399
00:19:08,079 --> 00:19:10,081
going to reign in
the NSAs ability

400
00:19:10,081 --> 00:19:13,451
to collect our metadata
from phones.

401
00:19:13,451 --> 00:19:16,287
I want to pivot away from that
'cause I think there're three

402
00:19:16,287 --> 00:19:19,324
other things that we ought
to be considering at least.

403
00:19:19,324 --> 00:19:23,027
What-- and the reactions of
governments and internet users

404
00:19:23,027 --> 00:19:26,364
around the world and what this
means with the architecture,

405
00:19:26,364 --> 00:19:29,300
not just the governance, the
architecture of the internet

406
00:19:29,300 --> 00:19:31,703
and also for the
protection of human rights

407
00:19:31,703 --> 00:19:33,838
of global internet
users and that turns

408
00:19:33,838 --> 00:19:35,673
out to be a very
thorny question.

409
00:19:35,673 --> 00:19:37,208
Certainly for governments,

410
00:19:37,208 --> 00:19:40,545
I think this entire kerfuffle
is reinforced the concerns

411
00:19:40,545 --> 00:19:44,115
that the global internet has
undermined their sovereignty

412
00:19:44,115 --> 00:19:46,417
in control over their citizens.

413
00:19:46,417 --> 00:19:48,586
And it's further
illuminated this sort

414
00:19:48,586 --> 00:19:52,557
of privileged position
of the United States.

415
00:19:52,557 --> 00:19:54,926
Certainly, with respect
to ICANN and some

416
00:19:54,926 --> 00:19:56,894
of the other critical resources,

417
00:19:56,894 --> 00:20:00,198
we continue to have a
disproportionate share

418
00:20:00,198 --> 00:20:03,067
of internet traffic, all
that's declining and obviously,

419
00:20:03,067 --> 00:20:06,104
we have a dominance in our
global internet companies.

420
00:20:06,104 --> 00:20:10,608
For some, and the EUs, I
think I have a good example,

421
00:20:10,608 --> 00:20:12,944
this illuminates
left an inability

422
00:20:12,944 --> 00:20:15,346
to protect the human
rights of their own citizens

423
00:20:15,346 --> 00:20:19,751
and we have a major fight coming
up in the data directive there

424
00:20:19,751 --> 00:20:21,786
about whether they're
going to allow data to come

425
00:20:21,786 --> 00:20:24,255
to the United States at all.

426
00:20:24,255 --> 00:20:29,527
At the same time, it's an
extraordinary opportunity

427
00:20:29,527 --> 00:20:34,265
for authoritarian governments
to exert more control

428
00:20:34,265 --> 00:20:38,569
over the people in data in their
own boarders and it's, you know,

429
00:20:38,569 --> 00:20:42,707
rushes now dusting of a
legislation that has to do

430
00:20:42,707 --> 00:20:44,042
with national servers.

431
00:20:44,042 --> 00:20:45,977
You're going to see
that elsewhere as well

432
00:20:45,977 --> 00:20:49,414
and I think it's fair to worry
whether this carefully honed

433
00:20:49,414 --> 00:20:55,386
narrative as US narrative of the
why is trusted neutral stored

434
00:20:55,386 --> 00:20:58,489
of the internet can
really hold and it's fair

435
00:20:58,489 --> 00:21:00,992
to ask whether we're moving
towards the balkanization

436
00:21:00,992 --> 00:21:04,762
of the internet as
government sees these moment

437
00:21:04,762 --> 00:21:08,333
to impost local server
requirements or worse

438
00:21:08,333 --> 00:21:12,003
and we saw some of these
proposals last year.

439
00:21:12,003 --> 00:21:14,872
I know we're supposed to be
acronym free at the wicked.

440
00:21:14,872 --> 00:21:17,975
I'll explain-- routing
requirements

441
00:21:17,975 --> 00:21:21,646
to either avoid the
United States of literally

442
00:21:21,646 --> 00:21:23,314
to direct the routing of traffic

443
00:21:23,314 --> 00:21:27,251
and the worst outcome
being literally ring fans

444
00:21:27,251 --> 00:21:30,254
to national or regional
networks.

445
00:21:30,254 --> 00:21:33,291
If I were in Latin America and
notice that there was 80 percent

446
00:21:33,291 --> 00:21:36,327
of my traffic still coming
from the United States,

447
00:21:36,327 --> 00:21:39,764
I may start to wonder why
we're still relying on Miami

448
00:21:39,764 --> 00:21:41,132
to reach most of the world.

449
00:21:41,132 --> 00:21:44,469
Some of that might be
a weird salutary effect

450
00:21:44,469 --> 00:21:48,272
that we finally get internet
exchange points in some places

451
00:21:48,272 --> 00:21:50,842
that have not had them.

452
00:21:50,842 --> 00:21:54,379
But I think governments becoming
involved directly in the rooting

453
00:21:54,379 --> 00:21:57,915
of internet data would
opposed a profound challenge

454
00:21:57,915 --> 00:22:00,184
to the open end-to-end internet

455
00:22:00,184 --> 00:22:02,920
and I think all these things
are going to be on the table.

456
00:22:02,920 --> 00:22:06,057
I think you are also kind of
expect to see a reexamination

457
00:22:06,057 --> 00:22:07,592
of the world's relationships

458
00:22:07,592 --> 00:22:10,661
with our cloud providers,
already seeing that.

459
00:22:10,661 --> 00:22:13,197
You know, there's a Netherlands
provider and no prism,

460
00:22:13,197 --> 00:22:15,867
no surveillance, no
government backdoors.

461
00:22:15,867 --> 00:22:21,939
And finally, I think we may have
lost some of the rapprochement

462
00:22:21,939 --> 00:22:25,743
that happened in the governance
wars in the last year.

463
00:22:25,743 --> 00:22:29,313
There are number of important
forums and discussions coming

464
00:22:29,313 --> 00:22:31,082
up about various treaties

465
00:22:31,082 --> 00:22:33,584
and how much various treaty
buddies ought to be able

466
00:22:33,584 --> 00:22:36,154
to impose their--

467
00:22:36,154 --> 00:22:39,924
post themselves into internet
debates, I think we're going

468
00:22:39,924 --> 00:22:41,092
to lose some ground there

469
00:22:41,092 --> 00:22:44,395
and it could be I
think quite troubling.

470
00:22:44,395 --> 00:22:48,933
Last point, global
internet users are furious.

471
00:22:48,933 --> 00:22:51,769
They believe their human
rights have been violated

472
00:22:51,769 --> 00:22:53,638
and I think they
don't yet realize

473
00:22:53,638 --> 00:22:56,174
that it's not entirely clear
whether they have any recourse

474
00:22:56,174 --> 00:22:57,341
for that.

475
00:22:57,341 --> 00:22:59,177
There's a lot of ambiguity
in human rights law.

476
00:22:59,177 --> 00:23:01,479
Human rights law are
pretty much applies,

477
00:23:01,479 --> 00:23:04,582
if countries make commitments
to protect the human rights

478
00:23:04,582 --> 00:23:06,951
of people within their
boarders or their control,

479
00:23:06,951 --> 00:23:10,188
I don't think we began to
understand or have any clarity

480
00:23:10,188 --> 00:23:13,124
on how-- who's responsible
for human rights

481
00:23:13,124 --> 00:23:15,159
where there's non-physical
action

482
00:23:15,159 --> 00:23:17,061
such as electronic surveillance.

483
00:23:17,061 --> 00:23:19,931
And they're not going to be
happy when they understand

484
00:23:19,931 --> 00:23:21,933
that FISA and all
the conversations

485
00:23:21,933 --> 00:23:25,837
in the United States about
safeguards and minimization are

486
00:23:25,837 --> 00:23:28,840
to protect our rights but
have absolutely nothing

487
00:23:28,840 --> 00:23:29,907
to do with them.

488
00:23:29,907 --> 00:23:32,276
I don't think congress
is going to care.

489
00:23:32,276 --> 00:23:34,712
But I think there's a
massive laws to respect

490
00:23:34,712 --> 00:23:37,715
and when we're talking about
five zeta [inaudible] whatever

491
00:23:37,715 --> 00:23:40,251
that is, a non-US
person data going

492
00:23:40,251 --> 00:23:45,122
into a new Utah data center, I
think that the irony at the end

493
00:23:45,122 --> 00:23:48,292
of the day will be that one

494
00:23:48,292 --> 00:23:51,996
of the FISA permissible
activities is collecting

495
00:23:51,996 --> 00:23:55,132
intelligence for foreign
affairs and foreign policy.

496
00:23:55,132 --> 00:23:58,703
And I think at the end of
the day, we may see people

497
00:23:58,703 --> 00:24:01,839
of the world uniting with
their governments around kinds

498
00:24:01,839 --> 00:24:06,344
of restrictions and ring fencing
of the internet that will come

499
00:24:06,344 --> 00:24:07,812
to both underlying rights

500
00:24:07,812 --> 00:24:10,114
and undermine the
openness of the internet.

501
00:24:10,114 --> 00:24:14,285
So, that is my anxious
persons guide to the--

502
00:24:14,285 --> 00:24:15,920
to what's been happening.

503
00:24:15,920 --> 00:24:17,655
>> Thank you Leslie.

504
00:24:17,655 --> 00:24:19,190
Randy?

505
00:24:19,190 --> 00:24:24,061
>> How many of you noticed
accounted how many surveillance

506
00:24:24,061 --> 00:24:28,032
devices you've past
to get to this room?

507
00:24:28,032 --> 00:24:33,804
Yeah. I just walked in from the
restaurant a couple blocks away.

508
00:24:33,804 --> 00:24:40,845
I counted 22 surveillance style
devices just in the walk outside

509
00:24:40,845 --> 00:24:44,448
of this building and there's
at least in this room right now

510
00:24:44,448 --> 00:24:48,386
that not counting your
smart phones and all that.

511
00:24:48,386 --> 00:24:50,555
I hope you all can find the six

512
00:24:50,555 --> 00:24:53,524
because they're pretty
obvious as to what they are.

513
00:24:53,524 --> 00:24:57,828
My point on all of this
is that as a practitioner,

514
00:24:57,828 --> 00:24:59,964
I'm the Sisa for Virginia Tech.

515
00:24:59,964 --> 00:25:04,168
My office is responsible for
monitoring and responding

516
00:25:04,168 --> 00:25:06,537
to any attacks against
our network infrastructure

517
00:25:06,537 --> 00:25:07,838
at Virginia Tech.

518
00:25:07,838 --> 00:25:09,907
We have our main campus down
the Blacksburg, Virginia.

519
00:25:09,907 --> 00:25:11,842
It's about four and a
half hours from here.

520
00:25:11,842 --> 00:25:13,477
We have a Northern
Virginia campus right

521
00:25:13,477 --> 00:25:15,513
across the river in Boylston.

522
00:25:15,513 --> 00:25:17,882
And so my charge,
my office is charged

523
00:25:17,882 --> 00:25:20,718
to monitor any attacks
from there.

524
00:25:20,718 --> 00:25:23,888
Anybody who has ever managed
an internet infrastructure has

525
00:25:23,888 --> 00:25:25,990
known since the very beginning

526
00:25:25,990 --> 00:25:29,493
that the internet has never
been anonymous in the sense

527
00:25:29,493 --> 00:25:31,329
of tracking a machine.

528
00:25:31,329 --> 00:25:34,465
From day 1, we've
always been able to track

529
00:25:34,465 --> 00:25:35,666
where our machine was.

530
00:25:35,666 --> 00:25:38,903
We were not able to track
who is at the machine

531
00:25:38,903 --> 00:25:41,005
with any reasonable
amount of accuracy

532
00:25:41,005 --> 00:25:44,241
but we've always been able
to track where machines are.

533
00:25:44,241 --> 00:25:47,845
The big thing was of course
data, storage capabilities.

534
00:25:47,845 --> 00:25:50,414
We didn't have enough
data storage capabilities,

535
00:25:50,414 --> 00:25:51,349
disk drives.

536
00:25:51,349 --> 00:25:53,618
In 1992, when I've
got involved--

537
00:25:53,618 --> 00:25:57,054
first involved with the computer
security stuff, you know,

538
00:25:57,054 --> 00:25:59,557
we had a one gigabyte drive and
we thought that was, you know,

539
00:25:59,557 --> 00:26:02,593
the entire disc storage
in the entire free world.

540
00:26:02,593 --> 00:26:06,631
And, you know, nowadays, with
the huge disk forms that are

541
00:26:06,631 --> 00:26:10,001
out there, that is allowing
this collection of data.

542
00:26:10,001 --> 00:26:13,404
So, from our standpoint,
that's always been the case.

543
00:26:13,404 --> 00:26:16,974
So, my challenge is,
you all let this happen.

544
00:26:16,974 --> 00:26:21,379
You all let knew that this was
happening and you let it go on.

545
00:26:21,379 --> 00:26:24,415
There is nothing new about the
prism stuff and all of these.

546
00:26:24,415 --> 00:26:25,883
It's kind of ironic for people

547
00:26:25,883 --> 00:26:28,719
in my world 'cause we all
sit back and we go, you know,

548
00:26:28,719 --> 00:26:32,723
in 2010, the Washington
Posts, Dana Priest

549
00:26:32,723 --> 00:26:35,292
and William Arkin wrote an
excellent series called Top

550
00:26:35,292 --> 00:26:37,928
Secret America where
they're talking about all

551
00:26:37,928 --> 00:26:39,563
of the built way companies

552
00:26:39,563 --> 00:26:41,632
that are building the
surveillance technologies

553
00:26:41,632 --> 00:26:44,602
that the federal government
and other entities are using.

554
00:26:44,602 --> 00:26:47,471
All out there was an excellent
series on the newspaper

555
00:26:47,471 --> 00:26:49,140
that I read it back then.

556
00:26:49,140 --> 00:26:51,809
Newsweek came out in
2008 where they talked

557
00:26:51,809 --> 00:26:55,546
about a whistle blower
who mentioned

558
00:26:55,546 --> 00:26:59,784
about NSA's warrantless
wiretapping so to speak.

559
00:26:59,784 --> 00:27:01,085
It was all out there.

560
00:27:01,085 --> 00:27:03,754
If you go back and you look
through the press things,

561
00:27:03,754 --> 00:27:07,291
there was always something
there and nobody reacted to it.

562
00:27:07,291 --> 00:27:09,994
So, it's ironic from
my viewpoint

563
00:27:09,994 --> 00:27:12,997
that everybody is having
this big flop about it now

564
00:27:12,997 --> 00:27:15,900
because it's been there
and you let it happen.

565
00:27:15,900 --> 00:27:19,937
So, my charge to you is don't
let it happen again, OK?

566
00:27:19,937 --> 00:27:22,239
When you do read
about these things,

567
00:27:22,239 --> 00:27:24,942
you need to influence your
legislatures about what's going

568
00:27:24,942 --> 00:27:28,312
on 'cause they do not
understand the technology.

569
00:27:28,312 --> 00:27:31,115
One quick example, in Virginia,

570
00:27:31,115 --> 00:27:33,484
there's data bridge
notification laws

571
00:27:33,484 --> 00:27:35,986
of social security is disclosed.

572
00:27:35,986 --> 00:27:37,988
You know, somebody
gets a spreadsheet

573
00:27:37,988 --> 00:27:40,224
and it explodes out there.

574
00:27:40,224 --> 00:27:44,028
Yet I can go to a county
courthouse website and look

575
00:27:44,028 --> 00:27:47,331
up public records deeds,
divorce decrees, whatever,

576
00:27:47,331 --> 00:27:49,433
and what's on those documents.

577
00:27:49,433 --> 00:27:52,169
Yet the kind of clerks can't
redact that information

578
00:27:52,169 --> 00:27:55,072
because until recently,
the law forbid it, OK?

579
00:27:55,072 --> 00:27:58,876
Everybody was in a rush for
eGovernment but never thought

580
00:27:58,876 --> 00:28:01,712
about what's in those
documents that going there.

581
00:28:01,712 --> 00:28:03,647
So, we need to be
able to influence

582
00:28:03,647 --> 00:28:06,283
and educate the legislatures
who are--

583
00:28:06,283 --> 00:28:08,285
who are building the policy.

584
00:28:08,285 --> 00:28:10,254
So, this is the whole thing.

585
00:28:10,254 --> 00:28:13,357
I'm a technologist and everybody
in here, the computer scientists

586
00:28:13,357 --> 00:28:15,626
and all that, you all
learned in here with me.

587
00:28:15,626 --> 00:28:17,561
We help build this
infrastructure.

588
00:28:17,561 --> 00:28:21,165
We may have had a
misgiving where we thought

589
00:28:21,165 --> 00:28:24,401
that as builders we could
control the people who use it.

590
00:28:24,401 --> 00:28:26,737
But as, you know,
previous history shown

591
00:28:26,737 --> 00:28:29,039
with the atom bomb development
and all these other things,

592
00:28:29,039 --> 00:28:30,407
that's not always the case.

593
00:28:30,407 --> 00:28:33,711
Builders do not control
the controllers.

594
00:28:33,711 --> 00:28:35,045
That's my first point.

595
00:28:35,045 --> 00:28:37,882
The second point is that, again,
you all have smart phones.

596
00:28:37,882 --> 00:28:39,116
Actually I don't.

597
00:28:39,116 --> 00:28:41,085
I have kind of a dumb phone
and people always laugh.

598
00:28:41,085 --> 00:28:43,721
They go, "You know,
you're a technologist,"

599
00:28:43,721 --> 00:28:46,490
and I just have a little,
you know, Samsung Integrity

600
00:28:46,490 --> 00:28:48,058
with the nice little
flippy thing.

601
00:28:48,058 --> 00:28:50,127
And I said, "Because the
guys in my lab have busted

602
00:28:50,127 --> 00:28:51,228
into the smart phones

603
00:28:51,228 --> 00:28:53,597
and tracked everybody
all over the place."

604
00:28:53,597 --> 00:28:54,999
But actually the reason
why I don't this is

605
00:28:54,999 --> 00:28:58,269
because the battery life is not
long enough for my taste, OK?

606
00:28:58,269 --> 00:29:00,971
But a great quote, Lyn Paramore
[assumed spelling] wrote a great

607
00:29:00,971 --> 00:29:04,942
article and in there quoted
things that are supposed

608
00:29:04,942 --> 00:29:06,610
to make our lives easier.

609
00:29:06,610 --> 00:29:10,581
"Smartphones, Gmails,
Skype, GPS, Facebook,

610
00:29:10,581 --> 00:29:13,884
they have become
tools to track us.

611
00:29:13,884 --> 00:29:17,254
And we've been happily
shopping for the bars

612
00:29:17,254 --> 00:29:22,259
to our own prison one prison at
a time, one product at a time."

613
00:29:22,259 --> 00:29:25,362
So, we're in the-- we're
to blame for all of this.

614
00:29:25,362 --> 00:29:27,364
We are allowing that to happen.

615
00:29:27,364 --> 00:29:28,599
The last thing I want to talk

616
00:29:28,599 --> 00:29:30,935
about is this Federal
word play thing.

617
00:29:30,935 --> 00:29:32,970
Whenever I confront a student

618
00:29:32,970 --> 00:29:36,874
or a professor whose been
violating a university policy,

619
00:29:36,874 --> 00:29:38,642
you let something
go out on the net.

620
00:29:38,642 --> 00:29:39,977
And I go. "Why did you do that?"

621
00:29:39,977 --> 00:29:42,746
And it's kind of like watching,
you know, a six-year-old.

622
00:29:42,746 --> 00:29:46,016
"I don't know, you know, it
wasn't my fault," you know.

623
00:29:46,016 --> 00:29:47,084
That type of stuff.

624
00:29:47,084 --> 00:29:50,354
And you get this
word play, you know.

625
00:29:50,354 --> 00:29:52,957
Richard Pryor, a long time
ago had an excellent thing

626
00:29:52,957 --> 00:29:56,827
when his son broke something
and he asked his son happened.

627
00:29:56,827 --> 00:29:59,530
And all the word play that his
son came out with, you know,

628
00:29:59,530 --> 00:30:01,165
"Some invisible man came
out and broke the thing."

629
00:30:01,165 --> 00:30:04,001
That's what we're seeing now.

630
00:30:04,001 --> 00:30:06,770
We're seeing this when they
say we're not collecting data

631
00:30:06,770 --> 00:30:08,172
on you.

632
00:30:08,172 --> 00:30:10,174
Well, OK, your not collecting it
technically but you're buying it

633
00:30:10,174 --> 00:30:12,509
from people who are
collecting it from us.

634
00:30:12,509 --> 00:30:15,045
So, that's-- that's
one thing there.

635
00:30:15,045 --> 00:30:18,349
The network companies that say,
you know, the data providers,

636
00:30:18,349 --> 00:30:21,218
the Verizons, the Googles,
they say, "Hey, you know,

637
00:30:21,218 --> 00:30:23,621
we're not willingly giving it
to the federal government."

638
00:30:23,621 --> 00:30:24,688
Well, of course not.

639
00:30:24,688 --> 00:30:26,190
You're being subpoenaed
for the document.

640
00:30:26,190 --> 00:30:29,126
You're not giving it
willingly to the-- to there.

641
00:30:29,126 --> 00:30:32,696
You know, Zack Holman
wrote a great little tweet.

642
00:30:32,696 --> 00:30:36,300
It says, "We don't give
direct database access

643
00:30:36,300 --> 00:30:38,035
to government agencies."

644
00:30:38,035 --> 00:30:43,607
That quote has become the
new "I didn't inhale," OK?

645
00:30:43,607 --> 00:30:45,609
And so the key word is direct.

646
00:30:45,609 --> 00:30:48,946
Marketers are being collecting
information on us all the time.

647
00:30:48,946 --> 00:30:50,881
And, in fact, that was
one of the big things

648
00:30:50,881 --> 00:30:52,316
that helped us with 9/11.

649
00:30:52,316 --> 00:30:54,518
On a positive side,
that did help us

650
00:30:54,518 --> 00:30:57,955
in 9/11 identify the hijackers
when the marketing companies

651
00:30:57,955 --> 00:31:00,758
and the credit card companies
realized that they could help

652
00:31:00,758 --> 00:31:02,593
because they had that data.

653
00:31:02,593 --> 00:31:07,765
So, we need to be sure that
things are done correctly.

654
00:31:07,765 --> 00:31:09,934
Everybody says we're
doing it legally.

655
00:31:09,934 --> 00:31:10,868
And that's correct.

656
00:31:10,868 --> 00:31:13,003
The laws stated they can do it.

657
00:31:13,003 --> 00:31:16,040
It's the creation of
that law that's the flaw.

658
00:31:16,040 --> 00:31:20,844
And that's my surveillance guide
telling me it's time to quit.

659
00:31:20,844 --> 00:31:22,413
Those are my points.

660
00:31:22,413 --> 00:31:23,314
>> Thanks, Randy.

661
00:31:23,314 --> 00:31:24,348
Melissa?

662
00:31:24,348 --> 00:31:25,349
>> Thank you.

663
00:31:25,349 --> 00:31:29,887
Well, I think it's
important to look

664
00:31:29,887 --> 00:31:34,058
to our past to inform
our future.

665
00:31:34,058 --> 00:31:36,226
And I'm going to take a
little bit different direction

666
00:31:36,226 --> 00:31:38,095
than my colleagues.

667
00:31:38,095 --> 00:31:41,198
The very first transmission of
the internet was October 29th,

668
00:31:41,198 --> 00:31:44,568
1969 and it was an e-mail
between two universities.

669
00:31:44,568 --> 00:31:50,341
And today we have more than 204
e-mails are sent per minute.

670
00:31:50,341 --> 00:31:53,410
More than 1,300 new mobile
users are added per minute

671
00:31:53,410 --> 00:31:56,480
to the internet, 47,000
applications are downloaded,

672
00:31:56,480 --> 00:32:01,552
100,000 tweets, 1.3 million
videos are uploaded to YouTube,

673
00:32:01,552 --> 00:32:04,722
two million searches to Google,
and six million Facebook views.

674
00:32:04,722 --> 00:32:08,092
The internet is part of
every part of our life

675
00:32:08,092 --> 00:32:11,895
and over the last
45 almost years,

676
00:32:11,895 --> 00:32:16,567
we have embedded the internet
in every part of our society.

677
00:32:16,567 --> 00:32:20,838
And it is the backbone of our
core infrastructure of every--

678
00:32:20,838 --> 00:32:23,874
every country's core
infrastructure.

679
00:32:23,874 --> 00:32:29,480
It represents e-government,
e-banking, e-health, e-learning,

680
00:32:29,480 --> 00:32:31,548
the next generation of
air traffic control,

681
00:32:31,548 --> 00:32:34,084
the next generation
of power grids

682
00:32:34,084 --> 00:32:37,421
and every other essential
service has been concentrated

683
00:32:37,421 --> 00:32:40,724
onto one infrastructure,
the internet.

684
00:32:40,724 --> 00:32:43,260
And that is putting
our businesses

685
00:32:43,260 --> 00:32:45,796
and our national
security at risk.

686
00:32:45,796 --> 00:32:48,699
And I-- when I speak about
our, I'm really speaking

687
00:32:48,699 --> 00:32:50,067
in as a global citizen.

688
00:32:50,067 --> 00:32:52,369
If I were in France I would be
speaking about it in France.

689
00:32:52,369 --> 00:32:55,305
If I were Iran or
Israel, it's the same way.

690
00:32:55,305 --> 00:32:58,375
And so I think that
that has really began

691
00:32:58,375 --> 00:33:00,411
to change the conversation

692
00:33:00,411 --> 00:33:03,647
that we can't have any one
single point of failure,

693
00:33:03,647 --> 00:33:07,518
economic failure and/or national
security failure to any one

694
00:33:07,518 --> 00:33:11,188
of our-- of our core
businesses or infrastructures.

695
00:33:11,188 --> 00:33:13,757
And so when we're talking about
cyber security and we're talking

696
00:33:13,757 --> 00:33:17,061
about different government
actions and we wrap it all

697
00:33:17,061 --> 00:33:20,297
into one conversation, I ask
you to start to think about it

698
00:33:20,297 --> 00:33:22,533
as multiple conversations.

699
00:33:22,533 --> 00:33:25,702
And it's not helpful
to bundle into one term

700
00:33:25,702 --> 00:33:28,338
of cyber security
and/or surveillance.

701
00:33:28,338 --> 00:33:30,974
So, I'd you to-- I'd like
you to think about it

702
00:33:30,974 --> 00:33:33,610
in six different ways
of why our governments

703
00:33:33,610 --> 00:33:37,414
and why our industry are
talking past each other.

704
00:33:37,414 --> 00:33:40,150
The first is is when we're
talking about cyber security,

705
00:33:40,150 --> 00:33:42,853
we're sometimes talking
about political activism.

706
00:33:42,853 --> 00:33:46,590
Those who would like to bring
transparency to policies

707
00:33:46,590 --> 00:33:49,827
and to our initiatives
that they don't agree with.

708
00:33:49,827 --> 00:33:53,764
In the United States, one could
say that that was WikiLeaks

709
00:33:53,764 --> 00:33:56,934
that brought about a great
amount of transparency

710
00:33:56,934 --> 00:34:00,070
to US policies as they
leaked our information

711
00:34:00,070 --> 00:34:01,371
into the internet.

712
00:34:01,371 --> 00:34:04,475
All right, one could argue
that that was also Snowden.

713
00:34:04,475 --> 00:34:08,078
But in other countries
political activism is being used

714
00:34:08,078 --> 00:34:13,050
by Twitter, using Twitter and/or
Facebook to organize people

715
00:34:13,050 --> 00:34:18,088
in these squares like Taksim
and/or in Turkey or Egypt

716
00:34:18,088 --> 00:34:21,658
to express political
discontent with their government

717
00:34:21,658 --> 00:34:24,428
with the intent to
overthrow the government.

718
00:34:24,428 --> 00:34:26,063
Political instability.

719
00:34:26,063 --> 00:34:27,831
And so when our governments
are starting to talk

720
00:34:27,831 --> 00:34:31,467
about surveillance on the
internet and/or filtering

721
00:34:31,467 --> 00:34:35,539
of the internet, some believe in
political democracy and freedom

722
00:34:35,539 --> 00:34:37,741
of that speech on the
internet and others do not.

723
00:34:37,741 --> 00:34:40,577
And it has different
mechanisms of how they're using

724
00:34:40,577 --> 00:34:42,713
that surveillance
or the technology

725
00:34:42,713 --> 00:34:44,915
around political activism.

726
00:34:44,915 --> 00:34:47,851
Now that should not be
confused with organized crime

727
00:34:47,851 --> 00:34:51,388
on the internet, the real modern
day bank robber who's stealing

728
00:34:51,388 --> 00:34:54,224
ones and zeros which
is real dollars

729
00:34:54,224 --> 00:34:57,995
out of your credit accounts
or out of your real banks,

730
00:34:57,995 --> 00:35:01,031
and as being passed on as
a cost for our citizens.

731
00:35:01,031 --> 00:35:02,833
We have many of our
governments who are talking

732
00:35:02,833 --> 00:35:04,701
about the importance
of organized crime.

733
00:35:04,701 --> 00:35:06,937
When I was just in Europe
just a few weeks ago,

734
00:35:06,937 --> 00:35:09,072
it was 30 million dollars stolen

735
00:35:09,072 --> 00:35:12,276
out of 45 different
cities in 30 minutes.

736
00:35:12,276 --> 00:35:14,144
That's a real problem
for our banks.

737
00:35:14,144 --> 00:35:16,180
It's a real problem
for our credit cards.

738
00:35:16,180 --> 00:35:18,715
And we're having to deal
with that organized crime

739
00:35:18,715 --> 00:35:20,751
and real theft of
ones and zeroes.

740
00:35:20,751 --> 00:35:24,721
Now that should not be confused
with intellectual property theft

741
00:35:24,721 --> 00:35:26,757
and industrial espionage.

742
00:35:26,757 --> 00:35:28,392
That's very different.

743
00:35:28,392 --> 00:35:30,827
And many of our government
leaders in the United States

744
00:35:30,827 --> 00:35:33,697
and many government leaders
in Europe are talking

745
00:35:33,697 --> 00:35:36,967
about the unprecedented theft
of intellectual property.

746
00:35:36,967 --> 00:35:40,070
Thefts, meaning,
illegally copying the plans,

747
00:35:40,070 --> 00:35:43,574
processes and/or next
generation technologies

748
00:35:43,574 --> 00:35:47,044
out of our corporations
for the economic advance

749
00:35:47,044 --> 00:35:50,147
of their companies
and/or countries.

750
00:35:50,147 --> 00:35:54,051
And so the intellectual property
theft is then not the same

751
00:35:54,051 --> 00:35:55,619
as espionage.

752
00:35:55,619 --> 00:35:58,355
And there are governments
that are conducting espionage.

753
00:35:58,355 --> 00:36:01,391
Most governments do to steal
the plans and intentions

754
00:36:01,391 --> 00:36:05,229
of other governments and
know their capabilities.

755
00:36:05,229 --> 00:36:07,431
In the United States, we
sort of bundled the two,

756
00:36:07,431 --> 00:36:11,268
IP theft and espionage.

757
00:36:11,268 --> 00:36:13,604
When were talking about it, in
fact, we're talking about it

758
00:36:13,604 --> 00:36:19,409
as Pearl Harbor and other
very exaggerated terms.

759
00:36:19,409 --> 00:36:21,578
If we are going to bundle
intellectual property theft

760
00:36:21,578 --> 00:36:24,414
with espionage then we have
to be willing to put espionage

761
00:36:24,414 --> 00:36:26,650
that we would walk from
it as a government.

762
00:36:26,650 --> 00:36:28,252
And I don't see any
government willing

763
00:36:28,252 --> 00:36:29,653
to walk away from espionage.

764
00:36:29,653 --> 00:36:31,922
So, why don't we talk about
what's really the problem

765
00:36:31,922 --> 00:36:35,025
and that's intellectual property
theft and/or the protection

766
00:36:35,025 --> 00:36:37,828
of intellectual property
and patents, et cetera.

767
00:36:37,828 --> 00:36:41,431
There are two other areas that
are becoming more concerning

768
00:36:41,431 --> 00:36:45,736
for most companies and
countries that are--

769
00:36:45,736 --> 00:36:47,404
the first is disruption
of service.

770
00:36:47,404 --> 00:36:50,274
And this is the distributed
denial-of-services actually

771
00:36:50,274 --> 00:36:53,076
degrading real services
in your e-banking

772
00:36:53,076 --> 00:36:56,913
and your e-infrastructures
that are preventing our banks

773
00:36:56,913 --> 00:37:00,350
from allowing you to actually
access those infrastructures

774
00:37:00,350 --> 00:37:01,918
and/or capabilities.

775
00:37:01,918 --> 00:37:03,754
And we just had a--
and a significant,

776
00:37:03,754 --> 00:37:04,888
in the United States,

777
00:37:04,888 --> 00:37:06,723
we're having a distributed
denial-of-service

778
00:37:06,723 --> 00:37:08,158
against our financial
institutions

779
00:37:08,158 --> 00:37:10,894
and so are many others
in Asia and Europe.

780
00:37:10,894 --> 00:37:13,730
And then finally the
destruction of property.

781
00:37:13,730 --> 00:37:16,700
There was just recently a
malware that was released

782
00:37:16,700 --> 00:37:18,635
against Saudi ARamCo

783
00:37:18,635 --> 00:37:21,872
which destroyed 30,000
of their computers.

784
00:37:21,872 --> 00:37:24,174
And when we start to actually
think about destruction

785
00:37:24,174 --> 00:37:26,877
of property and how one
might recover from that

786
00:37:26,877 --> 00:37:29,913
that is a different set of
capabilities than you would deal

787
00:37:29,913 --> 00:37:33,583
with from organized crime
and/or political activism.

788
00:37:33,583 --> 00:37:36,453
So, as we talk about this
on our panel over the course

789
00:37:36,453 --> 00:37:38,722
of the next hour, I ask
you to start to think

790
00:37:38,722 --> 00:37:40,524
about which problem
are you talking

791
00:37:40,524 --> 00:37:43,493
about because we're not
talking about the same thing

792
00:37:43,493 --> 00:37:45,862
in each of our conversations.

793
00:37:45,862 --> 00:37:48,365
I'd like to wrap up and that

794
00:37:48,365 --> 00:37:51,134
over 100 countries have
these capabilities,

795
00:37:51,134 --> 00:37:53,136
and they are using these
capabilities to deal

796
00:37:53,136 --> 00:37:56,306
with these different problems
whether it's political activism

797
00:37:56,306 --> 00:37:59,076
to overthrow government
or its political activism

798
00:37:59,076 --> 00:38:01,211
to bring transparency
to policies they don't

799
00:38:01,211 --> 00:38:03,613
like is different
than organized crime

800
00:38:03,613 --> 00:38:05,749
or intellectual property theft.

801
00:38:05,749 --> 00:38:07,684
And there are three strategic
things that are happening

802
00:38:07,684 --> 00:38:09,920
in the global order of things.

803
00:38:09,920 --> 00:38:14,524
First, some are using disruptive
technology like a Stuxnet

804
00:38:14,524 --> 00:38:17,394
or a Shamoon to bring
down core infrastructures

805
00:38:17,394 --> 00:38:20,097
or core businesses
around the world

806
00:38:20,097 --> 00:38:24,234
or some are implementing
surveillance tools to bring

807
00:38:24,234 --> 00:38:27,938
about transparency or to
show the vulnerabilities

808
00:38:27,938 --> 00:38:29,740
for those infrastructures
to be brought down.

809
00:38:29,740 --> 00:38:32,109
So, disruptive technologies
are being used.

810
00:38:32,109 --> 00:38:35,412
Second, strategic alliances
are also being wielded

811
00:38:35,412 --> 00:38:39,383
to actually gather that power
and control over the internet.

812
00:38:39,383 --> 00:38:43,987
And that's playing out in
the UN and the ITU and NATO

813
00:38:43,987 --> 00:38:47,023
and ACION [assumed spelling]
and other of the forum

814
00:38:47,023 --> 00:38:48,959
where countries can
align against each other

815
00:38:48,959 --> 00:38:50,160
for particular motives.

816
00:38:50,160 --> 00:38:53,397
And then finally there
are strategic properties.

817
00:38:53,397 --> 00:38:56,767
And I mean that in the
very sense of it is.

818
00:38:56,767 --> 00:38:58,902
There are 25 internet
service providers

819
00:38:58,902 --> 00:38:59,970
that control 90 percent

820
00:38:59,970 --> 00:39:02,272
of information flow
on the internet.

821
00:39:02,272 --> 00:39:03,974
There are internet
exchange points

822
00:39:03,974 --> 00:39:08,345
that actually control the
flow of technology and/or ones

823
00:39:08,345 --> 00:39:12,182
and zeroes from continent to
continent or within a continent.

824
00:39:12,182 --> 00:39:14,451
And there are data aggregators

825
00:39:14,451 --> 00:39:17,654
who have actually more
information on us like a Google

826
00:39:17,654 --> 00:39:20,190
or a Facebook than any
foreign intelligence service

827
00:39:20,190 --> 00:39:21,491
of any other country.

828
00:39:21,491 --> 00:39:22,559
So, you have to think

829
00:39:22,559 --> 00:39:24,361
about where are the
strategic properties

830
00:39:24,361 --> 00:39:25,495
and how they're being used

831
00:39:25,495 --> 00:39:28,465
by all governments not
just by one government.

832
00:39:28,465 --> 00:39:30,033
Thank you.

833
00:39:30,033 --> 00:39:34,738
>> Thank you, Melissa.

834
00:39:34,738 --> 00:39:35,539
Laura?

835
00:39:35,539 --> 00:39:36,840
>> Good afternoon everyone.

836
00:39:36,840 --> 00:39:38,175
I'm very delighted to be here.

837
00:39:38,175 --> 00:39:40,544
And I wish to thank the Internet
Society for the invitation

838
00:39:40,544 --> 00:39:43,013
and for GW for hosting
it as well.

839
00:39:43,013 --> 00:39:46,750
I view PRISM as an
opportunity to draw attention

840
00:39:46,750 --> 00:39:50,420
to the implications of broader
global internet governance

841
00:39:50,420 --> 00:39:52,989
conflicts that have
implications for economic

842
00:39:52,989 --> 00:39:54,624
and expressive liberty.

843
00:39:54,624 --> 00:39:59,563
I recently-- recently the
last two or three years spent

844
00:39:59,563 --> 00:40:01,064
that time researching

845
00:40:01,064 --> 00:40:03,266
and writing a new book
called the Global War

846
00:40:03,266 --> 00:40:04,434
for Internet Governance.

847
00:40:04,434 --> 00:40:06,536
And it's going to be
published later this year

848
00:40:06,536 --> 00:40:08,305
by Yale University Press.

849
00:40:08,305 --> 00:40:11,708
Now in this book, there are
approximately four pages

850
00:40:11,708 --> 00:40:13,777
at the end of acronyms.

851
00:40:13,777 --> 00:40:16,413
So, what I've done is I've
challenged myself today

852
00:40:16,413 --> 00:40:17,881
to not use any acronyms.

853
00:40:17,881 --> 00:40:20,851
So, what I would like to ask you
to do is to pound on the table

854
00:40:20,851 --> 00:40:23,787
if I use an internet governance
acronyms, so pay attention

855
00:40:23,787 --> 00:40:27,190
to that, and I know some
of you will do that.

856
00:40:27,190 --> 00:40:28,458
But what I tried to do

857
00:40:28,458 --> 00:40:31,161
in the book is describe
the various layers

858
00:40:31,161 --> 00:40:34,764
of how the internet is
already governed and what some

859
00:40:34,764 --> 00:40:38,001
of the current debates are that
I expect to shape the future

860
00:40:38,001 --> 00:40:40,837
of freedom and innovation
in the coming years.

861
00:40:40,837 --> 00:40:42,839
Now what is internet governance?

862
00:40:42,839 --> 00:40:44,374
This panel has already
described it.

863
00:40:44,374 --> 00:40:45,942
If I had to give one definition,

864
00:40:45,942 --> 00:40:51,248
I would say internet governance
is the design and administration

865
00:40:51,248 --> 00:40:52,782
of the technologies
that are necessary

866
00:40:52,782 --> 00:40:55,819
to keep the internet operational
and then the enactment

867
00:40:55,819 --> 00:40:58,855
of substantive policy
around those technologies.

868
00:40:58,855 --> 00:41:02,425
But there is no single system
of internet governance.

869
00:41:02,425 --> 00:41:05,195
John said it best when he was
describing the various roles,

870
00:41:05,195 --> 00:41:07,330
names and numbers,
administration,

871
00:41:07,330 --> 00:41:11,067
standard setting, private
interconnection, arrangements

872
00:41:11,067 --> 00:41:14,304
between telecommunication
companies, the privacy policies

873
00:41:14,304 --> 00:41:17,073
that are enacted by social
media, by search engines

874
00:41:17,073 --> 00:41:19,209
and other information
intermediaries.

875
00:41:19,209 --> 00:41:22,979
And, of course, cyber security
governance not necessarily

876
00:41:22,979 --> 00:41:25,215
enacted by governments
but by entities

877
00:41:25,215 --> 00:41:27,617
such as certificate
authorities that are handing

878
00:41:27,617 --> 00:41:29,853
out digital signatures
and things like that.

879
00:41:29,853 --> 00:41:31,621
So, those are just
a few examples.

880
00:41:31,621 --> 00:41:35,025
So, we need to take this
conversation outside

881
00:41:35,025 --> 00:41:38,194
of discussions about
just governance.

882
00:41:38,194 --> 00:41:41,431
However, one of themes that
I do take up in the book

883
00:41:41,431 --> 00:41:43,567
and in my work in general is

884
00:41:43,567 --> 00:41:47,671
that internet governance
conflicts are the new spaces

885
00:41:47,671 --> 00:41:52,075
where political and economic
power is working itself

886
00:41:52,075 --> 00:41:54,044
out in the 21st century.

887
00:41:54,044 --> 00:41:57,380
We see this with PRISM,
we see this with Stuxnet,

888
00:41:57,380 --> 00:42:00,083
we see this with the
turn to intellectual--

889
00:42:00,083 --> 00:42:01,251
to infrastructure

890
00:42:01,251 --> 00:42:03,653
for intellectual property
rights enforcement,

891
00:42:03,653 --> 00:42:07,223
with governments cutting off
access during political turmoil.

892
00:42:07,223 --> 00:42:08,625
And as Mellissa said,

893
00:42:08,625 --> 00:42:10,894
we had denial-of-service
attacks often used

894
00:42:10,894 --> 00:42:13,630
to suppress human
rights and expression.

895
00:42:13,630 --> 00:42:17,567
So, internet governance points
of control are really not just

896
00:42:17,567 --> 00:42:19,736
about keeping the internet
operational although

897
00:42:19,736 --> 00:42:21,771
that is absolutely vital.

898
00:42:21,771 --> 00:42:25,742
But there are also a proxy
for broader political

899
00:42:25,742 --> 00:42:27,344
and economic conflicts.

900
00:42:27,344 --> 00:42:29,813
So, the fact that PRISM
draws attention to some

901
00:42:29,813 --> 00:42:33,783
of these broader global
internet governance issues is

902
00:42:33,783 --> 00:42:35,485
an opportunity.

903
00:42:35,485 --> 00:42:39,356
But keep in mind that government
surveillance ad censorship

904
00:42:39,356 --> 00:42:43,126
for that matter which is in my
opinion an even greater problem

905
00:42:43,126 --> 00:42:46,663
around the world
is not something

906
00:42:46,663 --> 00:42:48,765
that happens in a vacuum.

907
00:42:48,765 --> 00:42:51,334
So, it's delegated and
it is made possible

908
00:42:51,334 --> 00:42:54,971
by certain arrangements
of technical architecture

909
00:42:54,971 --> 00:42:57,207
and by private ordering.

910
00:42:57,207 --> 00:43:01,411
So, infrastructure governance
just to give you a few examples,

911
00:43:01,411 --> 00:43:06,449
infrastructure governance is
directly tied to privacy issues.

912
00:43:06,449 --> 00:43:09,052
So, I have an information
engineering background.

913
00:43:09,052 --> 00:43:11,554
I am also a social scientist
who studies the politics

914
00:43:11,554 --> 00:43:13,156
of technical architecture.

915
00:43:13,156 --> 00:43:15,792
And I can say that, you
know, you probably could say

916
00:43:15,792 --> 00:43:17,160
to use a Harry Potter analogy.

917
00:43:17,160 --> 00:43:20,230
There are some dark arts
of internet governance

918
00:43:20,230 --> 00:43:25,068
that have a good intention but
they can be used for other uses.

919
00:43:25,068 --> 00:43:27,604
So, one of these, for example,
is the deep packet inspection.

920
00:43:27,604 --> 00:43:30,440
I didn't use the acronym
so no pounding on the table

921
00:43:30,440 --> 00:43:34,244
which is a capability that
allows network providers

922
00:43:34,244 --> 00:43:37,580
to inspect the actual
content of packets sent

923
00:43:37,580 --> 00:43:40,250
over the internet rather
than just the packet headers.

924
00:43:40,250 --> 00:43:42,152
So, this can be used
for a variety

925
00:43:42,152 --> 00:43:46,623
of very important function
such as network management,

926
00:43:46,623 --> 00:43:48,658
detecting viruses and worms.

927
00:43:48,658 --> 00:43:51,094
It could also be used for
customized advertising,

928
00:43:51,094 --> 00:43:53,163
now getting outside of
the operational role,

929
00:43:53,163 --> 00:43:55,799
or for surveillances
or for throttling

930
00:43:55,799 --> 00:43:57,333
and blocking of traffic.

931
00:43:57,333 --> 00:44:01,404
So, this is a very significant
development made possible only

932
00:44:01,404 --> 00:44:04,207
by advances and processing
power and storage.

933
00:44:04,207 --> 00:44:06,676
And we need transparency
and accountability

934
00:44:06,676 --> 00:44:08,712
in issues like this as well.

935
00:44:08,712 --> 00:44:11,648
So, another area of
infrastructure related

936
00:44:11,648 --> 00:44:15,585
to privacy is the hidden
identity infrastructure

937
00:44:15,585 --> 00:44:18,755
that makes possible business
models that are based

938
00:44:18,755 --> 00:44:20,390
on online advertising.

939
00:44:20,390 --> 00:44:22,992
So, this is a good thing
for freedom of expression

940
00:44:22,992 --> 00:44:26,463
because there are free products
that we are able to use,

941
00:44:26,463 --> 00:44:29,299
but we are almost at the
point where the prospect

942
00:44:29,299 --> 00:44:33,470
for anonymous speech considering
this identity infrastructure is

943
00:44:33,470 --> 00:44:35,305
almost impossible.

944
00:44:35,305 --> 00:44:38,475
We have technical identifiers
at the level of hardware

945
00:44:38,475 --> 00:44:40,410
like Ethernet cards at the level

946
00:44:40,410 --> 00:44:45,014
of virtual identifiers
locationally via cellphone

947
00:44:45,014 --> 00:44:50,653
location, wireless fidelity
AKA wifi, it's my one acronym

948
00:44:50,653 --> 00:44:53,456
or global positioning
system and through things

949
00:44:53,456 --> 00:44:56,526
like platform mediation and real
identification requirements.

950
00:44:56,526 --> 00:44:59,763
So, if you put this all
together, this is at the heart

951
00:44:59,763 --> 00:45:03,299
of business models that
we need at the heart

952
00:45:03,299 --> 00:45:07,403
of online advertising, at the
heart of having free software.

953
00:45:07,403 --> 00:45:10,607
But it also is the
technical capability

954
00:45:10,607 --> 00:45:12,942
that can enable new
form, even newer forms

955
00:45:12,942 --> 00:45:15,111
of surveillance in the future.

956
00:45:15,111 --> 00:45:18,481
So, these are new
opportunities for surveillance.

957
00:45:18,481 --> 00:45:21,618
Two other infrastructure issues
I'll mention I'll mention

958
00:45:21,618 --> 00:45:26,389
quickly include a current
rethinking and redesign of the

959
00:45:26,389 --> 00:45:28,892
"who is" protocol
which keeps track

960
00:45:28,892 --> 00:45:32,929
of who is registering a
domain name and, of course,

961
00:45:32,929 --> 00:45:35,565
also the issue as has
already been mentioned

962
00:45:35,565 --> 00:45:37,534
of internet exchange points.

963
00:45:37,534 --> 00:45:40,203
How these are governed and
how they are distributed

964
00:45:40,203 --> 00:45:42,172
around the world is something

965
00:45:42,172 --> 00:45:44,073
that is very related
to civil liberties.

966
00:45:44,073 --> 00:45:47,911
The Internet Society and we'll
hear from next has really been

967
00:45:47,911 --> 00:45:50,079
at the forefront of
this area which--

968
00:45:50,079 --> 00:45:52,215
having more internet
exchange points,

969
00:45:52,215 --> 00:45:54,717
looking at the criticality
of them for human rights

970
00:45:54,717 --> 00:45:56,452
for infrastructure development

971
00:45:56,452 --> 00:45:59,923
and as concentrated points
of information flows.

972
00:45:59,923 --> 00:46:04,060
So, the truth is that global
internet choke points,

973
00:46:04,060 --> 00:46:05,295
of course, exist.

974
00:46:05,295 --> 00:46:08,898
And the internet is governed
not by any one entity

975
00:46:08,898 --> 00:46:11,701
but multi-stakeholder governance
which I'm sure we will take

976
00:46:11,701 --> 00:46:13,970
up in the roundtable later.

977
00:46:13,970 --> 00:46:17,774
But that this governance
is not fixed anymore

978
00:46:17,774 --> 00:46:19,909
than architecture is fixed.

979
00:46:19,909 --> 00:46:22,345
So, the architecture
is constantly changing

980
00:46:22,345 --> 00:46:25,615
and the governance is
constantly changing as well.

981
00:46:25,615 --> 00:46:27,884
The basic theoretical
or conceptual framework

982
00:46:27,884 --> 00:46:30,119
of my own work is
that arrangements

983
00:46:30,119 --> 00:46:34,190
of technical architecture are
also arrangements of power.

984
00:46:34,190 --> 00:46:38,094
So, it's critical for the public
to be engaged in these debates

985
00:46:38,094 --> 00:46:40,029
because the future of
internet architecture

986
00:46:40,029 --> 00:46:42,632
and governance is
directly related

987
00:46:42,632 --> 00:46:44,033
to the future of
internet freedom.

988
00:46:44,033 --> 00:46:46,936
So, I appreciate the opportunity
to discuss that here today.

989
00:46:46,936 --> 00:46:49,172
Thank you very much
for listening.

990
00:46:49,172 --> 00:46:50,139
>> Thank you, Laura.

991
00:46:50,139 --> 00:46:52,542
Lynn?

992
00:46:52,542 --> 00:46:53,576
>> Good afternoon.

993
00:46:53,576 --> 00:46:55,745
This has been a very
comprehensive set

994
00:46:55,745 --> 00:46:59,048
of speaking points, I
have to say to date.

995
00:46:59,048 --> 00:47:02,285
So, the Internet Society is
a cause-based organization.

996
00:47:02,285 --> 00:47:05,154
We advocate for an
open global internet.

997
00:47:05,154 --> 00:47:06,656
In the recent revelations

998
00:47:06,656 --> 00:47:08,892
about the mass scale
interceptions not only

999
00:47:08,892 --> 00:47:12,128
by the US, the UK, but
many, many other countries

1000
00:47:12,128 --> 00:47:14,631
around the world have
serious implications

1001
00:47:14,631 --> 00:47:17,533
for the open global internet.

1002
00:47:17,533 --> 00:47:19,769
ISOC is an international
organization.

1003
00:47:19,769 --> 00:47:22,071
We have members, org
members and chapters

1004
00:47:22,071 --> 00:47:23,606
in virtually every country

1005
00:47:23,606 --> 00:47:26,809
of the world perhaps even
every country of the world.

1006
00:47:26,809 --> 00:47:30,914
We have headquarters in
just outside of D.C. here

1007
00:47:30,914 --> 00:47:33,650
in Western Virginia and
Geneva, Switzerland.

1008
00:47:33,650 --> 00:47:38,788
And we have a very senior policy
and technical staff in little

1009
00:47:38,788 --> 00:47:41,024
over 20 countries of
the world often times

1010
00:47:41,024 --> 00:47:43,393
in the same individual
which is more

1011
00:47:43,393 --> 00:47:45,595
and more the future in any case.

1012
00:47:45,595 --> 00:47:48,364
I spent 27 years in
Europe, just moved back

1013
00:47:48,364 --> 00:47:50,466
to the US a little
over a year ago.

1014
00:47:50,466 --> 00:47:52,568
And the one thing I'd really
like to do is to make sure

1015
00:47:52,568 --> 00:47:55,738
that here in D.C., in
this country's capital

1016
00:47:55,738 --> 00:47:58,408
that we recognize that this
is not just about US citizens

1017
00:47:58,408 --> 00:48:01,010
and it's not just
about the foreigners

1018
00:48:01,010 --> 00:48:03,780
that the US is surveilling.

1019
00:48:03,780 --> 00:48:06,749
This affects every
individual in the world.

1020
00:48:06,749 --> 00:48:09,585
It affects some of
them very directly

1021
00:48:09,585 --> 00:48:12,088
but it will affect the
internet we all have access

1022
00:48:12,088 --> 00:48:17,393
to going forward to tomorrow
and to generations to come.

1023
00:48:17,393 --> 00:48:21,764
If we are not careful, we will
actually rob both individuals

1024
00:48:21,764 --> 00:48:24,834
today, tomorrow and future
generations of all the freedom

1025
00:48:24,834 --> 00:48:26,736
and the benefit and
the innovation

1026
00:48:26,736 --> 00:48:29,639
that the internet has brought.

1027
00:48:29,639 --> 00:48:32,809
The Internet Society actually
deals an awful lot in principles

1028
00:48:32,809 --> 00:48:36,112
and the principles that make the
internet what the internet is.

1029
00:48:36,112 --> 00:48:38,381
First and foremost,
it's a platform.

1030
00:48:38,381 --> 00:48:43,019
It allows everybody to go out
and develop what they choose to,

1031
00:48:43,019 --> 00:48:46,656
to access what they choose to,
to innovate on material that's

1032
00:48:46,656 --> 00:48:49,192
out there and make
that available.

1033
00:48:49,192 --> 00:48:54,230
If we're not careful,
we'll loose all of that.

1034
00:48:54,230 --> 00:48:57,133
So, the-- in particular
recently,

1035
00:48:57,133 --> 00:48:59,902
the unwarded collection
storage and the ease

1036
00:48:59,902 --> 00:49:02,472
of correlation amongst all
the data that's collected.

1037
00:49:02,472 --> 00:49:04,841
And I actually don't
differentiate a lot

1038
00:49:04,841 --> 00:49:07,710
between metadata and content.

1039
00:49:07,710 --> 00:49:10,079
You can get so much
information from metadata

1040
00:49:10,079 --> 00:49:11,681
that we shouldn't kid
ourselves by saying,

1041
00:49:11,681 --> 00:49:15,418
"It's just metadata we're
collecting, it's OK."

1042
00:49:15,418 --> 00:49:19,789
That-- though the collection
that will undermine many

1043
00:49:19,789 --> 00:49:21,724
of the key principles
and relationships.

1044
00:49:21,724 --> 00:49:26,996
And in particular some of those
natural conclusions will start

1045
00:49:26,996 --> 00:49:28,598
to impact the physical
infrastructure

1046
00:49:28,598 --> 00:49:32,435
of the internet itself whether
it's using some of the IXPs

1047
00:49:32,435 --> 00:49:34,337
as choke points or
whether it's using some

1048
00:49:34,337 --> 00:49:36,372
of the technical
capabilities that exist

1049
00:49:36,372 --> 00:49:38,708
to help with surveillance.

1050
00:49:38,708 --> 00:49:42,111
Those are all things
we want to I think--

1051
00:49:42,111 --> 00:49:44,614
think through very,
very carefully.

1052
00:49:44,614 --> 00:49:46,115
One of the principles we argue

1053
00:49:46,115 --> 00:49:48,351
for is multistakeholder
dialogue.

1054
00:49:48,351 --> 00:49:51,120
And it's because so much of what
we're all facing whether it's

1055
00:49:51,120 --> 00:49:52,688
in a policy or a technical

1056
00:49:52,688 --> 00:49:55,024
or a social environment
has never been done

1057
00:49:55,024 --> 00:49:56,426
in the world before.

1058
00:49:56,426 --> 00:49:59,328
We're breaking barriers
every single day and we need

1059
00:49:59,328 --> 00:50:01,864
to bring everybody to the
table for a discussion

1060
00:50:01,864 --> 00:50:03,232
and move forward
thoughtfully and carefully.

1061
00:50:03,232 --> 00:50:09,839
That is even more so when we
look to governments particularly

1062
00:50:09,839 --> 00:50:12,909
in their role in
protecting citizens.

1063
00:50:12,909 --> 00:50:16,646
We believe that the internet
must be a channel for secure,

1064
00:50:16,646 --> 00:50:19,215
reliable, private communication

1065
00:50:19,215 --> 00:50:21,651
between entities
and individuals.

1066
00:50:21,651 --> 00:50:26,155
And surveillance without due
process is simply unacceptable.

1067
00:50:26,155 --> 00:50:29,859
And as some other articles
have said recently, frankly,

1068
00:50:29,859 --> 00:50:31,360
it's very creepy as well.

1069
00:50:31,360 --> 00:50:33,629
And if that makes it more
personal, this is good

1070
00:50:33,629 --> 00:50:38,601
because we need everybody to
care about what's happening now.

1071
00:50:38,601 --> 00:50:40,303
We also challenge the
view that policies

1072
00:50:40,303 --> 00:50:41,771
to ensure security
must always come

1073
00:50:41,771 --> 00:50:44,307
at the cost of user's rights.

1074
00:50:44,307 --> 00:50:47,210
I'd also argue with the fact
that we all know it was coming

1075
00:50:47,210 --> 00:50:49,445
so what are we concerned about?

1076
00:50:49,445 --> 00:50:50,980
Due process wasn't followed.

1077
00:50:50,980 --> 00:50:52,548
That's what were
concerned about.

1078
00:50:52,548 --> 00:50:54,050
Did most people that
pay attention

1079
00:50:54,050 --> 00:50:56,619
to this field understand that
you could do all these sorts

1080
00:50:56,619 --> 00:50:57,820
of things with the data?

1081
00:50:57,820 --> 00:51:01,057
Yes. Did we believe our
governments were doing it

1082
00:51:01,057 --> 00:51:03,759
without due process
and certainly

1083
00:51:03,759 --> 00:51:07,597
without an adequate
level of transparency?

1084
00:51:07,597 --> 00:51:09,999
I might answer yes
but hopefully--

1085
00:51:09,999 --> 00:51:11,934
hopefully we didn't
and [inaudible]

1086
00:51:11,934 --> 00:51:14,904
to happen as Frank said.

1087
00:51:14,904 --> 00:51:17,273
One of the things we'd actually

1088
00:51:17,273 --> 00:51:20,243
like to do is really
get everybody to focus

1089
00:51:20,243 --> 00:51:21,511
on the multistakeholder.

1090
00:51:21,511 --> 00:51:22,845
A lot of the principles

1091
00:51:22,845 --> 00:51:28,184
that have given us the internet
find new forms, structures

1092
00:51:28,184 --> 00:51:29,919
and processes to address that.

1093
00:51:29,919 --> 00:51:33,322
Don't revert back to we
need a new institution.

1094
00:51:33,322 --> 00:51:37,760
I don't think that is the answer
in almost every situation.

1095
00:51:37,760 --> 00:51:42,632
Some of the recent proposals
that have been put forward

1096
00:51:42,632 --> 00:51:45,234
to address some of these
aspects would call for treaties.

1097
00:51:45,234 --> 00:51:47,370
Treaties are largely
intergovernmental.

1098
00:51:47,370 --> 00:51:48,971
They don't allow for
the private sector.

1099
00:51:48,971 --> 00:51:51,240
They don't allow
for civil society.

1100
00:51:51,240 --> 00:51:53,209
And honestly I don't
know how you get some

1101
00:51:53,209 --> 00:51:54,610
of those private
sector companies

1102
00:51:54,610 --> 00:51:57,113
to sign on to a treaty.

1103
00:51:57,113 --> 00:51:59,248
So, I don't think treaties
are the answer either.

1104
00:51:59,248 --> 00:52:02,885
We're going to need to create
new processes and new forums

1105
00:52:02,885 --> 00:52:04,887
and certainly at the
core of all that ought

1106
00:52:04,887 --> 00:52:07,256
to be thoughtful
informed dialogue.

1107
00:52:07,256 --> 00:52:09,692
So, I think, you
know, it's our hope

1108
00:52:09,692 --> 00:52:13,095
that as these discussions
continue across the world

1109
00:52:13,095 --> 00:52:16,866
that we recognize and
come to agree again

1110
00:52:16,866 --> 00:52:19,035
on some other high
level principles.

1111
00:52:19,035 --> 00:52:21,504
Some of the ones I'd throw
out for further debate,

1112
00:52:21,504 --> 00:52:24,874
is it unwanted surveillance
even in the furtherance

1113
00:52:24,874 --> 00:52:27,877
of national security
is not acceptable.

1114
00:52:27,877 --> 00:52:31,347
Unwarranted surveillance
is not acceptable.

1115
00:52:31,347 --> 00:52:34,050
The disproportionate
surveillance is also

1116
00:52:34,050 --> 00:52:36,018
not acceptable.

1117
00:52:36,018 --> 00:52:38,654
That surveillance
without accountability is

1118
00:52:38,654 --> 00:52:41,123
not acceptable.

1119
00:52:41,123 --> 00:52:42,558
And further, turning

1120
00:52:42,558 --> 00:52:44,727
to something a little
more positive,

1121
00:52:44,727 --> 00:52:46,762
that there should be
transparency with respect

1122
00:52:46,762 --> 00:52:49,398
to policy and its
implementation,

1123
00:52:49,398 --> 00:52:53,202
that we should be harnessing the
expertise of all stakeholders

1124
00:52:53,202 --> 00:52:56,105
to discover better ways
to protect citizens

1125
00:52:56,105 --> 00:52:58,374
in a global community.

1126
00:52:58,374 --> 00:53:02,578
And most importantly,
encore to everything we do

1127
00:53:02,578 --> 00:53:05,147
that we uphold human rights.

1128
00:53:05,147 --> 00:53:07,016
And so I look forward to
the discussion for the rest

1129
00:53:07,016 --> 00:53:09,185
of the day, and thank you.

1130
00:53:09,185 --> 00:53:10,119
>> Thank you, Lynn.

1131
00:53:10,119 --> 00:53:10,920
Danny?

1132
00:53:10,920 --> 00:53:12,255
>> Thanks, Lance.

1133
00:53:12,255 --> 00:53:16,525
So, thanks to the Internet
Society and GW, Lynn and Lance,

1134
00:53:16,525 --> 00:53:18,694
for getting-- Paul for
getting us together.

1135
00:53:18,694 --> 00:53:23,633
And at the end of the
panel, I'm always reminded

1136
00:53:23,633 --> 00:53:25,635
of this very distinguished
member of Congress said

1137
00:53:25,635 --> 00:53:28,371
at the near the end of a very
excruciatingly long hearing,

1138
00:53:28,371 --> 00:53:31,807
everything's been said but
not every one has said it.

1139
00:53:31,807 --> 00:53:36,746
So, I subscribe to much
of what has been said

1140
00:53:36,746 --> 00:53:39,315
by many of my fellow panels.

1141
00:53:39,315 --> 00:53:42,084
I want to just make three points

1142
00:53:42,084 --> 00:53:47,089
about what I think we've
been experiencing as a result

1143
00:53:47,089 --> 00:53:49,458
of this surveillance
debate over the last month.

1144
00:53:49,458 --> 00:53:54,430
I think fundamentally what
we've had is a certain degree

1145
00:53:54,430 --> 00:53:57,967
of a crisis in confidence
and a crisis in trust

1146
00:53:57,967 --> 00:53:59,568
about the internet environment.

1147
00:53:59,568 --> 00:54:02,305
The question is, should
you trust it or not?

1148
00:54:02,305 --> 00:54:06,709
And as Mellissa noted,
it's, I think, useful to try

1149
00:54:06,709 --> 00:54:11,047
to breakdown to some extent
our current sources of trust

1150
00:54:11,047 --> 00:54:14,250
in the internet in particular,
in society in general.

1151
00:54:14,250 --> 00:54:16,719
I want to just make three
points about the institutional,

1152
00:54:16,719 --> 00:54:22,291
legal and political levels of
trust that we tend to look to.

1153
00:54:22,291 --> 00:54:25,027
To start with the
institutional, you heard from--

1154
00:54:25,027 --> 00:54:29,899
you heard from John and
from Lynn about some

1155
00:54:29,899 --> 00:54:32,368
of the institutions that
make the internet work.

1156
00:54:32,368 --> 00:54:33,569
You know, I think
it's interesting

1157
00:54:33,569 --> 00:54:36,172
when you look purely
technically at the internet.

1158
00:54:36,172 --> 00:54:40,309
People pretty much trust that
the pack is going to arrive more

1159
00:54:40,309 --> 00:54:41,510
or less in the right order.

1160
00:54:41,510 --> 00:54:44,246
And enough of them
will get there

1161
00:54:44,246 --> 00:54:45,514
that you could get your
message through it.

1162
00:54:45,514 --> 00:54:46,782
You can watch video.

1163
00:54:46,782 --> 00:54:49,218
We don't-- we don't have a
lot of debates about that.

1164
00:54:49,218 --> 00:54:55,391
I will note just as a kind of
a observation of the sociology

1165
00:54:55,391 --> 00:54:57,259
in a certain way of people

1166
00:54:57,259 --> 00:54:58,694
in the internet technical
community.

1167
00:54:58,694 --> 00:55:01,630
There is a sense in some
ways as Lynn suggested

1168
00:55:01,630 --> 00:55:06,769
that if any third party
can get in the middle

1169
00:55:06,769 --> 00:55:10,740
of a communication stream
between two parties,

1170
00:55:10,740 --> 00:55:13,542
but that is in a sort of
very idealized sense a

1171
00:55:13,542 --> 00:55:14,610
technical failure.

1172
00:55:14,610 --> 00:55:16,545
It's the internet
not working properly.

1173
00:55:16,545 --> 00:55:18,481
Now that's a narrow
technical view

1174
00:55:18,481 --> 00:55:19,615
of the internet environment.

1175
00:55:19,615 --> 00:55:23,319
We, of course, have a
broader legal and social

1176
00:55:23,319 --> 00:55:26,655
and political view of our
societies, and we do recognize

1177
00:55:26,655 --> 00:55:30,126
that that surveillance
and espionage will happen.

1178
00:55:30,126 --> 00:55:33,696
But part of the challenge, I
think, in closing the trust gap

1179
00:55:33,696 --> 00:55:36,232
that we have is to articulate
better what those sorts

1180
00:55:36,232 --> 00:55:37,533
of expectations are.

1181
00:55:37,533 --> 00:55:39,435
We do have administrative
institutions

1182
00:55:39,435 --> 00:55:41,337
like that run the
domain name service

1183
00:55:41,337 --> 00:55:42,605
and IP address assignment.

1184
00:55:42,605 --> 00:55:44,106
Thanks to people like John.

1185
00:55:44,106 --> 00:55:45,174
They just kind of worked--

1186
00:55:45,174 --> 00:55:46,909
people grumble about
I can't [phonetic].

1187
00:55:46,909 --> 00:55:49,545
But so far, you know, people
are getting new domain names.

1188
00:55:49,545 --> 00:55:50,780
They are being maintained.

1189
00:55:50,780 --> 00:55:55,484
Nothing has completely
fallen apart at that point.

1190
00:55:55,484 --> 00:55:56,786
What I think is more complicated

1191
00:55:56,786 --> 00:56:00,089
on the institutional trust
front is that in many cases,

1192
00:56:00,089 --> 00:56:01,657
we're used to looking
to government

1193
00:56:01,657 --> 00:56:04,393
to establish trustworthiness
in society.

1194
00:56:04,393 --> 00:56:06,262
And certainly governments
believe their job is

1195
00:56:06,262 --> 00:56:09,298
to establish trustworthiness
in society.

1196
00:56:09,298 --> 00:56:12,301
But as you've heard, many
of our sources of trust

1197
00:56:12,301 --> 00:56:14,136
in the internet are
actually not governmental.

1198
00:56:14,136 --> 00:56:17,907
They are working perfectly well
largely without governments.

1199
00:56:17,907 --> 00:56:20,209
And I'll come back
and talk about that.

1200
00:56:20,209 --> 00:56:23,312
But again because of that
somewhat unusual circumstance

1201
00:56:23,312 --> 00:56:27,049
that Lynn alluded to, these
multistakeholder processes,

1202
00:56:27,049 --> 00:56:30,820
we probably have to understand
that a little bit better

1203
00:56:30,820 --> 00:56:34,123
so that people can trust
those environments.

1204
00:56:34,123 --> 00:56:37,226
You know, on the-- when we
look at legal institutions,

1205
00:56:37,226 --> 00:56:39,195
we rely a lot on our
legal institutions

1206
00:56:39,195 --> 00:56:42,064
to establish trust in society.

1207
00:56:42,064 --> 00:56:44,366
We hope that our legal
institutions make it

1208
00:56:44,366 --> 00:56:47,837
so that most people and most
institutions mostly do the right

1209
00:56:47,837 --> 00:56:48,771
thing most of the time.

1210
00:56:48,771 --> 00:56:50,105
We don't expect perfection

1211
00:56:50,105 --> 00:56:53,108
but we do expect our legal
institutions to set standards

1212
00:56:53,108 --> 00:56:55,144
and that there are consequences
when they're not followed.

1213
00:56:55,144 --> 00:56:58,147
I think when we look at
the privacy issues raised

1214
00:56:58,147 --> 00:57:00,783
by the current surveillance
practices

1215
00:57:00,783 --> 00:57:04,420
that had been revealed, the
problem that we have, I believe,

1216
00:57:04,420 --> 00:57:08,090
is that every one would like
there to be a sense of privacy

1217
00:57:08,090 --> 00:57:09,959
in our communications
environment.

1218
00:57:09,959 --> 00:57:11,794
But I think we have a real--

1219
00:57:11,794 --> 00:57:16,799
a lot of confusion about
just what that ought to mean.

1220
00:57:16,799 --> 00:57:18,968
We tend to think about
privacy particularly

1221
00:57:18,968 --> 00:57:22,338
in the computer network
environment as being able

1222
00:57:22,338 --> 00:57:23,873
to keep things secret.

1223
00:57:23,873 --> 00:57:26,208
Well, I think we all understand
now that we don't have a lot

1224
00:57:26,208 --> 00:57:30,012
of secrets, and we rely
on lots of third parties

1225
00:57:30,012 --> 00:57:33,282
to maintain our information.

1226
00:57:33,282 --> 00:57:38,220
So, we don't keep secrets as
well as we may be used to.

1227
00:57:38,220 --> 00:57:40,923
And my own view is that that
means we have to start thinking

1228
00:57:40,923 --> 00:57:43,125
about privacy more as a question

1229
00:57:43,125 --> 00:57:47,029
of whether information is used
properly whether it's misused,

1230
00:57:47,029 --> 00:57:48,030
whether it's used

1231
00:57:48,030 --> 00:57:50,232
to discriminate unfairly
against people.

1232
00:57:50,232 --> 00:57:53,669
But that's going to require
certain amount of discussion.

1233
00:57:53,669 --> 00:57:55,371
Lots of people have
mentioned accountability.

1234
00:57:55,371 --> 00:57:58,240
We're going to need better
accountability mechanisms

1235
00:57:58,240 --> 00:58:00,409
for these more complex
privacy rules.

1236
00:58:00,409 --> 00:58:03,312
When privacy is not
a binary phenomenon

1237
00:58:03,312 --> 00:58:07,716
that is either it's secret or
it's not, we need mechanisms

1238
00:58:07,716 --> 00:58:11,787
to assure trust in the way
personal information is handled.

1239
00:58:11,787 --> 00:58:14,423
I think there's a very
simple analogy actually

1240
00:58:14,423 --> 00:58:17,393
that we can draw from
the financial world.

1241
00:58:17,393 --> 00:58:20,095
Huge parts of our economy,

1242
00:58:20,095 --> 00:58:23,799
huge parts of the
world's economy run based

1243
00:58:23,799 --> 00:58:26,302
on a pretty well understand
set of accounting rules.

1244
00:58:26,302 --> 00:58:29,204
We're used to looking at
balance sheets for corporations

1245
00:58:29,204 --> 00:58:30,639
and having some sense of trust

1246
00:58:30,639 --> 00:58:32,808
that those balance sheets
reflect what's actually going

1247
00:58:32,808 --> 00:58:35,110
on in the financial life
of the corporations.

1248
00:58:35,110 --> 00:58:37,513
We don't expect to see
all the transactions

1249
00:58:37,513 --> 00:58:40,115
in the general ledger in order
to look and get a picture

1250
00:58:40,115 --> 00:58:43,285
of whether the corporation is
profitable, not profitable,

1251
00:58:43,285 --> 00:58:46,422
paying its taxes
correctly, not, et cetera.

1252
00:58:46,422 --> 00:58:48,757
Now there are-- this doesn't
always work perfectly,

1253
00:58:48,757 --> 00:58:50,926
but I the analogy particularly

1254
00:58:50,926 --> 00:58:56,532
to the NSA surveillance
situation is quite strong.

1255
00:58:56,532 --> 00:58:59,401
We do as citizens of the
United States want to be able

1256
00:58:59,401 --> 00:59:01,170
to have a sense of confidence

1257
00:59:01,170 --> 00:59:05,274
that our intelligence agencies
are following the rules

1258
00:59:05,274 --> 00:59:06,642
that they say they're following.

1259
00:59:06,642 --> 00:59:10,079
My guess is they probably do
about 90 percent of the time.

1260
00:59:10,079 --> 00:59:12,114
But we want to know that
there's some accountability

1261
00:59:12,114 --> 00:59:13,382
to those rules.

1262
00:59:13,382 --> 00:59:16,285
I think we understand that
we're not going to be able

1263
00:59:16,285 --> 00:59:22,825
to send auditors, independent
auditors inside classified

1264
00:59:22,825 --> 00:59:25,494
environments and can have
them come back and report

1265
00:59:25,494 --> 00:59:26,829
on everything they found.

1266
00:59:26,829 --> 00:59:29,031
But if we follow this balance
sheet model, if we follow

1267
00:59:29,031 --> 00:59:32,201
to a methodology of assessing
how information is used,

1268
00:59:32,201 --> 00:59:34,837
we can get that sense
of trust back.

1269
00:59:34,837 --> 00:59:39,808
And finally, as a
matter of political trust

1270
00:59:39,808 --> 00:59:41,810
and by political,
I don't mean kind

1271
00:59:41,810 --> 00:59:43,746
of small P Washington politics.

1272
00:59:43,746 --> 00:59:45,781
I really mean politics
in the sense

1273
00:59:45,781 --> 00:59:48,917
of how we organize
ourselves as a society.

1274
00:59:48,917 --> 00:59:54,423
As people on this
panel have noted,

1275
00:59:54,423 --> 00:59:57,393
our sources of political
trust are complicated

1276
00:59:57,393 --> 01:00:00,029
in the internet environment
and unusual.

1277
01:00:00,029 --> 01:00:01,697
We are used to the
idea of states

1278
01:00:01,697 --> 01:00:06,368
of government's exercising
authority directly

1279
01:00:06,368 --> 01:00:10,539
on institutions often
on intermediaries,

1280
01:00:10,539 --> 01:00:12,875
but in the internet
world and we're--

1281
01:00:12,875 --> 01:00:15,077
and if you considered
the analogy

1282
01:00:15,077 --> 01:00:19,214
between telephone
networks in the past

1283
01:00:19,214 --> 01:00:22,351
and internet service providers
today, telephone networks,

1284
01:00:22,351 --> 01:00:24,920
broadcast networks were
really creatures of the state.

1285
01:00:24,920 --> 01:00:28,791
They were authorized by
the actions of legislatures

1286
01:00:28,791 --> 01:00:32,895
and therefore controlled in that
way at the local state federal

1287
01:00:32,895 --> 01:00:35,998
and even international
legal level.

1288
01:00:35,998 --> 01:00:38,567
The internet doesn't--
has not happened that way,

1289
01:00:38,567 --> 01:00:42,237
it was not a creature of the
state ever, it was really

1290
01:00:42,237 --> 01:00:46,709
in many ways a creature of
individual and voluntary action

1291
01:00:46,709 --> 01:00:50,279
by some people on this panel,
by others all around the world

1292
01:00:50,279 --> 01:00:54,016
who participate in making this
internet institutions work.

1293
01:00:54,016 --> 01:00:57,352
But now when we're
nervous about how they work

1294
01:00:57,352 --> 01:00:59,722
and how the state work
we have rethink some

1295
01:00:59,722 --> 01:01:00,856
of these relationships.

1296
01:01:00,856 --> 01:01:06,095
So, we're going to have
to get use to the fact

1297
01:01:06,095 --> 01:01:10,432
that governments-- I
would submit cannot reach

1298
01:01:10,432 --> 01:01:12,167
into these internet institutions

1299
01:01:12,167 --> 01:01:15,137
like the internet engineering
test force like I can--

1300
01:01:15,137 --> 01:01:17,506
like the worldwide
web consortium

1301
01:01:17,506 --> 01:01:19,875
and achieve exactly
the result they want.

1302
01:01:19,875 --> 01:01:23,378
But of course at the same time
governments will make laws

1303
01:01:23,378 --> 01:01:27,750
and rules about how individuals
and corporations act whether

1304
01:01:27,750 --> 01:01:29,384
for intellectual
property protection

1305
01:01:29,384 --> 01:01:33,088
or privacy protection
or anything else.

1306
01:01:33,088 --> 01:01:34,456
So, I think that what this--

1307
01:01:34,456 --> 01:01:38,327
the whole surveillance
experience has revealed is

1308
01:01:38,327 --> 01:01:42,698
that the rules and expectations

1309
01:01:42,698 --> 01:01:44,933
that we have are quite
a bit more nuanced

1310
01:01:44,933 --> 01:01:47,970
than the very binary
technical behavior

1311
01:01:47,970 --> 01:01:49,772
of the internet environment.

1312
01:01:49,772 --> 01:01:52,341
And I think our challenge
is now to do a better job

1313
01:01:52,341 --> 01:01:54,076
of articulating just
what we expected,

1314
01:01:54,076 --> 01:01:56,211
all these different
institutions at all these levels

1315
01:01:56,211 --> 01:01:58,280
and how we're going
to find accountability

1316
01:01:58,280 --> 01:02:00,516
to those expectations.

1317
01:02:00,516 --> 01:02:02,017
Thanks.

1318
01:02:02,017 --> 01:02:05,387
>> Thank you Danny and thank
you everybody on the panel.

1319
01:02:05,387 --> 01:02:09,091
I think what we'll do now,
I'm going to open up first

1320
01:02:09,091 --> 01:02:11,360
to the panelist for
five or 10 minutes

1321
01:02:11,360 --> 01:02:15,364
so they can ask questions
of their fellow panelists,

1322
01:02:15,364 --> 01:02:19,535
make further, you know,
comments, go some back and forth

1323
01:02:19,535 --> 01:02:21,436
that way for five or 10 minutes.

1324
01:02:21,436 --> 01:02:23,972
In the meantime if
you in the audience,

1325
01:02:23,972 --> 01:02:27,743
if you have a question would
you please if you're physically

1326
01:02:27,743 --> 01:02:31,346
in the audience here
at GW step up to one

1327
01:02:31,346 --> 01:02:34,983
of these two microphones in
either of the isles, form a line

1328
01:02:34,983 --> 01:02:38,654
and when your turn comes please
state your name and affiliation

1329
01:02:38,654 --> 01:02:41,857
and then ask your question.

1330
01:02:41,857 --> 01:02:45,127
If you are in the internet
world, if you're off

1331
01:02:45,127 --> 01:02:49,298
in the clouds somewhere and
want to communicate send it in,

1332
01:02:49,298 --> 01:02:52,267
Paul any other directions
on that

1333
01:02:52,267 --> 01:02:54,469
or you have some
questions already?

1334
01:02:54,469 --> 01:02:57,406
While you're waiting, I want to
give the panelist a chance first

1335
01:02:57,406 --> 01:02:59,541
but any other protocol?

1336
01:02:59,541 --> 01:03:06,815
>> So, they type the
questions into live stream

1337
01:03:06,815 --> 01:03:09,251
and I'll be reading them
here at one of these mics.

1338
01:03:09,251 --> 01:03:11,520
So, that's for the
live stream panelists.

1339
01:03:11,520 --> 01:03:14,723
In New York they can just line
up at their microphone there.

1340
01:03:14,723 --> 01:03:16,425
>> In New York they can
line up their microphone

1341
01:03:16,425 --> 01:03:17,593
and we'll see them
live up there?

1342
01:03:17,593 --> 01:03:18,493
>> We'll see them,
yes, that's right.

1343
01:03:18,493 --> 01:03:19,061
>> OK.

1344
01:03:19,061 --> 01:03:19,628
>> Very good.

1345
01:03:19,628 --> 01:03:20,395
>> All right.

1346
01:03:20,395 --> 01:03:21,230
This will be interesting.

1347
01:03:21,230 --> 01:03:23,398
OK, but first let's get to the--

1348
01:03:23,398 --> 01:03:27,502
give the panelists a chance
to ask questions, Leslie?

1349
01:03:27,502 --> 01:03:31,874
>> So, I want to ask a question
of Danny because talking

1350
01:03:31,874 --> 01:03:35,878
about the concern or persuading
people that, you know,

1351
01:03:35,878 --> 01:03:38,380
winning people of off
government is sort

1352
01:03:38,380 --> 01:03:41,650
of the governance structure
for the internet and trying

1353
01:03:41,650 --> 01:03:44,253
to educate them that it's
not really government,

1354
01:03:44,253 --> 01:03:47,189
it's all of these other
institutions and we do them

1355
01:03:47,189 --> 01:03:49,758
in a multi-stakeholder
way and many people

1356
01:03:49,758 --> 01:03:52,861
up here have spent
considerable time trying

1357
01:03:52,861 --> 01:03:55,898
to move people to that model.

1358
01:03:55,898 --> 01:03:58,267
It just seems to
me that the rest

1359
01:03:58,267 --> 01:04:00,802
of the world right now is going
to think we've been involved

1360
01:04:00,802 --> 01:04:02,070
in a slight of hand

1361
01:04:02,070 --> 01:04:06,208
that basically we're
saying governments stay out,

1362
01:04:06,208 --> 01:04:10,012
governments don't get
too involved here.

1363
01:04:10,012 --> 01:04:13,181
All these other into multi
stakeholder institutions are

1364
01:04:13,181 --> 01:04:15,083
really the core of
the internet and then

1365
01:04:15,083 --> 01:04:18,020
at the same time
building an environment

1366
01:04:18,020 --> 01:04:21,556
where the United States
uses historically--

1367
01:04:21,556 --> 01:04:25,227
historical dominance

1368
01:04:25,227 --> 01:04:28,230
to basically trump all
of those governance.

1369
01:04:28,230 --> 01:04:31,800
So, I hear what you're saying
but it was a hard argument

1370
01:04:31,800 --> 01:04:34,102
to make to the rest of
the world beforehand.

1371
01:04:34,102 --> 01:04:36,405
I'm just curious
whether you're continuing

1372
01:04:36,405 --> 01:04:38,206
to say it with a straight face.

1373
01:04:38,206 --> 01:04:39,141
But I'm having trouble.

1374
01:04:39,141 --> 01:04:41,443
>> It's a habit.

1375
01:04:41,443 --> 01:04:47,282
I guess what I would say
is the ability to make

1376
01:04:47,282 --> 01:04:49,785
that argument really
depends on--

1377
01:04:49,785 --> 01:04:51,954
as several people
have said the layer

1378
01:04:51,954 --> 01:04:53,355
at which you're making
the argument.

1379
01:04:53,355 --> 01:05:00,095
I don't believe that the NSA
surveillance changes one bit the

1380
01:05:00,095 --> 01:05:06,568
question of who should be
setting standards for TCPIP

1381
01:05:06,568 --> 01:05:10,072
or who should be determining
how domain names get assigned.

1382
01:05:10,072 --> 01:05:15,277
I do believe that as you
said Leslie that the question

1383
01:05:15,277 --> 01:05:20,248
of government espionage
activities whether it's the NSA

1384
01:05:20,248 --> 01:05:26,188
or GCHQ or MI5 or, you know,
the German Intelligence Agency,

1385
01:05:26,188 --> 01:05:28,490
the French Intelligence
Agency, anyone of them,

1386
01:05:28,490 --> 01:05:30,926
all of which you're doing
exactly the same thing.

1387
01:05:30,926 --> 01:05:35,998
I do believe that we now have
to have a more public discussion

1388
01:05:35,998 --> 01:05:37,632
about what our expectations are

1389
01:05:37,632 --> 01:05:39,835
for surveillance
including espionage

1390
01:05:39,835 --> 01:05:42,004
in the internet environment.

1391
01:05:42,004 --> 01:05:47,776
But that shouldn't get confused
with the question of whether all

1392
01:05:47,776 --> 01:05:49,778
of a sudden we need
a treaty about how

1393
01:05:49,778 --> 01:05:51,847
to set internet technical
standards.

1394
01:05:51,847 --> 01:05:55,450
And I believe that, you know,
I'm highly uncomfortable talking

1395
01:05:55,450 --> 01:05:56,952
about the rest of the world.

1396
01:05:56,952 --> 01:06:01,757
But I think that what we saw in
the internet governance debate

1397
01:06:01,757 --> 01:06:09,297
at the United Nations at the--
in Dubai where the proposition

1398
01:06:09,297 --> 01:06:15,670
from Democratic countries like
Iran and China and Russia was

1399
01:06:15,670 --> 01:06:17,205
to exert greater control

1400
01:06:17,205 --> 01:06:20,642
over the internet environment
was rejected not just

1401
01:06:20,642 --> 01:06:25,747
by the usual suspects, that
is the 34 OACD countries

1402
01:06:25,747 --> 01:06:28,016
who you could somewhat
expect to do that.

1403
01:06:28,016 --> 01:06:32,554
But by another 20 countries,
from Africa and South Asia

1404
01:06:32,554 --> 01:06:35,957
and different parts of
the world, that I think

1405
01:06:35,957 --> 01:06:42,898
at Brazil have recognized that
while we could always do better

1406
01:06:42,898 --> 01:06:44,900
with the current internet
governors arrangements

1407
01:06:44,900 --> 01:06:47,736
that they're working and
messing with them has a cause

1408
01:06:47,736 --> 01:06:49,004
for all those countries.

1409
01:06:49,004 --> 01:06:51,973
So, I think as long as we
keep these issues distinct

1410
01:06:51,973 --> 01:06:55,410
and don't confuse them
I think there's a way

1411
01:06:55,410 --> 01:06:58,814
to have both discussions
in a coherent way.

1412
01:06:58,814 --> 01:07:00,082
>> Well, so I agree with you.

1413
01:07:00,082 --> 01:07:00,715
>> I know you do.

1414
01:07:00,715 --> 01:07:01,817
[laughs]

1415
01:07:01,817 --> 01:07:06,154
>> But it seems to me
the opportunity here

1416
01:07:06,154 --> 01:07:09,157
for many countries to
combine them together

1417
01:07:09,157 --> 01:07:11,393
to not make them distinct.

1418
01:07:11,393 --> 01:07:14,596
The opportunity to
reclaim control

1419
01:07:14,596 --> 01:07:17,699
by basically bringing
this together.

1420
01:07:17,699 --> 01:07:19,101
>> Sure. So, what
did Russia say?

1421
01:07:19,101 --> 01:07:23,038
What did Russia say this-- you
know, Russia said in response

1422
01:07:23,038 --> 01:07:25,207
to the NSA we need more
government control--

1423
01:07:25,207 --> 01:07:26,274
>> Right.

1424
01:07:26,274 --> 01:07:30,212
>> -- of both the
internet infrastructure

1425
01:07:30,212 --> 01:07:31,580
and the internet companies.

1426
01:07:31,580 --> 01:07:34,216
It's a-- I mean, I think the
question is how does anyone say

1427
01:07:34,216 --> 01:07:35,984
that with a straight face

1428
01:07:35,984 --> 01:07:39,421
when the concern was undo
government intrusion?

1429
01:07:39,421 --> 01:07:42,023
But, yeah, I mean it--

1430
01:07:42,023 --> 01:07:45,127
people who want to make those
arguments will find ways

1431
01:07:45,127 --> 01:07:46,828
to make them.

1432
01:07:46,828 --> 01:07:50,198
>> I worry that many of those
in between are suddenly going

1433
01:07:50,198 --> 01:07:56,838
to become more persuadable
because of the outrage.

1434
01:07:56,838 --> 01:08:00,308
>> So, I have a question
for my fellow panelists.

1435
01:08:00,308 --> 01:08:04,212
And it's sort of following
what Danny just raised.

1436
01:08:04,212 --> 01:08:07,182
In December we had an
interesting conference,

1437
01:08:07,182 --> 01:08:09,885
the World Conference

1438
01:08:09,885 --> 01:08:12,320
on International
Telecommunications.

1439
01:08:12,320 --> 01:08:15,056
I'll use the acronym
WCIT not 'cause I want

1440
01:08:15,056 --> 01:08:16,558
to have the table bounded.

1441
01:08:16,558 --> 01:08:18,260
I explain the acronym first.

1442
01:08:18,260 --> 01:08:19,327
>> You did.

1443
01:08:19,327 --> 01:08:20,428
>> But you hear the
term WCIT so I want

1444
01:08:20,428 --> 01:08:22,096
to pronounce it as
you might hear it.

1445
01:08:22,096 --> 01:08:23,430
But the World Conference

1446
01:08:23,430 --> 01:08:26,401
on International
Telecommunications was look

1447
01:08:26,401 --> 01:08:28,103
at some treaty arrangements.

1448
01:08:28,103 --> 01:08:29,404
So, some tariffs.

1449
01:08:29,404 --> 01:08:33,108
Regarding interconnection
and there were number

1450
01:08:33,108 --> 01:08:36,278
of very interesting proposals
that shut up in Dubai.

1451
01:08:36,278 --> 01:08:41,283
And I'm struck by the
timing because that happened

1452
01:08:41,283 --> 01:08:46,921
and now we now have a lot of
events regarding surveillance

1453
01:08:46,921 --> 01:08:49,624
and then I say and
so on and so forth.

1454
01:08:49,624 --> 01:08:52,227
And I guess with my panelists
I'd ask the question,

1455
01:08:52,227 --> 01:08:56,631
does anyone care to speculate
if water had been reversed?

1456
01:08:56,631 --> 01:08:58,166
What the outcome
would have been?

1457
01:08:58,166 --> 01:09:01,036
Because I've had a
few people suggest

1458
01:09:01,036 --> 01:09:03,904
that that's an interesting
exercise.

1459
01:09:03,904 --> 01:09:08,475
I am not sure whether or not
the outcome that we had in Dubai

1460
01:09:08,475 --> 01:09:12,913
in December is what
we would be seeing

1461
01:09:12,913 --> 01:09:16,451
if in fact it was being
done instead next month.

1462
01:09:16,451 --> 01:09:17,786
>> Hold on, that was my concern.

1463
01:09:17,786 --> 01:09:21,122
That's my concern.

1464
01:09:21,122 --> 01:09:26,493
Well, I think that if you
look at the World Conference

1465
01:09:26,493 --> 01:09:30,198
on International
Telecommunications,

1466
01:09:30,198 --> 01:09:34,769
it was an important treaty
negotiation, renegotiation

1467
01:09:34,769 --> 01:09:41,142
that hadn't been renegotiated
since 1988, is that right?

1468
01:09:41,142 --> 01:09:45,613
'88. And as Americans we look
at these negotiations as one--

1469
01:09:45,613 --> 01:09:52,587
as a one negotiation and I think
that that's a poor perspective

1470
01:09:52,587 --> 01:09:56,057
because the WCIT was really

1471
01:09:56,057 --> 01:10:01,029
about how does one monetize
the internet and to pay

1472
01:10:01,029 --> 01:10:03,365
for court infrastructure.

1473
01:10:03,365 --> 01:10:09,437
And it is one of a multi-series
of negotiations, the world--

1474
01:10:09,437 --> 01:10:13,842
there's another
telecommunications conference

1475
01:10:13,842 --> 01:10:17,212
on policy, WTPF, it
just happened in Geneva

1476
01:10:17,212 --> 01:10:20,448
and they'll be the world
summit on information society

1477
01:10:20,448 --> 01:10:24,753
that will be culminating
in 2014 I think, right?

1478
01:10:24,753 --> 01:10:26,121
2014, '15.

1479
01:10:26,121 --> 01:10:27,389
>> So on, yup.

1480
01:10:27,389 --> 01:10:31,092
>> And there will be 24
negotiations to go between now

1481
01:10:31,092 --> 01:10:35,830
and then that will ultimately
be where things will land.

1482
01:10:35,830 --> 01:10:37,299
And then from-- the world summit

1483
01:10:37,299 --> 01:10:39,467
on information society
will be the strategy

1484
01:10:39,467 --> 01:10:43,471
by which will be executed
in the WTPF for policy.

1485
01:10:43,471 --> 01:10:48,143
The WCIT for regulation and
in the internet standards--

1486
01:10:48,143 --> 01:10:50,211
in the international
standards organization

1487
01:10:50,211 --> 01:10:53,281
for the overall technology.

1488
01:10:53,281 --> 01:10:57,452
So, I think if you are a
person in the corporate world

1489
01:10:57,452 --> 01:10:59,688
and you're worried about these
things you shouldn't just look

1490
01:10:59,688 --> 01:11:01,790
at one of these forums
as one off.

1491
01:11:01,790 --> 01:11:03,191
And if you're worried about it

1492
01:11:03,191 --> 01:11:05,226
from a government perspective
it's not just the policy forum

1493
01:11:05,226 --> 01:11:07,495
where the regulatory forum,
it's all of this forum

1494
01:11:07,495 --> 01:11:08,830
and they're all interconnected.

1495
01:11:08,830 --> 01:11:12,567
So, I would say that yes, I
think you actually suggested

1496
01:11:12,567 --> 01:11:15,770
that it was a positive outcome
at WCIT in Dubai and I think

1497
01:11:15,770 --> 01:11:19,240
that the United States lost
in that negotiation but--

1498
01:11:19,240 --> 01:11:23,111
and I think that the United
States and many are going

1499
01:11:23,111 --> 01:11:26,348
to continue to lose and it's
going to be a quick erosion

1500
01:11:26,348 --> 01:11:31,486
of our stance not a slower
version of our stance.

1501
01:11:31,486 --> 01:11:34,456
>> I'll take one more
question from the panel.

1502
01:11:34,456 --> 01:11:36,558
Any other panelist has
a question before we go

1503
01:11:36,558 --> 01:11:39,327
out to the audience?

1504
01:11:39,327 --> 01:11:42,197
Going once?

1505
01:11:43,765 --> 01:11:45,333
OK.

1506
01:11:45,333 --> 01:11:47,369
>> Mike Nelson with
Bloomberg Government

1507
01:11:47,369 --> 01:11:49,137
and with Georgetown University.

1508
01:11:49,137 --> 01:11:51,673
I want to commend the internet
society for great panel,

1509
01:11:51,673 --> 01:11:53,708
we got the lawyers,
we've got the techies,

1510
01:11:53,708 --> 01:11:56,578
we've got the scholars,
we've got the activists,

1511
01:11:56,578 --> 01:11:59,347
and that's great but we
tend here in Washington

1512
01:11:59,347 --> 01:12:00,915
to talk about the policy.

1513
01:12:00,915 --> 01:12:03,685
And Danny I tweeted your--

1514
01:12:03,685 --> 01:12:06,955
a [inaudible] of your talk
which I thought was exceptional.

1515
01:12:06,955 --> 01:12:08,890
And that was--

1516
01:12:08,890 --> 01:12:10,792
>> You got it to 142 characters?

1517
01:12:10,792 --> 01:12:12,627
>> Less than that.

1518
01:12:12,627 --> 01:12:17,766
But you basically said, data
will flow, we can't really focus

1519
01:12:17,766 --> 01:12:20,402
as we used to on
controlling that flow,

1520
01:12:20,402 --> 01:12:25,073
we have to control the
misuse of that data.

1521
01:12:25,073 --> 01:12:27,876
Policy makers are starting
to understand that.

1522
01:12:27,876 --> 01:12:30,478
But I think we also
have to figure out a way

1523
01:12:30,478 --> 01:12:33,648
that techies can start
implementing systems

1524
01:12:33,648 --> 01:12:35,150
that reflect that.

1525
01:12:35,150 --> 01:12:38,253
And the first way to
do that is to make sure

1526
01:12:38,253 --> 01:12:41,589
that systems are more
transparent so that we can see

1527
01:12:41,589 --> 01:12:44,459
where data is being misused.

1528
01:12:44,459 --> 01:12:47,829
And I guess I'd challenge the
audience to think about privacy,

1529
01:12:47,829 --> 01:12:50,832
not to tell the audience
and the panel to think

1530
01:12:50,832 --> 01:12:53,868
about transparency by design.

1531
01:12:53,868 --> 01:12:57,505
We've heard about privacy by
design but has anybody thought

1532
01:12:57,505 --> 01:13:00,642
of examples of where we're
building in the transparencies

1533
01:13:00,642 --> 01:13:03,144
so its in the technology
and other places

1534
01:13:03,144 --> 01:13:05,079
where we could do that better?

1535
01:13:05,079 --> 01:13:08,016
Just an open question.

1536
01:13:08,016 --> 01:13:09,417
>> Laura?

1537
01:13:09,417 --> 01:13:13,421
>> OK. I think that's a really
great question and a good point.

1538
01:13:13,421 --> 01:13:16,858
I'll give one example of where
I think the transparency is

1539
01:13:16,858 --> 01:13:18,693
excellent and then
a couple of examples

1540
01:13:18,693 --> 01:13:21,262
where I think we need
more transparency.

1541
01:13:21,262 --> 01:13:24,232
What is one of the oldest and
most vulnerable institutions

1542
01:13:24,232 --> 01:13:25,600
of internet governance?

1543
01:13:25,600 --> 01:13:28,736
The internet engineering
taskforce jumps to mind.

1544
01:13:28,736 --> 01:13:30,038
So, this is the-- one

1545
01:13:30,038 --> 01:13:32,941
of the standard setting
organizations for the internet.

1546
01:13:32,941 --> 01:13:34,676
There are many others
but they have set many

1547
01:13:34,676 --> 01:13:39,814
of the core standards so they
have a tradition of being open

1548
01:13:39,814 --> 01:13:41,249
in three different ways.

1549
01:13:41,249 --> 01:13:44,052
They're open in the
development of a standard

1550
01:13:44,052 --> 01:13:46,221
and that anyone can participate.

1551
01:13:46,221 --> 01:13:49,190
Now, granted there are a lot
of barriers to participation,

1552
01:13:49,190 --> 01:13:51,459
it requires a lot of
technical knowledge,

1553
01:13:51,459 --> 01:13:54,929
it requires in many
cases money to go to some

1554
01:13:54,929 --> 01:13:57,065
of the events in time.

1555
01:13:57,065 --> 01:13:59,734
But it is basically
open to anyone.

1556
01:13:59,734 --> 01:14:02,370
They are also open
and transparent

1557
01:14:02,370 --> 01:14:04,739
in that the actual
specification.

1558
01:14:04,739 --> 01:14:06,508
So, a standard is
not really software

1559
01:14:06,508 --> 01:14:09,377
or hardware specifications
that are written down

1560
01:14:09,377 --> 01:14:11,546
and people can go
online and view them.

1561
01:14:11,546 --> 01:14:14,516
So, I would differ with some
of the panelists and say that,

1562
01:14:14,516 --> 01:14:17,919
"Oh the technology
is-- it is political."

1563
01:14:17,919 --> 01:14:22,023
So, the technology designers
make political decisions

1564
01:14:22,023 --> 01:14:25,527
in the design whether they
like to call it that or not.

1565
01:14:25,527 --> 01:14:27,695
So, sometimes privacy
is designed in.

1566
01:14:27,695 --> 01:14:30,198
Think about encryption
standards for example.

1567
01:14:30,198 --> 01:14:33,535
Think about unique identifiers
and the privacy implications.

1568
01:14:33,535 --> 01:14:36,971
Yet the specification is
open so there are some degree

1569
01:14:36,971 --> 01:14:39,240
of accountability where
people can view it.

1570
01:14:39,240 --> 01:14:41,442
It's also open in
the implementation

1571
01:14:41,442 --> 01:14:44,379
because it results in
multiple competing products

1572
01:14:44,379 --> 01:14:46,247
that are based on that standard.

1573
01:14:46,247 --> 01:14:47,649
So, that's an example.

1574
01:14:47,649 --> 01:14:50,718
In other cases we don't have a
lot of transparency and I agree

1575
01:14:50,718 --> 01:14:52,186
with you that we need more.

1576
01:14:52,186 --> 01:14:55,890
So, here is an example, how do
we look at interconnections?

1577
01:14:55,890 --> 01:14:59,394
So, this is an area where
I'm worried because of all

1578
01:14:59,394 --> 01:15:01,563
of the calls for greater
government regulation

1579
01:15:01,563 --> 01:15:03,097
of interconnection in an area

1580
01:15:03,097 --> 01:15:06,401
that has worked fairly
well up until now.

1581
01:15:06,401 --> 01:15:08,536
Well, part of the reason
we're seeing this calls

1582
01:15:08,536 --> 01:15:10,772
for a regulation is that we
can't really see what the

1583
01:15:10,772 --> 01:15:13,207
agreements are between
these private companies.

1584
01:15:13,207 --> 01:15:17,178
So, I think it would be more
helpful to have transparency

1585
01:15:17,178 --> 01:15:19,714
in an area such as that as well
as other infrastructure areas.

1586
01:15:19,714 --> 01:15:25,987
>> So, I want to go
back to Danny's premise

1587
01:15:25,987 --> 01:15:28,856
which you apparently
support which seems to be--

1588
01:15:28,856 --> 01:15:32,560
data will flow, everybody
will collect it

1589
01:15:32,560 --> 01:15:34,395
and we should only
focus on the uses.

1590
01:15:34,395 --> 01:15:36,864
And that's certainly a
discussion we've had on sort

1591
01:15:36,864 --> 01:15:39,334
of the consumer side
of the ledger?

1592
01:15:39,334 --> 01:15:41,402
You know, Google will
collect it and where we have

1593
01:15:41,402 --> 01:15:44,339
to focus our attention
is how they're using it.

1594
01:15:44,339 --> 01:15:47,542
I have to submit the government
is collecting information

1595
01:15:47,542 --> 01:15:52,113
and certainly the US government
collecting information really

1596
01:15:52,113 --> 01:15:55,917
to-- is subject to-- I mean in
our own country it's subject

1597
01:15:55,917 --> 01:15:59,954
to this little thing called
the Fourth Amendment and I know

1598
01:15:59,954 --> 01:16:03,992
of no case and I stand-- I'm
willing to stand corrected

1599
01:16:03,992 --> 01:16:06,828
that says, you can go in--

1600
01:16:06,828 --> 01:16:09,597
I mean, this is essentially
what the governments is arguing

1601
01:16:09,597 --> 01:16:11,232
in NSA collection.

1602
01:16:11,232 --> 01:16:15,837
And they're calling it
acquisition and not collection

1603
01:16:15,837 --> 01:16:19,507
that acquiring the
information is not collection.

1604
01:16:19,507 --> 01:16:24,445
And that any rights that
might attach don't happen

1605
01:16:24,445 --> 01:16:26,280
until you open and
look at the packets.

1606
01:16:26,280 --> 01:16:29,117
I don't know, you know, I've
never heard anybody come

1607
01:16:29,117 --> 01:16:31,519
into somebody's house, walk
away with their desk drawer

1608
01:16:31,519 --> 01:16:33,855
and say, "We're acquiring."

1609
01:16:33,855 --> 01:16:37,659
To let you know if we ever
get around to looking at it.

1610
01:16:37,659 --> 01:16:41,095
And so-- Danny and I have
some disagreement although I'm

1611
01:16:41,095 --> 01:16:43,631
getting persuaded
more and more by his--

1612
01:16:43,631 --> 01:16:47,802
by the question of use
in the commercial side

1613
01:16:47,802 --> 01:16:49,837
of this big data world.

1614
01:16:49,837 --> 01:16:52,607
But, I'm not willing to go
there in terms of governments.

1615
01:16:52,607 --> 01:16:54,742
And I think it's a really
dangerous thing to do.

1616
01:16:54,742 --> 01:17:00,815
>> So I-- just to
clarify, my observation

1617
01:17:00,815 --> 01:17:07,789
that data will flow is not
meant as a moral conclusion.

1618
01:17:07,789 --> 01:17:11,492
And I think the extension
which we choose to put limits

1619
01:17:11,492 --> 01:17:15,596
on how much data government
can acquire from those

1620
01:17:15,596 --> 01:17:17,465
who have already
collected it, right.

1621
01:17:17,465 --> 01:17:21,636
Because that's what
we're talking about here,

1622
01:17:21,636 --> 01:17:26,708
it's very important and I think
that historically we have relied

1623
01:17:26,708 --> 01:17:32,080
on technical barriers to large
scale information collection

1624
01:17:32,080 --> 01:17:34,882
as a way to limit how much
power the government has

1625
01:17:34,882 --> 01:17:36,217
and we don't have those anymore.

1626
01:17:36,217 --> 01:17:38,619
So, we're going to have
to get very explicit

1627
01:17:38,619 --> 01:17:41,155
about what limits we think
government should have

1628
01:17:41,155 --> 01:17:43,424
on both the collection
and the use front.

1629
01:17:43,424 --> 01:17:46,594
My only observation kind of
back to your point Mike is

1630
01:17:46,594 --> 01:17:50,364
that we are much
better technically

1631
01:17:50,364 --> 01:17:52,734
at managing collection
limitation

1632
01:17:52,734 --> 01:17:54,736
than we are managing
use limitation.

1633
01:17:54,736 --> 01:17:57,038
Just as a pure matter
of the kinds

1634
01:17:57,038 --> 01:18:00,708
of computer science techniques
that we have available

1635
01:18:00,708 --> 01:18:04,779
and I would submit
that's because, you know,

1636
01:18:04,779 --> 01:18:07,782
the computer security community
cryptographers have taught us a

1637
01:18:07,782 --> 01:18:12,220
huge amount about how
to keep data secret

1638
01:18:12,220 --> 01:18:14,155
and control access to data.

1639
01:18:14,155 --> 01:18:17,125
There's a whole other set
of disciplines developing

1640
01:18:17,125 --> 01:18:21,629
in computer science that try to
characterize information usage,

1641
01:18:21,629 --> 01:18:26,134
track information usage,
but it is a different--

1642
01:18:26,134 --> 01:18:30,505
but there is less progress
on that because I think

1643
01:18:30,505 --> 01:18:33,207
that that's not a
view of privacy

1644
01:18:33,207 --> 01:18:36,944
that computer sciences
have previously focused on.

1645
01:18:36,944 --> 01:18:38,780
So, I think you're
exactly right to point

1646
01:18:38,780 --> 01:18:40,581
out that we need
more work there.

1647
01:18:40,581 --> 01:18:41,983
>> I'd actually hear
from the techies.

1648
01:18:41,983 --> 01:18:44,418
Because I wasn't thinking
so much about transparency

1649
01:18:44,418 --> 01:18:46,487
at the institution
level at layer eight.

1650
01:18:46,487 --> 01:18:48,890
I was thinking more
the lower levels.

1651
01:18:48,890 --> 01:18:49,957
Well, like--

1652
01:18:49,957 --> 01:18:51,325
>> Oh, I'll give the--
let me give the--

1653
01:18:51,325 --> 01:18:52,727
>> -- like route to tracing,
you know, when we send an e-mail

1654
01:18:52,727 --> 01:18:54,729
to each other you can find out
where it balanced along the way.

1655
01:18:54,729 --> 01:18:57,098
>> Let me give the techies
about two minutes before we move

1656
01:18:57,098 --> 01:18:59,433
on to another question
because we will have a chance

1657
01:18:59,433 --> 01:19:02,003
to circle back in
the round table again

1658
01:19:02,003 --> 01:19:03,805
so we can take another
bite at the apple here.

1659
01:19:03,805 --> 01:19:04,338
>> Yeah.

1660
01:19:04,338 --> 01:19:05,406
>> Go ahead.

1661
01:19:05,406 --> 01:19:06,774
>> I just want to--
just very quickly.

1662
01:19:06,774 --> 01:19:08,042
Stealing is stealing.

1663
01:19:08,042 --> 01:19:09,577
It doesn't matter whether
it's in the physical world

1664
01:19:09,577 --> 01:19:11,479
or in the cyber world.

1665
01:19:11,479 --> 01:19:16,184
So, whatever the techniques you
have to collect data of a theft,

1666
01:19:16,184 --> 01:19:18,953
in the physical world you
can apply the same techniques

1667
01:19:18,953 --> 01:19:20,288
in the cyber world.

1668
01:19:20,288 --> 01:19:22,156
The difference is speed.

1669
01:19:22,156 --> 01:19:25,293
I mean it takes me
physically a long time to go in

1670
01:19:25,293 --> 01:19:27,762
and steal a laptop from
the gentleman's tester

1671
01:19:27,762 --> 01:19:30,264
but I can steal all the
information on his laptop

1672
01:19:30,264 --> 01:19:32,934
in a second, probably as long
as it took me to do it as long

1673
01:19:32,934 --> 01:19:34,769
as I can connect
it over the net.

1674
01:19:34,769 --> 01:19:38,206
So, the comment about
the government, you know,

1675
01:19:38,206 --> 01:19:41,175
and the search warrant in
the constitution, you should,

1676
01:19:41,175 --> 01:19:42,210
you know, that's why it's there.

1677
01:19:42,210 --> 01:19:43,811
That's why we have
the constitution is

1678
01:19:43,811 --> 01:19:45,012
to follow those laws.

1679
01:19:45,012 --> 01:19:47,715
And you can still achieve
the same goals and stay

1680
01:19:47,715 --> 01:19:49,750
within the constitutional
limits.

1681
01:19:49,750 --> 01:19:51,118
It's been done.

1682
01:19:51,118 --> 01:19:54,021
It's just that what's happened
is we got a bunch of people

1683
01:19:54,021 --> 01:19:58,092
at the policy level that
didn't understand what the

1684
01:19:58,092 --> 01:20:00,027
implications are.

1685
01:20:00,027 --> 01:20:01,395
And that's where-- everything

1686
01:20:01,395 --> 01:20:03,097
that they've done
has been legal.

1687
01:20:03,097 --> 01:20:04,332
It-- the law is the problem.

1688
01:20:04,332 --> 01:20:06,601
Not what whether
they're doing it or that.

1689
01:20:06,601 --> 01:20:08,836
>> I would question that.

1690
01:20:08,836 --> 01:20:10,037
>> But--

1691
01:20:10,037 --> 01:20:13,074
>> OK. I'm going to move
this along because I want

1692
01:20:13,074 --> 01:20:15,610
to give Joanne a chance and
I'm sure Steve is getting a lot

1693
01:20:15,610 --> 01:20:17,879
of farther for the round table
to come back to just later on.

1694
01:20:17,879 --> 01:20:19,213
>> So, I don't want
to pick up on thing

1695
01:20:19,213 --> 01:20:23,818
which is the internet has
a tradition or convention,

1696
01:20:23,818 --> 01:20:28,489
I wouldn't say tradition,
convention of protocols

1697
01:20:28,489 --> 01:20:31,359
which behave in an open manner.

1698
01:20:31,359 --> 01:20:34,896
And so, this is for
example, your--

1699
01:20:34,896 --> 01:20:37,465
when you're looking at how
packets flow, there are commands

1700
01:20:37,465 --> 01:20:40,167
like traceroute that let you see
how they go through the internet

1701
01:20:40,167 --> 01:20:43,738
and you can map them through an
exchange point most of the time.

1702
01:20:43,738 --> 01:20:46,274
When you look at mail headers,
you can look at e-mail headers

1703
01:20:46,274 --> 01:20:48,676
and you can actually see,
wow that's not my e-mail,

1704
01:20:48,676 --> 01:20:51,512
it got from point A to
point B and it's visible

1705
01:20:51,512 --> 01:20:54,282
and you can see those
most of the time.

1706
01:20:54,282 --> 01:20:57,385
When you look at a packet that
you've received you can look

1707
01:20:57,385 --> 01:21:00,121
at the source address and
say, "Oh, where is that from?"

1708
01:21:00,121 --> 01:21:04,025
And you can look it up and
find it most of the time.

1709
01:21:04,025 --> 01:21:06,594
Now, there is no
obligations that any

1710
01:21:06,594 --> 01:21:08,429
of this information is accurate.

1711
01:21:08,429 --> 01:21:09,897
It's all sufficiently accurate

1712
01:21:09,897 --> 01:21:12,600
to keep the internet
running or at least so far.

1713
01:21:12,600 --> 01:21:15,336
And we hope it will
just keep it running,

1714
01:21:15,336 --> 01:21:18,873
but there's no actual
obligations and you need

1715
01:21:18,873 --> 01:21:23,077
to be careful because while
there would be some benefit

1716
01:21:23,077 --> 01:21:27,181
to having an attribute that says
there's an actual obligation

1717
01:21:27,181 --> 01:21:30,918
to make this accurate, then
I see people emerging saying,

1718
01:21:30,918 --> 01:21:34,455
"Well, wait a second, now I'm
worried about my anonymity

1719
01:21:34,455 --> 01:21:38,326
because now you can trace my
IP, or you can trace my e-mail."

1720
01:21:38,326 --> 01:21:43,931
So, we have just a
convention of transparency

1721
01:21:43,931 --> 01:21:46,133
which has been enough to
keep the internet running.

1722
01:21:46,133 --> 01:21:47,835
There is a question on
whether or not that's going

1723
01:21:47,835 --> 01:21:50,538
to actually work long term.

1724
01:21:50,538 --> 01:21:55,176
The point that was made by
Randy which is that the rate

1725
01:21:55,176 --> 01:21:58,379
at which you can attack
something digitally is a lot

1726
01:21:58,379 --> 01:21:59,914
faster than physically.

1727
01:21:59,914 --> 01:22:03,451
And this means that the ability
to have an accountable internet

1728
01:22:03,451 --> 01:22:07,822
where we can actually figure
out who sent the bomb threat

1729
01:22:07,822 --> 01:22:11,359
or figure out who sent the
e-mail which cause the problem

1730
01:22:11,359 --> 01:22:15,563
at the school is
potentially a very large duty

1731
01:22:15,563 --> 01:22:19,767
and it may require us making
a tradeoff between anonymity

1732
01:22:19,767 --> 01:22:24,138
and curated anonymity in
order to have accountability.

1733
01:22:24,138 --> 01:22:26,173
Right now it's not
clear that one

1734
01:22:26,173 --> 01:22:27,975
or the other is the
right answer.

1735
01:22:27,975 --> 01:22:31,245
>> So, we may-- we'll circle
back to this in the round table.

1736
01:22:31,245 --> 01:22:34,749
Let me move on to the
next question over here.

1737
01:22:34,749 --> 01:22:38,853
>> All right, I'm [inaudible]
cofounder of Codex for Africa.

1738
01:22:38,853 --> 01:22:40,921
This is more to as
the techie side too

1739
01:22:40,921 --> 01:22:43,257
but at the same time
from a global view.

1740
01:22:43,257 --> 01:22:47,695
We represent thousand
of developers in Africa,

1741
01:22:47,695 --> 01:22:49,764
in the upcoming years it's going

1742
01:22:49,764 --> 01:22:51,832
to be more software
developers who're are going

1743
01:22:51,832 --> 01:22:56,070
to be creating thousands of
applications on mobile and web.

1744
01:22:56,070 --> 01:22:59,507
And one of the things is what
are the strategies there,

1745
01:22:59,507 --> 01:23:03,077
when you have emerging countries
or emerging economy jumping

1746
01:23:03,077 --> 01:23:06,213
on a bag of bandwagon of using
the internet to do transaction

1747
01:23:06,213 --> 01:23:08,849
with the US or the
western world.

1748
01:23:08,849 --> 01:23:12,486
What do you think what would
happen because I could be

1749
01:23:12,486 --> 01:23:16,924
in a country like Synagogue,
you know, do some hacking,

1750
01:23:16,924 --> 01:23:20,561
I can do anything I can because
you don't have access to the--

1751
01:23:20,561 --> 01:23:22,630
maybe the continent
level network.

1752
01:23:22,630 --> 01:23:27,935
But as well as the
western world,

1753
01:23:27,935 --> 01:23:29,804
what are your strategies
and all that?

1754
01:23:29,804 --> 01:23:33,607
>> Well, this is where
the law comes into play.

1755
01:23:33,607 --> 01:23:35,576
What we hear on the
techie side for instance is

1756
01:23:35,576 --> 01:23:38,345
of course there is laws
in hacking in the US,

1757
01:23:38,345 --> 01:23:41,048
but there is no laws
in hacking in China,

1758
01:23:41,048 --> 01:23:42,416
as we would understand it.

1759
01:23:42,416 --> 01:23:45,820
So, each country gets to define,
you know, what a hacking is.

1760
01:23:45,820 --> 01:23:49,323
Some may take it as an
assault against the government

1761
01:23:49,323 --> 01:23:51,192
if you are hacking, you know,

1762
01:23:51,192 --> 01:23:54,795
some might just say it's
a plain and simple theft.

1763
01:23:54,795 --> 01:23:57,131
So, you're going to have to-- I
would think you'd have to look

1764
01:23:57,131 --> 01:23:59,900
at each individual
country's definition

1765
01:23:59,900 --> 01:24:03,504
of what they considered to
be hacking in that case.

1766
01:24:03,504 --> 01:24:07,641
Now, on the other side, again,
if you're writing an application

1767
01:24:07,641 --> 01:24:09,810
for someone like that then
you're going to do logging,

1768
01:24:09,810 --> 01:24:12,480
you're going to do all of this
type of stuff because you want

1769
01:24:12,480 --> 01:24:15,749
to provide an auditor
if you will

1770
01:24:15,749 --> 01:24:17,952
if it's a financial
application with some record

1771
01:24:17,952 --> 01:24:20,654
of whatever transactions
your software handles.

1772
01:24:20,654 --> 01:24:23,557
So, there's always going to be
a record of something that you--

1773
01:24:23,557 --> 01:24:26,460
either your app did or
where your app went.

1774
01:24:26,460 --> 01:24:30,331
Whether it's accurate or
not that's another question

1775
01:24:30,331 --> 01:24:31,632
but there's always
going to be a record.

1776
01:24:31,632 --> 01:24:34,635
And again, metadata
analysis I can use that

1777
01:24:34,635 --> 01:24:35,903
and make some inferences

1778
01:24:35,903 --> 01:24:39,039
as to what you did even
though I can't see what you--

1779
01:24:39,039 --> 01:24:43,511
what's in your individual
packets if you encrypted them.

1780
01:24:43,511 --> 01:24:44,578
>> John?

1781
01:24:44,578 --> 01:24:48,716
>> So, that's an amazing
wake up call here.

1782
01:24:48,716 --> 01:24:51,552
So, we have this internet
that's remarkable.

1783
01:24:51,552 --> 01:24:56,056
It allows people to interact,
people in different countries

1784
01:24:56,056 --> 01:24:59,059
with different expectations
to interact.

1785
01:24:59,059 --> 01:25:00,995
And yet, the conventions

1786
01:25:00,995 --> 01:25:06,667
by which governments work
haven't evolved fast enough.

1787
01:25:06,667 --> 01:25:10,204
The idea that citizen in country
A is interacting with citizen

1788
01:25:10,204 --> 01:25:14,542
in country B and it might be
illegal in one country and not

1789
01:25:14,542 --> 01:25:17,111
in another is a whole
new concept

1790
01:25:17,111 --> 01:25:19,914
that governments are going
to take some time to try

1791
01:25:19,914 --> 01:25:21,448
to figure out how to deal with.

1792
01:25:21,448 --> 01:25:22,683
So, we have a problem.

1793
01:25:22,683 --> 01:25:25,352
We literally have an
internet that has capabilities

1794
01:25:25,352 --> 01:25:29,223
that governments haven't
come to grip on how

1795
01:25:29,223 --> 01:25:32,893
to handle their duties
and responsibilities.

1796
01:25:32,893 --> 01:25:35,429
I know governments
have feel very strongly

1797
01:25:35,429 --> 01:25:38,499
about protecting their
citizens against pornography

1798
01:25:38,499 --> 01:25:41,869
or against certain
types of content.

1799
01:25:41,869 --> 01:25:43,270
I know governments
in other countries

1800
01:25:43,270 --> 01:25:46,840
that feel very strongly that
that's up to each citizen.

1801
01:25:46,840 --> 01:25:49,944
But the reality is that that
intersection has now happened

1802
01:25:49,944 --> 01:25:51,145
because of the internet.

1803
01:25:51,145 --> 01:25:53,948
Two governments can have
very different views

1804
01:25:53,948 --> 01:25:56,817
on what their responsibilities
of their citizens are.

1805
01:25:56,817 --> 01:26:00,387
So, to answer your
question in a general case,

1806
01:26:00,387 --> 01:26:02,022
the internets move
faster than governments.

1807
01:26:02,022 --> 01:26:04,024
Governments literally do
not know how to interact

1808
01:26:04,024 --> 01:26:05,893
with the situation you describe.

1809
01:26:05,893 --> 01:26:09,396
On a practical matter, if
you end up doing something

1810
01:26:09,396 --> 01:26:13,033
of significance, something
that causes a lot of harm

1811
01:26:13,033 --> 01:26:17,271
or actually there's a very
nice list of types of attacks,

1812
01:26:17,271 --> 01:26:21,775
distraction of property, theft
of intellectual property.

1813
01:26:21,775 --> 01:26:25,412
There's different types
of extortion or DDoS,

1814
01:26:25,412 --> 01:26:29,416
if you actually do something of
a major magnitude you'll find

1815
01:26:29,416 --> 01:26:32,119
out that law enforcement does
cooperate between countries

1816
01:26:32,119 --> 01:26:33,520
and it works very well.

1817
01:26:33,520 --> 01:26:36,223
It's just not set up for
the scale of the internet.

1818
01:26:36,223 --> 01:26:39,560
And it's in the age
of the cooperation

1819
01:26:39,560 --> 01:26:41,195
between law enforcement

1820
01:26:41,195 --> 01:26:44,898
and various computer
response teams is one step

1821
01:26:44,898 --> 01:26:48,135
above fax machines ringing
and going back and forth.

1822
01:26:48,135 --> 01:26:51,538
We have the mechanism to
handle the really bad events

1823
01:26:51,538 --> 01:26:53,073
fairly slowly.

1824
01:26:53,073 --> 01:26:55,342
We don't have anything
to handle the scale

1825
01:26:55,342 --> 01:26:58,545
of automatic attacks
happening 24 hours a day

1826
01:26:58,545 --> 01:27:00,114
around the entire
globe which don't--

1827
01:27:00,114 --> 01:27:01,682
>> Let me move to Danny.

1828
01:27:01,682 --> 01:27:03,550
He wanted to say something
and then I'm going to move

1829
01:27:03,550 --> 01:27:05,152
on to the next question.

1830
01:27:05,152 --> 01:27:06,820
By the way, I can't
really talk to anybody

1831
01:27:06,820 --> 01:27:09,256
in New York once
I ask a question.

1832
01:27:09,256 --> 01:27:11,492
So, what they do I guess
they'll stand up or something

1833
01:27:11,492 --> 01:27:12,459
or else go through Paul.

1834
01:27:12,459 --> 01:27:13,794
Danny, go ahead.

1835
01:27:13,794 --> 01:27:17,965
>> I just want to make one
observation about the challenge

1836
01:27:17,965 --> 01:27:23,537
of international law
enforcement cooperation.

1837
01:27:23,537 --> 01:27:26,106
Most people in this room
are probably familiar

1838
01:27:26,106 --> 01:27:30,577
with the SOPA debate that was
proposed in United States.

1839
01:27:30,577 --> 01:27:33,814
In a certain sense we only
have that debate with all

1840
01:27:33,814 --> 01:27:40,154
of its cataclysm because of the
failure of current mechanisms

1841
01:27:40,154 --> 01:27:43,023
in international law
enforcement cooperation.

1842
01:27:43,023 --> 01:27:45,592
We have that debate, the
Congress was considering

1843
01:27:45,592 --> 01:27:50,564
that law blocking access

1844
01:27:50,564 --> 01:27:53,233
to websites outside
the United States

1845
01:27:53,233 --> 01:27:58,038
that might have infringing
content because people

1846
01:27:58,038 --> 01:27:59,473
in Congress were concerned

1847
01:27:59,473 --> 01:28:03,344
that US Law Enforcement didn't
have an effective way of working

1848
01:28:03,344 --> 01:28:07,781
with law enforcement
authorities from the countries

1849
01:28:07,781 --> 01:28:09,850
where the infringement
was actually happening.

1850
01:28:09,850 --> 01:28:16,256
I think that we have to get a
lot better as John is suggesting

1851
01:28:16,256 --> 01:28:18,859
at add enforcement cooperation.

1852
01:28:18,859 --> 01:28:21,895
There are realms where that
works reasonably well but it's--

1853
01:28:21,895 --> 01:28:25,632
the problem is it's mostly
cooperation in the form of how

1854
01:28:25,632 --> 01:28:30,003
to make a criminal conviction
against someone to stick.

1855
01:28:30,003 --> 01:28:32,773
Law enforcement cooperation
mechanisms are good

1856
01:28:32,773 --> 01:28:34,541
at exchanging evidence,
it make sure

1857
01:28:34,541 --> 01:28:37,811
that you have the information
you need to, you know,

1858
01:28:37,811 --> 01:28:41,215
bring someone to
trial but not good

1859
01:28:41,215 --> 01:28:45,219
at actually stopping
the behavior

1860
01:28:45,219 --> 01:28:47,054
that maybe harmful
as it's happening.

1861
01:28:47,054 --> 01:28:49,156
So, I think it's a
very big challenge.

1862
01:28:49,156 --> 01:28:51,792
>> All right, go to Paul for a--

1863
01:28:51,792 --> 01:28:53,727
>> I actually did see that
David Salmon [assumed spelling]

1864
01:28:53,727 --> 01:28:57,131
of the New York Society's
chapter president would

1865
01:28:57,131 --> 01:28:58,365
like to have a question.

1866
01:28:58,365 --> 01:28:59,700
So, why don't we go
to him if he will--

1867
01:28:59,700 --> 01:29:01,568
I think they have a
little bit of a delay.

1868
01:29:01,568 --> 01:29:05,539
So, he might just be
hearing this in a second.

1869
01:29:05,539 --> 01:29:07,441
>> OK David.

1870
01:29:07,441 --> 01:29:14,982
[ Inaudible Remark ]

1871
01:29:14,982 --> 01:29:22,689
>> OK, that's your cue David.

1872
01:29:22,689 --> 01:29:24,558
>> OK. I'll speak to the
camera then or-- yeah.

1873
01:29:24,558 --> 01:29:26,460
OK, so.

1874
01:29:26,460 --> 01:29:34,001
[ Inaudible Remark ]

1875
01:29:34,001 --> 01:29:36,570
OK, we have some delay here.

1876
01:29:36,570 --> 01:29:39,440
My question is what sort

1877
01:29:39,440 --> 01:29:41,608
of scenarios do our
panelists envision

1878
01:29:41,608 --> 01:29:45,712
and what would be some
alternative solutions

1879
01:29:45,712 --> 01:29:50,417
if our government specifically
Congress is unwilling or unable

1880
01:29:50,417 --> 01:29:54,755
to rain in agencies such as the
NSA in terms of surveillance?

1881
01:29:54,755 --> 01:29:57,057
If they can't do
it or choose not

1882
01:29:57,057 --> 01:29:58,992
to what would be
the consequences?

1883
01:29:58,992 --> 01:30:02,029
Are there technical solutions
or are there possible solutions

1884
01:30:02,029 --> 01:30:05,032
that could be implemented
without US government?

1885
01:30:05,032 --> 01:30:09,803
>> OK. The panelists are being--
the panelists are being asked,

1886
01:30:09,803 --> 01:30:11,605
is there a work around congress?

1887
01:30:11,605 --> 01:30:15,075
>> I would just to
speak to it just

1888
01:30:15,075 --> 01:30:16,944
as an individual not
as a panel member.

1889
01:30:16,944 --> 01:30:18,312
But if congress can't rain

1890
01:30:18,312 --> 01:30:21,548
in the government agency we
have a lot more serious problems

1891
01:30:21,548 --> 01:30:23,584
than what's going
on in the internet.

1892
01:30:23,584 --> 01:30:28,021
>> When was the last time
we passed a federal budget?

1893
01:30:28,021 --> 01:30:30,257
>> I mean, they are
government agency.

1894
01:30:30,257 --> 01:30:31,358
Congress has to do that.

1895
01:30:31,358 --> 01:30:34,695
Now, again, there is
classified information

1896
01:30:34,695 --> 01:30:37,865
and all this other stuff that
can influence how law is passed.

1897
01:30:37,865 --> 01:30:40,968
But quite frankly if congress
didn't have that power

1898
01:30:40,968 --> 01:30:43,737
to do it then we wouldn't see
General Alexander making a run

1899
01:30:43,737 --> 01:30:47,174
up to talk to members, I
think was it today or--

1900
01:30:47,174 --> 01:30:48,475
>> No, it's tomorrow.

1901
01:30:48,475 --> 01:30:49,409
>> Yeah, the vote is tomorrow.

1902
01:30:49,409 --> 01:30:50,944
So, you know, doing that,

1903
01:30:50,944 --> 01:30:53,780
so certainly I would think
congress has the ability to do

1904
01:30:53,780 --> 01:30:56,216
and should have the ability or
else we don't have a democracy.

1905
01:30:56,216 --> 01:30:59,820
>> OK, any other
panelist winging on that?

1906
01:30:59,820 --> 01:31:00,320
Lynn?

1907
01:31:00,320 --> 01:31:01,622
>> Well--

1908
01:31:01,622 --> 01:31:03,223
>> You can just say quicker
than I'm-- oh, I'm sorry.

1909
01:31:03,223 --> 01:31:04,324
>> No please.

1910
01:31:04,324 --> 01:31:06,527
>> That, you know, there
are ways for people

1911
01:31:06,527 --> 01:31:08,228
to manage their traffic.

1912
01:31:08,228 --> 01:31:11,331
I know I'm certainly certain
that would be even more ways

1913
01:31:11,331 --> 01:31:14,801
for people to manage their
traffic and choose the routing.

1914
01:31:14,801 --> 01:31:17,137
We actually are quite
concerned about that

1915
01:31:17,137 --> 01:31:20,707
because it will make the global
internet much less resilient.

1916
01:31:20,707 --> 01:31:24,545
It will-- putting something
in a box doesn't mean it's--

1917
01:31:24,545 --> 01:31:29,149
it maybe protecting it from
one country actually examine it

1918
01:31:29,149 --> 01:31:31,451
but it doesn't protect
the other country.

1919
01:31:31,451 --> 01:31:36,490
And so, I'm not quite sure
what David's question was but,

1920
01:31:36,490 --> 01:31:39,927
you know, if it's about
routing and the ability to route

1921
01:31:39,927 --> 01:31:42,829
around what you see as a
problem, I think we need

1922
01:31:42,829 --> 01:31:44,131
to be very, very
careful about what some

1923
01:31:44,131 --> 01:31:45,465
of those potential solutions are

1924
01:31:45,465 --> 01:31:47,501
and because I don't think
it will address the question

1925
01:31:47,501 --> 01:31:50,003
you're-- the problem you're
trying to route around.

1926
01:31:50,003 --> 01:31:54,274
And in fact it will overtime
make the global internet much

1927
01:31:54,274 --> 01:31:57,044
less resilient.

1928
01:31:57,044 --> 01:31:58,111
>> Paul?

1929
01:31:58,111 --> 01:31:59,880
>> OK, I have a question
from live stream.

1930
01:31:59,880 --> 01:32:01,615
It's from Garth Gram
[assumed spelling].

1931
01:32:01,615 --> 01:32:03,850
He asks, is the real
issue autonomy

1932
01:32:03,850 --> 01:32:06,587
and self determined
choice rather than privacy?

1933
01:32:06,587 --> 01:32:09,423
And if so, what is
the role of identity

1934
01:32:09,423 --> 01:32:12,926
in addressing the
issue of trust?

1935
01:32:12,926 --> 01:32:20,634
>> Well, I'll take
one step at that.

1936
01:32:20,634 --> 01:32:24,871
I think that in the
discussions of privacy

1937
01:32:24,871 --> 01:32:31,778
over the last 10 years or
so, maybe longer I think

1938
01:32:31,778 --> 01:32:36,383
that we've gotten a little
bit distracted by the promise

1939
01:32:36,383 --> 01:32:41,588
of individual choice as
somehow the key to privacy.

1940
01:32:41,588 --> 01:32:45,325
I think that a lot of
the privacy values--

1941
01:32:45,325 --> 01:32:48,462
and what I mean by that
is the dialogue box is

1942
01:32:48,462 --> 01:32:51,898
that everyone sees in, you
know, one website or another

1943
01:32:51,898 --> 01:32:54,701
where you have to click here
to accept the privacy policy

1944
01:32:54,701 --> 01:32:57,571
or swat away a dialogue
box to proceed.

1945
01:32:57,571 --> 01:33:03,010
And I think certainly in-- it's
actually a remarkable point

1946
01:33:03,010 --> 01:33:06,179
of convergence between the
United States and Europe

1947
01:33:06,179 --> 01:33:10,150
in the last couple years
both the White House

1948
01:33:10,150 --> 01:33:13,620
and the Federal Trade Commission
issued major privacy policy

1949
01:33:13,620 --> 01:33:16,857
statements that noted
the limitations of this

1950
01:33:16,857 --> 01:33:20,293
so called noticing choice or
individual determination model.

1951
01:33:20,293 --> 01:33:23,563
The European certainly have
pointed that out as well.

1952
01:33:23,563 --> 01:33:26,333
A lot of the things
that we value associated

1953
01:33:26,333 --> 01:33:27,968
with privacy are
collected values.

1954
01:33:27,968 --> 01:33:30,871
We want to make sure
people can associate freely,

1955
01:33:30,871 --> 01:33:33,874
can engage in politics,
can engage in commerce,

1956
01:33:33,874 --> 01:33:36,143
can seek medical
care, et cetera.

1957
01:33:36,143 --> 01:33:39,846
And I think that giving
people the choices to opt

1958
01:33:39,846 --> 01:33:42,749
out of those things or
somehow control their identity

1959
01:33:42,749 --> 01:33:45,852
when they are trying to
speak to their doctor or make

1960
01:33:45,852 --> 01:33:48,155
up public political
statement really seems

1961
01:33:48,155 --> 01:33:51,992
to be exactly the opposite of
some of our core privacy value.

1962
01:33:51,992 --> 01:33:55,295
So, I think that
there are situations

1963
01:33:55,295 --> 01:33:58,131
in which individual
autonomy is quite important

1964
01:33:58,131 --> 01:34:00,901
but a little bit also to the
last question about the NSA.

1965
01:34:00,901 --> 01:34:04,404
I don't think we get ourselves
out of these privacy problems

1966
01:34:04,404 --> 01:34:13,280
by just giving people, you
know, 20K long encryption keys

1967
01:34:13,280 --> 01:34:15,549
to wield against everyone else.

1968
01:34:15,549 --> 01:34:16,750
>> Laura?

1969
01:34:16,750 --> 01:34:20,887
>> That's a really
interesting question and I want

1970
01:34:20,887 --> 01:34:22,689
to tie it back to something

1971
01:34:22,689 --> 01:34:25,792
that I think Danny said
before about data will flow.

1972
01:34:25,792 --> 01:34:27,728
And, you know, while
I agree with that,

1973
01:34:27,728 --> 01:34:30,797
that's also not necessarily
the case.

1974
01:34:30,797 --> 01:34:34,034
We have interconnection disputes
that have resulted in outages,

1975
01:34:34,034 --> 01:34:36,136
we've had countries
that have cut off access

1976
01:34:36,136 --> 01:34:37,437
for their citizens.

1977
01:34:37,437 --> 01:34:39,806
We have areas of the world
that have infrastructures

1978
01:34:39,806 --> 01:34:41,374
of complete censorship.

1979
01:34:41,374 --> 01:34:44,411
We have digital divide
issues, we have trends away

1980
01:34:44,411 --> 01:34:47,380
from interoperability where
we're going in the cloud

1981
01:34:47,380 --> 01:34:50,250
to more proprietary
protocols for example.

1982
01:34:50,250 --> 01:34:53,420
So, it's-- so data will
not necessarily flow.

1983
01:34:53,420 --> 01:34:55,288
But one of the things
that is required for it

1984
01:34:55,288 --> 01:34:59,126
to flow is this issue of trust
that the questioner brought up.

1985
01:34:59,126 --> 01:35:03,830
So, I think I can mention just
a couple of areas or maybe three

1986
01:35:03,830 --> 01:35:05,165
that are very important.

1987
01:35:05,165 --> 01:35:09,002
So, the trust has always excited
between network providers

1988
01:35:09,002 --> 01:35:12,639
to exchange information about
IP addresses that are either

1989
01:35:12,639 --> 01:35:15,876
in their control or that they
can reach on the internet.

1990
01:35:15,876 --> 01:35:18,678
But we have seen
examples that's done

1991
01:35:18,678 --> 01:35:20,814
by through a boarder
gateway protocol.

1992
01:35:20,814 --> 01:35:22,182
There have been examples

1993
01:35:22,182 --> 01:35:25,452
where false routes have been
advertised whether intentionally

1994
01:35:25,452 --> 01:35:28,555
or not and outages
have occurred.

1995
01:35:28,555 --> 01:35:31,525
So, there is-- our effort
is underway now to secure

1996
01:35:31,525 --> 01:35:33,126
that which are very necessary.

1997
01:35:33,126 --> 01:35:35,295
So, we have to build
trust into the network.

1998
01:35:35,295 --> 01:35:37,230
It's not something that
we can just assume.

1999
01:35:37,230 --> 01:35:39,900
It has to be designed in,
it has to be build in.

2000
01:35:39,900 --> 01:35:42,903
The same thing with how the
domain name system works.

2001
01:35:42,903 --> 01:35:45,972
We have servers located around
the world that resolve queries

2002
01:35:45,972 --> 01:35:50,343
of domain names like maybe I'm
up here looking at cnn.com,

2003
01:35:50,343 --> 01:35:54,014
I'm not but the domain
name server would resolve

2004
01:35:54,014 --> 01:35:57,050
that into its IP address
and route the information.

2005
01:35:57,050 --> 01:35:59,986
Well, that can be gamed also

2006
01:35:59,986 --> 01:36:03,223
and that there can be a
false return of a query.

2007
01:36:03,223 --> 01:36:06,526
So, having things like domain
name system security extensions

2008
01:36:06,526 --> 01:36:08,762
has to be continued
to be implemented.

2009
01:36:08,762 --> 01:36:10,997
You know, these are just
a few of the examples,

2010
01:36:10,997 --> 01:36:14,968
an answer to the question
that it has to be designed in,

2011
01:36:14,968 --> 01:36:18,104
same thing with website
authentication.

2012
01:36:18,104 --> 01:36:21,908
If I'm saying that correctly the
role of certificate authorities

2013
01:36:21,908 --> 01:36:24,311
and how they verify
through a digital signatures

2014
01:36:24,311 --> 01:36:27,247
that a website is who
the website says it is.

2015
01:36:27,247 --> 01:36:29,950
So, again, this is an
example of the politics

2016
01:36:29,950 --> 01:36:32,319
of the architecture, it's
no just about agreements

2017
01:36:32,319 --> 01:36:35,255
between people but about
designing this trust

2018
01:36:35,255 --> 01:36:37,457
and identity into
the infrastructure.

2019
01:36:37,457 --> 01:36:39,726
>> I'm going to move on
to the next question just

2020
01:36:39,726 --> 01:36:43,663
because I want to get the
audience as much opportunity

2021
01:36:43,663 --> 01:36:47,234
as I can because the
panelists are going to be able

2022
01:36:47,234 --> 01:36:50,904
to circle back on this
later on over here.

2023
01:36:50,904 --> 01:36:53,440
>> So, I'm Luke Wadman [assumed
spelling], I'm a student working

2024
01:36:53,440 --> 01:36:55,475
as a policy analyst intern,

2025
01:36:55,475 --> 01:36:58,378
analysis intern for
IEEE this summer.

2026
01:36:58,378 --> 01:37:00,513
I'm working on internet
governance issues.

2027
01:37:00,513 --> 01:37:04,050
And does the panel
think there is any--

2028
01:37:04,050 --> 01:37:10,056
would it be a good way to
frame the debate on privacy

2029
01:37:10,056 --> 01:37:13,426
and internet governance and
et cetera in economic terms

2030
01:37:13,426 --> 01:37:15,962
because if I've learned
anything in my time in DC it's

2031
01:37:15,962 --> 01:37:17,564
that catching the ear

2032
01:37:17,564 --> 01:37:20,200
of our congressional
representatives is easy

2033
01:37:20,200 --> 01:37:22,969
if you start talking about
jobs and job creation

2034
01:37:22,969 --> 01:37:27,207
and we've already talked a
little bit about the impact

2035
01:37:27,207 --> 01:37:31,878
of things like prism on US-based
IT companies like Google

2036
01:37:31,878 --> 01:37:34,381
and Facebook, particularly
in the EU

2037
01:37:34,381 --> 01:37:36,583
but also around the world.

2038
01:37:36,583 --> 01:37:39,819
One case is that Google isn't
really competitive in China

2039
01:37:39,819 --> 01:37:42,756
and that's probably going to
continue in that direction.

2040
01:37:42,756 --> 01:37:46,860
So, would that be a good way to
frame this whole conversation

2041
01:37:46,860 --> 01:37:48,395
and actually encourage some sort

2042
01:37:48,395 --> 01:37:52,265
of positive congressional
action?

2043
01:37:53,600 --> 01:37:56,703
>> So, I would never say
that I have any idea how

2044
01:37:56,703 --> 01:37:59,339
to encourage positive
congressional action.

2045
01:37:59,339 --> 01:38:02,375
I just want to put
that on the table.

2046
01:38:02,375 --> 01:38:03,944
I think it is true

2047
01:38:03,944 --> 01:38:07,514
that everything that's
happened this sort

2048
01:38:07,514 --> 01:38:13,753
of last six weeks inside this
sort of NSA bubble has happened

2049
01:38:13,753 --> 01:38:17,757
without any reference
as to what it might--

2050
01:38:17,757 --> 01:38:22,562
the impact that it might
have on US industry.

2051
01:38:22,562 --> 01:38:25,532
And I think it is possible
that the impact at least

2052
01:38:25,532 --> 01:38:27,300
in the short run maybe severe.

2053
01:38:27,300 --> 01:38:30,370
On the other hand a
lot of people may carry

2054
01:38:30,370 --> 01:38:33,873
on about being unhappy
about discovering

2055
01:38:33,873 --> 01:38:37,811
that the NSA is sucking
up their data.

2056
01:38:37,811 --> 01:38:42,816
Historically, when
the big comp--

2057
01:38:42,816 --> 01:38:45,685
if you look at the SOPA fight

2058
01:38:45,685 --> 01:38:47,554
which I think was
probably the first time

2059
01:38:47,554 --> 01:38:52,158
that US internet industry sort
of held hands with activists

2060
01:38:52,158 --> 01:38:56,329
and technologist, it does
get congresses attention.

2061
01:38:56,329 --> 01:39:00,066
I will say though that
National Security is different.

2062
01:39:00,066 --> 01:39:03,703
It is just always
different and the arc

2063
01:39:03,703 --> 01:39:08,575
of National Security has been
more, more, more since 9/11

2064
01:39:08,575 --> 01:39:13,813
and the question is whether
these revelations have sort

2065
01:39:13,813 --> 01:39:17,717
of pushed us beyond the
more and more place.

2066
01:39:17,717 --> 01:39:20,587
>> OK. Let's move over here.

2067
01:39:20,587 --> 01:39:24,457
>> Hi, I'm Susan Aaronson
with GW, I'm a professor here

2068
01:39:24,457 --> 01:39:26,559
and I work with the
Worldwide Web Foundation

2069
01:39:26,559 --> 01:39:28,428
on measuring internet openness.

2070
01:39:28,428 --> 01:39:32,032
And I want to ask you a
question that relates to trust,

2071
01:39:32,032 --> 01:39:34,034
the trust of policy makers.

2072
01:39:34,034 --> 01:39:38,271
So, in the last couple of
days we've seen [inaudible]

2073
01:39:38,271 --> 01:39:41,041
and Angle a Miracle [assumed
spelling] make these delightful

2074
01:39:41,041 --> 01:39:46,613
comments about sever locations
and threats in terms of privacy.

2075
01:39:46,613 --> 01:39:49,482
And again, I wonder
if there are--

2076
01:39:49,482 --> 01:39:52,919
so, they're basically saying
if the server can't be located

2077
01:39:52,919 --> 01:39:58,525
where we can control, where our
privacy rules dominate we might

2078
01:39:58,525 --> 01:40:01,194
not accept for example some

2079
01:40:01,194 --> 01:40:02,395
of the things the
United States wants

2080
01:40:02,395 --> 01:40:04,230
in the trade agreement or--

2081
01:40:04,230 --> 01:40:07,934
and we see similar things with
the Trans-Pacific Partnership

2082
01:40:07,934 --> 01:40:10,236
and I just wonder if you
could talk a little bit

2083
01:40:10,236 --> 01:40:11,571
about this now.

2084
01:40:11,571 --> 01:40:15,208
You know, you can always, for
national security reasons,

2085
01:40:15,208 --> 01:40:19,345
you can always say you have
a particular policy in place

2086
01:40:19,345 --> 01:40:21,181
and it's not protectionist.

2087
01:40:21,181 --> 01:40:23,349
But this is opposite
of that, right?

2088
01:40:23,349 --> 01:40:25,518
They're saying that
for privacy reasons,

2089
01:40:25,518 --> 01:40:31,458
they want to essentially
protect their citizens

2090
01:40:31,458 --> 01:40:33,426
from their information
being traded

2091
01:40:33,426 --> 01:40:36,696
by having the server
location in the United Stated.

2092
01:40:36,696 --> 01:40:40,600
If I may add one other
thing which is Frank La Rue,

2093
01:40:40,600 --> 01:40:44,637
who works for the-- who is
the UN Special Representative

2094
01:40:44,637 --> 01:40:48,174
on Freedom of Expression,
he has said basically

2095
01:40:48,174 --> 01:40:51,377
that the US' failure to protect
the privacy is a violation

2096
01:40:51,377 --> 01:40:53,146
of its human rights' obligation

2097
01:40:53,146 --> 01:40:55,148
because that is a
basic human right

2098
01:40:55,148 --> 01:40:57,750
under the Universal
Declaration, blah, blah, blah.

2099
01:40:57,750 --> 01:41:03,990
So I want to hear your comments.

2100
01:41:03,990 --> 01:41:05,225
>> Sure. I'll do this.

2101
01:41:05,225 --> 01:41:06,960
Pull it out there.

2102
01:41:06,960 --> 01:41:09,395
I'll-- the Trans-Pacific
Partnership

2103
01:41:09,395 --> 01:41:18,471
and the US Free Trade Agreement
is and always will have had

2104
01:41:20,540 --> 01:41:24,911
to address the data
privacy laws.

2105
01:41:24,911 --> 01:41:27,113
The Safe Harbor that
we had in place

2106
01:41:27,113 --> 01:41:31,918
in 2001 will actually
expire with the agreement.

2107
01:41:31,918 --> 01:41:35,488
And the United States, as you
know, has no national umbrella

2108
01:41:35,488 --> 01:41:37,357
for data breach and
data privacy.

2109
01:41:37,357 --> 01:41:41,494
We have 47 individual states
with their individual programs

2110
01:41:41,494 --> 01:41:43,263
and no national umbrella.

2111
01:41:43,263 --> 01:41:46,099
And so, if we're recalling
for congressional action

2112
01:41:46,099 --> 01:41:50,336
that had an economic, you
know, significant impact,

2113
01:41:50,336 --> 01:41:54,374
there are 52 pieces of
legislation currently

2114
01:41:54,374 --> 01:41:57,777
in 113th Congress
around cyber security,

2115
01:41:57,777 --> 01:41:59,646
about 10 of which
around data breach.

2116
01:41:59,646 --> 01:42:01,181
It would be wonderful
if we could get

2117
01:42:01,181 --> 01:42:03,716
to some bipartisan
agreement on that

2118
01:42:03,716 --> 01:42:07,787
so we could enable the
overall Free Trade Agreement

2119
01:42:07,787 --> 01:42:11,257
to move forward between
the two continents.

2120
01:42:11,257 --> 01:42:16,162
More specifically though, noting
the 47 different state laws

2121
01:42:16,162 --> 01:42:19,799
and noting the difference
between the Europe

2122
01:42:19,799 --> 01:42:23,836
and the United States,
cloud computing

2123
01:42:23,836 --> 01:42:27,574
and where the data is
stored follows the geography

2124
01:42:27,574 --> 01:42:29,976
and will always follow
the geography.

2125
01:42:29,976 --> 01:42:32,545
So if there's a data breach
here in the state of Virginia,

2126
01:42:32,545 --> 01:42:34,480
it follows a different
set of rules

2127
01:42:34,480 --> 01:42:37,550
than Massachusetts
and in California.

2128
01:42:37,550 --> 01:42:40,853
And a company, whoever the
company might be, actually has

2129
01:42:40,853 --> 01:42:44,324
to know all sets of laws
for that particular state

2130
01:42:44,324 --> 01:42:48,361
in this case in order to follow
the regulatory compliance,

2131
01:42:48,361 --> 01:42:49,429
et cetera.

2132
01:42:49,429 --> 01:42:51,798
That also is the same
for if it's stored

2133
01:42:51,798 --> 01:42:53,132
in the United Kingdom,

2134
01:42:53,132 --> 01:42:55,535
it follows the United Kingdom's
laws, and the Netherlands,

2135
01:42:55,535 --> 01:42:58,004
and Brazil, and you
pick the place.

2136
01:42:58,004 --> 01:43:04,711
And so when the EU and
the leaders of Germany

2137
01:43:04,711 --> 01:43:07,480
and elsewhere are talking
about the data protection

2138
01:43:07,480 --> 01:43:12,252
and data privacy, and they are
looking at the United States

2139
01:43:12,252 --> 01:43:15,221
and worried about how our data--

2140
01:43:15,221 --> 01:43:18,258
we're protecting
data and the privacy,

2141
01:43:18,258 --> 01:43:21,761
then it would be also important
understand how the European

2142
01:43:21,761 --> 01:43:26,933
companies are mirroring data
in other countries like Brazil

2143
01:43:26,933 --> 01:43:30,937
or South Africa or
Egypt or China or India,

2144
01:43:30,937 --> 01:43:34,040
et cetera because the data
always follows the law

2145
01:43:34,040 --> 01:43:39,112
of the geography
that it sits in.

2146
01:43:39,112 --> 01:43:42,181
>> I'll just add to that
that one of the things to--

2147
01:43:42,181 --> 01:43:46,886
I mean, obviously, the
NSA revelations have sort

2148
01:43:46,886 --> 01:43:50,156
of strengthened the EU's
hand in a discussion

2149
01:43:50,156 --> 01:43:52,458
that was going long before.

2150
01:43:52,458 --> 01:43:56,963
We have a particular view
of what privacy means.

2151
01:43:56,963 --> 01:44:02,101
It doesn't match up, going back
to this question earlier about,

2152
01:44:02,101 --> 01:44:06,973
you know, what economic kind of
motivation might move Congress.

2153
01:44:06,973 --> 01:44:10,376
One would think the US
companies would move forward

2154
01:44:10,376 --> 01:44:12,945
on a comprehensive
data protection regime

2155
01:44:12,945 --> 01:44:16,215
in the United States that
might be more flexible

2156
01:44:16,215 --> 01:44:20,553
and perhaps reflect the internet
more than the European one,

2157
01:44:20,553 --> 01:44:23,323
but I haven't seen them
step forward on that.

2158
01:44:23,323 --> 01:44:26,726
I think it would be interesting
for somebody to ask the question

2159
01:44:26,726 --> 01:44:30,863
about the various EU countries
in their surveillance regimes

2160
01:44:30,863 --> 01:44:33,733
because as much as I say
some very unpleasant things

2161
01:44:33,733 --> 01:44:37,136
about ours, I think you
would find that it--

2162
01:44:37,136 --> 01:44:39,405
with the exception
of our capacity

2163
01:44:39,405 --> 01:44:43,810
for the just incredible
scale of collection,

2164
01:44:43,810 --> 01:44:47,914
that the actual legal
protections are no better

2165
01:44:47,914 --> 01:44:50,583
at best and probably
a lot worse.

2166
01:44:50,583 --> 01:44:56,089
>> Just one comment on
the trade discussions.

2167
01:44:56,089 --> 01:44:58,091
Suzanne, I think
it's a very good,

2168
01:44:58,091 --> 01:45:00,593
it's a very important question.

2169
01:45:00,593 --> 01:45:04,564
I certainly think that,
you know, as you well know,

2170
01:45:04,564 --> 01:45:07,867
better than probably anyone
in this room, you know,

2171
01:45:07,867 --> 01:45:10,970
trade agreements have always
made exceptions for things

2172
01:45:10,970 --> 01:45:14,407
like national security,
public morals,

2173
01:45:14,407 --> 01:45:16,676
sometimes consumer
protections, things like that.

2174
01:45:16,676 --> 01:45:21,080
I think what we see now is
that simply pushing them off,

2175
01:45:21,080 --> 01:45:24,083
those issues off into the
exception category is not going

2176
01:45:24,083 --> 01:45:28,121
to work so we need
some kind of mechanism

2177
01:45:28,121 --> 01:45:30,323
that on the one hand
respects the fact

2178
01:45:30,323 --> 01:45:32,425
that governments do
have a legitimate

2179
01:45:32,425 --> 01:45:35,128
and important interest in
protecting their citizens

2180
01:45:35,128 --> 01:45:39,632
against unsafe products,
against human rights violations

2181
01:45:39,632 --> 01:45:42,235
if that's the way they do
privacy, against, you know,

2182
01:45:42,235 --> 01:45:44,604
security breaches,
what have you.

2183
01:45:44,604 --> 01:45:51,477
But tying that to the
location of data is, I think,

2184
01:45:51,477 --> 01:45:56,716
just an overly simplistic way
of accomplishing that purpose,

2185
01:45:56,716 --> 01:46:00,353
and I think, you know,
you can make fancy--

2186
01:46:00,353 --> 01:46:04,323
well, you can make fancy trade
arguments about why that's not,

2187
01:46:04,323 --> 01:46:07,727
you know, most favored
nation treatment.

2188
01:46:07,727 --> 01:46:13,065
But I think the bottom line is,
we used to have trade agreements

2189
01:46:13,065 --> 01:46:15,802
that were fundamentally about
tariffs and we've mostly dealt

2190
01:46:15,802 --> 01:46:18,204
with those issues, and now we
are going to trade agreements

2191
01:46:18,204 --> 01:46:21,507
that are fundamentally about
the non-tariff barriers

2192
01:46:21,507 --> 01:46:23,776
that exist between economies.

2193
01:46:23,776 --> 01:46:27,046
So we're going to have
to deal with that either.

2194
01:46:27,046 --> 01:46:30,883
I think that in the, you
know-- for some period of time,

2195
01:46:30,883 --> 01:46:35,388
I think the surveillance issues
will cloud those discussions

2196
01:46:35,388 --> 01:46:37,990
but we'll come back
to them at some point

2197
01:46:37,990 --> 01:46:40,827
and they will be
the same issues.

2198
01:46:40,827 --> 01:46:43,763
So-- and I-- the only thing I--

2199
01:46:43,763 --> 01:46:49,802
the only final thing I
would say, I think that one

2200
01:46:49,802 --> 01:46:51,204
of the big challenges
we're going to have

2201
01:46:51,204 --> 01:46:54,907
in the trade context on
internet issues is the challenge

2202
01:46:54,907 --> 01:47:00,146
that we found with ACTA,
that the ACTA was making--

2203
01:47:00,146 --> 01:47:02,448
[Inaudible Remark] Sorry, oh,
sorry, oh God, Steve is going

2204
01:47:02,448 --> 01:47:04,150
to throw that look at me.

2205
01:47:04,150 --> 01:47:10,523
So there was a trade agreement
involving intellectual property

2206
01:47:10,523 --> 01:47:17,163
enforcement whose
acronym is ACTA

2207
01:47:17,163 --> 01:47:22,268
and was very strenuously opposed
by civil society groups all

2208
01:47:22,268 --> 01:47:24,470
over the world because they
didn't know what it was,

2209
01:47:24,470 --> 01:47:26,539
they didn't know what was in
the agreement and they argued,

2210
01:47:26,539 --> 01:47:28,608
I think-- I thought,
quite legitimately

2211
01:47:28,608 --> 01:47:31,010
that if there are
going to be rules made

2212
01:47:31,010 --> 01:47:34,113
about intellectual property
rights that affect individuals,

2213
01:47:34,113 --> 01:47:36,182
there should be some
public discussion

2214
01:47:36,182 --> 01:47:37,783
of what those rules are.

2215
01:47:37,783 --> 01:47:42,121
Trade people believe they
somehow can't negotiate

2216
01:47:42,121 --> 01:47:43,489
in public.

2217
01:47:43,489 --> 01:47:46,125
And that's a sort of an article
of faith in the trade world.

2218
01:47:46,125 --> 01:47:50,329
They're going to have to learn
to be a little bit more public

2219
01:47:50,329 --> 01:47:53,466
if they're going to get anything
done on these issues is my deal.

2220
01:47:53,466 --> 01:47:55,401
>> Lynn, you got the last
word before the break.

2221
01:47:55,401 --> 01:47:56,802
>> Just quickly.

2222
01:47:56,802 --> 01:47:58,104
Not only-- it wasn't that they
wouldn't negotiate in public,

2223
01:47:58,104 --> 01:47:59,639
they would not authorize
a release

2224
01:47:59,639 --> 01:48:02,141
of the documents
post-negotiation.

2225
01:48:02,141 --> 01:48:04,243
They were not available
publicly.

2226
01:48:04,243 --> 01:48:06,846
>> So this sounds
like a thread going--

2227
01:48:06,846 --> 01:48:11,918
circling back to NSA and FISA
and all that, but I am sorry

2228
01:48:11,918 --> 01:48:15,488
that we have hit the point
where we promised we were going

2229
01:48:15,488 --> 01:48:18,291
to take a very brief five-minute
break that you're going

2230
01:48:18,291 --> 01:48:20,693
to have a chance to stretch
your legs, then we're going

2231
01:48:20,693 --> 01:48:26,699
to come back and people on the
panel will mix it up some more,

2232
01:48:26,699 --> 01:48:30,736
even better I suspect,
moderated by Steve Roberts.

2233
01:48:30,736 --> 01:48:33,239
But let's take a quick
five-minute break.

2234
01:48:33,239 --> 01:48:36,475
There will be one other
opportunity for you all to meet

2235
01:48:36,475 --> 01:48:38,744
and greet at least
most of the panelists

2236
01:48:38,744 --> 01:48:42,882
and there's a reception that
starts at 5:15 afterwards.

2237
01:48:42,882 --> 01:48:45,551
But for now, five-minute break,
we'll convene at 4 o'clock.

2238
01:48:45,551 --> 01:48:47,486
Thank you very much.

2239
01:48:47,486 --> 01:48:53,960
[ Inaudible Discussions ]

2240
01:48:53,960 --> 01:48:55,294
Well, thanks for
sticking around.

2241
01:48:55,294 --> 01:48:56,829
I know it's been
a long afternoon.

2242
01:48:56,829 --> 01:48:59,932
As Lance said, I'm
Steve Roberts.

2243
01:48:59,932 --> 01:49:02,335
I'm a professor here at
GW in the School of Media

2244
01:49:02,335 --> 01:49:04,570
and Public Affairs,
right across the street.

2245
01:49:04,570 --> 01:49:08,841
And my job is to try to
crystallize some of the issues

2246
01:49:08,841 --> 01:49:11,644
that we've been discussing

2247
01:49:11,644 --> 01:49:14,447
and [inaudible] some
conversation among

2248
01:49:14,447 --> 01:49:15,815
the panelists.

2249
01:49:15,815 --> 01:49:19,919
And I want to start by quoting
a couple of things I heard.

2250
01:49:19,919 --> 01:49:22,455
Lynn, for instance, said that

2251
01:49:22,455 --> 01:49:25,157
"unwanted surveillance
is not acceptable."

2252
01:49:25,157 --> 01:49:29,528
Leslie talked a lot
about human rights.

2253
01:49:29,528 --> 01:49:32,398
But there was a phrase

2254
01:49:32,398 --> 01:49:36,068
that I did not hear the entire
first hour and a half except

2255
01:49:36,068 --> 01:49:39,839
in passing, and that word
was "national security."

2256
01:49:39,839 --> 01:49:44,877
And so I want to pose this
question to the panel.

2257
01:49:44,877 --> 01:49:48,014
Isn't national security
a human right?

2258
01:49:48,014 --> 01:49:50,383
Isn't safety a human right?

2259
01:49:50,383 --> 01:49:57,123
Isn't the unwanted surveillance,

2260
01:49:57,123 --> 01:50:01,360
one person's unwanted
surveillance is another person's

2261
01:50:01,360 --> 01:50:06,432
protection from danger
and from terrorism?

2262
01:50:06,432 --> 01:50:10,703
So, I want to ask everybody,
what's the tradeoff here?

2263
01:50:10,703 --> 01:50:16,776
The whole idea in the first half
of this panel was the importance

2264
01:50:16,776 --> 01:50:20,146
of the freedoms in the internet.

2265
01:50:20,146 --> 01:50:21,480
But what are the limits,

2266
01:50:21,480 --> 01:50:23,916
and what are the
legitimate tradeoffs,

2267
01:50:23,916 --> 01:50:27,453
and how do we balance
legitimate human rights

2268
01:50:27,453 --> 01:50:29,922
against legitimate
rights to be safe

2269
01:50:29,922 --> 01:50:31,824
from terrorism and
other threats?

2270
01:50:31,824 --> 01:50:34,360
Who wants to start?

2271
01:50:34,360 --> 01:50:36,896
Go ahead, John.

2272
01:50:36,896 --> 01:50:42,435
>> So I'm going to almost answer
the question, but not quite.

2273
01:50:42,435 --> 01:50:50,543
It is true that the
governments have certain roles

2274
01:50:50,543 --> 01:50:51,911
and responsibilities.

2275
01:50:51,911 --> 01:50:56,916
And one of those roles is
there's a certain protection,

2276
01:50:56,916 --> 01:50:59,251
a certain defensive role

2277
01:50:59,251 --> 01:51:02,021
that a government feels
it has to provide.

2278
01:51:02,021 --> 01:51:06,559
And the question is how do
governments do what they see

2279
01:51:06,559 --> 01:51:09,128
as their obligations,

2280
01:51:09,128 --> 01:51:12,832
their actual responsibilities
given the internet.

2281
01:51:12,832 --> 01:51:16,268
The internet has not been
very good at this, OK?

2282
01:51:16,268 --> 01:51:16,969
So, --

2283
01:51:16,969 --> 01:51:18,204
>> Would you excuse me.

2284
01:51:18,204 --> 01:51:21,006
It's not just an obligation,
it's not just something

2285
01:51:21,006 --> 01:51:24,877
that they passing, this
is the first obligation

2286
01:51:24,877 --> 01:51:26,579
of government, is to protect--

2287
01:51:26,579 --> 01:51:27,146
>> Right.

2288
01:51:27,146 --> 01:51:27,980
>> -- people.

2289
01:51:27,980 --> 01:51:29,348
Isn't it the first obligation?

2290
01:51:29,348 --> 01:51:31,383
>> Ideal. One of the things that
[inaudible] does, of course,

2291
01:51:31,383 --> 01:51:33,686
is we're responsible for
maintaining a registry

2292
01:51:33,686 --> 01:51:36,122
of IP addresses and that
registry is often used

2293
01:51:36,122 --> 01:51:39,525
because someone does
something in cyberspace

2294
01:51:39,525 --> 01:51:41,260
and the first thing
law enforcement would

2295
01:51:41,260 --> 01:51:44,263
like to know is, where is
that in the real world?

2296
01:51:44,263 --> 01:51:46,799
Because real world has the
people in organizations

2297
01:51:46,799 --> 01:51:48,534
and the cyberspace has to do

2298
01:51:48,534 --> 01:51:50,302
with domain names
and IP addresses.

2299
01:51:50,302 --> 01:51:53,305
And so, governments
feel they have

2300
01:51:53,305 --> 01:51:54,907
to enforce laws for example.

2301
01:51:54,907 --> 01:51:57,810
And yet the internet wasn't
built with an interface

2302
01:51:57,810 --> 01:52:01,380
for government is saying, "If
you're trying to do your duty,

2303
01:52:01,380 --> 01:52:04,383
here's how you go about
finding that person.

2304
01:52:04,383 --> 01:52:07,720
Here's how you go about doing
what you see as an obligation."

2305
01:52:07,720 --> 01:52:10,723
So, I know a lot of
people look at this

2306
01:52:10,723 --> 01:52:15,060
and they go this entire area of
governments and what they want

2307
01:52:15,060 --> 01:52:17,763
to do with the internet and
they want to take control

2308
01:52:17,763 --> 01:52:20,299
and they want to
do surveillance.

2309
01:52:20,299 --> 01:52:22,802
If you turn it around
and look at it,

2310
01:52:22,802 --> 01:52:25,004
remember that from the
government's perspective,

2311
01:52:25,004 --> 01:52:28,407
in many cases, these governments
feel they have an obligation

2312
01:52:28,407 --> 01:52:31,710
and the internet is
actively preventing them

2313
01:52:31,710 --> 01:52:33,579
from doing something
they're required

2314
01:52:33,579 --> 01:52:35,047
by their citizens to do.

2315
01:52:35,047 --> 01:52:38,350
So, we need to not omit the fact

2316
01:52:38,350 --> 01:52:42,521
that the internet doesn't
provide a friendly interface

2317
01:52:42,521 --> 01:52:43,856
to government.

2318
01:52:43,856 --> 01:52:47,226
So, me people would see that
as a feature but it's a fact

2319
01:52:47,226 --> 01:52:49,328
that shouldn't be
overlooked in the discussion.

2320
01:52:49,328 --> 01:52:50,062
>> Tradeoff.

2321
01:52:50,062 --> 01:52:51,230
What's the tradeoff?

2322
01:52:51,230 --> 01:52:52,198
Leslie?

2323
01:52:52,198 --> 01:52:54,500
>> So, I want to back this up.

2324
01:52:54,500 --> 01:52:56,869
This is not a new question
and it doesn't have

2325
01:52:56,869 --> 01:52:58,137
to do with the internet.

2326
01:52:58,137 --> 01:52:59,672
I mean, we have a--

2327
01:52:59,672 --> 01:53:04,210
an international
human rights framework

2328
01:53:04,210 --> 01:53:08,514
that explicitly makes national
security an exception for--

2329
01:53:08,514 --> 01:53:13,219
exception for-- in
human rights treaties.

2330
01:53:13,219 --> 01:53:16,589
It is an obligation of
the countries themselves

2331
01:53:16,589 --> 01:53:18,524
to protect our national
security.

2332
01:53:18,524 --> 01:53:21,493
But we also have an entire
developed jurisprudence

2333
01:53:21,493 --> 01:53:25,631
about publicly enacted
transparent law,

2334
01:53:25,631 --> 01:53:30,436
proportionate law, fair
process, remedy and oversight.

2335
01:53:30,436 --> 01:53:33,906
And, you know, I think
we just throw this

2336
01:53:33,906 --> 01:53:37,009
into the internet context, we're
just missing, there's a bit--

2337
01:53:37,009 --> 01:53:41,413
you know, there's a basic--
there's bodies of law and norms.

2338
01:53:41,413 --> 01:53:45,017
And the question here is not
whether there's a tradeoff,

2339
01:53:45,017 --> 01:53:46,685
it's whether you
reach a balance.

2340
01:53:46,685 --> 01:53:52,191
And I think when you have
most of this process secret,

2341
01:53:52,191 --> 01:53:55,794
the judicial process
secret, the oversight secret,

2342
01:53:55,794 --> 01:53:58,631
the interpretation
of the law secret,

2343
01:53:58,631 --> 01:54:01,200
then you cannot achieve
that balance.

2344
01:54:01,200 --> 01:54:03,269
The question at the
end of day is balance.

2345
01:54:03,269 --> 01:54:05,471
I certainly would take
issue with the idea

2346
01:54:05,471 --> 01:54:09,375
that the internet has been
unfriendly to law enforcement

2347
01:54:09,375 --> 01:54:11,610
and it's always this, you
know, we're going dark

2348
01:54:11,610 --> 01:54:13,012
and we can't see anything.

2349
01:54:13,012 --> 01:54:16,715
I think if we learned anything
over the last couple of months,

2350
01:54:16,715 --> 01:54:20,419
it's that law enforcement
really has access

2351
01:54:20,419 --> 01:54:22,021
to much more information

2352
01:54:22,021 --> 01:54:24,790
and that there is
therefore a temptation

2353
01:54:24,790 --> 01:54:27,726
to use what technology
has created

2354
01:54:27,726 --> 01:54:32,631
to go beyond what a balanced
human rights frame would allow.

2355
01:54:32,631 --> 01:54:34,199
And I think that's
what our problem is,

2356
01:54:34,199 --> 01:54:35,534
not that they're not
supposed to be [inaudible].

2357
01:54:35,534 --> 01:54:38,137
It is a first order of
business for government.

2358
01:54:38,137 --> 01:54:40,906
They are supposed to
protect their citizens.

2359
01:54:40,906 --> 01:54:44,977
But Steve, if you look at this
framework that's been created,

2360
01:54:44,977 --> 01:54:49,248
it was framework that was
created on a battlefield in Iraq

2361
01:54:49,248 --> 01:54:55,220
to make sure that you had every
less possible bid of information

2362
01:54:55,220 --> 01:54:58,557
to make sure you would
know about the IED.

2363
01:54:58,557 --> 01:55:03,362
And this whole haystack
and needle analogy assumes

2364
01:55:03,362 --> 01:55:06,532
that collecting a
haystack is proportionate,

2365
01:55:06,532 --> 01:55:08,167
and I don't think it is.

2366
01:55:08,167 --> 01:55:11,303
>> But the President
has said this program

2367
01:55:11,303 --> 01:55:13,305
of surveillance is
essential, the Director

2368
01:55:13,305 --> 01:55:16,709
of national security said that
it's essential, the Chairman

2369
01:55:16,709 --> 01:55:18,777
of the Senate Intelligence
Committee,

2370
01:55:18,777 --> 01:55:20,846
a liberal former mayor

2371
01:55:20,846 --> 01:55:23,649
of San Francisco had
said it's essential,

2372
01:55:23,649 --> 01:55:25,951
what's your quarrel with this?

2373
01:55:25,951 --> 01:55:29,121
And how do you rebut their
argument of everybody

2374
01:55:29,121 --> 01:55:33,359
who has had access to the
secret, say this is justifiable.

2375
01:55:33,359 --> 01:55:38,497
I'd like other people
to deal with this.

2376
01:55:38,497 --> 01:55:39,298
>> Please.

2377
01:55:39,298 --> 01:55:40,065
>> Yeah. [Multiple Speakers]

2378
01:55:40,065 --> 01:55:45,204
>> OK. So, it's-- there's

2379
01:55:45,204 --> 01:55:48,407
so many portrayals
of this as a binary.

2380
01:55:48,407 --> 01:55:50,976
And, you know, I think
the issue is more one

2381
01:55:50,976 --> 01:55:53,445
of degrees [phonetic] and
a more granular issue.

2382
01:55:53,445 --> 01:55:55,180
But there are some
binaries here, right?

2383
01:55:55,180 --> 01:55:57,616
We either have a
constitution or we don't.

2384
01:55:57,616 --> 01:55:59,918
We either have a fourth
amendment or we don't.

2385
01:55:59,918 --> 01:56:02,121
But if you start looking
at the actual practices

2386
01:56:02,121 --> 01:56:05,057
and I don't think we have a full
picture of exactly what's going

2387
01:56:05,057 --> 01:56:08,193
on but based on some of the
things that we've heard,

2388
01:56:08,193 --> 01:56:12,197
there are ways to enact the
necessary national security

2389
01:56:12,197 --> 01:56:16,568
without crossing the lines
that would be unacceptable

2390
01:56:16,568 --> 01:56:17,936
to the majority of the people.

2391
01:56:17,936 --> 01:56:21,507
So, having low level-- so
layers of control and layers

2392
01:56:21,507 --> 01:56:24,610
of accountability in the
processes of surveillance,

2393
01:56:24,610 --> 01:56:27,312
right, so not just having any
low level analyst being able

2394
01:56:27,312 --> 01:56:30,349
to take a fire hose of
information and download

2395
01:56:30,349 --> 01:56:33,485
that unto their computer just
to exaggerate the point, right?

2396
01:56:33,485 --> 01:56:35,487
So, there's the granularity,

2397
01:56:35,487 --> 01:56:37,423
there's getting the
information that's necessary,

2398
01:56:37,423 --> 01:56:38,891
there's the process
of accountability,

2399
01:56:38,891 --> 01:56:40,459
there's the issue
of judicial review.

2400
01:56:40,459 --> 01:56:42,294
So, I think that there are ways

2401
01:56:42,294 --> 01:56:45,330
to enact the necessary
national security now

2402
01:56:45,330 --> 01:56:47,866
that our public's
fear is online and now

2403
01:56:47,866 --> 01:56:50,903
that we have the privatization
of that public's fear

2404
01:56:50,903 --> 01:56:53,238
without going to the extremes

2405
01:56:53,238 --> 01:56:56,075
of basically having
the fire hose analogy

2406
01:56:56,075 --> 01:56:59,578
and just downloading
whatever data about anybody.

2407
01:56:59,578 --> 01:57:01,914
>> Anybody else on the panel
who want to pick on this?

2408
01:57:01,914 --> 01:57:03,816
Please, go ahead.

2409
01:57:03,816 --> 01:57:07,486
>> So, you want us to talk about
tradeoffs but I actually want

2410
01:57:07,486 --> 01:57:11,690
to suggest that I think a more
accountable clear system is

2411
01:57:11,690 --> 01:57:13,058
better for national security.

2412
01:57:13,058 --> 01:57:16,228
I think what's happening
now where you have very,

2413
01:57:16,228 --> 01:57:20,766
very broad authorities that
are unclear is almost the worst

2414
01:57:20,766 --> 01:57:23,869
of all possible worlds
for both civil liberties

2415
01:57:23,869 --> 01:57:27,439
and national security
because you have--

2416
01:57:27,439 --> 01:57:31,777
you have policy officials,
other governments, activists,

2417
01:57:31,777 --> 01:57:34,046
et cetera, poking
around in the business

2418
01:57:34,046 --> 01:57:36,849
of the intelligence community,
and that's not a very good thing

2419
01:57:36,849 --> 01:57:40,052
for them frankly, they want
to able to do what they do

2420
01:57:40,052 --> 01:57:45,791
of quietly and-- but in
order for us to do that,

2421
01:57:45,791 --> 01:57:49,962
in order for that to happen,
there has to be a clear sense

2422
01:57:49,962 --> 01:57:51,163
of what the rules are.

2423
01:57:51,163 --> 01:57:53,232
One sense I which-- I
largely agree with Leslie

2424
01:57:53,232 --> 01:57:55,400
but the one sense in which
I think this is an internet

2425
01:57:55,400 --> 01:57:58,704
problem is it's really
kind of a 9/11 problem,

2426
01:57:58,704 --> 01:58:00,472
and then I think a lot of
what's going on is going

2427
01:58:00,472 --> 01:58:06,044
on under the kind of exceptional
basis that we've handled a lot

2428
01:58:06,044 --> 01:58:08,981
of national security
issues post 9/11.

2429
01:58:08,981 --> 01:58:13,152
And to quote the President
again, ironically enough,

2430
01:58:13,152 --> 01:58:16,922
just a few weeks before this
whole surveillance story broke,

2431
01:58:16,922 --> 01:58:19,291
the President went to the
National Defense Universities,

2432
01:58:19,291 --> 01:58:24,263
you know, and gave a
speech saying, number one,

2433
01:58:24,263 --> 01:58:28,100
it is bad for a country
to be perpetually at war,

2434
01:58:28,100 --> 01:58:29,801
and number two, that
the threat level

2435
01:58:29,801 --> 01:58:35,440
from Al Qaeda was basically
below the level that it was

2436
01:58:35,440 --> 01:58:38,277
at 9/11, and that we should--

2437
01:58:38,277 --> 01:58:41,313
and that we should start
treating that threat,

2438
01:58:41,313 --> 01:58:45,250
that national security threat
as part of the norm not

2439
01:58:45,250 --> 01:58:47,152
as an exception that
we have to respond

2440
01:58:47,152 --> 01:58:50,455
to with these kinds
of exceptions.

2441
01:58:50,455 --> 01:58:52,958
This whole surveillance
program was created

2442
01:58:52,958 --> 01:58:54,960
as the President's
surveillance programs, you know,

2443
01:58:54,960 --> 01:58:57,162
as an exception, and
that's its problem.

2444
01:58:57,162 --> 01:58:58,297
If the problem is not--

2445
01:58:58,297 --> 01:58:59,998
>> Although continued by
a democratic president--

2446
01:58:59,998 --> 01:59:04,870
>> Yes, that will-- that's
right but I think that it needs

2447
01:59:04,870 --> 01:59:10,175
to be continued on a more
clear accountable basis.

2448
01:59:10,175 --> 01:59:14,913
And so I don't tend to accept
that the issue gets solved

2449
01:59:14,913 --> 01:59:17,282
by saying more surveillance,
less surveillance.

2450
01:59:17,282 --> 01:59:19,851
I think that the issue
is surveillance according

2451
01:59:19,851 --> 01:59:21,887
to what rules and with
what accountability.

2452
01:59:21,887 --> 01:59:25,057
>> Lynn I quoted [phonetic]
you-- please, your turn.

2453
01:59:25,057 --> 01:59:26,325
>> Yeah. I mean, I'll come
to my point [inaudible]

2454
01:59:26,325 --> 01:59:29,561
but just [inaudible] said
unwarranted surveillance.

2455
01:59:29,561 --> 01:59:32,364
I recognize the difficulty
in unwanted thief

2456
01:59:32,364 --> 01:59:34,766
in the perspective
of the individual.

2457
01:59:34,766 --> 01:59:37,436
So, it's very much
an unwarranted.

2458
01:59:37,436 --> 01:59:38,403
>> Thank you.

2459
01:59:38,403 --> 01:59:39,171
>> But-- And I just
really wanted

2460
01:59:39,171 --> 01:59:40,372
to echo the three comments

2461
01:59:40,372 --> 01:59:42,841
that have been made here
very, very, very strongly.

2462
01:59:42,841 --> 01:59:45,010
When-- In a system
like the internet

2463
01:59:45,010 --> 01:59:47,913
which is breaking all barriers
where we're so interconnected

2464
01:59:47,913 --> 01:59:51,116
and so interdependent, we
have to change our paradigm

2465
01:59:51,116 --> 01:59:53,885
of looking at this and move
it to one of managing risk.

2466
01:59:53,885 --> 01:59:57,322
We can talk about in the context
of tradeoffs if you like.

2467
01:59:57,322 --> 01:59:59,725
But we really do
have to look at--

2468
01:59:59,725 --> 02:00:02,327
>> Wasn't that the only context?

2469
02:00:02,327 --> 02:00:06,265
Or isn't tradeoff is the only
legitimate way to talk about it?

2470
02:00:06,265 --> 02:00:09,034
Because we-- isn't that
what we do everyday?

2471
02:00:09,034 --> 02:00:11,136
>> I think tradeoff
is legitimate way

2472
02:00:11,136 --> 02:00:13,138
but I'm not sure we're
making the right tradeoffs

2473
02:00:13,138 --> 02:00:15,874
and I think we continue to
focus on national security

2474
02:00:15,874 --> 02:00:20,145
and quite often run
by flagrant abuses

2475
02:00:20,145 --> 02:00:23,582
than we're conflating the issue
or we're not pulling it apart.

2476
02:00:23,582 --> 02:00:26,251
It's not about national security
and what is the best way

2477
02:00:26,251 --> 02:00:28,820
to protect national security.

2478
02:00:28,820 --> 02:00:30,222
From my perspective, you know,

2479
02:00:30,222 --> 02:00:32,057
what our members
are actually upset

2480
02:00:32,057 --> 02:00:35,494
about is the flagrant
abuses and the lack

2481
02:00:35,494 --> 02:00:37,229
of transparency and the secrecy.

2482
02:00:37,229 --> 02:00:38,363
>> Yes, please.

2483
02:00:38,363 --> 02:00:42,267
>> And I think part of
the problem that I have

2484
02:00:42,267 --> 02:00:43,869
with hearing what they've said

2485
02:00:43,869 --> 02:00:45,971
for giving the reasons is
we haven't heard the reason

2486
02:00:45,971 --> 02:00:47,339
that makes sense.

2487
02:00:47,339 --> 02:00:50,042
It's-- why are you
collecting the data,

2488
02:00:50,042 --> 02:00:52,477
it's like the equivalent
of your mom

2489
02:00:52,477 --> 02:00:55,347
and dad saying well,
because I said so.

2490
02:00:55,347 --> 02:00:58,450
You have to give it something
behind that, you know, to--

2491
02:00:58,450 --> 02:01:01,953
is there a credible threat
at whatever level there is.

2492
02:01:01,953 --> 02:01:03,322
I think Danny is right.

2493
02:01:03,322 --> 02:01:06,725
I think the threat level from
what we've read in previous,

2494
02:01:06,725 --> 02:01:08,860
you know, speeches
by the President is

2495
02:01:08,860 --> 02:01:11,296
that the threat level is a
lot less than it was at 9/11.

2496
02:01:11,296 --> 02:01:13,098
Well, if it's a lot less
than it wasn't 9/11,

2497
02:01:13,098 --> 02:01:15,233
why do we need to expand this?

2498
02:01:15,233 --> 02:01:17,969
Give us something to look at.

2499
02:01:17,969 --> 02:01:21,373
But I think when I hear
them talk about these things

2500
02:01:21,373 --> 02:01:25,210
and give these reasons as
somebody who does this type

2501
02:01:25,210 --> 02:01:28,080
of metadata analysis
and, you know,

2502
02:01:28,080 --> 02:01:30,148
just as for my own
infrastructure was certainly

2503
02:01:30,148 --> 02:01:32,818
in my own infrastructure I
can do a lot of that analysis.

2504
02:01:32,818 --> 02:01:35,020
But there's an uplink to me.

2505
02:01:35,020 --> 02:01:37,556
And those people that
control that infrastructure,

2506
02:01:37,556 --> 02:01:39,324
my infrastructure,
your infrastructure,

2507
02:01:39,324 --> 02:01:41,259
they can do the same
type of analysis

2508
02:01:41,259 --> 02:01:43,028
and it trees all the way up.

2509
02:01:43,028 --> 02:01:45,664
It's-- So, why?

2510
02:01:45,664 --> 02:01:48,300
You have to give us
a credible reason.

2511
02:01:48,300 --> 02:01:50,469
>> But was running through a lot

2512
02:01:50,469 --> 02:01:53,705
of your comments is a basic
mistrust of government.

2513
02:01:53,705 --> 02:01:55,140
I mean you've been told--

2514
02:01:55,140 --> 02:01:59,678
public has been told by
the Intelligence committees

2515
02:01:59,678 --> 02:02:03,448
which have in brief that this
is a very valuable tool PRISM

2516
02:02:03,448 --> 02:02:06,051
and other surveillance are
very valuable to the President.

2517
02:02:06,051 --> 02:02:09,020
Duly elected democratic liberal
president had said it's a very

2518
02:02:09,020 --> 02:02:10,856
valuable tool, the
liberal chairman

2519
02:02:10,856 --> 02:02:12,891
of the Senate Intelligence
Committee has said it's a very

2520
02:02:12,891 --> 02:02:15,660
valuable tool and everyone
of you is doubting it.

2521
02:02:15,660 --> 02:02:20,932
So, what is the source of your
suspicions and your mistrust

2522
02:02:20,932 --> 02:02:22,434
of what you're being told?

2523
02:02:22,434 --> 02:02:24,703
>> So, I actually
don't, you know, when--

2524
02:02:24,703 --> 02:02:27,539
there's no way for us to
know if it's a valuable tool

2525
02:02:27,539 --> 02:02:28,940
or not a valuable tool.

2526
02:02:28,940 --> 02:02:32,611
So, you could take them at face
value that it's a valuable tool.

2527
02:02:32,611 --> 02:02:35,447
Collection of data
is a valuable thing.

2528
02:02:35,447 --> 02:02:39,418
It's just not the only analysis
in a democratic society.

2529
02:02:39,418 --> 02:02:41,319
And I think-- so, I mean, I--

2530
02:02:41,319 --> 02:02:44,156
and that's I think
the problem here,

2531
02:02:44,156 --> 02:02:48,427
we live in a democratic
society where we're supposed

2532
02:02:48,427 --> 02:02:52,230
to have proportional laws
that more than a small number

2533
02:02:52,230 --> 02:02:56,101
of people are able to know
about to assess that balance

2534
02:02:56,101 --> 02:02:58,203
between liberty and security.

2535
02:02:58,203 --> 02:03:00,071
We really don't have that.

2536
02:03:00,071 --> 02:03:03,008
I mean, if this was a discussion

2537
02:03:03,008 --> 02:03:07,312
that they were tasking
these companies

2538
02:03:07,312 --> 02:03:11,583
with specific request
based on articulable facts

2539
02:03:11,583 --> 02:03:13,418
about specific individuals

2540
02:03:13,418 --> 02:03:15,954
or even several hundred
individuals,

2541
02:03:15,954 --> 02:03:19,057
we might be having a different
discussion about the balance

2542
02:03:19,057 --> 02:03:21,326
between liberty and security.

2543
02:03:21,326 --> 02:03:23,695
But we're having a
discussion about the value

2544
02:03:23,695 --> 02:03:26,431
of basically collecting
the data potentially

2545
02:03:26,431 --> 02:03:27,566
on everybody in the world.

2546
02:03:27,566 --> 02:03:29,968
I mean, we don't know the set.

2547
02:03:29,968 --> 02:03:33,004
So, it's not about trust
of government or not.

2548
02:03:33,004 --> 02:03:36,174
You know, I think you could
probably come, you know,

2549
02:03:36,174 --> 02:03:39,344
device a program where you
know everything about everybody

2550
02:03:39,344 --> 02:03:41,947
in the world and claim
it makes you safer,

2551
02:03:41,947 --> 02:03:43,648
maybe it makes you safer.

2552
02:03:43,648 --> 02:03:48,019
But we no longer are
following either the values,

2553
02:03:48,019 --> 02:03:50,355
the constitution
or the norms of it.

2554
02:03:50,355 --> 02:03:52,324
>> Well, we see you're not
following the constitution.

2555
02:03:52,324 --> 02:03:56,461
These laws were passed by
democratically-elected Congress.

2556
02:03:56,461 --> 02:03:57,929
>> Well, having been there.

2557
02:03:57,929 --> 02:03:58,497
Yeah.

2558
02:03:58,497 --> 02:03:59,197
>> Yeah, right.

2559
02:03:59,197 --> 02:04:00,265
>> Having been there,

2560
02:04:00,265 --> 02:04:01,299
they didn't know what
they were passing

2561
02:04:01,299 --> 02:04:02,701
and they didn't know
what [inaudible].

2562
02:04:02,701 --> 02:04:04,169
>> So, [inaudible] to that, you
just said the issue wasn't trust

2563
02:04:04,169 --> 02:04:05,837
and you now you just say, well,

2564
02:04:05,837 --> 02:04:07,072
they didn't know what
they were passing.

2565
02:04:07,072 --> 02:04:08,440
>> They didn't know--
they didn't know--

2566
02:04:08,440 --> 02:04:10,542
>> If you believe well-- well,
let me ask you the question.

2567
02:04:10,542 --> 02:04:13,879
If you believe in a democratic
system, now you're saying,

2568
02:04:13,879 --> 02:04:15,146
I don't believe

2569
02:04:15,146 --> 02:04:16,815
in the democratic process
that's passed these laws.

2570
02:04:16,815 --> 02:04:18,016
>> No.

2571
02:04:18,016 --> 02:04:19,284
>> That they were
misinformed and we know better?

2572
02:04:19,284 --> 02:04:23,455
>> No. The laws have been
after the fact, stretched

2573
02:04:23,455 --> 02:04:26,491
and manipulated in ways
the Congress didn't intend.

2574
02:04:26,491 --> 02:04:31,596
And that's where-- and that's
where we've gone off the rails.

2575
02:04:31,596 --> 02:04:35,567
Nobody who is in Congress
at that time, Section 215,

2576
02:04:35,567 --> 02:04:37,269
the metadata law
that we're talking

2577
02:04:37,269 --> 02:04:40,105
about which is aimed
specifically US citizens.

2578
02:04:40,105 --> 02:04:44,509
In making the changes they
were making, nobody believed

2579
02:04:44,509 --> 02:04:48,780
that relevant data meant
everybody in the United States.

2580
02:04:48,780 --> 02:04:49,981
>> Let me ask you--

2581
02:04:49,981 --> 02:04:51,850
>> So, you know, this is--
so this is ultimately--

2582
02:04:51,850 --> 02:04:54,152
yes, it's a question
of trust in so far

2583
02:04:54,152 --> 02:04:58,323
as the people implementing the
law have made it as elastic

2584
02:04:58,323 --> 02:05:00,425
as possible without it
completely exploding

2585
02:05:00,425 --> 02:05:04,095
and it might not be exploding.

2586
02:05:04,095 --> 02:05:05,363
>> John.

2587
02:05:05,363 --> 02:05:07,599
>> I've expressed no view
on whether it's desirable

2588
02:05:07,599 --> 02:05:11,803
or undesirable or whether
it's illegal or legal.

2589
02:05:11,803 --> 02:05:15,507
Neither of those questions
are really interesting to me.

2590
02:05:15,507 --> 02:05:18,910
When it comes to
the internet though,

2591
02:05:18,910 --> 02:05:22,480
the question is there's
a set of events going

2592
02:05:22,480 --> 02:05:24,583
on regarding surveillance,

2593
02:05:24,583 --> 02:05:27,986
and the internet is
global in nature.

2594
02:05:27,986 --> 02:05:32,023
We have allies and
trading partners

2595
02:05:32,023 --> 02:05:39,230
and organizations globally,
other governments who want

2596
02:05:39,230 --> 02:05:42,300
to understand what's going

2597
02:05:42,300 --> 02:05:45,604
on because they may
have the same desire.

2598
02:05:45,604 --> 02:05:50,742
There may be another government
that wishes for its reasons

2599
02:05:50,742 --> 02:05:54,980
to engage in surveillance of
communication in its country.

2600
02:05:54,980 --> 02:05:58,750
And it wants to understand
what is the framework

2601
02:05:58,750 --> 02:06:02,854
by which this is occurring
and how does it happen

2602
02:06:02,854 --> 02:06:06,558
in the internet, how was it's
supported, how does it go

2603
02:06:06,558 --> 02:06:09,361
on because they have their
own national interests

2604
02:06:09,361 --> 02:06:12,497
and they may pass laws in their
region that are perfectly fine

2605
02:06:12,497 --> 02:06:15,700
and acceptable according
to their processes.

2606
02:06:15,700 --> 02:06:18,169
So, we now have this
framework that says,

2607
02:06:18,169 --> 02:06:19,738
there are circumstances during

2608
02:06:19,738 --> 02:06:22,507
which surveillance is
apparently an accepted part

2609
02:06:22,507 --> 02:06:23,875
of the architecture.

2610
02:06:23,875 --> 02:06:25,777
What we don't have
is a transparency

2611
02:06:25,777 --> 02:06:29,781
about where that's occurring and
how that occurs and what happens

2612
02:06:29,781 --> 02:06:32,550
if another 130 countries
also do it.

2613
02:06:32,550 --> 02:06:37,422
I believe that if we're to have
equitable internet governance,

2614
02:06:37,422 --> 02:06:40,425
it's necessary to have
a fully articulated

2615
02:06:40,425 --> 02:06:42,260
and transparent framework.

2616
02:06:42,260 --> 02:06:44,029
I do not know whether
or not everyone is going

2617
02:06:44,029 --> 02:06:46,831
to like what their country
chooses for what it does

2618
02:06:46,831 --> 02:06:48,333
with surveillance or not.

2619
02:06:48,333 --> 02:06:49,601
That's a different question.

2620
02:06:49,601 --> 02:06:51,736
That's a question of laws
and governance structure.

2621
02:06:51,736 --> 02:06:54,205
But if this is going to go
on, we need to understand

2622
02:06:54,205 --> 02:06:56,741
where it occurs and how
it occurs and the fact

2623
02:06:56,741 --> 02:06:58,977
that it could be occurring
in a lot of places.

2624
02:06:58,977 --> 02:07:01,980
And that should be understood
and documented as part

2625
02:07:01,980 --> 02:07:06,351
of a clearly transparent
recognition

2626
02:07:06,351 --> 02:07:08,019
that this is part
of the internet.

2627
02:07:08,019 --> 02:07:11,089
>> Let me ask you
all this question.

2628
02:07:11,089 --> 02:07:12,724
You said you're not
interested in legality.

2629
02:07:12,724 --> 02:07:17,629
But one of the key debates
here is the legal framework

2630
02:07:17,629 --> 02:07:20,398
for PRISM and the FISA law.

2631
02:07:20,398 --> 02:07:26,471
And there's not much
debate about whether

2632
02:07:26,471 --> 02:07:29,541
or what's been taking places
legal or not under the law,

2633
02:07:29,541 --> 02:07:32,510
but there's a big debate about
whether the law is the right law

2634
02:07:32,510 --> 02:07:34,212
and whether the framework
should be altered.

2635
02:07:34,212 --> 02:07:39,417
If you all were to testify
before an intelligence

2636
02:07:39,417 --> 02:07:42,153
committees and others
on the Hill and asked,

2637
02:07:42,153 --> 02:07:44,155
how should this law be change

2638
02:07:44,155 --> 02:07:46,257
to advance the values
your talking about?

2639
02:07:46,257 --> 02:07:48,393
What would be some
of your suggestions?

2640
02:07:48,393 --> 02:07:51,696
Go ahead.

2641
02:07:51,696 --> 02:07:54,933
>> I think we have to start
by walking out the changes

2642
02:07:54,933 --> 02:07:59,104
that we made in the
records law because we took

2643
02:07:59,104 --> 02:08:02,607
out all the words that
make it proportionate

2644
02:08:02,607 --> 02:08:06,644
and make it targeted
and transformed it

2645
02:08:06,644 --> 02:08:08,913
into a broad collection statute.

2646
02:08:08,913 --> 02:08:12,183
And I, you know, I think
the ways to walk it back

2647
02:08:12,183 --> 02:08:17,589
that allows substantial
collection of targets

2648
02:08:17,589 --> 02:08:22,093
and information related to
that targets and backs it

2649
02:08:22,093 --> 02:08:27,499
out of this broad relevancy
standard that allows it--

2650
02:08:27,499 --> 02:08:30,735
if one to be collected
on anybody but also not--

2651
02:08:30,735 --> 02:08:34,672
it just takes out the whole
national security purpose.

2652
02:08:34,672 --> 02:08:38,009
Basically, you no longer
have to be collecting data

2653
02:08:38,009 --> 02:08:39,778
because of a particular
terrorist

2654
02:08:39,778 --> 02:08:42,847
or particular intelligence
activity.

2655
02:08:42,847 --> 02:08:45,550
You only have to be
collecting in order

2656
02:08:45,550 --> 02:08:47,786
to be protecting
the United States.

2657
02:08:47,786 --> 02:08:52,557
And that is simply to fraud
and to likely to abuse.

2658
02:08:52,557 --> 02:08:55,426
It is harder for me to
note what have changed 702

2659
02:08:55,426 --> 02:08:57,595
because we still don't
understand what they're doing.

2660
02:08:57,595 --> 02:08:59,164
>> And [inaudible] going
to thought about these--

2661
02:08:59,164 --> 02:09:02,467
>> Except for the transparence--
except for greater transparency.

2662
02:09:02,467 --> 02:09:05,069
>> 'Cause this is-- this
is going to be debated

2663
02:09:05,069 --> 02:09:06,304
in the weeks and months ahead.

2664
02:09:06,304 --> 02:09:07,605
It's a very important question.

2665
02:09:07,605 --> 02:09:08,873
>> But the traditional method

2666
02:09:08,873 --> 02:09:11,376
of before the haystack
love [phonetic],

2667
02:09:11,376 --> 02:09:12,877
if you allow me to call it that.

2668
02:09:12,877 --> 02:09:14,679
Before that was placed,
the traditional methods

2669
02:09:14,679 --> 02:09:16,981
of law enforcement
worked, and they would work

2670
02:09:16,981 --> 02:09:18,983
with whatever the
internet had to provide.

2671
02:09:18,983 --> 02:09:20,518
You needed to identify somebody.

2672
02:09:20,518 --> 02:09:24,155
You usually identify them
through a non-technical aspect.

2673
02:09:24,155 --> 02:09:26,958
You had an informant
somebody tell you, "Hey,

2674
02:09:26,958 --> 02:09:29,928
I think that you were doing
something illegal," and that--

2675
02:09:29,928 --> 02:09:31,963
that puts the focus on you.

2676
02:09:31,963 --> 02:09:34,432
From there, you would use
your traditional tools whether

2677
02:09:34,432 --> 02:09:36,301
they're on the net or
not to find, you know,

2678
02:09:36,301 --> 02:09:38,036
to find out what's going on.

2679
02:09:38,036 --> 02:09:45,143
Collecting data when there's
no evidence of a crime is kind

2680
02:09:45,143 --> 02:09:47,612
of counter intuitive and
kind of productive in a way

2681
02:09:47,612 --> 02:09:49,848
because it's sitting there.

2682
02:09:49,848 --> 02:09:53,351
So, if it were me and I was an
adversary of the United States,

2683
02:09:53,351 --> 02:09:57,288
I would find where those--
that database was being stored

2684
02:09:57,288 --> 02:10:00,024
and I would go after it to
collect all that information

2685
02:10:00,024 --> 02:10:02,126
because I can do the same
type of metadata analysis

2686
02:10:02,126 --> 02:10:03,194
that could be done that way.

2687
02:10:03,194 --> 02:10:07,332
The third thing is--
the reason why we--

2688
02:10:07,332 --> 02:10:09,567
you've mentioned earlier that
maybe we've mistrusted is

2689
02:10:09,567 --> 02:10:14,005
because we know what can be
done with that data and we know

2690
02:10:14,005 --> 02:10:15,139
when somebody-- we know

2691
02:10:15,139 --> 02:10:18,109
when somebody has given
us a [inaudible] answer.

2692
02:10:18,109 --> 02:10:20,678
Because I know that if I
control my infrastructure,

2693
02:10:20,678 --> 02:10:23,848
I know the power that I
have doing in my office,

2694
02:10:23,848 --> 02:10:27,085
I have to act responsibly
and within, you know,

2695
02:10:27,085 --> 02:10:28,219
the laws and all that.

2696
02:10:28,219 --> 02:10:30,054
But I know what can be done

2697
02:10:30,054 --> 02:10:33,258
if there's no oversight
on my position.

2698
02:10:33,258 --> 02:10:34,959
And that's why I
think you hear--

2699
02:10:34,959 --> 02:10:36,227
>> But there is oversight.

2700
02:10:36,227 --> 02:10:38,997
It is, you know, I mean they--

2701
02:10:38,997 --> 02:10:42,200
>> It would be if you were-- if
you were the oversight committee

2702
02:10:42,200 --> 02:10:46,471
for what I would do technically,
do you have the technical skills

2703
02:10:46,471 --> 02:10:48,406
to know what I'm doing?

2704
02:10:48,406 --> 02:10:49,407
[Inaudible Remark]

2705
02:10:49,407 --> 02:10:52,877
>> So I'm going to
leave the legal--

2706
02:10:52,877 --> 02:10:55,880
so the legal policy
questions, I largely agree

2707
02:10:55,880 --> 02:10:57,015
with what has been said.

2708
02:10:57,015 --> 02:10:59,083
I don't think that we
have adequate oversight.

2709
02:10:59,083 --> 02:11:02,854
And if I were-- I was talking
to Congress about what to do

2710
02:11:02,854 --> 02:11:04,689
to increase the trust
in this environment,

2711
02:11:04,689 --> 02:11:07,025
I would say that that Congress

2712
02:11:07,025 --> 02:11:09,827
and the FISA court
needs a more effective

2713
02:11:09,827 --> 02:11:11,296
accountability mechanism.

2714
02:11:11,296 --> 02:11:14,499
There is no way that the FISA
court judges or the members

2715
02:11:14,499 --> 02:11:16,301
of the Intelligence
community are looking

2716
02:11:16,301 --> 02:11:17,568
at every single query--

2717
02:11:17,568 --> 02:11:18,569
>> Right.

2718
02:11:18,569 --> 02:11:20,505
>> -- that NSA analysts
are performing

2719
02:11:20,505 --> 02:11:22,006
on these enormous
amounts of data.

2720
02:11:22,006 --> 02:11:23,775
It is technically possible to do

2721
02:11:23,775 --> 02:11:26,010
that to Mike Nelson's [assumed
spelling] earlier point

2722
02:11:26,010 --> 02:11:30,949
to actually evaluate whether
when Bob led the general counsel

2723
02:11:30,949 --> 02:11:34,385
of ODNI says, "Yeah, we have
the whole state haystack

2724
02:11:34,385 --> 02:11:37,722
but we only ask questions
based on certain predicates."

2725
02:11:37,722 --> 02:11:40,291
I know Bob and I more
or less trust him

2726
02:11:40,291 --> 02:11:43,661
but I think it's outrageous
for the government to say

2727
02:11:43,661 --> 02:11:46,431
to its citizens,
"Don't worry, trust us."

2728
02:11:46,431 --> 02:11:48,599
We give the government
considerable authority

2729
02:11:48,599 --> 02:11:50,401
but we need mechanisms
to make sure it's being

2730
02:11:50,401 --> 02:11:51,602
used responsibly.

2731
02:11:51,602 --> 02:11:53,538
And none of the oversight
mechanisms that exist

2732
02:11:53,538 --> 02:11:57,775
that you've mentioned are
able to provide that kind

2733
02:11:57,775 --> 02:12:00,244
of accountability
other than to call

2734
02:12:00,244 --> 02:12:02,580
up a responsible
person like, you know,

2735
02:12:02,580 --> 02:12:03,748
Mr. Ledin [assumed
spelling] say,

2736
02:12:03,748 --> 02:12:04,882
"Are you following the rules?"

2737
02:12:04,882 --> 02:12:06,517
And he says, "Yes, we're
following the rules."

2738
02:12:06,517 --> 02:12:09,420
He doesn't even know what
every single analyst does

2739
02:12:09,420 --> 02:12:11,122
in the agencies that's
responsible for it.

2740
02:12:11,122 --> 02:12:15,226
>> Let me ask you about one of
the proposals that has been made

2741
02:12:15,226 --> 02:12:17,161
and why they debated
in Washington.

2742
02:12:17,161 --> 02:12:20,832
And so, a lot of people
pointed out one of the flaws,

2743
02:12:20,832 --> 02:12:23,167
critics had pointed
out one of the flaws

2744
02:12:23,167 --> 02:12:26,804
in the FISA process is there's
no adversarial mechanism

2745
02:12:26,804 --> 02:12:31,709
within the FISA system that the
government comes in and asks

2746
02:12:31,709 --> 02:12:35,646
for permission and there
is no counter voice.

2747
02:12:35,646 --> 02:12:37,348
There is no adversarial
proceeding.

2748
02:12:37,348 --> 02:12:42,220
And in most legal systems, there
is a mechanism for challenging.

2749
02:12:42,220 --> 02:12:45,990
So, a number of legislative
proposals have been advanced

2750
02:12:45,990 --> 02:12:47,392
in one form or another.

2751
02:12:47,392 --> 02:12:50,361
Is this one of the mechanism set
that Congress should be looking

2752
02:12:50,361 --> 02:12:53,531
at to try to reorder
this balance that many

2753
02:12:53,531 --> 02:12:55,166
of you think is out way?

2754
02:12:55,166 --> 02:12:59,270
>> Yeah. I actually think
this question of some kind

2755
02:12:59,270 --> 02:13:02,306
of a public advocate and
I think it's probably--

2756
02:13:02,306 --> 02:13:05,576
we figured it out how to give
private lawyers the ability

2757
02:13:05,576 --> 02:13:07,378
to look at classified
information

2758
02:13:07,378 --> 02:13:09,380
and criminal procedures.

2759
02:13:09,380 --> 02:13:12,216
We ought to be able to come up
with this table of those people

2760
02:13:12,216 --> 02:13:15,353
who litigate the
national security state,

2761
02:13:15,353 --> 02:13:18,356
who can stand in for the public.

2762
02:13:18,356 --> 02:13:24,762
And, you know, I think it's one
of many potential points of sort

2763
02:13:24,762 --> 02:13:28,299
of strengthening oversight here.

2764
02:13:28,299 --> 02:13:30,835
I think it's-- I think
it's critically important.

2765
02:13:30,835 --> 02:13:32,336
I think different levels of sort

2766
02:13:32,336 --> 02:13:35,039
of reporting back
to the FISA court.

2767
02:13:35,039 --> 02:13:37,041
I think part of the
problem and the reason

2768
02:13:37,041 --> 02:13:39,477
that people are responding
is, I mean,

2769
02:13:39,477 --> 02:13:42,914
it's interesting FISA was
a civil liberties measure

2770
02:13:42,914 --> 02:13:46,150
when it was adopted in 1978.

2771
02:13:46,150 --> 02:13:48,686
And, you know, it's basically
my mentors were the civil

2772
02:13:48,686 --> 02:13:51,589
libertarians who
proposed this crazy idea.

2773
02:13:51,589 --> 02:13:58,696
And the world is really
different from the ones in 1978.

2774
02:13:58,696 --> 02:14:02,300
And being in contact with
a foreign person, I mean,

2775
02:14:02,300 --> 02:14:03,968
you know, there was
an iron curtain.

2776
02:14:03,968 --> 02:14:05,436
If you were-- if they
could actually figure

2777
02:14:05,436 --> 02:14:08,239
out you were communicating
with a foreign person,

2778
02:14:08,239 --> 02:14:10,708
it probably had some
significance.

2779
02:14:10,708 --> 02:14:12,777
We now live in this
world where 20 percent

2780
02:14:12,777 --> 02:14:15,746
of us are first generation,

2781
02:14:15,746 --> 02:14:18,549
where our corporations
are global,

2782
02:14:18,549 --> 02:14:21,886
where we travel all the
time, and where we--

2783
02:14:21,886 --> 02:14:24,555
people don't identify
themselves in that the same kind

2784
02:14:24,555 --> 02:14:28,226
of we-them way and
yet we have a law

2785
02:14:28,226 --> 02:14:31,295
and a designation
of foreign persons.

2786
02:14:31,295 --> 02:14:34,966
That really is a Cold
War era and almost has

2787
02:14:34,966 --> 02:14:37,235
to be reconsidered
all by itself.

2788
02:14:37,235 --> 02:14:39,871
And the law can't
be working very well

2789
02:14:39,871 --> 02:14:41,672
because it's not
supposed to sweep

2790
02:14:41,672 --> 02:14:43,541
up American's communications.

2791
02:14:43,541 --> 02:14:46,077
And all you have to do is read
the minimization guidelines

2792
02:14:46,077 --> 02:14:48,846
to understand how much of our
communications [inaudible].

2793
02:14:48,846 --> 02:14:53,151
>> Hal Berghel wrote
an interesting article

2794
02:14:53,151 --> 02:14:56,087
that just came out in
IEEE Computer magazine.

2795
02:14:56,087 --> 02:14:57,788
It's called "Through
the PRISM Darkly".

2796
02:14:57,788 --> 02:15:00,024
And there's a quote
in there that says,

2797
02:15:00,024 --> 02:15:01,893
"The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court has an

2798
02:15:01,893 --> 02:15:05,930
approval rate of 99.93 percent
of all surveillance requests.

2799
02:15:05,930 --> 02:15:08,666
While this might not meet
the strict definition

2800
02:15:08,666 --> 02:15:10,902
of a kangaroo court,
it seems to fall

2801
02:15:10,902 --> 02:15:13,237
within the marsupial family."

2802
02:15:13,237 --> 02:15:13,971
So--

2803
02:15:13,971 --> 02:15:15,339
[ Laughter ]

2804
02:15:15,339 --> 02:15:18,509
The point of it is is that there
are, you know, there are two

2805
02:15:18,509 --> 02:15:22,046
and he calls them cyber urban
myths that deal with this.

2806
02:15:22,046 --> 02:15:25,216
One is that you do need
to all of this, you know,

2807
02:15:25,216 --> 02:15:28,753
information to do it
and that there's not--

2808
02:15:28,753 --> 02:15:30,821
there's sufficient oversight.

2809
02:15:30,821 --> 02:15:31,856
And I think we all agree,

2810
02:15:31,856 --> 02:15:34,525
there's not sufficient
oversight.

2811
02:15:34,525 --> 02:15:39,797
You wouldn't ask me to be on
a medical oversight committee

2812
02:15:39,797 --> 02:15:42,033
to review surgical procedures

2813
02:15:42,033 --> 02:15:43,801
because I'm not a
doctor, I'm not a surgeon.

2814
02:15:43,801 --> 02:15:46,070
I don't have that
expertise in that area.

2815
02:15:46,070 --> 02:15:47,371
And so, I think that's the--

2816
02:15:47,371 --> 02:15:49,040
I think that's the thing

2817
02:15:49,040 --> 02:15:53,244
that bothers the technology
people is we know it is a small

2818
02:15:53,244 --> 02:15:56,013
community of the actual people
that know the nuts and bolts

2819
02:15:56,013 --> 02:15:58,616
about technology security
from that standpoint.

2820
02:15:58,616 --> 02:16:00,818
And if we don't know
each other by--

2821
02:16:00,818 --> 02:16:04,088
personally, we know each other
by reputation and whatever.

2822
02:16:04,088 --> 02:16:07,992
And so when you look and
you query your other peers

2823
02:16:07,992 --> 02:16:10,161
and they have the same
misgivings that you do,

2824
02:16:10,161 --> 02:16:11,596
then it makes you
wonder what's going on.

2825
02:16:11,596 --> 02:16:15,800
>> I just want to make one
other point about the people

2826
02:16:15,800 --> 02:16:19,203
who are being swept up in
this-- in this surveillance.

2827
02:16:19,203 --> 02:16:20,705
I think one of the reasons

2828
02:16:20,705 --> 02:16:23,040
that more fine-grained
accountability is really

2829
02:16:23,040 --> 02:16:26,110
critical is we don't know

2830
02:16:26,110 --> 02:16:29,380
but I think it's a safe
assumption that, you know,

2831
02:16:29,380 --> 02:16:32,683
somewhere north of 90 percent
of the people who are on any

2832
02:16:32,683 --> 02:16:36,153
of these terrorism watch list
who were the targets of any

2833
02:16:36,153 --> 02:16:38,623
of this surveillance
are Arab-Americans

2834
02:16:38,623 --> 02:16:40,424
who have some connection
to the Middle East,

2835
02:16:40,424 --> 02:16:42,826
many of whom are
probably Muslims.

2836
02:16:42,826 --> 02:16:45,563
In this country, we don't
have a great history

2837
02:16:45,563 --> 02:16:49,734
of treating minorities
perfectly fairly.

2838
02:16:49,734 --> 02:16:54,305
And part of the reason we
have oversight mechanisms,

2839
02:16:54,305 --> 02:16:57,174
part of reason we have open
courts, part of reason we try

2840
02:16:57,174 --> 02:17:02,713
to have due process with public
visibility is to make sure

2841
02:17:02,713 --> 02:17:05,516
that we actually do
our job and really--

2842
02:17:05,516 --> 02:17:08,084
and really treating people
fairly and not discriminating.

2843
02:17:08,084 --> 02:17:11,522
And again, I don't--
I don't think--

2844
02:17:11,522 --> 02:17:13,591
I think it's really interesting,
you hear this panel,

2845
02:17:13,591 --> 02:17:14,892
you hear the public discussion.

2846
02:17:14,892 --> 02:17:16,994
I don't think through
that many people saying,

2847
02:17:16,994 --> 02:17:18,896
"Stop the Surveillance."

2848
02:17:18,896 --> 02:17:20,031
People are not saying that I was

2849
02:17:20,031 --> 02:17:22,400
in Boston during the
marathon bombings.

2850
02:17:22,400 --> 02:17:25,036
People are clamoring for the
instillation of more cameras.

2851
02:17:25,036 --> 02:17:27,638
You know, the question
I really believe is not

2852
02:17:27,638 --> 02:17:30,508
about whether law enforcement
should have these tools.

2853
02:17:30,508 --> 02:17:32,109
It's about whether
we can feel confident

2854
02:17:32,109 --> 02:17:34,779
that they're using
them responsibly.

2855
02:17:34,779 --> 02:17:37,781
>> One of you made
the point that--

2856
02:17:37,781 --> 02:17:39,483
actually, this is
not a new issue--

2857
02:17:39,483 --> 02:17:42,852
that just a few years ago,
Washington posted an expose,

2858
02:17:42,852 --> 02:17:46,424
a very lengthy one, Diana Press
[assumed spelling] and others.

2859
02:17:46,424 --> 02:17:50,460
And there was not anything
like the same kind of reaction

2860
02:17:50,460 --> 02:17:52,263
that there's been lately.

2861
02:17:52,263 --> 02:17:55,333
And I'm wondering why you
think what's the difference,

2862
02:17:55,333 --> 02:17:58,536
why has there been such--
why are we having this panel

2863
02:17:58,536 --> 02:17:59,637
and not three years ago.

2864
02:17:59,637 --> 02:18:01,572
Why is there so much
conversation now

2865
02:18:01,572 --> 02:18:04,674
about this issue
when, in fact, when--

2866
02:18:04,674 --> 02:18:08,379
at least some of this
was made known through--

2867
02:18:08,379 --> 02:18:10,448
to post another mechanisms
some years ago?

2868
02:18:10,448 --> 02:18:11,816
>> Smartphones.

2869
02:18:11,816 --> 02:18:13,484
>> We didn't have the numbers,
we didn't have the numbers.

2870
02:18:13,484 --> 02:18:15,852
I mean, from the Verizon
order, we now know.

2871
02:18:15,852 --> 02:18:17,321
It's-- I don't remember
how many millions

2872
02:18:17,321 --> 02:18:18,723
of people's records were--

2873
02:18:18,723 --> 02:18:20,825
tens of millions of people's
records were collected.

2874
02:18:20,825 --> 02:18:23,294
We had-- we have
general outlines

2875
02:18:23,294 --> 02:18:26,931
from the post reporting,
from, you know, from all kinds

2876
02:18:26,931 --> 02:18:30,300
of things but we did-- it was
not dramatized with numbers.

2877
02:18:30,300 --> 02:18:33,637
And I think and now we know
it's basically everyone's data.

2878
02:18:33,637 --> 02:18:35,638
We never actually knew
that was happening.

2879
02:18:35,638 --> 02:18:36,540
>> Right. I think that's right.

2880
02:18:36,540 --> 02:18:38,609
I also think there was an uproar

2881
02:18:38,609 --> 02:18:43,280
when the warrantless
wiretapping was first revealed.

2882
02:18:43,280 --> 02:18:45,750
We had a very big
battle in Congress.

2883
02:18:45,750 --> 02:18:47,550
People were really
worried about it.

2884
02:18:47,550 --> 02:18:49,420
People who were not
following it closely

2885
02:18:49,420 --> 02:18:51,922
and they passed an amendment
might have actually thought

2886
02:18:51,922 --> 02:18:54,325
that what we wound
up with was some kind

2887
02:18:54,325 --> 02:18:56,093
of additional procedural
protections.

2888
02:18:56,093 --> 02:18:59,730
Instead, we wound up-- what we
wound up with was a ratification

2889
02:18:59,730 --> 02:19:01,898
of that program, immunity

2890
02:19:01,898 --> 02:19:05,468
for the providers,
and not much more.

2891
02:19:05,468 --> 02:19:09,173
And so I, you know, I
think a lot of us knew some

2892
02:19:09,173 --> 02:19:12,009
of this was going on but
I think we didn't know.

2893
02:19:12,009 --> 02:19:14,844
One of my colleagues, Jim
Dempsey who's on the Privacy

2894
02:19:14,844 --> 02:19:19,884
and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board wrote an article saying,

2895
02:19:19,884 --> 02:19:22,852
"Did they just approve
a vacuum cleaner?"

2896
02:19:22,852 --> 02:19:25,489
And lots of people then
responded with, "Oh,

2897
02:19:25,489 --> 02:19:28,092
you know, that's ridiculous."

2898
02:19:28,092 --> 02:19:31,529
Well, no, in fact, they
approved a vacuum cleaner

2899
02:19:31,529 --> 02:19:33,297
and we didn't know it.

2900
02:19:33,297 --> 02:19:34,432
>> Laura? Laura.

2901
02:19:34,432 --> 02:19:35,566
>> I agree with those points.

2902
02:19:35,566 --> 02:19:38,035
I think it is a matter
of scale in this case.

2903
02:19:38,035 --> 02:19:39,670
But I think there are
few other points, too,

2904
02:19:39,670 --> 02:19:41,472
that are a little
bit more subtle.

2905
02:19:41,472 --> 02:19:43,207
So, one issue is that this came

2906
02:19:43,207 --> 02:19:46,811
after Hillary Clinton's
internet freedom speech

2907
02:19:46,811 --> 02:19:50,981
and this entire mean
[phonetic] that has been created

2908
02:19:50,981 --> 02:19:54,318
and I think rightly
replicated around the world

2909
02:19:54,318 --> 02:19:55,786
about internet freedom.

2910
02:19:55,786 --> 02:20:00,891
So, this is a very important
issue and what this does is it--

2911
02:20:00,891 --> 02:20:03,727
it's providing an opportunity
for people to challenge

2912
02:20:03,727 --> 02:20:07,031
that notion of the internet
freedom and to point

2913
02:20:07,031 --> 02:20:09,567
out what they're
calling hypocrisy.

2914
02:20:09,567 --> 02:20:12,269
So, that to me is a problem.

2915
02:20:12,269 --> 02:20:16,440
It can also be an opportunity
if it's addressed appropriately.

2916
02:20:16,440 --> 02:20:21,512
Another issue is that individual
citizens are living their life

2917
02:20:21,512 --> 02:20:23,380
online to a much greater extent

2918
02:20:23,380 --> 02:20:25,049
than they did five
years ago even.

2919
02:20:25,049 --> 02:20:27,051
It's really amazing
if you think.

2920
02:20:27,051 --> 02:20:29,019
I mean, I'll just give you
an example I was talking

2921
02:20:29,019 --> 02:20:29,820
about today.

2922
02:20:29,820 --> 02:20:31,856
So, five years ago, I was--

2923
02:20:31,856 --> 02:20:34,225
I would read the paper
in the morning and now,

2924
02:20:34,225 --> 02:20:37,194
I'm completely connected to
my smartphone all the time

2925
02:20:37,194 --> 02:20:40,397
and I am posting information,
I'm communicating in it.

2926
02:20:40,397 --> 02:20:42,800
So, the public sphere
is what's at stake here.

2927
02:20:42,800 --> 02:20:44,468
The public sphere is online.

2928
02:20:44,468 --> 02:20:45,803
And I think that
that is much greater

2929
02:20:45,803 --> 02:20:48,606
than during these last
instances a few years ago

2930
02:20:48,606 --> 02:20:49,874
that were mentioned.

2931
02:20:49,874 --> 02:20:53,143
So, scale, the issue of
people being more cognizant

2932
02:20:53,143 --> 02:20:56,247
about how their internal
private life is lived

2933
02:20:56,247 --> 02:20:59,183
out in the digital
realm and also the mean

2934
02:20:59,183 --> 02:21:01,685
that has been fairly successful

2935
02:21:01,685 --> 02:21:03,988
about internet freedom
has ensued

2936
02:21:03,988 --> 02:21:06,857
in these intervening years.

2937
02:21:06,857 --> 02:21:09,426
>> I think those were
grilling [phonetic] points.

2938
02:21:09,426 --> 02:21:10,394
>> Yeah. [Multiple Speakers]

2939
02:21:10,394 --> 02:21:12,263
>> I was just going
to say quickly

2940
02:21:12,263 --> 02:21:15,733
that technology makes lots of
things possible and it was clear

2941
02:21:15,733 --> 02:21:17,167
at the time of those articles.

2942
02:21:17,167 --> 02:21:18,502
It's clear today.

2943
02:21:18,502 --> 02:21:21,238
It doesn't mean that
it's eminently minable

2944
02:21:21,238 --> 02:21:23,974
but that's done outside
of due process.

2945
02:21:23,974 --> 02:21:25,142
And I think those are the things

2946
02:21:25,142 --> 02:21:26,510
that are getting
people excitable.

2947
02:21:26,510 --> 02:21:30,114
It's not technology and it's
not what's technically possible

2948
02:21:30,114 --> 02:21:32,016
or even what's technically
feasible.

2949
02:21:32,016 --> 02:21:37,221
It's actually ultimately
the full mining

2950
02:21:37,221 --> 02:21:39,790
and then the lack
of public scrutiny.

2951
02:21:39,790 --> 02:21:41,892
>> What about the argument
that you hear from some people

2952
02:21:41,892 --> 02:21:45,796
that not only are we three
years farther away from 9/11?

2953
02:21:45,796 --> 02:21:48,499
Several of you made
the point that a lot

2954
02:21:48,499 --> 02:21:52,169
of these original
processes were passed almost

2955
02:21:52,169 --> 02:21:55,673
in a battlefield mentality,
one of you used that phrase.

2956
02:21:55,673 --> 02:22:01,478
And that there were extreme
circumstances with the value

2957
02:22:01,478 --> 02:22:02,479
of national security

2958
02:22:02,479 --> 02:22:04,815
in protecting the
homeland very much

2959
02:22:04,815 --> 02:22:06,784
in the forefront
of a public debate.

2960
02:22:06,784 --> 02:22:10,654
So you got three years later
but some people would argue--

2961
02:22:10,654 --> 02:22:12,289
there's almost a
contradiction here.

2962
02:22:12,289 --> 02:22:14,758
Certainly the intelligence
community would say, "Well,

2963
02:22:14,758 --> 02:22:18,329
actually people are more
relaxed now and less concerned

2964
02:22:18,329 --> 02:22:21,632
about the threat because
our systems have worked

2965
02:22:21,632 --> 02:22:24,468
and that you shouldn't
be dismantling systems

2966
02:22:24,468 --> 02:22:26,570
which have actually made
people more secure."

2967
02:22:26,570 --> 02:22:27,938
How would you answer that?

2968
02:22:27,938 --> 02:22:29,340
>> Let's concentrate to what
the President has said though.

2969
02:22:29,340 --> 02:22:31,241
I mean, what the
President has told us--

2970
02:22:31,241 --> 02:22:33,110
>> Although he has said
he's in favor of the system.

2971
02:22:33,110 --> 02:22:36,947
>> Yes. And he said that
the capability is necessary.

2972
02:22:36,947 --> 02:22:39,850
He's in no way precluded
additional oversight.

2973
02:22:39,850 --> 02:22:42,286
I think he's actually
welcomed the discussion of--

2974
02:22:42,286 --> 02:22:43,354
>> Sure.

2975
02:22:43,354 --> 02:22:44,688
>> -- of what kind
of oversight we need.

2976
02:22:44,688 --> 02:22:49,226
But he said we're living
it in a lower threat level

2977
02:22:49,226 --> 02:22:52,396
and that we need to make
changes as a society

2978
02:22:52,396 --> 02:22:54,465
and as government
in response to that.

2979
02:22:54,465 --> 02:22:57,968
So, not the other way around.

2980
02:22:57,968 --> 02:23:03,941
>> Edward Snowden, to some
people he's a traitor.

2981
02:23:03,941 --> 02:23:05,376
To some people, he's a hero.

2982
02:23:05,376 --> 02:23:07,111
What do you think?

2983
02:23:07,111 --> 02:23:11,649
>> Everybody, on your clearance
you signed a document that says,

2984
02:23:11,649 --> 02:23:15,786
"If you disclose secrecy,
there's a penalty."

2985
02:23:15,786 --> 02:23:18,822
So, from that standpoint,
you clearly violated

2986
02:23:18,822 --> 02:23:23,927
that document and, you know,
I don't have a problem with--

2987
02:23:23,927 --> 02:23:26,563
with being prosecuted
because of that.

2988
02:23:26,563 --> 02:23:27,865
On the oversight--

2989
02:23:27,865 --> 02:23:29,633
>> Because it this contractual--

2990
02:23:29,633 --> 02:23:30,868
>> Because it is contractual.

2991
02:23:30,868 --> 02:23:32,336
I mean, it states, "Anybody
who has a clearance."

2992
02:23:32,336 --> 02:23:34,605
You have that-- it's in
your-- in the agreement,

2993
02:23:34,605 --> 02:23:38,308
and it says clearly that you,
you know, 25 years in prison

2994
02:23:38,308 --> 02:23:39,309
or whatever it is that--

2995
02:23:39,309 --> 02:23:40,044
>> You actually read that?

2996
02:23:40,044 --> 02:23:41,812
>> No, it's-- yeah.

2997
02:23:41,812 --> 02:23:44,515
It happens when you come from
a family of lawyers, you know.

2998
02:23:44,515 --> 02:23:45,849
>> It's privacy policy.

2999
02:23:45,849 --> 02:23:48,052
>> No. I mean, you look-- yeah,
I mean, if I'm going to go

3000
02:23:48,052 --> 02:23:50,220
to jail, I want to know
what I have to say, right?

3001
02:23:50,220 --> 02:23:52,923
And, so I think-- I think
from that standpoint, yes.

3002
02:23:52,923 --> 02:23:54,792
I think the rest of the
community is still trying

3003
02:23:54,792 --> 02:23:57,895
to divide it as to whether
or not the information

3004
02:23:57,895 --> 02:24:01,065
that is disclosed is a problem.

3005
02:24:01,065 --> 02:24:03,100
And some people go back kind

3006
02:24:03,100 --> 02:24:06,070
of like what I was saying
is there have been articles

3007
02:24:06,070 --> 02:24:08,172
about this for, you
know, a long time.

3008
02:24:08,172 --> 02:24:10,374
You know, you can go
back into the '70s

3009
02:24:10,374 --> 02:24:14,445
when NSA had the ECHELON
program, in the mid-'90s

3010
02:24:14,445 --> 02:24:16,613
with Omnivore and
Carnivore, you know,

3011
02:24:16,613 --> 02:24:17,648
all of those type of things.

3012
02:24:17,648 --> 02:24:18,816
You've had this type

3013
02:24:18,816 --> 02:24:20,884
of electronic surveillance
for quite sometime.

3014
02:24:20,884 --> 02:24:24,054
So, we're not quite sure what
it is and not having seen all

3015
02:24:24,054 --> 02:24:27,224
that is disclosed but we're
not quite sure of what it is

3016
02:24:27,224 --> 02:24:31,829
that he's telling the world
that we don't know already.

3017
02:24:31,829 --> 02:24:35,299
And so from that stand point,
I think part of my community,

3018
02:24:35,299 --> 02:24:37,901
we're not sure about
the content.

3019
02:24:37,901 --> 02:24:40,738
But certainly he violated an
agreement and he, you know,

3020
02:24:40,738 --> 02:24:43,040
that's what they're going
to go after him for.

3021
02:24:43,040 --> 02:24:46,410
>> So I have mixed views
about Snowden because I think

3022
02:24:46,410 --> 02:24:49,213
that whistleblowing in a
free society and a right

3023
02:24:49,213 --> 02:24:51,348
to know is critically important.

3024
02:24:51,348 --> 02:24:54,651
And if you go back
to Pentagon Papers

3025
02:24:54,651 --> 02:24:57,788
and terrible things did not
happen with the publishing

3026
02:24:57,788 --> 02:24:59,523
of the Pentagon Papers.

3027
02:24:59,523 --> 02:25:02,226
[ Pause ]

3028
02:25:02,226 --> 02:25:04,261
So-- so, part of--

3029
02:25:04,261 --> 02:25:05,796
>> I'll cover the
Pentagon Papers story and--

3030
02:25:05,796 --> 02:25:06,797
>> I'm sure--

3031
02:25:06,797 --> 02:25:07,765
>> -- cover Daniel
Ellsberg's trial.

3032
02:25:07,765 --> 02:25:08,465
So, I'm--

3033
02:25:08,465 --> 02:25:09,099
>> And Ellsberg's trial.

3034
02:25:09,099 --> 02:25:09,800
>> Yes.

3035
02:25:09,800 --> 02:25:10,834
>> And Ellsberg is very,

3036
02:25:10,834 --> 02:25:13,771
very out there right
now about Snowden.

3037
02:25:13,771 --> 02:25:16,073
I was kind of right with him

3038
02:25:16,073 --> 02:25:21,311
until he started keeping away
the US cyber security strategy

3039
02:25:21,311 --> 02:25:24,114
with respect to China
while he was in Hong Kong.

3040
02:25:24,114 --> 02:25:29,253
And then I started to wonder
exactly what he's motivations

3041
02:25:29,253 --> 02:25:30,587
were, you know.

3042
02:25:30,587 --> 02:25:35,526
And so, I do feel like
there's a level or recklessness

3043
02:25:35,526 --> 02:25:42,299
that worries me and although
it's hard for me to really know

3044
02:25:42,299 --> 02:25:45,836
if there's damage to national
security because I've set

3045
02:25:45,836 --> 02:25:48,972
in some of these meetings
with national security people

3046
02:25:48,972 --> 02:25:51,909
who I've held up the
minimization guidelines

3047
02:25:51,909 --> 02:25:53,277
and said, "Is there anything

3048
02:25:53,277 --> 02:25:55,379
in here that's really
secret or should be?"

3049
02:25:55,379 --> 02:25:56,847
And they said, "No."

3050
02:25:56,847 --> 02:26:00,184
The existence of
these programs sort

3051
02:26:00,184 --> 02:26:02,853
of have been broad-brushed
some people knew.

3052
02:26:02,853 --> 02:26:05,022
So, if at the end of the day,

3053
02:26:05,022 --> 02:26:06,390
it's that the public
finally knows

3054
02:26:06,390 --> 02:26:08,325
that it's happening
'cause I'm not sure

3055
02:26:08,325 --> 02:26:10,894
if any thing's been revealed
that will allow people

3056
02:26:10,894 --> 02:26:15,232
to somehow evade all of this,
that, I think, you know,

3057
02:26:15,232 --> 02:26:18,302
society has to make
room for whistleblowers.

3058
02:26:18,302 --> 02:26:20,304
I just wish we had
whistleblowers

3059
02:26:20,304 --> 02:26:23,407
who were a little less reckless.

3060
02:26:23,407 --> 02:26:24,708
>> Well, you know,
as a whistleblower,

3061
02:26:24,708 --> 02:26:26,910
he appears to have
delusions of grandeur.

3062
02:26:26,910 --> 02:26:28,011
>> Well, right.

3063
02:26:28,011 --> 02:26:28,979
>> I mean, the first
couple of days, he had--

3064
02:26:28,979 --> 02:26:31,014
he'd made statements
such as saying--

3065
02:26:31,014 --> 02:26:33,483
such as that he could order
a wiretap of the President

3066
02:26:33,483 --> 02:26:35,853
and he could, you know,
had all the locations

3067
02:26:35,853 --> 02:26:37,254
of all the NSA stations.

3068
02:26:37,254 --> 02:26:42,626
Pretty unlikely, that said,
I guess the, you know,

3069
02:26:42,626 --> 02:26:45,796
I think that his disclosures
have done a public service.

3070
02:26:45,796 --> 02:26:47,931
I think he's a whistleblower
in that sense.

3071
02:26:47,931 --> 02:26:48,999
I actually agree.

3072
02:26:48,999 --> 02:26:50,434
It seems like he
just broken the law

3073
02:26:50,434 --> 02:26:52,336
and doesn't seem
very complicated.

3074
02:26:52,336 --> 02:26:55,205
What I find confusing and--

3075
02:26:55,205 --> 02:26:59,676
is that somehow the
traditional notion

3076
02:26:59,676 --> 02:27:02,880
of civil disobedience seems
to have been lost track

3077
02:27:02,880 --> 02:27:04,514
of in what he's doing.

3078
02:27:04,514 --> 02:27:06,250
I mean, I wish-- I mean, look,

3079
02:27:06,250 --> 02:27:09,353
he's obviously has put his
life at total risk and--

3080
02:27:09,353 --> 02:27:11,622
>> Although traditional
idea is you pay the penalty

3081
02:27:11,622 --> 02:27:12,956
for having broken the law.

3082
02:27:12,956 --> 02:27:14,324
>> You pay the penalty and
you [inaudible] having a trial

3083
02:27:14,324 --> 02:27:16,994
and you expose-- you expose the
things that you're concerned

3084
02:27:16,994 --> 02:27:19,263
about and you expose
them, further look at me.

3085
02:27:19,263 --> 02:27:20,597
He's a civilian.

3086
02:27:20,597 --> 02:27:23,667
He wouldn't be tried in a
court martial the way Bradley

3087
02:27:23,667 --> 02:27:24,401
Manning is.

3088
02:27:24,401 --> 02:27:25,402
>> Right.

3089
02:27:25,402 --> 02:27:26,803
>> He could've staged
a public trial

3090
02:27:26,803 --> 02:27:30,540
and a big public discussion that
he chose not to and I, you know,

3091
02:27:30,540 --> 02:27:31,909
again, it's not for me

3092
02:27:31,909 --> 02:27:35,512
to say how people should put
their lives at risk as he'd has

3093
02:27:35,512 --> 02:27:38,782
but I think it's a-- I think
it's an incomplete active

3094
02:27:38,782 --> 02:27:40,450
civil disobedience.

3095
02:27:40,450 --> 02:27:42,519
>> Anybody else want
it, got a view on that?

3096
02:27:42,519 --> 02:27:45,155
Let me ask you another question.

3097
02:27:45,155 --> 02:27:49,059
One of the things that
Dan said that the--

3098
02:27:49,059 --> 02:27:51,261
are the very interesting
analysis when he talked

3099
02:27:51,261 --> 02:27:53,864
about the internet not being
a creature of the state,

3100
02:27:53,864 --> 02:27:55,933
how earlier forms

3101
02:27:55,933 --> 02:27:59,937
of communication whether
it's telephones and telegraph

3102
02:27:59,937 --> 02:28:02,205
and so many of them grew up.

3103
02:28:02,205 --> 02:28:05,142
Television spectrums,
I mean, they were sold

3104
02:28:05,142 --> 02:28:07,177
by the government,
right, and still are.

3105
02:28:07,177 --> 02:28:12,015
So, there was an inherent
regulatory legal organic

3106
02:28:12,015 --> 02:28:14,484
connection between earlier
forms of communication

3107
02:28:14,484 --> 02:28:18,288
and government regulation which,
as you point out is missing

3108
02:28:18,288 --> 02:28:22,159
in a large part in this
particular system we've all been

3109
02:28:22,159 --> 02:28:23,593
talking about.

3110
02:28:23,593 --> 02:28:25,562
>> But it's more than a legal
question it seems to me,

3111
02:28:25,562 --> 02:28:30,767
it's also a cultural question,
that a lot of you being soaked

3112
02:28:30,767 --> 02:28:32,602
in this culture and committed

3113
02:28:32,602 --> 02:28:37,607
to this culture have evinced
skepticism of government

3114
02:28:37,607 --> 02:28:42,045
and of regulation and yet at
the same time, you're grappling

3115
02:28:42,045 --> 02:28:46,016
with the notion of how do you
bring some order to a system

3116
02:28:46,016 --> 02:28:50,921
that continues to cry out
for some kind of regulation.

3117
02:28:50,921 --> 02:28:53,690
I'm interested for you
to use a little bit

3118
02:28:53,690 --> 02:28:58,095
about the contradiction between
sort of the historic origins

3119
02:28:58,095 --> 02:29:01,999
and the culture of this
system and the need

3120
02:29:01,999 --> 02:29:05,035
to bring some order
and regulation to it.

3121
02:29:05,035 --> 02:29:07,671
It seems to me there's an
inherent conflict that's worth

3122
02:29:07,671 --> 02:29:09,740
talking about.

3123
02:29:09,740 --> 02:29:10,841
Start.

3124
02:29:10,841 --> 02:29:11,942
>> I'll kick off the
discussion about that.

3125
02:29:11,942 --> 02:29:15,746
I think sometimes when
you go to a workshop

3126
02:29:15,746 --> 02:29:18,482
that discusses internet
governance,

3127
02:29:18,482 --> 02:29:23,687
it descends into a question
such as who should grab the keys

3128
02:29:23,687 --> 02:29:25,288
of internet governance, right?

3129
02:29:25,288 --> 02:29:26,323
So, the question of--

3130
02:29:26,323 --> 02:29:27,624
so if question were asked

3131
02:29:27,624 --> 02:29:30,794
such as should the United
Nations control the internet

3132
02:29:30,794 --> 02:29:32,829
or should the United
States control it

3133
02:29:32,829 --> 02:29:34,064
or should Google control it?

3134
02:29:34,064 --> 02:29:36,166
Like those kinds of
questions don't make any sense

3135
02:29:36,166 --> 02:29:37,667
in their first instance.

3136
02:29:37,667 --> 02:29:41,204
And part of that is because
there is no monolithic system

3137
02:29:41,204 --> 02:29:42,305
of internet governance.

3138
02:29:42,305 --> 02:29:45,142
It's highly granular,
it's multi layered.

3139
02:29:45,142 --> 02:29:47,577
There are-- there are
so many different levels

3140
02:29:47,577 --> 02:29:49,746
of internet governance.

3141
02:29:49,746 --> 02:29:51,381
I mean, I-- my book is very long

3142
02:29:51,381 --> 02:29:53,316
and I only get into
some of them.

3143
02:29:53,316 --> 02:29:56,453
But the issue here is
multistakeholder governance

3144
02:29:56,453 --> 02:29:57,854
and what that means.

3145
02:29:57,854 --> 02:30:01,191
So, internet governance is very
interesting because it is not

3146
02:30:01,191 --> 02:30:03,660
about governments necessarily
but that doesn't mean

3147
02:30:03,660 --> 02:30:05,295
that there's not a
role for government

3148
02:30:05,295 --> 02:30:06,963
in many different areas.

3149
02:30:06,963 --> 02:30:09,599
So, if I have identity theft,
I'd like the government

3150
02:30:09,599 --> 02:30:10,600
to step in and help me.

3151
02:30:10,600 --> 02:30:12,702
I expect antitrust enforcement.

3152
02:30:12,702 --> 02:30:15,806
I expect laws about--
some laws about privacy.

3153
02:30:15,806 --> 02:30:16,973
I expect some laws

3154
02:30:16,973 --> 02:30:19,109
about intellectual
property rights enforcement.

3155
02:30:19,109 --> 02:30:22,079
I expect certain national
statute on any variety

3156
02:30:22,079 --> 02:30:25,515
of things related to
trade, child protection.

3157
02:30:25,515 --> 02:30:28,785
So, there are many places
for the government to be

3158
02:30:28,785 --> 02:30:31,054
in internet regulation
and governance.

3159
02:30:31,054 --> 02:30:34,157
But most functions
that are related

3160
02:30:34,157 --> 02:30:36,660
to the operational
stability and security

3161
02:30:36,660 --> 02:30:39,129
of the internet have
not been the purview

3162
02:30:39,129 --> 02:30:40,297
of traditional governments

3163
02:30:40,297 --> 02:30:42,532
but they have been enacted
by private industry.

3164
02:30:42,532 --> 02:30:44,734
And I think that that's
a very important point.

3165
02:30:44,734 --> 02:30:47,270
Now, tying this back
to the PRISM issue,

3166
02:30:47,270 --> 02:30:52,109
one concern that I have is
that the one separate area

3167
02:30:52,109 --> 02:30:54,478
of how the internet is
being used in the data

3168
02:30:54,478 --> 02:30:56,713
that can be collected
and gathered will bleed

3169
02:30:56,713 --> 02:30:59,349
into this other area of
the operational stability

3170
02:30:59,349 --> 02:31:01,084
and security of the internet.

3171
02:31:01,084 --> 02:31:05,455
So, we can expect to see
this issue used as a proxy

3172
02:31:05,455 --> 02:31:08,191
for governments that are
interested in gaining control

3173
02:31:08,191 --> 02:31:10,327
in certain operational
areas of the internet.

3174
02:31:10,327 --> 02:31:12,429
I guarantee that
that will happen.

3175
02:31:12,429 --> 02:31:14,531
So, we'll see that in some--

3176
02:31:14,531 --> 02:31:16,833
once he calls for
international treaties.

3177
02:31:16,833 --> 02:31:19,236
Again, that leave
out private industry.

3178
02:31:19,236 --> 02:31:21,071
That leave out civil society.

3179
02:31:21,071 --> 02:31:23,874
We'll see it in additional
calls for bringing

3180
02:31:23,874 --> 02:31:26,443
in a more multilateral control

3181
02:31:26,443 --> 02:31:28,245
of some critical
internet resources.

3182
02:31:28,245 --> 02:31:30,680
So, I think one bleeds
into another.

3183
02:31:30,680 --> 02:31:34,351
But that it's really not
about private industry

3184
02:31:34,351 --> 02:31:37,320
versus governments
or civil society

3185
02:31:37,320 --> 02:31:39,723
versus private industry,
for example.

3186
02:31:39,723 --> 02:31:42,359
It's about the more
contextual question

3187
02:31:42,359 --> 02:31:45,462
of what governance is
necessary for what--

3188
02:31:45,462 --> 02:31:47,097
which particular area.

3189
02:31:47,097 --> 02:31:50,033
So, in certain cases, it's
completely appropriate

3190
02:31:50,033 --> 02:31:52,536
for only the private
sector to be involved.

3191
02:31:52,536 --> 02:31:54,538
In other cases, it's the
purview of government.

3192
02:31:54,538 --> 02:31:57,841
So, it has to be asked
in a contextual area,

3193
02:31:57,841 --> 02:32:00,110
and that's what multistakeholder
governance is.

3194
02:32:00,110 --> 02:32:03,713
It's not everybody in charge
of every-- it's granular area.

3195
02:32:03,713 --> 02:32:04,781
That's not it.

3196
02:32:04,781 --> 02:32:06,516
It's about what's
the appropriate form

3197
02:32:06,516 --> 02:32:08,718
of governance in
a particular area.

3198
02:32:08,718 --> 02:32:10,654
>> John?

3199
02:32:10,654 --> 02:32:12,422
>> So the one thing
we do know is

3200
02:32:12,422 --> 02:32:15,692
that the internet
evolves very quickly.

3201
02:32:15,692 --> 02:32:22,766
I was involved 25 years of
it and it changes rapidly.

3202
02:32:22,766 --> 02:32:28,538
What was dial-up
modems and just Telnet

3203
02:32:28,538 --> 02:32:36,112
and FTP quickly became
circuits and high speed fiber.

3204
02:32:36,112 --> 02:32:37,881
Yeah, OK, sorry.

3205
02:32:37,881 --> 02:32:39,149
[Inaudible] And the web--

3206
02:32:39,149 --> 02:32:41,084
>> My work here is done, yeah.

3207
02:32:41,084 --> 02:32:47,891
>> The fact is that that
evolution doesn't work well

3208
02:32:47,891 --> 02:32:49,726
with government regulation.

3209
02:32:49,726 --> 02:32:54,397
Having been involved in
the telecommunication side

3210
02:32:54,397 --> 02:32:57,400
of the industry as opposed the
internet side, I also dealt

3211
02:32:57,400 --> 02:32:59,102
with a lot of [inaudible]
regulations.

3212
02:32:59,102 --> 02:33:02,138
And generally, we're dealing
with regulations that were three

3213
02:33:02,138 --> 02:33:05,809
to ten years behind the
time trying to drag them

3214
02:33:05,809 --> 02:33:10,614
into current circumstance,
and it was inevitable.

3215
02:33:10,614 --> 02:33:14,918
The process of regulation
doesn't work well

3216
02:33:14,918 --> 02:33:17,954
with a forward-looking
rapidly evolving internet.

3217
02:33:17,954 --> 02:33:22,559
So, when we start
thinking about--

3218
02:33:22,559 --> 02:33:27,764
about the non-governmental
nature of the internet,

3219
02:33:27,764 --> 02:33:31,635
as the internet grows up, we
find ourselves in a conundrum

3220
02:33:31,635 --> 02:33:35,038
because the internet
is no longer optional.

3221
02:33:35,038 --> 02:33:38,108
The internet is intwined
in everyone's life.

3222
02:33:38,108 --> 02:33:40,910
Governments are looking at
their economies and going,

3223
02:33:40,910 --> 02:33:44,748
"Some percentage of my
economy is tied to this?"

3224
02:33:44,748 --> 02:33:47,517
You can say I have a choices
to whether or not I'm going

3225
02:33:47,517 --> 02:33:49,486
to participate but I don't.

3226
02:33:49,486 --> 02:33:51,655
I have to be involved.

3227
02:33:51,655 --> 02:33:55,025
So, governments are now
realizing they have no choice,

3228
02:33:55,025 --> 02:33:56,426
they need to be involved.

3229
02:33:56,426 --> 02:33:59,296
They look at their duties,
their responsibilities.

3230
02:33:59,296 --> 02:34:01,898
And they go, "How do I
affect what I'm required

3231
02:34:01,898 --> 02:34:03,900
to do in this new media?"

3232
02:34:03,900 --> 02:34:08,571
And it's a big challenge,
folks, because the protocols

3233
02:34:08,571 --> 02:34:11,074
and the operational conventions

3234
02:34:11,074 --> 02:34:13,643
that hold the internet
together have to be global.

3235
02:34:13,643 --> 02:34:16,613
They have to interoperate
on global basis.

3236
02:34:16,613 --> 02:34:18,481
But governments are
used to acting

3237
02:34:18,481 --> 02:34:22,385
on a national basis
occasionally regional,

3238
02:34:22,385 --> 02:34:26,122
occasionally bilateral,
multilateral, but generally,

3239
02:34:26,122 --> 02:34:28,158
they act on a national basis

3240
02:34:28,158 --> 02:34:31,895
and you can easily break
the internet by attempting

3241
02:34:31,895 --> 02:34:35,432
to regulate it without the
idea of a global context

3242
02:34:35,432 --> 02:34:36,766
in which it operates in.

3243
02:34:36,766 --> 02:34:38,301
This is really what's
been opened

3244
02:34:38,301 --> 02:34:39,302
up in the last five years.

3245
02:34:39,302 --> 02:34:40,637
In the last five years,

3246
02:34:40,637 --> 02:34:42,772
governments are realizing
they do need to get involved,

3247
02:34:42,772 --> 02:34:44,374
they don't understand
the framework

3248
02:34:44,374 --> 02:34:46,476
by which they can do so safely.

3249
02:34:46,476 --> 02:34:50,747
In general, this has resulted
to not much regulation

3250
02:34:50,747 --> 02:34:53,650
but that's not necessarily going
to be the case going forward.

3251
02:34:53,650 --> 02:34:57,187
And it's-- the internet
community and I say

3252
02:34:57,187 --> 02:35:00,256
that being the operators,
the various entities

3253
02:35:00,256 --> 02:35:01,458
that operate pieces

3254
02:35:01,458 --> 02:35:04,894
of the infrastructure
aren't exactly forthcoming

3255
02:35:04,894 --> 02:35:06,696
to government saying, "Here,

3256
02:35:06,696 --> 02:35:09,099
this is how to safely
regulate the internet.

3257
02:35:09,099 --> 02:35:11,334
That guide book has
not been written."

3258
02:35:11,334 --> 02:35:15,004
And so, without a meeting
of the minds on this topic,

3259
02:35:15,004 --> 02:35:18,875
we run the risk that governments
are going to make regulations

3260
02:35:18,875 --> 02:35:21,978
that make no sense or break
portions of the internet.

3261
02:35:21,978 --> 02:35:24,080
Until this an understood
common framework

3262
02:35:24,080 --> 02:35:26,616
for this, we're all at risk.

3263
02:35:26,616 --> 02:35:29,219
>> Lynn, do you wanted to talk?

3264
02:35:29,219 --> 02:35:32,188
>> Yeah, very good comments
both from Laura and John,

3265
02:35:32,188 --> 02:35:35,158
and I just want to make sure
that we're left with a myth here

3266
02:35:35,158 --> 02:35:36,693
that much of the internet
committee believes

3267
02:35:36,693 --> 02:35:38,528
that there's no rule
for governments.

3268
02:35:38,528 --> 02:35:40,230
We've been engaging
with governments

3269
02:35:40,230 --> 02:35:43,500
and certainly we could have
done it better over the years.

3270
02:35:43,500 --> 02:35:45,402
But, you know, for many,

3271
02:35:45,402 --> 02:35:48,671
many years when ISOC had a very
small staff of seven people,

3272
02:35:48,671 --> 02:35:51,841
I was going to [inaudible]
and spending weeks

3273
02:35:51,841 --> 02:35:54,644
because you don't go to United
Nations meeting for two days,

3274
02:35:54,644 --> 02:35:56,679
you'd go for two
and three weeks.

3275
02:35:56,679 --> 02:35:58,648
That's a significant investment,

3276
02:35:58,648 --> 02:36:00,483
and we went because
we wanted people

3277
02:36:00,483 --> 02:36:03,787
to understand how the
internets actually worked.

3278
02:36:03,787 --> 02:36:06,322
And I-- it's like a slight
disagreement with John

3279
02:36:06,322 --> 02:36:09,793
and nobody has the answer
but how we regulate for a lot

3280
02:36:09,793 --> 02:36:11,327
of this new environments.

3281
02:36:11,327 --> 02:36:13,797
It's not because we think
there should be no regulations

3282
02:36:13,797 --> 02:36:15,465
because we can't
figure out what sort

3283
02:36:15,465 --> 02:36:17,367
of regulation there should be.

3284
02:36:17,367 --> 02:36:20,403
And to John's other point,
it is because of the pace

3285
02:36:20,403 --> 02:36:22,472
with which the internet changes.

3286
02:36:22,472 --> 02:36:23,907
And it is to the fact
that it has broken

3287
02:36:23,907 --> 02:36:25,108
so many global boundaries.

3288
02:36:25,108 --> 02:36:28,211
You can do it within
any single context.

3289
02:36:28,211 --> 02:36:30,079
So, it is a very,
very complex world.

3290
02:36:30,079 --> 02:36:34,984
And we continue to advocate for
dialogue discussion, thoughtful,

3291
02:36:34,984 --> 02:36:36,619
let it take the time it needs.

3292
02:36:36,619 --> 02:36:40,123
We need to pull apart lots
of different complexities

3293
02:36:40,123 --> 02:36:42,025
and let the right thing emerge.

3294
02:36:42,025 --> 02:36:43,860
That is not the same
as saying no rule

3295
02:36:43,860 --> 02:36:46,729
for governments but
it often gets--

3296
02:36:46,729 --> 02:36:49,666
>> And another dimension of
this is not all governments are

3297
02:36:49,666 --> 02:36:51,034
the same.

3298
02:36:51,034 --> 02:36:56,706
Because you can talk about China
being a pretty malign force

3299
02:36:56,706 --> 02:37:00,043
in terms of internet freedom
to say nothing of Iran

3300
02:37:00,043 --> 02:37:03,980
which uses the internet to roll
up all networks of descent,

3301
02:37:03,980 --> 02:37:05,882
where in Tahrir Square,

3302
02:37:05,882 --> 02:37:09,886
the internet is a
mechanism for expression.

3303
02:37:09,886 --> 02:37:12,689
So, part of it, you can--

3304
02:37:12,689 --> 02:37:15,024
part of the problem
is government even

3305
02:37:15,024 --> 02:37:17,827
as a concept is subject to
many different definitions.

3306
02:37:17,827 --> 02:37:19,028
Yeah.

3307
02:37:19,028 --> 02:37:20,763
>> It is Steve but that's
probably why the western

3308
02:37:20,763 --> 02:37:26,302
governments that operate
in democracies with legal

3309
02:37:26,302 --> 02:37:28,538
and constitutional frameworks

3310
02:37:28,538 --> 02:37:31,341
that it's particularly
important.

3311
02:37:31,341 --> 02:37:34,210
And one of the reasons people
are particularly unhappy

3312
02:37:34,210 --> 02:37:37,146
about this particular
surveillance is if we're trying

3313
02:37:37,146 --> 02:37:39,482
to come up with this
nuanced role

3314
02:37:39,482 --> 02:37:41,618
about where government belongs,

3315
02:37:41,618 --> 02:37:43,987
we haven't exactly
sent the right message

3316
02:37:43,987 --> 02:37:45,188
to the rest of the world.

3317
02:37:45,188 --> 02:37:47,423
And I think that's part
of the problem here.

3318
02:37:47,423 --> 02:37:50,393
>> I just want to offer a
kind of a friendly amendment,

3319
02:37:50,393 --> 02:37:52,662
I hope to John's view, you know.

3320
02:37:52,662 --> 02:37:56,633
I think John correctly
points out that attempting

3321
02:37:56,633 --> 02:37:59,836
to regulate the internet
infrastructure whether it's the

3322
02:37:59,836 --> 02:38:02,105
institutions that
operate and design it

3323
02:38:02,105 --> 02:38:06,042
or the actual operators
is very [inaudible]

3324
02:38:06,042 --> 02:38:08,478
because it changes
very quickly and it has

3325
02:38:08,478 --> 02:38:09,746
to work on a global basis.

3326
02:38:09,746 --> 02:38:11,915
That was the experience of the--

3327
02:38:11,915 --> 02:38:14,551
of SOPA, the Stop
Online Privacy Act,

3328
02:38:14,551 --> 02:38:18,721
was that policymakers
thought they could reach in--

3329
02:38:18,721 --> 02:38:19,422
>> Piracy.

3330
02:38:19,422 --> 02:38:21,057
>> -- sorry, Piracy Act.

3331
02:38:21,057 --> 02:38:22,559
>> [Inaudible] is the stop--

3332
02:38:22,559 --> 02:38:23,993
>> That's right.

3333
02:38:23,993 --> 02:38:27,430
Thank you, thank you, thank you.

3334
02:38:27,430 --> 02:38:29,999
Right, you know, governments
thought they could reach

3335
02:38:29,999 --> 02:38:32,602
in to the internet
infrastructure

3336
02:38:32,602 --> 02:38:34,304
to solve a problem
that is really

3337
02:38:34,304 --> 02:38:37,473
about human behavior
and violating laws.

3338
02:38:37,473 --> 02:38:40,843
However, at the same time
there are plenty of legal rules

3339
02:38:40,843 --> 02:38:44,881
that actually work incredibly
well on the internet.

3340
02:38:44,881 --> 02:38:48,117
You know, the FTC is still using
the Fair Credit Reporting Act

3341
02:38:48,117 --> 02:38:51,054
from 1970 which was one
of our first piracy laws

3342
02:38:51,054 --> 02:38:54,691
in United States to stop very
advanced sophisticated online

3343
02:38:54,691 --> 02:38:56,292
services from harming people.

3344
02:38:56,292 --> 02:38:58,394
That's not causing
John any problems.

3345
02:38:58,394 --> 02:39:01,030
He's not-- he [inaudible]
even think about it.

3346
02:39:01,030 --> 02:39:08,338
And so I think there's-- I think
that it's when governments try

3347
02:39:08,338 --> 02:39:10,173
to do this sort of
shortcuts that they were used

3348
02:39:10,173 --> 02:39:12,642
to doing is you were suggesting
with the broadcasters, you know,

3349
02:39:12,642 --> 02:39:14,978
say, "You guys have to behave
this way in order for us

3350
02:39:14,978 --> 02:39:16,813
to achieve a broader
policy goal."

3351
02:39:16,813 --> 02:39:18,848
That's where we really
have problems

3352
02:39:18,848 --> 02:39:20,583
in the internet environment.

3353
02:39:20,583 --> 02:39:25,822
>> You know, number of you have
used the word privacy as a value

3354
02:39:25,822 --> 02:39:29,292
and as a very curious
[phonetic] value.

3355
02:39:29,292 --> 02:39:32,195
But I want you to
play with the idea

3356
02:39:32,195 --> 02:39:34,297
that perhaps we're
actually really ambivalent

3357
02:39:34,297 --> 02:39:37,767
about the question of privacy
because in fact in many ways,

3358
02:39:37,767 --> 02:39:43,940
the wide availability of data is
actually an enormous convenient.

3359
02:39:43,940 --> 02:39:46,843
Every time you go to
a website and you put

3360
02:39:46,843 --> 02:39:49,779
in your e-mail address
and up comes your password

3361
02:39:49,779 --> 02:39:52,048
and all your credit
card information

3362
02:39:52,048 --> 02:39:54,984
and at one stop shopping
at Amazon, right?

3363
02:39:54,984 --> 02:39:58,821
We all love it but isn't that--

3364
02:39:58,821 --> 02:40:01,024
>> But we've made a decision
to share that with them, so.

3365
02:40:01,024 --> 02:40:01,724
>> Well--

3366
02:40:01,724 --> 02:40:02,792
>> Wait just a minute.

3367
02:40:02,792 --> 02:40:04,861
I want a-- I want a--
I understand that.

3368
02:40:04,861 --> 02:40:08,798
But I want to pose a question
about whether at some point,

3369
02:40:08,798 --> 02:40:11,534
aren't we really ambivalent
about this question

3370
02:40:11,534 --> 02:40:17,173
that we actually like people
to have information about us

3371
02:40:17,173 --> 02:40:20,610
when it serves our purposes of
convenience and accessibility.

3372
02:40:20,610 --> 02:40:22,945
And that there was a certain--

3373
02:40:22,945 --> 02:40:25,214
I understand your
point about voluntary.

3374
02:40:25,214 --> 02:40:27,650
But this will mark [phonetic]
a point here as well.

3375
02:40:27,650 --> 02:40:29,752
>> I think part of
the problem is--

3376
02:40:29,752 --> 02:40:32,088
is the public is
realizing that the people

3377
02:40:32,088 --> 02:40:34,357
that are storing the
information that we give

3378
02:40:34,357 --> 02:40:37,827
to them aren't doing a good
a job in protecting it.

3379
02:40:37,827 --> 02:40:39,962
I could go to my local bank--
I grew up in Falls Church.

3380
02:40:39,962 --> 02:40:42,098
I used to go to the local
First Virginia Bank right there

3381
02:40:42,098 --> 02:40:43,232
in Falls Church.

3382
02:40:43,232 --> 02:40:45,068
I gave them all my
information when I opened

3383
02:40:45,068 --> 02:40:47,170
up my first account
when I was a teenager.

3384
02:40:47,170 --> 02:40:49,539
And I had a reasonable
expectation

3385
02:40:49,539 --> 02:40:51,107
that the only way they
were going to get that--

3386
02:40:51,107 --> 02:40:53,409
anybody else is going to
get that information was

3387
02:40:53,409 --> 02:40:56,713
if they actually went in and
rob the bank and stole the file,

3388
02:40:56,713 --> 02:40:59,048
you know, the file
cabinet or whatever.

3389
02:40:59,048 --> 02:41:00,717
>> Or if anyone in the
government wanted it?

3390
02:41:00,717 --> 02:41:02,318
>> Or if anyone in the
government want it?

3391
02:41:02,318 --> 02:41:04,754
I mean that-- I mean
that, you know, that--

3392
02:41:04,754 --> 02:41:05,588
that's a reasonable thing.

3393
02:41:05,588 --> 02:41:07,056
But nowadays when we find

3394
02:41:07,056 --> 02:41:09,992
out that you have all these
massive data leaks, you know,

3395
02:41:09,992 --> 02:41:13,096
and when you examine
the root cause of what--

3396
02:41:13,096 --> 02:41:15,565
what the leak was from
a tactical standpoint,

3397
02:41:15,565 --> 02:41:17,900
I should have been
fixed 15 years ago.

3398
02:41:17,900 --> 02:41:22,238
You know, some of these attacks,
I do a talk now if they ask me,

3399
02:41:22,238 --> 02:41:24,741
you know, I guess it's because
I had gray hair and I've been

3400
02:41:24,741 --> 02:41:26,943
in the security business
for 20 years.

3401
02:41:26,943 --> 02:41:29,011
I think I noticed something

3402
02:41:29,011 --> 02:41:32,648
but I do [inaudible]
that the contract--

3403
02:41:32,648 --> 02:41:33,750
>> It's because of the ponytail.

3404
02:41:33,750 --> 02:41:35,151
>> I think it is.

3405
02:41:35,151 --> 02:41:37,086
You know, it's the-- it's the
same attack methods that we saw

3406
02:41:37,086 --> 02:41:41,157
in the early '90s are
still effective in 2013.

3407
02:41:41,157 --> 02:41:44,494
And so my question to the
technical community was,

3408
02:41:44,494 --> 02:41:47,764
what have we been doing
this last 20 years?

3409
02:41:47,764 --> 02:41:53,035
I mean, you know, I in the SANS
Institute that I was a part of,

3410
02:41:53,035 --> 02:41:56,672
we drew up a top
ten threats in 2001.

3411
02:41:56,672 --> 02:42:00,810
I pulled it out and today
in 2013, every single one

3412
02:42:00,810 --> 02:42:05,181
of those top ten threats from
2001 is still affecting today.

3413
02:42:05,181 --> 02:42:07,850
So, what have we been
doing to protect ourselves?

3414
02:42:07,850 --> 02:42:09,218
And I think it's that type

3415
02:42:09,218 --> 02:42:13,322
of thing that's causing this
rumble about, you know, well,

3416
02:42:13,322 --> 02:42:15,491
private industry isn't
doing anything about it,

3417
02:42:15,491 --> 02:42:17,493
individuals aren't
doing anything about it.

3418
02:42:17,493 --> 02:42:19,629
So, that only leaves
a government

3419
02:42:19,629 --> 02:42:22,331
to do something about
it, you know.

3420
02:42:22,331 --> 02:42:25,301
And so I think that's why
we're seeing that pushing

3421
02:42:25,301 --> 02:42:27,670
that direction, 'cause
historically when you look

3422
02:42:27,670 --> 02:42:30,840
at it, the same things
are still affecting us,

3423
02:42:30,840 --> 02:42:33,342
it's just that what's
happening now is back in 2001,

3424
02:42:33,342 --> 02:42:37,013
the scope of a data breach
was much less than the scope

3425
02:42:37,013 --> 02:42:38,014
of the data breach now.

3426
02:42:38,014 --> 02:42:39,048
>> Sure, sure.

3427
02:42:39,048 --> 02:42:40,016
>> And just one last
aside [phonetic].

3428
02:42:40,016 --> 02:42:41,050
The iPhone, I think,
I looked it up,

3429
02:42:41,050 --> 02:42:43,586
is five years old
today-- this year.

3430
02:42:43,586 --> 02:42:47,690
So, to answer your question
about why the difference from--

3431
02:42:47,690 --> 02:42:49,091
>> Hold on just a second.

3432
02:42:49,091 --> 02:42:50,493
John and Leslie, you want a-- is
there a point you wanted to make

3433
02:42:50,493 --> 02:42:52,962
about the voluntary
submission of data.

3434
02:42:52,962 --> 02:42:54,697
>> I don't think so.

3435
02:42:54,697 --> 02:42:58,234
I think every point has been
made by everybody quite well.

3436
02:42:58,234 --> 02:42:59,669
>> OK. John?

3437
02:42:59,669 --> 02:43:03,306
>> You thought-- say that maybe
people don't value privacy

3438
02:43:03,306 --> 02:43:06,809
over convenience, and that
that we give up privacy

3439
02:43:06,809 --> 02:43:10,146
and there's no outrage
about that.

3440
02:43:10,146 --> 02:43:12,815
Why is there an outrage
in some cases?

3441
02:43:12,815 --> 02:43:15,117
And I guess the question
that comes up is,

3442
02:43:15,117 --> 02:43:18,120
a lot of people voluntarily
give up privacy

3443
02:43:18,120 --> 02:43:19,755
because we want the convenience.

3444
02:43:19,755 --> 02:43:22,091
We want to click the button
and get the order done.

3445
02:43:22,091 --> 02:43:24,293
We want the website
to know who we are.

3446
02:43:24,293 --> 02:43:26,195
We want to fill out
all the information

3447
02:43:26,195 --> 02:43:30,233
on the airline profile because
it just makes traveling a little

3448
02:43:30,233 --> 02:43:31,868
easier and anything
that makes it easier--

3449
02:43:31,868 --> 02:43:34,303
>> And who can not remember all
those damn passwords anyway,

3450
02:43:34,303 --> 02:43:35,271
right?

3451
02:43:35,271 --> 02:43:36,806
>> So there are times
we do that.

3452
02:43:36,806 --> 02:43:40,109
But the reality is that there's
also times when you consent

3453
02:43:40,109 --> 02:43:43,846
to losing your privacy
in situations that aren't

3454
02:43:43,846 --> 02:43:46,582
for your convenience but
you're going to anyway.

3455
02:43:46,582 --> 02:43:47,950
Next time you're
going to your doctor,

3456
02:43:47,950 --> 02:43:51,153
pick up that HIPAA form
and look at it, OK?

3457
02:43:51,153 --> 02:43:53,890
It says, "We're going to
share your data with the CDC

3458
02:43:53,890 --> 02:43:55,925
because if there's an
outbreak of something,

3459
02:43:55,925 --> 02:43:57,693
we're going to do that, OK?"

3460
02:43:57,693 --> 02:44:00,096
It's not for my convenience,
hopefully, I'm not relevant,

3461
02:44:00,096 --> 02:44:02,598
but the fact is they're
going to do what--

3462
02:44:02,598 --> 02:44:06,135
and we consent with because
well, we knew about it.

3463
02:44:06,135 --> 02:44:07,370
We understand--

3464
02:44:07,370 --> 02:44:08,771
>> And there's a public
interest involved because--

3465
02:44:08,771 --> 02:44:12,275
>> There's a public
interest but also as annoying

3466
02:44:12,275 --> 02:44:15,177
as that form is, they
took the time to tell us.

3467
02:44:15,177 --> 02:44:17,480
I do think that's a
different question

3468
02:44:17,480 --> 02:44:19,181
when there's surveillance
is going on

3469
02:44:19,181 --> 02:44:20,917
and you don't know
about it at all.

3470
02:44:20,917 --> 02:44:25,021
And I think that might be the
angst behind a lot of this.

3471
02:44:25,021 --> 02:44:26,155
>> Leslie?

3472
02:44:26,155 --> 02:44:27,456
>> Well, I also think
that there's difference

3473
02:44:27,456 --> 02:44:30,393
between surveillance
by the government

3474
02:44:30,393 --> 02:44:33,729
and surveillance by companies.

3475
02:44:33,729 --> 02:44:35,898
I mean I think they've
become more joined together

3476
02:44:35,898 --> 02:44:39,101
because they are now the
source of all the information

3477
02:44:39,101 --> 02:44:40,403
that the government
is collecting.

3478
02:44:40,403 --> 02:44:43,439
But I think at least in
the constitutional system,

3479
02:44:43,439 --> 02:44:46,042
not in Europe where they're
making a distinction.

3480
02:44:46,042 --> 02:44:51,847
Having that government who has
the capacity to impose penalties

3481
02:44:51,847 --> 02:44:59,155
on people and make choices about
who is going to be prosecuted,

3482
02:44:59,155 --> 02:45:03,859
et cetera, is entirely different
matter than whether I like

3483
02:45:03,859 --> 02:45:05,428
or disliked it, you know,

3484
02:45:05,428 --> 02:45:08,731
Google Profiles keep
sending me the same crib

3485
02:45:08,731 --> 02:45:11,600
for my pregnant daughter
over and over again.

3486
02:45:11,600 --> 02:45:14,403
I'm annoyed, I'm
extremely annoyed.

3487
02:45:14,403 --> 02:45:15,638
But I also think--

3488
02:45:15,638 --> 02:45:17,039
>> They knew she was
pregnant before she did, yes?

3489
02:45:17,039 --> 02:45:18,107
>> Yes.

3490
02:45:18,107 --> 02:45:19,308
>> Well, they probably
did, but they knew

3491
02:45:19,308 --> 02:45:21,277
that I did this thing once
and it's following the--

3492
02:45:21,277 --> 02:45:23,512
it's literally following
me around the world.

3493
02:45:23,512 --> 02:45:24,947
I mean it's became
kind of a joke.

3494
02:45:24,947 --> 02:45:28,250
But I find that annoying and
I'm somebody who knows how

3495
02:45:28,250 --> 02:45:29,819
to set my privacy settings.

3496
02:45:29,819 --> 02:45:33,889
So, you know, in one-- in
one circumstance it's a loss

3497
02:45:33,889 --> 02:45:37,393
of some measure of control,
we ought to have more control,

3498
02:45:37,393 --> 02:45:39,762
it's one of the reasons we
ought to have a baseline build

3499
02:45:39,762 --> 02:45:42,498
to give us some fair
information practices.

3500
02:45:42,498 --> 02:45:46,869
In the other, you know, the
government has the capacity

3501
02:45:46,869 --> 02:45:49,271
to make very important
decisions about us.

3502
02:45:49,271 --> 02:45:53,309
And we have a constitution that
says they have to follow rules.

3503
02:45:53,309 --> 02:45:59,548
And so we do react differently
to the crib and to the NSA.

3504
02:45:59,548 --> 02:46:00,683
>> Yeah.

3505
02:46:00,683 --> 02:46:04,987
>> The one thing I would
say about our tension

3506
02:46:04,987 --> 02:46:09,358
between convenience and
privacy is-- I just think that--

3507
02:46:09,358 --> 02:46:14,296
I think privacy has always been
a kind of a contested concept.

3508
02:46:14,296 --> 02:46:15,865
I mean, it's not an absolute.

3509
02:46:15,865 --> 02:46:18,300
I don't think there's
anyone hardly in the world

3510
02:46:18,300 --> 02:46:21,670
who thinks it's-- it's
an absolute condition.

3511
02:46:21,670 --> 02:46:23,572
But we know, as Leslie
is saying,

3512
02:46:23,572 --> 02:46:26,709
we have different
privacy expectations.

3513
02:46:26,709 --> 02:46:30,346
We want different privacy
results at different times.

3514
02:46:30,346 --> 02:46:34,016
And some of the-- some
of the privacy promise

3515
02:46:34,016 --> 02:46:35,484
that we have [inaudible]

3516
02:46:35,484 --> 02:46:38,454
like seeing the same
crib too many times.

3517
02:46:38,454 --> 02:46:40,923
Others have real consequence

3518
02:46:40,923 --> 02:46:42,291
like if you're credit
report is wrong

3519
02:46:42,291 --> 02:46:44,293
and you can't get a mortgage,
you're really, you know,

3520
02:46:44,293 --> 02:46:46,529
it really-- or you don't
get a job, you know,

3521
02:46:46,529 --> 02:46:47,730
it really makes a difference.

3522
02:46:47,730 --> 02:46:52,701
And I think that-- I think
in a way the phrase--

3523
02:46:52,701 --> 02:46:54,703
I think categorizing privacy

3524
02:46:54,703 --> 02:46:58,007
as a single right is what
makes the conversation a little

3525
02:46:58,007 --> 02:47:00,476
confused because it-- the
reality is it's a number

3526
02:47:00,476 --> 02:47:02,845
of concerns wrapped up into one.

3527
02:47:02,845 --> 02:47:06,882
>> But in this day and age,
isn't it a little naive to say,

3528
02:47:06,882 --> 02:47:08,984
I'm going to give my
information to Amazon?

3529
02:47:08,984 --> 02:47:11,087
Or I'm going to give my
information to Google

3530
02:47:11,087 --> 02:47:14,824
for my own purposes because I
choose to, and somehow I'm going

3531
02:47:14,824 --> 02:47:16,959
to be able to control--

3532
02:47:16,959 --> 02:47:17,993
>> Oh, yes.

3533
02:47:17,993 --> 02:47:19,829
>> -- all the use
of that information.

3534
02:47:19,829 --> 02:47:21,630
>> Yeah, that's not--
that's not doable,

3535
02:47:21,630 --> 02:47:24,033
and I don't think any
privacy law we would pass

3536
02:47:24,033 --> 02:47:27,803
in this country would
change that.

3537
02:47:27,803 --> 02:47:29,238
>> It is naive but I think--

3538
02:47:29,238 --> 02:47:33,542
I think the problem is I don't
mind giving you any information

3539
02:47:33,542 --> 02:47:37,179
you ask about me if you tell me
ahead of time what you're going

3540
02:47:37,179 --> 02:47:38,380
to do with that information.

3541
02:47:38,380 --> 02:47:40,816
So, what John was talking
about in the HIPAA thing

3542
02:47:40,816 --> 02:47:43,853
when they say, "We're going
to give it out to the CDC,"

3543
02:47:43,853 --> 02:47:46,655
and you tell me ahead of
time before I give you

3544
02:47:46,655 --> 02:47:48,724
that information, that's much--

3545
02:47:48,724 --> 02:47:51,927
that's a much different
environment than giving it here

3546
02:47:51,927 --> 02:47:54,563
and then buried in [inaudible]
fine print is a little click

3547
02:47:54,563 --> 02:47:55,764
thing that says,
"Oh, by the way,

3548
02:47:55,764 --> 02:47:57,500
we're going to just give
this to anybody we want."

3549
02:47:57,500 --> 02:47:59,235
>> We only have few
minutes, and I want to--

3550
02:47:59,235 --> 02:48:02,771
you've mentioned out, a number
of you, the fact that we're--

3551
02:48:02,771 --> 02:48:06,308
we're dealing with a very
complex system as Laura said

3552
02:48:06,308 --> 02:48:08,310
with a lot of stakeholders here.

3553
02:48:08,310 --> 02:48:13,015
And one of the stakeholders are
these providers whether it's

3554
02:48:13,015 --> 02:48:18,220
Google, whether it's Yahoo,
who take that information.

3555
02:48:18,220 --> 02:48:20,389
They don't warn you in some
ways that they're going

3556
02:48:20,389 --> 02:48:23,259
to give it away because they're
not voluntarily giving it away.

3557
02:48:23,259 --> 02:48:24,393
They're being subpoenaed,

3558
02:48:24,393 --> 02:48:26,295
they're being ordered
to by the government.

3559
02:48:26,295 --> 02:48:27,296
And they are caught.

3560
02:48:27,296 --> 02:48:29,765
We have-- this institution,

3561
02:48:29,765 --> 02:48:33,536
these huge institutions
are private institutions,

3562
02:48:33,536 --> 02:48:34,970
but as we've learned
through PRISM

3563
02:48:34,970 --> 02:48:39,909
and all the revelation
subject to government orders

3564
02:48:39,909 --> 02:48:42,244
and government warrants.

3565
02:48:42,244 --> 02:48:45,814
And many of them are fighting
this at least fighting

3566
02:48:45,814 --> 02:48:49,552
to be able to be more
transparent because they have--

3567
02:48:49,552 --> 02:48:51,620
they're stakeholders, too.

3568
02:48:51,620 --> 02:48:54,523
And-- and they are worried
that their brands are going

3569
02:48:54,523 --> 02:48:57,059
to be tarnished by
being swept up in this.

3570
02:48:57,059 --> 02:48:59,562
And to talk a little bit
about the special role

3571
02:48:59,562 --> 02:49:02,097
of this institution, these
intermediary institutions,

3572
02:49:02,097 --> 02:49:04,867
the Apples, the Microsofts,
the Googles who are

3573
02:49:04,867 --> 02:49:06,869
on one hand are getting
pulled by the government

3574
02:49:06,869 --> 02:49:08,270
to release information.

3575
02:49:08,270 --> 02:49:10,940
On the other hand, they're being
pressured to keep it private.

3576
02:49:10,940 --> 02:49:12,041
>> Yeah.

3577
02:49:12,041 --> 02:49:14,877
>> Yeah, that's a really
important question.

3578
02:49:14,877 --> 02:49:18,781
And if you look at-- Let me
just back it up to before PRISM.

3579
02:49:18,781 --> 02:49:21,951
If you look at even just the
Google transparency reports

3580
02:49:21,951 --> 02:49:24,353
which probably don't have
everything and I think

3581
02:49:24,353 --> 02:49:27,723
and even Google says that
national security isn't--

3582
02:49:27,723 --> 02:49:30,459
not everything is reflected
in the transparency reports.

3583
02:49:30,459 --> 02:49:32,428
But when you do look
at something like that,

3584
02:49:32,428 --> 02:49:34,430
you can see that there
is a very big disconnect

3585
02:49:34,430 --> 02:49:36,966
between what governments
are asking information

3586
02:49:36,966 --> 02:49:40,102
intermediaries to do and
what they actually do.

3587
02:49:40,102 --> 02:49:43,706
So, you can see that--
just to give an example.

3588
02:49:43,706 --> 02:49:49,411
Maybe they disclosed data about
an individual in 37 percent,

3589
02:49:49,411 --> 02:49:53,816
37 percent of the time in--
to the Brazilian government

3590
02:49:53,816 --> 02:49:56,685
or 47 percent of the time
to another government.

3591
02:49:56,685 --> 02:49:58,087
Do you see what I'm saying?

3592
02:49:58,087 --> 02:50:01,223
There is a disconnect in that
differential between the request

3593
02:50:01,223 --> 02:50:04,260
to turn over user data
and the actual instances

3594
02:50:04,260 --> 02:50:05,494
of turning over the data.

3595
02:50:05,494 --> 02:50:09,064
That's where they have this
special governance role.

3596
02:50:09,064 --> 02:50:10,933
And that's an important
point the make.

3597
02:50:10,933 --> 02:50:15,938
But they also bear a burden
in carrying out a request

3598
02:50:15,938 --> 02:50:18,207
such as the more
recent revelations

3599
02:50:18,207 --> 02:50:20,843
because there is a
public relations hit.

3600
02:50:20,843 --> 02:50:25,648
There is the cost of hiring
numerous attorneys to deal

3601
02:50:25,648 --> 02:50:27,316
with the fallout from this.

3602
02:50:27,316 --> 02:50:29,485
And there's the possible
economic impact

3603
02:50:29,485 --> 02:50:32,755
of having trouble doing business
in other parts of the world

3604
02:50:32,755 --> 02:50:35,924
that might be suspicious
towards those companies.

3605
02:50:35,924 --> 02:50:39,194
>> Yeah, you might be thanking--
they might be thanking Snowden

3606
02:50:39,194 --> 02:50:41,563
for the revelations
because and, of course,

3607
02:50:41,563 --> 02:50:44,600
by the national security
letters.

3608
02:50:44,600 --> 02:50:45,734
They're not allowed to--

3609
02:50:45,734 --> 02:50:48,304
to let anyone know that
they collected the data.

3610
02:50:48,304 --> 02:50:49,805
So, now on the other
hand, you have the--

3611
02:50:49,805 --> 02:50:51,707
the Snowden revelations
which were saying, "Hey,

3612
02:50:51,707 --> 02:50:53,976
these guys had to
give out the data".

3613
02:50:53,976 --> 02:50:56,812
So, you know, and
now that's come out.

3614
02:50:56,812 --> 02:50:58,580
What they should have
said is instead of trying

3615
02:50:58,580 --> 02:50:59,648
to back [inaudible]
been saying, "You know,

3616
02:50:59,648 --> 02:51:01,717
trying to save their
reputation."

3617
02:51:01,717 --> 02:51:03,018
We said, "Look, you
got subpoenaed,

3618
02:51:03,018 --> 02:51:04,086
we know you got subpoenaed,

3619
02:51:04,086 --> 02:51:07,089
you gave up the data
because it's a law."

3620
02:51:07,089 --> 02:51:11,760
But I think that that
piece of it is the secrecy,

3621
02:51:11,760 --> 02:51:15,964
not being able to say why
something was collected,

3622
02:51:15,964 --> 02:51:18,567
you know, and not being able
to even say anything about it.

3623
02:51:18,567 --> 02:51:19,835
Lesley?

3624
02:51:19,835 --> 02:51:23,706
>> Well, the question raised
is this bigger question

3625
02:51:23,706 --> 02:51:27,576
when we talk about players
in the internet echo system.

3626
02:51:27,576 --> 02:51:31,413
The intermediaries
are a critical part.

3627
02:51:31,413 --> 02:51:35,584
And we have-- under our law, we
sort of provide them with a lot

3628
02:51:35,584 --> 02:51:39,455
of special protections
because they can't be liable

3629
02:51:39,455 --> 02:51:42,524
for everything that's going
on in their platforms.

3630
02:51:42,524 --> 02:51:44,526
And yet there under
enormous pressure,

3631
02:51:44,526 --> 02:51:50,265
this national security
revelation is one small piece

3632
02:51:50,265 --> 02:51:53,502
of this very complex
environment where when you ask

3633
02:51:53,502 --> 02:51:57,339
about governments and government
is trying to regulate,

3634
02:51:57,339 --> 02:52:01,944
the first place that governments
go in trying to solve anything,

3635
02:52:01,944 --> 02:52:05,013
a social problem is to
try to figure out how

3636
02:52:05,013 --> 02:52:08,283
to get the intermediaries to
take on that responsibility.

3637
02:52:08,283 --> 02:52:11,620
So, this has been sort of
a tension that's existed

3638
02:52:11,620 --> 02:52:15,858
since we actually had any
kind of powerful intermediary.

3639
02:52:15,858 --> 02:52:18,527
So, that's one side, and the
other side is the amounts

3640
02:52:18,527 --> 02:52:21,163
of power they have as
a governance entity

3641
02:52:21,163 --> 02:52:22,831
to set the rules of
[inaudible] for the internet.

3642
02:52:22,831 --> 02:52:24,032
And so--

3643
02:52:24,032 --> 02:52:25,801
>> And one of the
interesting variables here is,

3644
02:52:25,801 --> 02:52:28,737
I noticed just recently that
several of the big players,

3645
02:52:28,737 --> 02:52:30,939
Microsoft, Google, Yahoo,

3646
02:52:30,939 --> 02:52:33,575
I think three have
all filed suit--

3647
02:52:33,575 --> 02:52:34,877
>> Right.

3648
02:52:34,877 --> 02:52:38,080
>> -- in an attempt to be
able to be more transparent

3649
02:52:38,080 --> 02:52:40,883
about the role and the-- and
the requirements they're under.

3650
02:52:40,883 --> 02:52:43,185
I think in part because of
the point Laura was raising

3651
02:52:43,185 --> 02:52:46,955
that they themselves, given the
culture that they're part of

3652
02:52:46,955 --> 02:52:48,857
and the stakeholders they have,

3653
02:52:48,857 --> 02:52:52,060
they are taking a big public
relations in branding hit

3654
02:52:52,060 --> 02:52:53,162
for this kind of cooperation.

3655
02:52:53,162 --> 02:52:55,063
>> And they also have
real leverage here

3656
02:52:55,063 --> 02:52:58,600
which they have exercised
on occasion, you know.

3657
02:52:58,600 --> 02:53:02,838
Many of the big intermediaries
Google, Twitter,

3658
02:53:02,838 --> 02:53:06,975
others have at times gone to
court to challenge subpoenas

3659
02:53:06,975 --> 02:53:09,144
and other kinds of court
orders they receive saying

3660
02:53:09,144 --> 02:53:10,345
that they're too broad.

3661
02:53:10,345 --> 02:53:11,780
I mean, Google had been--

3662
02:53:11,780 --> 02:53:15,617
had been under order to
turnover large volumes

3663
02:53:15,617 --> 02:53:17,686
of search log data, this
was just a criminal case,

3664
02:53:17,686 --> 02:53:18,287
it's not [inaudible] cases.

3665
02:53:18,287 --> 02:53:19,555
>> Right.

3666
02:53:19,555 --> 02:53:20,923
>> And they've challenged
those and they, you know,

3667
02:53:20,923 --> 02:53:24,126
so the intermediaries have
a really important role

3668
02:53:24,126 --> 02:53:26,829
because at least until
there's a change in the law,

3669
02:53:26,829 --> 02:53:29,865
they are often the only ones
who can actually bring any kind

3670
02:53:29,865 --> 02:53:31,400
of challenge to the
scope of the--

3671
02:53:31,400 --> 02:53:34,102
of the authority that the
government is claiming.

3672
02:53:34,102 --> 02:53:37,473
>> This is nothing new
because in World War II,

3673
02:53:37,473 --> 02:53:41,009
the federal government used to
look at the telegraphs at RCA

3674
02:53:41,009 --> 02:53:44,112
and look at the phone system
for records and stuff like that.

3675
02:53:44,112 --> 02:53:46,448
I mean what's changed
is the number of players

3676
02:53:46,448 --> 02:53:48,550
because back then it was
just those two, I suppose,

3677
02:53:48,550 --> 02:53:49,885
plus maybe some minors.

3678
02:53:49,885 --> 02:53:51,220
Now you have you know multi--

3679
02:53:51,220 --> 02:53:53,255
multinational groups
all over the place.

3680
02:53:53,255 --> 02:53:56,725
But the technique, I mean,
the tactic of government going

3681
02:53:56,725 --> 02:54:01,964
to a provider and getting the
information they need, it's--

3682
02:54:01,964 --> 02:54:03,098
it's [inaudible] been there.

3683
02:54:03,098 --> 02:54:04,733
>> I would assume the
Egyptian government did

3684
02:54:04,733 --> 02:54:07,102
that when the communications
were chiseled, you know,

3685
02:54:07,102 --> 02:54:08,637
letters chiseled
on stone tablets.

3686
02:54:08,637 --> 02:54:11,206
>> I'm going to-- We
have five minutes left.

3687
02:54:11,206 --> 02:54:13,709
I'm going to give each
you one minute to--

3688
02:54:13,709 --> 02:54:14,776
we've had a long day,

3689
02:54:14,776 --> 02:54:18,080
very attentive audience,
lot of issues.

3690
02:54:18,080 --> 02:54:23,385
But I want to give each of you
a chance to make a final point

3691
02:54:23,385 --> 02:54:25,120
after this conversation.

3692
02:54:25,120 --> 02:54:27,322
You started with
your initial remarks.

3693
02:54:27,322 --> 02:54:29,691
But what do you want the
audience to be left with?

3694
02:54:29,691 --> 02:54:33,562
What-- in each of your mind
is something significant we've

3695
02:54:33,562 --> 02:54:36,164
talked about today, an issue
that you want to reinforce?

3696
02:54:36,164 --> 02:54:37,866
I want to give each you
a chance to do that,

3697
02:54:37,866 --> 02:54:39,601
and since we've started
with you earlier,

3698
02:54:39,601 --> 02:54:43,572
I'll start with you this
way and we'll go down.

3699
02:54:43,572 --> 02:54:47,376
>> So as contentious
this processes is,

3700
02:54:47,376 --> 02:54:49,578
I think it's incredibly
important,

3701
02:54:49,578 --> 02:54:52,648
the dialogue that's happening
in the United States.

3702
02:54:52,648 --> 02:54:57,052
Hopefully, we can do more than
just, you know, have battles

3703
02:54:57,052 --> 02:55:00,489
in the newspapers and on panels
like this and really look

3704
02:55:00,489 --> 02:55:04,326
at our legal system and make
sure that it has the kind

3705
02:55:04,326 --> 02:55:06,595
of accountability
that we needed.

3706
02:55:06,595 --> 02:55:09,131
Laura said, you know,
the problem here is scale

3707
02:55:09,131 --> 02:55:10,666
and I really agree with that.

3708
02:55:10,666 --> 02:55:11,967
Courts have been good

3709
02:55:11,967 --> 02:55:14,736
at supervising electronic
surveillance [inaudible] one

3710
02:55:14,736 --> 02:55:18,373
wiretap on one phone number
or a handful of phone numbers.

3711
02:55:18,373 --> 02:55:22,911
The scale of intrusion here is
such that we can only manage it

3712
02:55:22,911 --> 02:55:27,516
and have it a proper oversight
with using exactly the same kind

3713
02:55:27,516 --> 02:55:29,518
of computational tools
and analytic tools

3714
02:55:29,518 --> 02:55:32,454
that are being used by the
intelligence agencies to try

3715
02:55:32,454 --> 02:55:34,423
to mind this data to begin with.

3716
02:55:34,423 --> 02:55:38,260
And the one other thing I
would just say is, this is--

3717
02:55:38,260 --> 02:55:40,729
as several people said,
this is a global discussion.

3718
02:55:40,729 --> 02:55:48,003
The US is obviously an important
part of the internet environment

3719
02:55:48,003 --> 02:55:50,839
but we are not the only
country on the internet

3720
02:55:50,839 --> 02:55:55,644
and we do not control the whole
internet and I think that just

3721
02:55:55,644 --> 02:55:58,714
as we are examining the behavior
of our intelligence agencies,

3722
02:55:58,714 --> 02:56:01,483
I think it's very important
that other countries

3723
02:56:01,483 --> 02:56:04,953
that have democratic values
that believe in transparency

3724
02:56:04,953 --> 02:56:08,223
and due process really look
very hard at their intelligence

3725
02:56:08,223 --> 02:56:10,258
and surveillance
practices as well.

3726
02:56:10,258 --> 02:56:11,293
>> Thanks, Dan.

3727
02:56:11,293 --> 02:56:12,394
Lynn.

3728
02:56:12,394 --> 02:56:15,530
>> I guess I'd start with saying

3729
02:56:15,530 --> 02:56:18,467
that everybody's voice is
extraordinarily important,

3730
02:56:18,467 --> 02:56:19,601
not only here in the US

3731
02:56:19,601 --> 02:56:21,403
but every individual
around the world.

3732
02:56:21,403 --> 02:56:23,805
And we need attention
and we need voice

3733
02:56:23,805 --> 02:56:27,676
to every issue whether it's
this particular set of issues

3734
02:56:27,676 --> 02:56:31,980
or it's United Nation's
expressed interest

3735
02:56:31,980 --> 02:56:34,549
in some portions of
the internet ecosystem.

3736
02:56:34,549 --> 02:56:37,753
And I think specific
to this issue,

3737
02:56:37,753 --> 02:56:39,821
the only thing I would say is--

3738
02:56:39,821 --> 02:56:41,890
[inaudible] we're all
very interconnected

3739
02:56:41,890 --> 02:56:43,725
and very interdependent.

3740
02:56:43,725 --> 02:56:46,194
And when we think about
things such as security

3741
02:56:46,194 --> 02:56:50,198
or managing risk or trying
to manage those tradeoffs,

3742
02:56:50,198 --> 02:56:52,367
we actually need
to do that in a--

3743
02:56:52,367 --> 02:56:54,002
with both sides of the dialogue.

3744
02:56:54,002 --> 02:56:56,938
One actually looking at what
we can actually do to protect

3745
02:56:56,938 --> 02:57:00,909
and ensure things that
support economic prosperity

3746
02:57:00,909 --> 02:57:04,146
and social development
while trading off

3747
02:57:04,146 --> 02:57:07,015
against preventing
any perceived harm.

3748
02:57:07,015 --> 02:57:10,852
I think we're far too much to
[inaudible] over in the side

3749
02:57:10,852 --> 02:57:12,821
of preventing perceived harm,

3750
02:57:12,821 --> 02:57:15,223
and that we don't quite
have the balanced rate yet.

3751
02:57:15,223 --> 02:57:16,625
>> Laura.

3752
02:57:16,625 --> 02:57:22,698
>> I think it's important not to
take the stability and success

3753
02:57:22,698 --> 02:57:25,701
and the security of the
internet for granted.

3754
02:57:25,701 --> 02:57:29,104
So, we're used to it working for
the most part because of efforts

3755
02:57:29,104 --> 02:57:32,274
like John's organization and
others and it is working,

3756
02:57:32,274 --> 02:57:36,144
but we also have examples
of problems with denial

3757
02:57:36,144 --> 02:57:38,046
of service attacks, examples

3758
02:57:38,046 --> 02:57:40,082
of government is
cutting off access,

3759
02:57:40,082 --> 02:57:42,350
examples of interconnection
problems.

3760
02:57:42,350 --> 02:57:44,519
We have trends away
from interoperability

3761
02:57:44,519 --> 02:57:46,488
which I think is a
really big problem.

3762
02:57:46,488 --> 02:57:48,356
We have trends away
from anonymity

3763
02:57:48,356 --> 02:57:50,992
which changes the nature of
the technical infrastructure.

3764
02:57:50,992 --> 02:57:53,695
So, point one is that we
cannot take the stability

3765
02:57:53,695 --> 02:57:54,863
and security for granted.

3766
02:57:54,863 --> 02:57:57,699
It has required a
tremendous amount of effort

3767
02:57:57,699 --> 02:58:00,068
on the parts of many,
many people.

3768
02:58:00,068 --> 02:58:04,439
And it's something that concerns
me everyday when I see some

3769
02:58:04,439 --> 02:58:07,776
of the trends away from
interoperability and security

3770
02:58:07,776 --> 02:58:11,747
and interconnection
security, basically.

3771
02:58:11,747 --> 02:58:13,115
So, that's point number one.

3772
02:58:13,115 --> 02:58:15,550
The second point
is if we believe

3773
02:58:15,550 --> 02:58:19,955
that we have the public sphere
in the online environment,

3774
02:58:19,955 --> 02:58:21,990
if we believe that there's
a technical mediation

3775
02:58:21,990 --> 02:58:24,292
of the public sphere,
then we have to think

3776
02:58:24,292 --> 02:58:25,494
about what that means.

3777
02:58:25,494 --> 02:58:27,095
What does the democracy look

3778
02:58:27,095 --> 02:58:30,699
like when the public
sphere is now digital?

3779
02:58:30,699 --> 02:58:35,170
So, we know historically that
possibility is for anonymity

3780
02:58:35,170 --> 02:58:37,806
or at least traceable anonymity
have been closely linked

3781
02:58:37,806 --> 02:58:39,007
to democracy.

3782
02:58:39,007 --> 02:58:43,645
So, I think it's important
to just ask the question

3783
02:58:43,645 --> 02:58:45,280
of what does democracy look

3784
02:58:45,280 --> 02:58:48,817
like when we have this technical
mediation of the public sphere

3785
02:58:48,817 --> 02:58:51,319
and the privatization of
conditions of civil liberties

3786
02:58:51,319 --> 02:58:55,690
where private companies are
getting a request delegated

3787
02:58:55,690 --> 02:58:58,994
from governments or carrying
out their own governance

3788
02:58:58,994 --> 02:59:00,362
of these infrastructures.

3789
02:59:00,362 --> 02:59:01,863
So, don't take the
internet security

3790
02:59:01,863 --> 02:59:03,765
and instability for granted.

3791
02:59:03,765 --> 02:59:05,801
Remember that we have
the technical mediation

3792
02:59:05,801 --> 02:59:07,569
of the public sphere
and the privatization

3793
02:59:07,569 --> 02:59:09,171
of conditions of
civil liberties.

3794
02:59:09,171 --> 02:59:14,042
And the final point is that
internet governance is something

3795
02:59:14,042 --> 02:59:19,381
that is-- that the
public can be engaged in.

3796
02:59:19,381 --> 02:59:22,217
We've seen examples of
civil society action

3797
02:59:22,217 --> 02:59:27,255
of private action, civil
liberties advocates involved

3798
02:59:27,255 --> 02:59:28,990
in decisions about
internet governance.

3799
02:59:28,990 --> 02:59:30,826
There are many avenues
to do that.

3800
02:59:30,826 --> 02:59:33,495
That the-- I do have an
engineering background

3801
02:59:33,495 --> 02:59:35,664
but the technology
is not that hard

3802
02:59:35,664 --> 02:59:38,600
that people can learn the
technology, learn the issues

3803
02:59:38,600 --> 02:59:41,369
and get engaged in these
debates which are very important

3804
02:59:41,369 --> 02:59:43,104
because as goes internet
governance,

3805
02:59:43,104 --> 02:59:44,906
so goes internet freedom.

3806
02:59:44,906 --> 02:59:46,908
>> Randy?

3807
02:59:46,908 --> 02:59:51,379
>> All of you here that are
attending this panel discussion,

3808
02:59:51,379 --> 02:59:54,249
you all have stake in what
we've been talking about.

3809
02:59:54,249 --> 02:59:57,519
And so I would challenge you
guys to not only make sure

3810
02:59:57,519 --> 02:59:59,321
that your peers understand
what some of the pressures are

3811
02:59:59,321 --> 03:00:00,622
and what some of the
pitfalls and what are some

3812
03:00:00,622 --> 03:00:02,023
of the disadvantages are of
working with the internet.

3813
03:00:02,023 --> 03:00:07,462
But also, you guys are
probably going to be on a track

3814
03:00:07,462 --> 03:00:11,433
where you're going to be
working with legislators

3815
03:00:11,433 --> 03:00:13,568
and policy makers
and things like that.

3816
03:00:13,568 --> 03:00:16,905
And make sure that they
understand the implications

3817
03:00:16,905 --> 03:00:20,408
of whatever it is that they're
trying to write up or implement,

3818
03:00:20,408 --> 03:00:23,311
both on the legal side
and on the policy side.

3819
03:00:23,311 --> 03:00:27,115
That's to me what I see your
contribution to the whole thing.

3820
03:00:27,115 --> 03:00:28,884
It's going to be
very incremental.

3821
03:00:28,884 --> 03:00:30,619
It's going to take a long time.

3822
03:00:30,619 --> 03:00:33,021
You know if some people talk
about the fact that it's

3823
03:00:33,021 --> 03:00:35,490
like when the automobile was
first introduced at the turn

3824
03:00:35,490 --> 03:00:39,261
of the century and it took us
25 years to come up with the set

3825
03:00:39,261 --> 03:00:41,162
of laws and procedures
to make things work

3826
03:00:41,162 --> 03:00:42,497
when we didn't do that.

3827
03:00:42,497 --> 03:00:44,799
But you guys are the ones that
are going to be talking to

3828
03:00:44,799 --> 03:00:48,670
and down the road
influencing policy and laws.

3829
03:00:48,670 --> 03:00:51,239
And so, you know,
take the challenge,

3830
03:00:51,239 --> 03:00:55,143
do it and influence
what you can.

3831
03:00:55,143 --> 03:00:56,177
>> Leslie.

3832
03:00:56,177 --> 03:00:59,080
>> So I'm just going
to make one point.

3833
03:00:59,080 --> 03:01:03,051
And that's that those of us
who are Americans or people

3834
03:01:03,051 --> 03:01:07,322
in the United States have
a voice in this debate

3835
03:01:07,322 --> 03:01:09,257
that we need to exercise.

3836
03:01:09,257 --> 03:01:11,092
But we need to exercise
it with more

3837
03:01:11,092 --> 03:01:12,961
than our own rights in mind.

3838
03:01:12,961 --> 03:01:16,965
If-- the interesting thing
about the internet and the lack

3839
03:01:16,965 --> 03:01:19,334
of a government control is the--

3840
03:01:19,334 --> 03:01:23,371
it's also very unclear
about who's responsible

3841
03:01:23,371 --> 03:01:29,577
for the human rights of people
in the online environment.

3842
03:01:29,577 --> 03:01:33,682
And we-- I think the NSA example
that we have data flowing all

3843
03:01:33,682 --> 03:01:37,352
over the world, states
have obligations to people

3844
03:01:37,352 --> 03:01:43,758
within their borders, and
a few other kinds of places

3845
03:01:43,758 --> 03:01:45,627
that the law has developed.

3846
03:01:45,627 --> 03:01:48,964
We're not sure who has the
obligation for the rights

3847
03:01:48,964 --> 03:01:51,399
of internet users in
this kind of environment.

3848
03:01:51,399 --> 03:01:56,538
And it's a conversation
that really needs to happen

3849
03:01:56,538 --> 03:01:59,007
because the-- our lives,
some significant part

3850
03:01:59,007 --> 03:02:03,878
of who we are is now online
and flowing through these wires

3851
03:02:03,878 --> 03:02:07,248
and who ultimately is
responsible to make sure

3852
03:02:07,248 --> 03:02:10,185
that basic privacy and free
expression rights are honored

3853
03:02:10,185 --> 03:02:12,954
has become increasingly complex.

3854
03:02:12,954 --> 03:02:15,657
So, people need to
take that on as well.

3855
03:02:15,657 --> 03:02:16,424
>> Last word, John.

3856
03:02:16,424 --> 03:02:20,628
>> It's a global internet.

3857
03:02:20,628 --> 03:02:23,965
There needs to be an
equally global discussion

3858
03:02:23,965 --> 03:02:28,203
about the principles
by which we operate it.

3859
03:02:28,203 --> 03:02:30,538
And part of what's occurred

3860
03:02:30,538 --> 03:02:34,709
over the last few months will
help encourage one aspect

3861
03:02:34,709 --> 03:02:35,677
of that discussion.

3862
03:02:35,677 --> 03:02:37,746
So, it's a probably
a good thing.

3863
03:02:37,746 --> 03:02:39,214
>> I want to thank all
of you for being here.

3864
03:02:39,214 --> 03:02:40,548
I want to thank the
Internet Society.

3865
03:02:40,548 --> 03:02:43,184
I want to thank the GW
Engineering Department

3866
03:02:43,184 --> 03:02:45,553
and their [inaudible]
Lance Hoffman's Institute.

3867
03:02:45,553 --> 03:02:48,189
Long afternoon, thanks
for your patience.

3868
03:02:48,189 --> 03:02:49,324
I hope you learned something.

3869
03:02:49,324 --> 03:02:50,825
Come back again.

3870
03:02:50,825 --> 03:02:51,860
Thanks a lot.

3871
03:02:51,860 --> 03:02:53,928
[Applause]