0:00:01.333,0:00:04.870
>> Good afternoon again[br]and welcome to GW.

0:00:04.870,0:00:08.340
My name is David Dolling and[br]I'm the Dean of the School

0:00:08.340,0:00:10.543
of Engineering and[br]Applied Science here

0:00:10.543,0:00:13.379
at the George Washington[br]University.

0:00:13.379,0:00:16.415
I don't think it would[br]be news to anybody

0:00:16.415,0:00:19.718
that there's been a lot of[br]documents out there recently

0:00:19.718,0:00:21.520
with respect to cyber security.

0:00:21.520,0:00:25.024
We've seen the White[br]House's executive order aimed

0:00:25.024,0:00:27.960
at protecting our[br]critical infrastructure.

0:00:27.960,0:00:31.464
We've seen a report from the[br]Security Company Mandiant

0:00:31.464,0:00:34.733
that exposed a Chinese[br]military hacking group.

0:00:34.733,0:00:37.903
And very much in the news[br]now although it's faded

0:00:37.903,0:00:41.540
after the press conference[br]yesterday afternoon have been

0:00:41.540,0:00:44.810
documents related[br]to NSA's prison

0:00:44.810,0:00:47.813
and telephone surveillance[br]programs.

0:00:47.813,0:00:49.849
Well today, we are[br]very fortunate

0:00:49.849,0:00:51.684
that have several[br]experts with us

0:00:51.684,0:00:55.721
to discuss their various[br]view points on surveillance

0:00:55.721,0:00:59.291
on cyber security and the[br]future of the internet.

0:00:59.291,0:01:04.063
As we try to be secure[br]while protecting privacy,

0:01:04.063,0:01:08.534
we do need to be guided by[br]knowledge from many disciplines

0:01:08.534,0:01:12.238
and in fact, this was stated[br]quite explicitly last December

0:01:12.238,0:01:16.308
at the launch of the GW[br]Cyber Security Initiative.

0:01:16.308,0:01:18.210
The initiative's chairman,

0:01:18.210,0:01:22.581
former DHS Secretary Michael[br]Chertoff spoke of the need

0:01:22.581,0:01:26.385
for university's[br]like ours and others

0:01:26.385,0:01:29.622
to give students an[br]understanding of the triad

0:01:29.622,0:01:33.726
of technology, business[br]policy and how they interact

0:01:33.726,0:01:37.897
to create difficult cyber[br]security challenges.

0:01:37.897,0:01:41.066
While I'm on the podium here,[br]I'd like to just take advantage

0:01:41.066,0:01:44.837
of a captive audience because I[br]know you all too polite to cheer

0:01:44.837,0:01:49.341
or get up and move out to say[br]a few things about the School

0:01:49.341,0:01:51.911
of Engineering and[br]Applied Science here at GW

0:01:51.911,0:01:55.881
which is a very thriving[br]and growing enterprise.

0:01:55.881,0:01:58.484
Our Department of[br]Computer Science

0:01:58.484,0:02:01.954
in fact anticipated[br]Secretary Chertoff's remarks

0:02:01.954,0:02:05.724
by launching last fall[br]the Master of Science

0:02:05.724,0:02:09.728
in Cyber security in our[br]Computer Science Department.

0:02:09.728,0:02:10.930
It's the first program

0:02:10.930,0:02:14.366
in Washington DC designed[br]specifically to respond

0:02:14.366,0:02:16.936
to the large and[br]fast growing need

0:02:16.936,0:02:20.573
for technical cyber[br]security experts locally,

0:02:20.573,0:02:24.310
nationally, and internationally.

0:02:24.310,0:02:28.981
Underscoring our commitment[br]here to cyber security education

0:02:28.981,0:02:32.218
and public service, our NSF

0:02:32.218,0:02:36.488
and DHS sponsored CyberCorps[br]scholarship programs.

0:02:36.488,0:02:39.925
These programs fund students who[br]are going to be future leaders

0:02:39.925,0:02:42.995
in the federal government[br]on cyber security

0:02:42.995,0:02:46.131
and indeed some of[br]them already are.

0:02:46.131,0:02:49.668
Each week, the CyberCorps[br]students meet in class often

0:02:49.668,0:02:52.671
with current or former[br]federal employees as well

0:02:52.671,0:02:54.807
as industry experts to learn

0:02:54.807,0:02:58.510
about the major cyber security[br]issues so they're prepared

0:02:58.510,0:03:00.980
to meet the challenges that[br]will certainly great them

0:03:00.980,0:03:04.183
after they graduate[br]here and take jobs.

0:03:04.183,0:03:06.885
This course which was[br]previously only available

0:03:06.885,0:03:11.423
to CyberCorps students is now[br]available to all GW students

0:03:11.423,0:03:14.760
as a hybrid cause[br]conducted mostly online

0:03:14.760,0:03:15.961
with the short intensive

0:03:15.961,0:03:18.897
in person learning[br]experience or the beginning.

0:03:18.897,0:03:22.635
Starting next year,[br]some doctor or students

0:03:22.635,0:03:24.336
in the graduate school[br]of education

0:03:24.336,0:03:27.406
and human development[br]here at GW on human

0:03:27.406,0:03:31.243
and organizational learning[br]will also be taking this class a

0:03:31.243,0:03:34.647
required part of their[br]cyber security focus.

0:03:34.647,0:03:37.049
Well, let me say that[br]today's event which looks

0:03:37.049,0:03:39.218
to be very well populated[br]and looks like it's going

0:03:39.218,0:03:41.553
to be very interesting[br]is sponsored

0:03:41.553,0:03:44.890
by the cyber security policy[br]in research institute.

0:03:44.890,0:03:48.227
We abbreviate that around[br]here to CSPRI of the School

0:03:48.227,0:03:50.396
of Engineering and[br]Applied Science.

0:03:50.396,0:03:54.166
In addition to overseeing[br]the CyberCorps program,

0:03:54.166,0:03:58.337
it facilitates and execute[br]into disciplinary research

0:03:58.337,0:04:01.740
in education in cyber[br]security across GW.

0:04:01.740,0:04:04.810
One example of this is its[br]work with the graduate school

0:04:04.810,0:04:07.680
of education in human[br]development supporting the

0:04:07.680,0:04:10.983
national cyber watch[br]center in a joint project

0:04:10.983,0:04:14.687
to develop the nation[br]cyber security workforce.

0:04:14.687,0:04:16.922
More information on that program

0:04:16.922,0:04:20.526
on CSPRI Cyber Security[br]Scholarships and School

0:04:20.526,0:04:22.594
of Engineering and Applied[br]Science can be found

0:04:22.594,0:04:26.999
in the material available[br]the registration desk.

0:04:26.999,0:04:29.368
We're happy to have[br]as a cosponsor

0:04:29.368,0:04:34.473
of this event today the internet[br]society and it's my pleasure

0:04:34.473,0:04:37.209
to now introduced Paul[br]Brigner, Regional Director

0:04:37.209,0:04:41.680
of the North American Bureau at[br]the Internet Society to come up

0:04:41.680,0:04:44.116
and tell you a few[br]words about it

0:04:44.116,0:04:46.618
and its role and[br]in today's event.

0:04:46.618,0:04:49.488
So, on behalf of GW, the[br]School of Engineering

0:04:49.488,0:04:51.657
and Applied Science,[br]CSPRI and the Department

0:04:51.657,0:04:54.159
Of Computer Science,[br]welcome to GW

0:04:54.159,0:04:56.061
and I hope you have[br]a great afternoon.

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Thank you.

0:04:57.529,0:05:00.966
[ Applause ]

0:05:00.966,0:05:10.042
[ Pause ]

0:05:11.043,0:05:12.644
>> Thank you Dr.[br]Dolling and thank you

0:05:12.644,0:05:15.514
to the George Washington[br]Cyber Security Policy

0:05:15.514,0:05:17.249
And Research Institute[br]for partnering

0:05:17.249,0:05:18.884
with us on this event today.

0:05:18.884,0:05:22.187
And thanks to all of[br]you for joining us

0:05:22.187,0:05:25.924
and that means not everyone here[br]in the room but also to those

0:05:25.924,0:05:28.761
who are at a remote[br]hub in New York City.

0:05:28.761,0:05:30.062
That remote hub is[br]being sponsored

0:05:30.062,0:05:32.364
by the internet societies[br]New York chapter.

0:05:32.364,0:05:33.932
I know we don't have[br]a good view of them

0:05:33.932,0:05:35.968
with the camera right[br]now but what's going

0:05:35.968,0:05:37.503
to happen is they[br]will walk up to

0:05:37.503,0:05:40.239
that camera and ask questions.

0:05:40.239,0:05:42.508
And by the way, they've[br]been meeting

0:05:42.508,0:05:44.276
on this topic already[br]this morning.

0:05:44.276,0:05:46.044
They've had their[br]own meetings today,

0:05:46.044,0:05:49.314
so maybe that gives you an idea[br]of how passionate that group

0:05:49.314,0:05:52.050
of individual is about[br]the topics we will be

0:05:52.050,0:05:53.419
discussing though.

0:05:53.419,0:05:56.221
So, thank you to the New York[br]chapter for getting together

0:05:56.221,0:05:59.425
to join us as remote hub.

0:05:59.425,0:06:01.794
And definitely, thank you[br]to all those on live stream.

0:06:01.794,0:06:04.296
We have a very good crowd[br]already gathering on live stream

0:06:04.296,0:06:08.634
to watch us from[br]all over the world.

0:06:08.634,0:06:11.570
My first order of business today[br]is makes sure that you're aware

0:06:11.570,0:06:12.971
of the internet society.

0:06:12.971,0:06:15.974
If this is the first time you're[br]joining from one of our events,

0:06:15.974,0:06:19.011
we are a global nonprofit[br]cost driven organization

0:06:19.011,0:06:21.013
with a very straight[br]forward vision.

0:06:21.013,0:06:24.383
That is the internet[br]is for everyone.

0:06:24.383,0:06:26.618
We work to achieve that vision

0:06:26.618,0:06:29.288
by promoting the open[br]development evolution and use

0:06:29.288,0:06:30.289
of the internet for the benefit

0:06:30.289,0:06:32.658
of tall people throughout[br]the world.

0:06:32.658,0:06:36.628
Some of our key functions[br]involve facilitating the open

0:06:36.628,0:06:39.665
development of standards,[br]protocols, administration

0:06:39.665,0:06:42.768
and a technical infrastructure[br]of the internet.

0:06:42.768,0:06:47.039
Supporting internet education[br]in developing countries.

0:06:47.039,0:06:49.775
Promoting professional[br]development in community meeting

0:06:49.775,0:06:52.578
to faster greater[br]participation and leadership

0:06:52.578,0:06:55.547
in areas important to the[br]evolution of the internet

0:06:55.547,0:06:58.650
and fostering an environment[br]for international cooperation,

0:06:58.650,0:06:59.952
community and a culture

0:06:59.952,0:07:03.589
that enables internet[br]self governance.

0:07:03.589,0:07:07.292
Well, I saw staff lead specific[br]projects on these topics.

0:07:07.292,0:07:09.761
Much of our work is achieved[br]through the work of our members

0:07:09.761,0:07:12.364
and chapters around the world.

0:07:12.364,0:07:14.299
And speaking of chapters,

0:07:14.299,0:07:16.034
I would like to give[br]special recognition

0:07:16.034,0:07:18.604
to the local DC chapter.

0:07:18.604,0:07:21.440
I am very fortunate that our[br]headquarters is just not far

0:07:21.440,0:07:24.676
away in western Virginia so[br]I'm able to interact personally

0:07:24.676,0:07:27.513
with our DC chapter[br]on a regular basis.

0:07:27.513,0:07:28.747
And I can attest to the fact

0:07:28.747,0:07:30.716
that they are really a[br]first class group of people

0:07:30.716,0:07:34.386
that regularly hold very[br]interesting meetings related

0:07:34.386,0:07:36.488
to the internet societies[br]mission.

0:07:36.488,0:07:38.724
So, if you're a local[br]and you're not involve,

0:07:38.724,0:07:41.693
you're really missing out, I[br]do hope you will get involved.

0:07:41.693,0:07:44.129
And if the leaders who are here

0:07:44.129,0:07:47.432
from the internet society DC[br]chapter would stand briefly,

0:07:47.432,0:07:50.102
I just want to make sure[br]that you're recognized.

0:07:51.069,0:07:52.571
So, great.

0:07:52.571,0:07:54.072
So, you know who they are.

0:07:54.072,0:07:55.908
Please make a special[br]effort to talk

0:07:55.908,0:07:57.409
to them today during[br]this event if you'd

0:07:57.409,0:07:59.511
like to get involve[br]with the chapter.

0:07:59.511,0:08:03.181
[ Pause ]

0:08:03.181,0:08:06.385
One of my key functions[br]at the internet society is

0:08:06.385,0:08:08.587
to work closely with our[br]chapters in the region not only

0:08:08.587,0:08:12.324
to plan iNET events like this[br]but to assist with their events

0:08:12.324,0:08:16.695
and to have an open[br]dialogue on policy issues.

0:08:16.695,0:08:19.197
That dialogue in turn[br]helps me and my colleagues

0:08:19.197,0:08:22.501
at the internet society to form[br]our policy positions and help

0:08:22.501,0:08:24.503
to set the agenda for[br]our regional meetings

0:08:24.503,0:08:26.638
like the one we are[br]attending today

0:08:26.638,0:08:29.341
and that brings me[br]to today's agenda.

0:08:29.341,0:08:31.743
The topic of this iNET[br]has really been driven

0:08:31.743,0:08:33.278
by the interest of our members

0:08:33.278,0:08:36.347
in the North American[br]region and around the world.

0:08:36.347,0:08:39.918
It so happens today that one of[br]our panelist is the President

0:08:39.918,0:08:41.186
and Chief Executive Officer

0:08:41.186,0:08:44.623
of the internet society[br]that's Lynn St. Amour.

0:08:44.623,0:08:46.658
So, she will have[br]the opportunity

0:08:46.658,0:08:50.262
to address the concerns[br]of our constituency today.

0:08:50.262,0:08:53.065
Now, without further delay,

0:08:53.065,0:08:56.134
I would like to introduce[br]Professors Lance Hoffman.

0:08:56.134,0:09:00.772
He is the Director of the Cyber[br]Security Research and Policy--

0:09:00.772,0:09:02.774
I'm sorry, the Cyber[br]Security Policy

0:09:02.774,0:09:06.044
and Research Institute here at[br]George Washington University.

0:09:06.044,0:09:10.315
I first met Professor Hoffman[br]when he sponsored a debate

0:09:10.315,0:09:14.286
on PIPA and SOPA and[br]I knew that he was,

0:09:14.286,0:09:16.922
based on that experience, I[br]knew that he was game to talk

0:09:16.922,0:09:19.358
about some very controversial[br]topics.

0:09:19.358,0:09:21.927
So, I guessed right, he[br]was interested in talking

0:09:21.927,0:09:24.596
about this one as well and[br]it's been really a pleasure

0:09:24.596,0:09:26.198
to partner with him[br]on this event.

0:09:26.198,0:09:30.268
So, I want to sincerely[br]thank you for that.

0:09:30.268,0:09:32.170
It's really been a[br]great experience.

0:09:32.170,0:09:35.173
I'd also like to thank all[br]of our fantastic panelist

0:09:35.173,0:09:36.642
who have agreed to[br]speak here today.

0:09:36.642,0:09:38.810
We really have an all[br]star group of people

0:09:38.810,0:09:41.513
who have taken their time out[br]to share their views with you.

0:09:41.513,0:09:44.783
I'd like them all to come up[br]and take their sits on stage now

0:09:44.783,0:09:47.152
if they would and I[br]will turn this event

0:09:47.152,0:09:48.987
over to Professor Hoffman.

0:09:48.987,0:09:53.325
One thing I forgot to mention[br]is that if you want to Twitter

0:09:53.325,0:09:54.559
or tweet about this event,

0:09:54.559,0:09:59.164
please use the hashtag[br]iNET DC, iNET DC.

0:09:59.164,0:10:01.500
Thank you all over much.

0:10:01.500,0:10:07.005
[ Applause ]

0:10:07.005,0:10:16.081
[ Noise ]

0:10:18.517,0:10:27.592
[ Inaudible Discussion ]

0:10:35.867,0:10:37.269
>> Good afternoon everybody.

0:10:37.269,0:10:43.375
Let me add my welcome to that of[br]Dean Dolling and to Paul Brigner

0:10:43.375,0:10:46.178
and let me also thank the[br]internet society, our cosponsor

0:10:46.178,0:10:48.447
for this event for[br]their programmatic

0:10:48.447,0:10:51.049
and financial assistance[br]in making it possible.

0:10:51.049,0:10:55.754
I also want to thank from[br]CSPRI, my Associate Director,

0:10:55.754,0:10:59.458
Dr. Costis Toregas and our[br]intern and research assistance

0:10:59.458,0:11:02.694
who have worked on this and are[br]helping here today tray hair

0:11:02.694,0:11:03.929
[phonetic] Dustin[br]Benanberg [assumed spelling],

0:11:03.929,0:11:04.896
Jaime Moore [assumed spelling],

0:11:04.896,0:11:06.698
and Greg Ziegler[br][assumed spelling].

0:11:06.698,0:11:11.069
My role today is to set the[br]stage for our excellent panel

0:11:11.069,0:11:14.406
and into moderate that panel[br]discussion on cyber security

0:11:14.406,0:11:17.976
in the future of the internet[br]given the recent revelations

0:11:17.976,0:11:20.812
about prism and other[br]surveillance programs.

0:11:20.812,0:11:23.915
The panelist of each degree[br]to summarize their thoughts

0:11:23.915,0:11:26.952
in a four minute statements[br]so we could have lots of time

0:11:26.952,0:11:29.955
for questions from the[br]audience including the audience

0:11:29.955,0:11:31.590
in cyber space.

0:11:31.590,0:11:36.228
After the audience question and[br]answer session in a short break,

0:11:36.228,0:11:39.030
participants will return for[br]a very interesting session

0:11:39.030,0:11:42.667
around table discussion where[br]we will see their world views

0:11:42.667,0:11:45.170
on this, where there[br]world views agree,

0:11:45.170,0:11:50.542
and where there are tensions and[br]talk about this in a round table

0:11:50.542,0:11:52.477
which will be informed by[br]their previous statements

0:11:52.477,0:11:54.980
and the audience[br]questions before hand.

0:11:54.980,0:11:57.215
I'm delighted that[br]for this event,

0:11:57.215,0:12:00.318
we will have an experience[br]moderator Professor Steve

0:12:00.318,0:12:03.121
Roberts leading the[br]round table discussion.

0:12:03.121,0:12:06.124
Many of the students and[br]faculty here may recognize Steve

0:12:06.124,0:12:07.659
as the superior professor[br]of media

0:12:07.659,0:12:10.529
and public affairs here at GW.

0:12:10.529,0:12:12.998
But others including[br]those viewing on this

0:12:12.998,0:12:15.267
on the internet maybe[br]more familiar with him

0:12:15.267,0:12:17.002
from his appearances[br]as a commentator

0:12:17.002,0:12:19.671
on many Washington[br]based television shows,

0:12:19.671,0:12:22.707
as a political analyst[br]on the ABC radio network,

0:12:22.707,0:12:26.311
and as a substitute host[br]on NPR Diane Rehm Show.

0:12:26.311,0:12:29.514
Another rule where he-- this[br]is material from experts

0:12:29.514,0:12:33.785
and clarifies it to facilitate[br]informed public discussion.

0:12:33.785,0:12:36.087
But before the round table,

0:12:36.087,0:12:38.056
let me identify the[br]participants on stage.

0:12:38.056,0:12:40.792
We will not have lengthy[br]introductions here

0:12:40.792,0:12:44.329
since their bio sketches have[br]been made available to you

0:12:44.329,0:12:48.700
in the brochure which you[br]have gotten or can get

0:12:48.700,0:12:50.702
at the registration desk.

0:12:50.702,0:12:55.841
But anyway, let me[br]introduce very briefly

0:12:55.841,0:12:59.411
and you see their name[br]tags in front of you,

0:12:59.411,0:13:02.480
Danny Weitzner is the[br]Director and Cofounder

0:13:02.480,0:13:04.216
of the MIT Computer Science

0:13:04.216,0:13:07.252
and Artificial Intelligence[br]Laboratory.

0:13:07.252,0:13:10.255
>> Not the whole lab.

0:13:10.255,0:13:13.024
>> Not the whole lab?

0:13:13.024,0:13:15.260
>> I'll explain.

0:13:15.260,0:13:18.430
>> OK. Lynn St. Amour[br]is the President and CEO

0:13:18.430,0:13:20.432
of the Internet Society.

0:13:20.432,0:13:23.335
Let's see, who's next.

0:13:23.335,0:13:25.604
Laura, Laura DeNardis[br]is professor of School

0:13:25.604,0:13:28.573
of Communication at[br]American University.

0:13:28.573,0:13:32.611
Melissa Hathaway is President of[br]the Hathaway Global Strategies.

0:13:32.611,0:13:33.912
Let's see.

0:13:33.912,0:13:35.747
Who's down there?

0:13:35.747,0:13:38.183
I don't have you on my list.

0:13:38.183,0:13:39.618
>> Oh no.

0:13:39.618,0:13:40.886
>> I apologize.

0:13:40.886,0:13:42.020
>> That would me.

0:13:42.020,0:13:43.088
>> Oh Randy, of course.

0:13:43.088,0:13:45.757
Randy from-- I don't have here.

0:13:45.757,0:13:47.826
I mean, OK.

0:13:47.826,0:13:50.295
Randy-- where are you from?

0:13:50.295,0:13:51.363
I'll let you introduce yourself.

0:13:51.363,0:13:51.997
I'm sorry.

0:13:51.997,0:13:53.098
[Inaudible Remark]

0:13:53.098,0:13:53.999
>> I'm the University[br]IT Security Officer

0:13:53.999,0:13:54.933
at Virginia Tech.

0:13:54.933,0:13:56.134
>> I didn't want[br]it to get it wrong

0:13:56.134,0:13:58.270
and say something[br]wrong-- wrong university.

0:13:58.270,0:13:59.638
Sorry Randy.

0:13:59.638,0:14:01.573
OK, let's see.

0:14:01.573,0:14:04.809
Leslie Harris is from Center[br]for Democracy and Technology.

0:14:04.809,0:14:07.512
And last but not the least,[br]John Curran, President and CEO

0:14:07.512,0:14:10.615
of American Registry[br]for Internet Numbers.

0:14:10.615,0:14:15.687
OK, so without further ado, I am[br]going to suggest to be each go

0:14:15.687,0:14:19.257
down the-- I have to[br]decide, I'm going to leave it

0:14:19.257,0:14:24.896
to I guess either Danny or[br]John on who wants to go first.

0:14:24.896,0:14:25.397
>> No, no, no.

0:14:25.397,0:14:25.830
Go ahead.

0:14:25.830,0:14:26.264
>> John?

0:14:26.264,0:14:26.698
>> OK.

0:14:26.698,0:14:27.332
>> OK?

0:14:27.332,0:14:28.333
>> OK John, go on.

0:14:28.333,0:14:29.134
Four minutes please.

0:14:29.134,0:14:30.468
>> Well, thank you.

0:14:30.468,0:14:33.471
I'm happy to be here and I[br]want to thank the opportunity

0:14:33.471,0:14:35.607
to present at this panel.

0:14:35.607,0:14:38.610
Keeping my remark short,[br]I will say that we're

0:14:38.610,0:14:43.081
in an interesting period of[br]time with respect to the future

0:14:43.081,0:14:46.151
of the internet and[br]how it's governed.

0:14:46.151,0:14:49.354
People may not realize[br]it but the fact is,

0:14:49.354,0:14:52.424
there is a coordination[br]function that's existed

0:14:52.424,0:14:55.994
since the earliest days of the[br]internet which is necessary

0:14:55.994,0:14:58.563
so that we can actually[br]use the internet

0:14:58.563,0:15:00.265
so that it actually functions.

0:15:00.265,0:15:01.800
For example, computers

0:15:01.800,0:15:04.769
on the internet have[br]unique identifiers.

0:15:04.769,0:15:07.505
Several, actually, one of[br]them is the IP addresses

0:15:07.505,0:15:08.773
which is part of what[br]Aaron [assumed spelling] is

0:15:08.773,0:15:10.008
involved in.

0:15:10.008,0:15:12.877
We can't have computers[br]using the same IP addresses.

0:15:12.877,0:15:15.313
Every computer needs[br]its own IP address.

0:15:15.313,0:15:18.583
Likewise, there's coordination[br]of things like domain names

0:15:18.583,0:15:20.385
to make sure that a[br]domain name is a sign

0:15:20.385,0:15:23.154
to one organization,[br]et cetera, et cetera.

0:15:23.154,0:15:25.724
This is called technical[br]coordination

0:15:25.724,0:15:29.594
and it's been a function of the[br]internet, necessary function

0:15:29.594,0:15:32.364
for the protocols[br]to work as designed

0:15:32.364,0:15:33.865
since the very beginning.

0:15:33.865,0:15:36.634
People may not realize that[br]this use to all be done

0:15:36.634,0:15:41.639
by one gentlemen, Dr. Jon Postel[br]who we no longer have with us

0:15:41.639,0:15:43.541
but was an amazing individual.

0:15:43.541,0:15:46.878
And in the late '90s, we[br]actually went about setting

0:15:46.878,0:15:51.149
up infrastructure to enable[br]this technical coordination

0:15:51.149,0:15:56.054
so that IP addresses and[br]domain names could be available

0:15:56.054,0:15:59.657
to everyone globally for[br]their use on the internet

0:15:59.657,0:16:02.293
but coordinated so that[br]they actually interoperated

0:16:02.293,0:16:05.764
so that they work as expected.

0:16:05.764,0:16:08.266
This structure involves[br]a lot of organizations.

0:16:08.266,0:16:11.503
Aaron is one, there're five[br]regional registries throughout

0:16:11.503,0:16:12.904
the globe.

0:16:12.904,0:16:15.373
Aaron is the one that handles[br]North America, so with Canada,

0:16:15.373,0:16:17.742
the United States and about[br]half of the Caribbean.

0:16:17.742,0:16:20.311
Though there are four[br]other regional registries

0:16:20.311,0:16:22.914
and then there is the DNS[br]coordination that goes

0:16:22.914,0:16:25.784
on through organizations[br]such as ICANN.

0:16:25.784,0:16:27.419
The international[br]coo-- [laughs].

0:16:27.419,0:16:32.424
Sorry. International--[br][Noise] --

0:16:32.424,0:16:34.826
Organization for assigned[br]Names and Numbers.

0:16:34.826,0:16:39.064
So, the fact is that these[br]bodies all work doing technical

0:16:39.064,0:16:41.399
coordination is very important.

0:16:41.399,0:16:46.438
But, they've been doing it based[br]on a historical trajectory.

0:16:46.438,0:16:49.874
A trajectory that originated[br]with projects and programs

0:16:49.874,0:16:51.643
out of the US government[br]which have

0:16:51.643,0:16:55.346
since been increasingly[br]moved out to independence

0:16:55.346,0:16:56.748
but were not quite there yet.

0:16:56.748,0:17:02.787
In fact, some of you maybe aware[br]that these organizations were

0:17:02.787,0:17:07.959
under supervision somewhat[br]indirect but still supervision

0:17:07.959,0:17:12.564
of program such as NTIA in[br]the department of commerce.

0:17:12.564,0:17:16.501
And so, one of the things that[br]we now find ourselves facing is

0:17:16.501,0:17:19.771
that there is a unique[br]role in the US government

0:17:19.771,0:17:21.372
with respect to the internet.

0:17:21.372,0:17:26.344
And this unique role is one that[br]is based on-- it's experienced.

0:17:26.344,0:17:29.581
It's a steady hand,[br]behind the scenes,

0:17:29.581,0:17:31.449
helping the internet[br]mature and grow.

0:17:31.449,0:17:35.487
Recently however, we've now[br]seen that there's another hand

0:17:35.487,0:17:37.455
that maybe busy doing[br]other things

0:17:37.455,0:17:41.326
such as surveillance[br]in cyber security.

0:17:41.326,0:17:44.662
And so, the question that comes[br]up is how do we reconcile those?

0:17:44.662,0:17:50.535
How do we reconcile an open[br]global transparent internet run

0:17:50.535,0:17:53.805
for everyone with[br]the possibility

0:17:53.805,0:17:58.309
that there is also surveillance[br]going on and other things

0:17:58.309,0:18:00.578
that may not meet[br]the expectations

0:18:00.578,0:18:02.280
of global internet users.

0:18:02.280,0:18:05.483
And so, this is the[br]challenge in front of us.

0:18:05.483,0:18:08.820
It's particularly[br]highlighted because of the fact

0:18:08.820,0:18:12.257
that the US governments[br]unique oversight role in this

0:18:12.257,0:18:14.159
and it's brought[br]to the forefront

0:18:14.159,0:18:19.597
by the recent discussions where[br]we now say that it is not simply

0:18:19.597,0:18:21.533
for the benefit of[br]all the internet,

0:18:21.533,0:18:24.836
but there's also some[br]national priorities

0:18:24.836,0:18:29.040
and national initiatives that[br]the US government also pursues

0:18:29.040,0:18:30.708
over the same infrastructure.

0:18:30.708,0:18:34.312
I think that's the challenge[br]that we will now face more

0:18:34.312,0:18:36.481
so than ever in light[br]of the revelations

0:18:36.481,0:18:40.151
for the last few months and[br]the net result would be a lot

0:18:40.151,0:18:42.086
of the discussion in[br]forum such as this.

0:18:42.086,0:18:43.521
Thank you.

0:18:43.521,0:18:44.622
>> Thank you and I'll try

0:18:44.622,0:18:46.724
to make this iPhone[br]behave a little better--

0:18:46.724,0:18:47.292
>> OK.

0:18:47.292,0:18:48.126
>> Although--

0:18:48.126,0:18:48.960
>> I thought I was over on time.

0:18:48.960,0:18:50.061
>> Yes.

0:18:50.061,0:18:51.396
>> You were right on[br]time, you were great.

0:18:51.396,0:18:51.896
>> OK.

0:18:51.896,0:18:52.597
>> Leslie?

0:18:52.597,0:18:55.099
>> It's time, I guess.

0:18:55.099,0:18:58.970
So, I also want to get us out[br]of the DC bubble and the focus

0:18:58.970,0:19:01.573
on the rights of people[br]in the United States.

0:19:01.573,0:19:04.275
I've been talking about[br]that for the last six weeks.

0:19:04.275,0:19:08.079
And congresses about to[br]considering an amendment that's

0:19:08.079,0:19:10.081
going to reign in[br]the NSAs ability

0:19:10.081,0:19:13.451
to collect our metadata[br]from phones.

0:19:13.451,0:19:16.287
I want to pivot away from that[br]'cause I think there're three

0:19:16.287,0:19:19.324
other things that we ought[br]to be considering at least.

0:19:19.324,0:19:23.027
What-- and the reactions of[br]governments and internet users

0:19:23.027,0:19:26.364
around the world and what this[br]means with the architecture,

0:19:26.364,0:19:29.300
not just the governance, the[br]architecture of the internet

0:19:29.300,0:19:31.703
and also for the[br]protection of human rights

0:19:31.703,0:19:33.838
of global internet[br]users and that turns

0:19:33.838,0:19:35.673
out to be a very[br]thorny question.

0:19:35.673,0:19:37.208
Certainly for governments,

0:19:37.208,0:19:40.545
I think this entire kerfuffle[br]is reinforced the concerns

0:19:40.545,0:19:44.115
that the global internet has[br]undermined their sovereignty

0:19:44.115,0:19:46.417
in control over their citizens.

0:19:46.417,0:19:48.586
And it's further[br]illuminated this sort

0:19:48.586,0:19:52.557
of privileged position[br]of the United States.

0:19:52.557,0:19:54.926
Certainly, with respect[br]to ICANN and some

0:19:54.926,0:19:56.894
of the other critical resources,

0:19:56.894,0:20:00.198
we continue to have a[br]disproportionate share

0:20:00.198,0:20:03.067
of internet traffic, all[br]that's declining and obviously,

0:20:03.067,0:20:06.104
we have a dominance in our[br]global internet companies.

0:20:06.104,0:20:10.608
For some, and the EUs, I[br]think I have a good example,

0:20:10.608,0:20:12.944
this illuminates[br]left an inability

0:20:12.944,0:20:15.346
to protect the human[br]rights of their own citizens

0:20:15.346,0:20:19.751
and we have a major fight coming[br]up in the data directive there

0:20:19.751,0:20:21.786
about whether they're[br]going to allow data to come

0:20:21.786,0:20:24.255
to the United States at all.

0:20:24.255,0:20:29.527
At the same time, it's an[br]extraordinary opportunity

0:20:29.527,0:20:34.265
for authoritarian governments[br]to exert more control

0:20:34.265,0:20:38.569
over the people in data in their[br]own boarders and it's, you know,

0:20:38.569,0:20:42.707
rushes now dusting of a[br]legislation that has to do

0:20:42.707,0:20:44.042
with national servers.

0:20:44.042,0:20:45.977
You're going to see[br]that elsewhere as well

0:20:45.977,0:20:49.414
and I think it's fair to worry[br]whether this carefully honed

0:20:49.414,0:20:55.386
narrative as US narrative of the[br]why is trusted neutral stored

0:20:55.386,0:20:58.489
of the internet can[br]really hold and it's fair

0:20:58.489,0:21:00.992
to ask whether we're moving[br]towards the balkanization

0:21:00.992,0:21:04.762
of the internet as[br]government sees these moment

0:21:04.762,0:21:08.333
to impost local server[br]requirements or worse

0:21:08.333,0:21:12.003
and we saw some of these[br]proposals last year.

0:21:12.003,0:21:14.872
I know we're supposed to be[br]acronym free at the wicked.

0:21:14.872,0:21:17.975
I'll explain-- routing[br]requirements

0:21:17.975,0:21:21.646
to either avoid the[br]United States of literally

0:21:21.646,0:21:23.314
to direct the routing of traffic

0:21:23.314,0:21:27.251
and the worst outcome[br]being literally ring fans

0:21:27.251,0:21:30.254
to national or regional[br]networks.

0:21:30.254,0:21:33.291
If I were in Latin America and[br]notice that there was 80 percent

0:21:33.291,0:21:36.327
of my traffic still coming[br]from the United States,

0:21:36.327,0:21:39.764
I may start to wonder why[br]we're still relying on Miami

0:21:39.764,0:21:41.132
to reach most of the world.

0:21:41.132,0:21:44.469
Some of that might be[br]a weird salutary effect

0:21:44.469,0:21:48.272
that we finally get internet[br]exchange points in some places

0:21:48.272,0:21:50.842
that have not had them.

0:21:50.842,0:21:54.379
But I think governments becoming[br]involved directly in the rooting

0:21:54.379,0:21:57.915
of internet data would[br]opposed a profound challenge

0:21:57.915,0:22:00.184
to the open end-to-end internet

0:22:00.184,0:22:02.920
and I think all these things[br]are going to be on the table.

0:22:02.920,0:22:06.057
I think you are also kind of[br]expect to see a reexamination

0:22:06.057,0:22:07.592
of the world's relationships

0:22:07.592,0:22:10.661
with our cloud providers,[br]already seeing that.

0:22:10.661,0:22:13.197
You know, there's a Netherlands[br]provider and no prism,

0:22:13.197,0:22:15.867
no surveillance, no[br]government backdoors.

0:22:15.867,0:22:21.939
And finally, I think we may have[br]lost some of the rapprochement

0:22:21.939,0:22:25.743
that happened in the governance[br]wars in the last year.

0:22:25.743,0:22:29.313
There are number of important[br]forums and discussions coming

0:22:29.313,0:22:31.082
up about various treaties

0:22:31.082,0:22:33.584
and how much various treaty[br]buddies ought to be able

0:22:33.584,0:22:36.154
to impose their--

0:22:36.154,0:22:39.924
post themselves into internet[br]debates, I think we're going

0:22:39.924,0:22:41.092
to lose some ground there

0:22:41.092,0:22:44.395
and it could be I[br]think quite troubling.

0:22:44.395,0:22:48.933
Last point, global[br]internet users are furious.

0:22:48.933,0:22:51.769
They believe their human[br]rights have been violated

0:22:51.769,0:22:53.638
and I think they[br]don't yet realize

0:22:53.638,0:22:56.174
that it's not entirely clear[br]whether they have any recourse

0:22:56.174,0:22:57.341
for that.

0:22:57.341,0:22:59.177
There's a lot of ambiguity[br]in human rights law.

0:22:59.177,0:23:01.479
Human rights law are[br]pretty much applies,

0:23:01.479,0:23:04.582
if countries make commitments[br]to protect the human rights

0:23:04.582,0:23:06.951
of people within their[br]boarders or their control,

0:23:06.951,0:23:10.188
I don't think we began to[br]understand or have any clarity

0:23:10.188,0:23:13.124
on how-- who's responsible[br]for human rights

0:23:13.124,0:23:15.159
where there's non-physical[br]action

0:23:15.159,0:23:17.061
such as electronic surveillance.

0:23:17.061,0:23:19.931
And they're not going to be[br]happy when they understand

0:23:19.931,0:23:21.933
that FISA and all[br]the conversations

0:23:21.933,0:23:25.837
in the United States about[br]safeguards and minimization are

0:23:25.837,0:23:28.840
to protect our rights but[br]have absolutely nothing

0:23:28.840,0:23:29.907
to do with them.

0:23:29.907,0:23:32.276
I don't think congress[br]is going to care.

0:23:32.276,0:23:34.712
But I think there's a[br]massive laws to respect

0:23:34.712,0:23:37.715
and when we're talking about[br]five zeta [inaudible] whatever

0:23:37.715,0:23:40.251
that is, a non-US[br]person data going

0:23:40.251,0:23:45.122
into a new Utah data center, I[br]think that the irony at the end

0:23:45.122,0:23:48.292
of the day will be that one

0:23:48.292,0:23:51.996
of the FISA permissible[br]activities is collecting

0:23:51.996,0:23:55.132
intelligence for foreign[br]affairs and foreign policy.

0:23:55.132,0:23:58.703
And I think at the end of[br]the day, we may see people

0:23:58.703,0:24:01.839
of the world uniting with[br]their governments around kinds

0:24:01.839,0:24:06.344
of restrictions and ring fencing[br]of the internet that will come

0:24:06.344,0:24:07.812
to both underlying rights

0:24:07.812,0:24:10.114
and undermine the[br]openness of the internet.

0:24:10.114,0:24:14.285
So, that is my anxious[br]persons guide to the--

0:24:14.285,0:24:15.920
to what's been happening.

0:24:15.920,0:24:17.655
>> Thank you Leslie.

0:24:17.655,0:24:19.190
Randy?

0:24:19.190,0:24:24.061
>> How many of you noticed[br]accounted how many surveillance

0:24:24.061,0:24:28.032
devices you've past[br]to get to this room?

0:24:28.032,0:24:33.804
Yeah. I just walked in from the[br]restaurant a couple blocks away.

0:24:33.804,0:24:40.845
I counted 22 surveillance style[br]devices just in the walk outside

0:24:40.845,0:24:44.448
of this building and there's[br]at least in this room right now

0:24:44.448,0:24:48.386
that not counting your[br]smart phones and all that.

0:24:48.386,0:24:50.555
I hope you all can find the six

0:24:50.555,0:24:53.524
because they're pretty[br]obvious as to what they are.

0:24:53.524,0:24:57.828
My point on all of this[br]is that as a practitioner,

0:24:57.828,0:24:59.964
I'm the Sisa for Virginia Tech.

0:24:59.964,0:25:04.168
My office is responsible for[br]monitoring and responding

0:25:04.168,0:25:06.537
to any attacks against[br]our network infrastructure

0:25:06.537,0:25:07.838
at Virginia Tech.

0:25:07.838,0:25:09.907
We have our main campus down[br]the Blacksburg, Virginia.

0:25:09.907,0:25:11.842
It's about four and a[br]half hours from here.

0:25:11.842,0:25:13.477
We have a Northern[br]Virginia campus right

0:25:13.477,0:25:15.513
across the river in Boylston.

0:25:15.513,0:25:17.882
And so my charge,[br]my office is charged

0:25:17.882,0:25:20.718
to monitor any attacks[br]from there.

0:25:20.718,0:25:23.888
Anybody who has ever managed[br]an internet infrastructure has

0:25:23.888,0:25:25.990
known since the very beginning

0:25:25.990,0:25:29.493
that the internet has never[br]been anonymous in the sense

0:25:29.493,0:25:31.329
of tracking a machine.

0:25:31.329,0:25:34.465
From day 1, we've[br]always been able to track

0:25:34.465,0:25:35.666
where our machine was.

0:25:35.666,0:25:38.903
We were not able to track[br]who is at the machine

0:25:38.903,0:25:41.005
with any reasonable[br]amount of accuracy

0:25:41.005,0:25:44.241
but we've always been able[br]to track where machines are.

0:25:44.241,0:25:47.845
The big thing was of course[br]data, storage capabilities.

0:25:47.845,0:25:50.414
We didn't have enough[br]data storage capabilities,

0:25:50.414,0:25:51.349
disk drives.

0:25:51.349,0:25:53.618
In 1992, when I've[br]got involved--

0:25:53.618,0:25:57.054
first involved with the computer[br]security stuff, you know,

0:25:57.054,0:25:59.557
we had a one gigabyte drive and[br]we thought that was, you know,

0:25:59.557,0:26:02.593
the entire disc storage[br]in the entire free world.

0:26:02.593,0:26:06.631
And, you know, nowadays, with[br]the huge disk forms that are

0:26:06.631,0:26:10.001
out there, that is allowing[br]this collection of data.

0:26:10.001,0:26:13.404
So, from our standpoint,[br]that's always been the case.

0:26:13.404,0:26:16.974
So, my challenge is,[br]you all let this happen.

0:26:16.974,0:26:21.379
You all let knew that this was[br]happening and you let it go on.

0:26:21.379,0:26:24.415
There is nothing new about the[br]prism stuff and all of these.

0:26:24.415,0:26:25.883
It's kind of ironic for people

0:26:25.883,0:26:28.719
in my world 'cause we all[br]sit back and we go, you know,

0:26:28.719,0:26:32.723
in 2010, the Washington[br]Posts, Dana Priest

0:26:32.723,0:26:35.292
and William Arkin wrote an[br]excellent series called Top

0:26:35.292,0:26:37.928
Secret America where[br]they're talking about all

0:26:37.928,0:26:39.563
of the built way companies

0:26:39.563,0:26:41.632
that are building the[br]surveillance technologies

0:26:41.632,0:26:44.602
that the federal government[br]and other entities are using.

0:26:44.602,0:26:47.471
All out there was an excellent[br]series on the newspaper

0:26:47.471,0:26:49.140
that I read it back then.

0:26:49.140,0:26:51.809
Newsweek came out in[br]2008 where they talked

0:26:51.809,0:26:55.546
about a whistle blower[br]who mentioned

0:26:55.546,0:26:59.784
about NSA's warrantless[br]wiretapping so to speak.

0:26:59.784,0:27:01.085
It was all out there.

0:27:01.085,0:27:03.754
If you go back and you look[br]through the press things,

0:27:03.754,0:27:07.291
there was always something[br]there and nobody reacted to it.

0:27:07.291,0:27:09.994
So, it's ironic from[br]my viewpoint

0:27:09.994,0:27:12.997
that everybody is having[br]this big flop about it now

0:27:12.997,0:27:15.900
because it's been there[br]and you let it happen.

0:27:15.900,0:27:19.937
So, my charge to you is don't[br]let it happen again, OK?

0:27:19.937,0:27:22.239
When you do read[br]about these things,

0:27:22.239,0:27:24.942
you need to influence your[br]legislatures about what's going

0:27:24.942,0:27:28.312
on 'cause they do not[br]understand the technology.

0:27:28.312,0:27:31.115
One quick example, in Virginia,

0:27:31.115,0:27:33.484
there's data bridge[br]notification laws

0:27:33.484,0:27:35.986
of social security is disclosed.

0:27:35.986,0:27:37.988
You know, somebody[br]gets a spreadsheet

0:27:37.988,0:27:40.224
and it explodes out there.

0:27:40.224,0:27:44.028
Yet I can go to a county[br]courthouse website and look

0:27:44.028,0:27:47.331
up public records deeds,[br]divorce decrees, whatever,

0:27:47.331,0:27:49.433
and what's on those documents.

0:27:49.433,0:27:52.169
Yet the kind of clerks can't[br]redact that information

0:27:52.169,0:27:55.072
because until recently,[br]the law forbid it, OK?

0:27:55.072,0:27:58.876
Everybody was in a rush for[br]eGovernment but never thought

0:27:58.876,0:28:01.712
about what's in those[br]documents that going there.

0:28:01.712,0:28:03.647
So, we need to be[br]able to influence

0:28:03.647,0:28:06.283
and educate the legislatures[br]who are--

0:28:06.283,0:28:08.285
who are building the policy.

0:28:08.285,0:28:10.254
So, this is the whole thing.

0:28:10.254,0:28:13.357
I'm a technologist and everybody[br]in here, the computer scientists

0:28:13.357,0:28:15.626
and all that, you all[br]learned in here with me.

0:28:15.626,0:28:17.561
We help build this[br]infrastructure.

0:28:17.561,0:28:21.165
We may have had a[br]misgiving where we thought

0:28:21.165,0:28:24.401
that as builders we could[br]control the people who use it.

0:28:24.401,0:28:26.737
But as, you know,[br]previous history shown

0:28:26.737,0:28:29.039
with the atom bomb development[br]and all these other things,

0:28:29.039,0:28:30.407
that's not always the case.

0:28:30.407,0:28:33.711
Builders do not control[br]the controllers.

0:28:33.711,0:28:35.045
That's my first point.

0:28:35.045,0:28:37.882
The second point is that, again,[br]you all have smart phones.

0:28:37.882,0:28:39.116
Actually I don't.

0:28:39.116,0:28:41.085
I have kind of a dumb phone[br]and people always laugh.

0:28:41.085,0:28:43.721
They go, "You know,[br]you're a technologist,"

0:28:43.721,0:28:46.490
and I just have a little,[br]you know, Samsung Integrity

0:28:46.490,0:28:48.058
with the nice little[br]flippy thing.

0:28:48.058,0:28:50.127
And I said, "Because the[br]guys in my lab have busted

0:28:50.127,0:28:51.228
into the smart phones

0:28:51.228,0:28:53.597
and tracked everybody[br]all over the place."

0:28:53.597,0:28:54.999
But actually the reason[br]why I don't this is

0:28:54.999,0:28:58.269
because the battery life is not[br]long enough for my taste, OK?

0:28:58.269,0:29:00.971
But a great quote, Lyn Paramore[br][assumed spelling] wrote a great

0:29:00.971,0:29:04.942
article and in there quoted[br]things that are supposed

0:29:04.942,0:29:06.610
to make our lives easier.

0:29:06.610,0:29:10.581
"Smartphones, Gmails,[br]Skype, GPS, Facebook,

0:29:10.581,0:29:13.884
they have become[br]tools to track us.

0:29:13.884,0:29:17.254
And we've been happily[br]shopping for the bars

0:29:17.254,0:29:22.259
to our own prison one prison at[br]a time, one product at a time."

0:29:22.259,0:29:25.362
So, we're in the-- we're[br]to blame for all of this.

0:29:25.362,0:29:27.364
We are allowing that to happen.

0:29:27.364,0:29:28.599
The last thing I want to talk

0:29:28.599,0:29:30.935
about is this Federal[br]word play thing.

0:29:30.935,0:29:32.970
Whenever I confront a student

0:29:32.970,0:29:36.874
or a professor whose been[br]violating a university policy,

0:29:36.874,0:29:38.642
you let something[br]go out on the net.

0:29:38.642,0:29:39.977
And I go. "Why did you do that?"

0:29:39.977,0:29:42.746
And it's kind of like watching,[br]you know, a six-year-old.

0:29:42.746,0:29:46.016
"I don't know, you know, it[br]wasn't my fault," you know.

0:29:46.016,0:29:47.084
That type of stuff.

0:29:47.084,0:29:50.354
And you get this[br]word play, you know.

0:29:50.354,0:29:52.957
Richard Pryor, a long time[br]ago had an excellent thing

0:29:52.957,0:29:56.827
when his son broke something[br]and he asked his son happened.

0:29:56.827,0:29:59.530
And all the word play that his[br]son came out with, you know,

0:29:59.530,0:30:01.165
"Some invisible man came[br]out and broke the thing."

0:30:01.165,0:30:04.001
That's what we're seeing now.

0:30:04.001,0:30:06.770
We're seeing this when they[br]say we're not collecting data

0:30:06.770,0:30:08.172
on you.

0:30:08.172,0:30:10.174
Well, OK, your not collecting it[br]technically but you're buying it

0:30:10.174,0:30:12.509
from people who are[br]collecting it from us.

0:30:12.509,0:30:15.045
So, that's-- that's[br]one thing there.

0:30:15.045,0:30:18.349
The network companies that say,[br]you know, the data providers,

0:30:18.349,0:30:21.218
the Verizons, the Googles,[br]they say, "Hey, you know,

0:30:21.218,0:30:23.621
we're not willingly giving it[br]to the federal government."

0:30:23.621,0:30:24.688
Well, of course not.

0:30:24.688,0:30:26.190
You're being subpoenaed[br]for the document.

0:30:26.190,0:30:29.126
You're not giving it[br]willingly to the-- to there.

0:30:29.126,0:30:32.696
You know, Zack Holman[br]wrote a great little tweet.

0:30:32.696,0:30:36.300
It says, "We don't give[br]direct database access

0:30:36.300,0:30:38.035
to government agencies."

0:30:38.035,0:30:43.607
That quote has become the[br]new "I didn't inhale," OK?

0:30:43.607,0:30:45.609
And so the key word is direct.

0:30:45.609,0:30:48.946
Marketers are being collecting[br]information on us all the time.

0:30:48.946,0:30:50.881
And, in fact, that was[br]one of the big things

0:30:50.881,0:30:52.316
that helped us with 9/11.

0:30:52.316,0:30:54.518
On a positive side,[br]that did help us

0:30:54.518,0:30:57.955
in 9/11 identify the hijackers[br]when the marketing companies

0:30:57.955,0:31:00.758
and the credit card companies[br]realized that they could help

0:31:00.758,0:31:02.593
because they had that data.

0:31:02.593,0:31:07.765
So, we need to be sure that[br]things are done correctly.

0:31:07.765,0:31:09.934
Everybody says we're[br]doing it legally.

0:31:09.934,0:31:10.868
And that's correct.

0:31:10.868,0:31:13.003
The laws stated they can do it.

0:31:13.003,0:31:16.040
It's the creation of[br]that law that's the flaw.

0:31:16.040,0:31:20.844
And that's my surveillance guide[br]telling me it's time to quit.

0:31:20.844,0:31:22.413
Those are my points.

0:31:22.413,0:31:23.314
>> Thanks, Randy.

0:31:23.314,0:31:24.348
Melissa?

0:31:24.348,0:31:25.349
>> Thank you.

0:31:25.349,0:31:29.887
Well, I think it's[br]important to look

0:31:29.887,0:31:34.058
to our past to inform[br]our future.

0:31:34.058,0:31:36.226
And I'm going to take a[br]little bit different direction

0:31:36.226,0:31:38.095
than my colleagues.

0:31:38.095,0:31:41.198
The very first transmission of[br]the internet was October 29th,

0:31:41.198,0:31:44.568
1969 and it was an e-mail[br]between two universities.

0:31:44.568,0:31:50.341
And today we have more than 204[br]e-mails are sent per minute.

0:31:50.341,0:31:53.410
More than 1,300 new mobile[br]users are added per minute

0:31:53.410,0:31:56.480
to the internet, 47,000[br]applications are downloaded,

0:31:56.480,0:32:01.552
100,000 tweets, 1.3 million[br]videos are uploaded to YouTube,

0:32:01.552,0:32:04.722
two million searches to Google,[br]and six million Facebook views.

0:32:04.722,0:32:08.092
The internet is part of[br]every part of our life

0:32:08.092,0:32:11.895
and over the last[br]45 almost years,

0:32:11.895,0:32:16.567
we have embedded the internet[br]in every part of our society.

0:32:16.567,0:32:20.838
And it is the backbone of our[br]core infrastructure of every--

0:32:20.838,0:32:23.874
every country's core[br]infrastructure.

0:32:23.874,0:32:29.480
It represents e-government,[br]e-banking, e-health, e-learning,

0:32:29.480,0:32:31.548
the next generation of[br]air traffic control,

0:32:31.548,0:32:34.084
the next generation[br]of power grids

0:32:34.084,0:32:37.421
and every other essential[br]service has been concentrated

0:32:37.421,0:32:40.724
onto one infrastructure,[br]the internet.

0:32:40.724,0:32:43.260
And that is putting[br]our businesses

0:32:43.260,0:32:45.796
and our national[br]security at risk.

0:32:45.796,0:32:48.699
And I-- when I speak about[br]our, I'm really speaking

0:32:48.699,0:32:50.067
in as a global citizen.

0:32:50.067,0:32:52.369
If I were in France I would be[br]speaking about it in France.

0:32:52.369,0:32:55.305
If I were Iran or[br]Israel, it's the same way.

0:32:55.305,0:32:58.375
And so I think that[br]that has really began

0:32:58.375,0:33:00.411
to change the conversation

0:33:00.411,0:33:03.647
that we can't have any one[br]single point of failure,

0:33:03.647,0:33:07.518
economic failure and/or national[br]security failure to any one

0:33:07.518,0:33:11.188
of our-- of our core[br]businesses or infrastructures.

0:33:11.188,0:33:13.757
And so when we're talking about[br]cyber security and we're talking

0:33:13.757,0:33:17.061
about different government[br]actions and we wrap it all

0:33:17.061,0:33:20.297
into one conversation, I ask[br]you to start to think about it

0:33:20.297,0:33:22.533
as multiple conversations.

0:33:22.533,0:33:25.702
And it's not helpful[br]to bundle into one term

0:33:25.702,0:33:28.338
of cyber security[br]and/or surveillance.

0:33:28.338,0:33:30.974
So, I'd you to-- I'd like[br]you to think about it

0:33:30.974,0:33:33.610
in six different ways[br]of why our governments

0:33:33.610,0:33:37.414
and why our industry are[br]talking past each other.

0:33:37.414,0:33:40.150
The first is is when we're[br]talking about cyber security,

0:33:40.150,0:33:42.853
we're sometimes talking[br]about political activism.

0:33:42.853,0:33:46.590
Those who would like to bring[br]transparency to policies

0:33:46.590,0:33:49.827
and to our initiatives[br]that they don't agree with.

0:33:49.827,0:33:53.764
In the United States, one could[br]say that that was WikiLeaks

0:33:53.764,0:33:56.934
that brought about a great[br]amount of transparency

0:33:56.934,0:34:00.070
to US policies as they[br]leaked our information

0:34:00.070,0:34:01.371
into the internet.

0:34:01.371,0:34:04.475
All right, one could argue[br]that that was also Snowden.

0:34:04.475,0:34:08.078
But in other countries[br]political activism is being used

0:34:08.078,0:34:13.050
by Twitter, using Twitter and/or[br]Facebook to organize people

0:34:13.050,0:34:18.088
in these squares like Taksim[br]and/or in Turkey or Egypt

0:34:18.088,0:34:21.658
to express political[br]discontent with their government

0:34:21.658,0:34:24.428
with the intent to[br]overthrow the government.

0:34:24.428,0:34:26.063
Political instability.

0:34:26.063,0:34:27.831
And so when our governments[br]are starting to talk

0:34:27.831,0:34:31.467
about surveillance on the[br]internet and/or filtering

0:34:31.467,0:34:35.539
of the internet, some believe in[br]political democracy and freedom

0:34:35.539,0:34:37.741
of that speech on the[br]internet and others do not.

0:34:37.741,0:34:40.577
And it has different[br]mechanisms of how they're using

0:34:40.577,0:34:42.713
that surveillance[br]or the technology

0:34:42.713,0:34:44.915
around political activism.

0:34:44.915,0:34:47.851
Now that should not be[br]confused with organized crime

0:34:47.851,0:34:51.388
on the internet, the real modern[br]day bank robber who's stealing

0:34:51.388,0:34:54.224
ones and zeros which[br]is real dollars

0:34:54.224,0:34:57.995
out of your credit accounts[br]or out of your real banks,

0:34:57.995,0:35:01.031
and as being passed on as[br]a cost for our citizens.

0:35:01.031,0:35:02.833
We have many of our[br]governments who are talking

0:35:02.833,0:35:04.701
about the importance[br]of organized crime.

0:35:04.701,0:35:06.937
When I was just in Europe[br]just a few weeks ago,

0:35:06.937,0:35:09.072
it was 30 million dollars stolen

0:35:09.072,0:35:12.276
out of 45 different[br]cities in 30 minutes.

0:35:12.276,0:35:14.144
That's a real problem[br]for our banks.

0:35:14.144,0:35:16.180
It's a real problem[br]for our credit cards.

0:35:16.180,0:35:18.715
And we're having to deal[br]with that organized crime

0:35:18.715,0:35:20.751
and real theft of[br]ones and zeroes.

0:35:20.751,0:35:24.721
Now that should not be confused[br]with intellectual property theft

0:35:24.721,0:35:26.757
and industrial espionage.

0:35:26.757,0:35:28.392
That's very different.

0:35:28.392,0:35:30.827
And many of our government[br]leaders in the United States

0:35:30.827,0:35:33.697
and many government leaders[br]in Europe are talking

0:35:33.697,0:35:36.967
about the unprecedented theft[br]of intellectual property.

0:35:36.967,0:35:40.070
Thefts, meaning,[br]illegally copying the plans,

0:35:40.070,0:35:43.574
processes and/or next[br]generation technologies

0:35:43.574,0:35:47.044
out of our corporations[br]for the economic advance

0:35:47.044,0:35:50.147
of their companies[br]and/or countries.

0:35:50.147,0:35:54.051
And so the intellectual property[br]theft is then not the same

0:35:54.051,0:35:55.619
as espionage.

0:35:55.619,0:35:58.355
And there are governments[br]that are conducting espionage.

0:35:58.355,0:36:01.391
Most governments do to steal[br]the plans and intentions

0:36:01.391,0:36:05.229
of other governments and[br]know their capabilities.

0:36:05.229,0:36:07.431
In the United States, we[br]sort of bundled the two,

0:36:07.431,0:36:11.268
IP theft and espionage.

0:36:11.268,0:36:13.604
When were talking about it, in[br]fact, we're talking about it

0:36:13.604,0:36:19.409
as Pearl Harbor and other[br]very exaggerated terms.

0:36:19.409,0:36:21.578
If we are going to bundle[br]intellectual property theft

0:36:21.578,0:36:24.414
with espionage then we have[br]to be willing to put espionage

0:36:24.414,0:36:26.650
that we would walk from[br]it as a government.

0:36:26.650,0:36:28.252
And I don't see any[br]government willing

0:36:28.252,0:36:29.653
to walk away from espionage.

0:36:29.653,0:36:31.922
So, why don't we talk about[br]what's really the problem

0:36:31.922,0:36:35.025
and that's intellectual property[br]theft and/or the protection

0:36:35.025,0:36:37.828
of intellectual property[br]and patents, et cetera.

0:36:37.828,0:36:41.431
There are two other areas that[br]are becoming more concerning

0:36:41.431,0:36:45.736
for most companies and[br]countries that are--

0:36:45.736,0:36:47.404
the first is disruption[br]of service.

0:36:47.404,0:36:50.274
And this is the distributed[br]denial-of-services actually

0:36:50.274,0:36:53.076
degrading real services[br]in your e-banking

0:36:53.076,0:36:56.913
and your e-infrastructures[br]that are preventing our banks

0:36:56.913,0:37:00.350
from allowing you to actually[br]access those infrastructures

0:37:00.350,0:37:01.918
and/or capabilities.

0:37:01.918,0:37:03.754
And we just had a--[br]and a significant,

0:37:03.754,0:37:04.888
in the United States,

0:37:04.888,0:37:06.723
we're having a distributed[br]denial-of-service

0:37:06.723,0:37:08.158
against our financial[br]institutions

0:37:08.158,0:37:10.894
and so are many others[br]in Asia and Europe.

0:37:10.894,0:37:13.730
And then finally the[br]destruction of property.

0:37:13.730,0:37:16.700
There was just recently a[br]malware that was released

0:37:16.700,0:37:18.635
against Saudi ARamCo

0:37:18.635,0:37:21.872
which destroyed 30,000[br]of their computers.

0:37:21.872,0:37:24.174
And when we start to actually[br]think about destruction

0:37:24.174,0:37:26.877
of property and how one[br]might recover from that

0:37:26.877,0:37:29.913
that is a different set of[br]capabilities than you would deal

0:37:29.913,0:37:33.583
with from organized crime[br]and/or political activism.

0:37:33.583,0:37:36.453
So, as we talk about this[br]on our panel over the course

0:37:36.453,0:37:38.722
of the next hour, I ask[br]you to start to think

0:37:38.722,0:37:40.524
about which problem[br]are you talking

0:37:40.524,0:37:43.493
about because we're not[br]talking about the same thing

0:37:43.493,0:37:45.862
in each of our conversations.

0:37:45.862,0:37:48.365
I'd like to wrap up and that

0:37:48.365,0:37:51.134
over 100 countries have[br]these capabilities,

0:37:51.134,0:37:53.136
and they are using these[br]capabilities to deal

0:37:53.136,0:37:56.306
with these different problems[br]whether it's political activism

0:37:56.306,0:37:59.076
to overthrow government[br]or its political activism

0:37:59.076,0:38:01.211
to bring transparency[br]to policies they don't

0:38:01.211,0:38:03.613
like is different[br]than organized crime

0:38:03.613,0:38:05.749
or intellectual property theft.

0:38:05.749,0:38:07.684
And there are three strategic[br]things that are happening

0:38:07.684,0:38:09.920
in the global order of things.

0:38:09.920,0:38:14.524
First, some are using disruptive[br]technology like a Stuxnet

0:38:14.524,0:38:17.394
or a Shamoon to bring[br]down core infrastructures

0:38:17.394,0:38:20.097
or core businesses[br]around the world

0:38:20.097,0:38:24.234
or some are implementing[br]surveillance tools to bring

0:38:24.234,0:38:27.938
about transparency or to[br]show the vulnerabilities

0:38:27.938,0:38:29.740
for those infrastructures[br]to be brought down.

0:38:29.740,0:38:32.109
So, disruptive technologies[br]are being used.

0:38:32.109,0:38:35.412
Second, strategic alliances[br]are also being wielded

0:38:35.412,0:38:39.383
to actually gather that power[br]and control over the internet.

0:38:39.383,0:38:43.987
And that's playing out in[br]the UN and the ITU and NATO

0:38:43.987,0:38:47.023
and ACION [assumed spelling][br]and other of the forum

0:38:47.023,0:38:48.959
where countries can[br]align against each other

0:38:48.959,0:38:50.160
for particular motives.

0:38:50.160,0:38:53.397
And then finally there[br]are strategic properties.

0:38:53.397,0:38:56.767
And I mean that in the[br]very sense of it is.

0:38:56.767,0:38:58.902
There are 25 internet[br]service providers

0:38:58.902,0:38:59.970
that control 90 percent

0:38:59.970,0:39:02.272
of information flow[br]on the internet.

0:39:02.272,0:39:03.974
There are internet[br]exchange points

0:39:03.974,0:39:08.345
that actually control the[br]flow of technology and/or ones

0:39:08.345,0:39:12.182
and zeroes from continent to[br]continent or within a continent.

0:39:12.182,0:39:14.451
And there are data aggregators

0:39:14.451,0:39:17.654
who have actually more[br]information on us like a Google

0:39:17.654,0:39:20.190
or a Facebook than any[br]foreign intelligence service

0:39:20.190,0:39:21.491
of any other country.

0:39:21.491,0:39:22.559
So, you have to think

0:39:22.559,0:39:24.361
about where are the[br]strategic properties

0:39:24.361,0:39:25.495
and how they're being used

0:39:25.495,0:39:28.465
by all governments not[br]just by one government.

0:39:28.465,0:39:30.033
Thank you.

0:39:30.033,0:39:34.738
>> Thank you, Melissa.

0:39:34.738,0:39:35.539
Laura?

0:39:35.539,0:39:36.840
>> Good afternoon everyone.

0:39:36.840,0:39:38.175
I'm very delighted to be here.

0:39:38.175,0:39:40.544
And I wish to thank the Internet[br]Society for the invitation

0:39:40.544,0:39:43.013
and for GW for hosting[br]it as well.

0:39:43.013,0:39:46.750
I view PRISM as an[br]opportunity to draw attention

0:39:46.750,0:39:50.420
to the implications of broader[br]global internet governance

0:39:50.420,0:39:52.989
conflicts that have[br]implications for economic

0:39:52.989,0:39:54.624
and expressive liberty.

0:39:54.624,0:39:59.563
I recently-- recently the[br]last two or three years spent

0:39:59.563,0:40:01.064
that time researching

0:40:01.064,0:40:03.266
and writing a new book[br]called the Global War

0:40:03.266,0:40:04.434
for Internet Governance.

0:40:04.434,0:40:06.536
And it's going to be[br]published later this year

0:40:06.536,0:40:08.305
by Yale University Press.

0:40:08.305,0:40:11.708
Now in this book, there are[br]approximately four pages

0:40:11.708,0:40:13.777
at the end of acronyms.

0:40:13.777,0:40:16.413
So, what I've done is I've[br]challenged myself today

0:40:16.413,0:40:17.881
to not use any acronyms.

0:40:17.881,0:40:20.851
So, what I would like to ask you[br]to do is to pound on the table

0:40:20.851,0:40:23.787
if I use an internet governance[br]acronyms, so pay attention

0:40:23.787,0:40:27.190
to that, and I know some[br]of you will do that.

0:40:27.190,0:40:28.458
But what I tried to do

0:40:28.458,0:40:31.161
in the book is describe[br]the various layers

0:40:31.161,0:40:34.764
of how the internet is[br]already governed and what some

0:40:34.764,0:40:38.001
of the current debates are that[br]I expect to shape the future

0:40:38.001,0:40:40.837
of freedom and innovation[br]in the coming years.

0:40:40.837,0:40:42.839
Now what is internet governance?

0:40:42.839,0:40:44.374
This panel has already[br]described it.

0:40:44.374,0:40:45.942
If I had to give one definition,

0:40:45.942,0:40:51.248
I would say internet governance[br]is the design and administration

0:40:51.248,0:40:52.782
of the technologies[br]that are necessary

0:40:52.782,0:40:55.819
to keep the internet operational[br]and then the enactment

0:40:55.819,0:40:58.855
of substantive policy[br]around those technologies.

0:40:58.855,0:41:02.425
But there is no single system[br]of internet governance.

0:41:02.425,0:41:05.195
John said it best when he was[br]describing the various roles,

0:41:05.195,0:41:07.330
names and numbers,[br]administration,

0:41:07.330,0:41:11.067
standard setting, private[br]interconnection, arrangements

0:41:11.067,0:41:14.304
between telecommunication[br]companies, the privacy policies

0:41:14.304,0:41:17.073
that are enacted by social[br]media, by search engines

0:41:17.073,0:41:19.209
and other information[br]intermediaries.

0:41:19.209,0:41:22.979
And, of course, cyber security[br]governance not necessarily

0:41:22.979,0:41:25.215
enacted by governments[br]but by entities

0:41:25.215,0:41:27.617
such as certificate[br]authorities that are handing

0:41:27.617,0:41:29.853
out digital signatures[br]and things like that.

0:41:29.853,0:41:31.621
So, those are just[br]a few examples.

0:41:31.621,0:41:35.025
So, we need to take this[br]conversation outside

0:41:35.025,0:41:38.194
of discussions about[br]just governance.

0:41:38.194,0:41:41.431
However, one of themes that[br]I do take up in the book

0:41:41.431,0:41:43.567
and in my work in general is

0:41:43.567,0:41:47.671
that internet governance[br]conflicts are the new spaces

0:41:47.671,0:41:52.075
where political and economic[br]power is working itself

0:41:52.075,0:41:54.044
out in the 21st century.

0:41:54.044,0:41:57.380
We see this with PRISM,[br]we see this with Stuxnet,

0:41:57.380,0:42:00.083
we see this with the[br]turn to intellectual--

0:42:00.083,0:42:01.251
to infrastructure

0:42:01.251,0:42:03.653
for intellectual property[br]rights enforcement,

0:42:03.653,0:42:07.223
with governments cutting off[br]access during political turmoil.

0:42:07.223,0:42:08.625
And as Mellissa said,

0:42:08.625,0:42:10.894
we had denial-of-service[br]attacks often used

0:42:10.894,0:42:13.630
to suppress human[br]rights and expression.

0:42:13.630,0:42:17.567
So, internet governance points[br]of control are really not just

0:42:17.567,0:42:19.736
about keeping the internet[br]operational although

0:42:19.736,0:42:21.771
that is absolutely vital.

0:42:21.771,0:42:25.742
But there are also a proxy[br]for broader political

0:42:25.742,0:42:27.344
and economic conflicts.

0:42:27.344,0:42:29.813
So, the fact that PRISM[br]draws attention to some

0:42:29.813,0:42:33.783
of these broader global[br]internet governance issues is

0:42:33.783,0:42:35.485
an opportunity.

0:42:35.485,0:42:39.356
But keep in mind that government[br]surveillance ad censorship

0:42:39.356,0:42:43.126
for that matter which is in my[br]opinion an even greater problem

0:42:43.126,0:42:46.663
around the world[br]is not something

0:42:46.663,0:42:48.765
that happens in a vacuum.

0:42:48.765,0:42:51.334
So, it's delegated and[br]it is made possible

0:42:51.334,0:42:54.971
by certain arrangements[br]of technical architecture

0:42:54.971,0:42:57.207
and by private ordering.

0:42:57.207,0:43:01.411
So, infrastructure governance[br]just to give you a few examples,

0:43:01.411,0:43:06.449
infrastructure governance is[br]directly tied to privacy issues.

0:43:06.449,0:43:09.052
So, I have an information[br]engineering background.

0:43:09.052,0:43:11.554
I am also a social scientist[br]who studies the politics

0:43:11.554,0:43:13.156
of technical architecture.

0:43:13.156,0:43:15.792
And I can say that, you[br]know, you probably could say

0:43:15.792,0:43:17.160
to use a Harry Potter analogy.

0:43:17.160,0:43:20.230
There are some dark arts[br]of internet governance

0:43:20.230,0:43:25.068
that have a good intention but[br]they can be used for other uses.

0:43:25.068,0:43:27.604
So, one of these, for example,[br]is the deep packet inspection.

0:43:27.604,0:43:30.440
I didn't use the acronym[br]so no pounding on the table

0:43:30.440,0:43:34.244
which is a capability that[br]allows network providers

0:43:34.244,0:43:37.580
to inspect the actual[br]content of packets sent

0:43:37.580,0:43:40.250
over the internet rather[br]than just the packet headers.

0:43:40.250,0:43:42.152
So, this can be used[br]for a variety

0:43:42.152,0:43:46.623
of very important function[br]such as network management,

0:43:46.623,0:43:48.658
detecting viruses and worms.

0:43:48.658,0:43:51.094
It could also be used for[br]customized advertising,

0:43:51.094,0:43:53.163
now getting outside of[br]the operational role,

0:43:53.163,0:43:55.799
or for surveillances[br]or for throttling

0:43:55.799,0:43:57.333
and blocking of traffic.

0:43:57.333,0:44:01.404
So, this is a very significant[br]development made possible only

0:44:01.404,0:44:04.207
by advances and processing[br]power and storage.

0:44:04.207,0:44:06.676
And we need transparency[br]and accountability

0:44:06.676,0:44:08.712
in issues like this as well.

0:44:08.712,0:44:11.648
So, another area of[br]infrastructure related

0:44:11.648,0:44:15.585
to privacy is the hidden[br]identity infrastructure

0:44:15.585,0:44:18.755
that makes possible business[br]models that are based

0:44:18.755,0:44:20.390
on online advertising.

0:44:20.390,0:44:22.992
So, this is a good thing[br]for freedom of expression

0:44:22.992,0:44:26.463
because there are free products[br]that we are able to use,

0:44:26.463,0:44:29.299
but we are almost at the[br]point where the prospect

0:44:29.299,0:44:33.470
for anonymous speech considering[br]this identity infrastructure is

0:44:33.470,0:44:35.305
almost impossible.

0:44:35.305,0:44:38.475
We have technical identifiers[br]at the level of hardware

0:44:38.475,0:44:40.410
like Ethernet cards at the level

0:44:40.410,0:44:45.014
of virtual identifiers[br]locationally via cellphone

0:44:45.014,0:44:50.653
location, wireless fidelity[br]AKA wifi, it's my one acronym

0:44:50.653,0:44:53.456
or global positioning[br]system and through things

0:44:53.456,0:44:56.526
like platform mediation and real[br]identification requirements.

0:44:56.526,0:44:59.763
So, if you put this all[br]together, this is at the heart

0:44:59.763,0:45:03.299
of business models that[br]we need at the heart

0:45:03.299,0:45:07.403
of online advertising, at the[br]heart of having free software.

0:45:07.403,0:45:10.607
But it also is the[br]technical capability

0:45:10.607,0:45:12.942
that can enable new[br]form, even newer forms

0:45:12.942,0:45:15.111
of surveillance in the future.

0:45:15.111,0:45:18.481
So, these are new[br]opportunities for surveillance.

0:45:18.481,0:45:21.618
Two other infrastructure issues[br]I'll mention I'll mention

0:45:21.618,0:45:26.389
quickly include a current[br]rethinking and redesign of the

0:45:26.389,0:45:28.892
"who is" protocol[br]which keeps track

0:45:28.892,0:45:32.929
of who is registering a[br]domain name and, of course,

0:45:32.929,0:45:35.565
also the issue as has[br]already been mentioned

0:45:35.565,0:45:37.534
of internet exchange points.

0:45:37.534,0:45:40.203
How these are governed and[br]how they are distributed

0:45:40.203,0:45:42.172
around the world is something

0:45:42.172,0:45:44.073
that is very related[br]to civil liberties.

0:45:44.073,0:45:47.911
The Internet Society and we'll[br]hear from next has really been

0:45:47.911,0:45:50.079
at the forefront of[br]this area which--

0:45:50.079,0:45:52.215
having more internet[br]exchange points,

0:45:52.215,0:45:54.717
looking at the criticality[br]of them for human rights

0:45:54.717,0:45:56.452
for infrastructure development

0:45:56.452,0:45:59.923
and as concentrated points[br]of information flows.

0:45:59.923,0:46:04.060
So, the truth is that global[br]internet choke points,

0:46:04.060,0:46:05.295
of course, exist.

0:46:05.295,0:46:08.898
And the internet is governed[br]not by any one entity

0:46:08.898,0:46:11.701
but multi-stakeholder governance[br]which I'm sure we will take

0:46:11.701,0:46:13.970
up in the roundtable later.

0:46:13.970,0:46:17.774
But that this governance[br]is not fixed anymore

0:46:17.774,0:46:19.909
than architecture is fixed.

0:46:19.909,0:46:22.345
So, the architecture[br]is constantly changing

0:46:22.345,0:46:25.615
and the governance is[br]constantly changing as well.

0:46:25.615,0:46:27.884
The basic theoretical[br]or conceptual framework

0:46:27.884,0:46:30.119
of my own work is[br]that arrangements

0:46:30.119,0:46:34.190
of technical architecture are[br]also arrangements of power.

0:46:34.190,0:46:38.094
So, it's critical for the public[br]to be engaged in these debates

0:46:38.094,0:46:40.029
because the future of[br]internet architecture

0:46:40.029,0:46:42.632
and governance is[br]directly related

0:46:42.632,0:46:44.033
to the future of[br]internet freedom.

0:46:44.033,0:46:46.936
So, I appreciate the opportunity[br]to discuss that here today.

0:46:46.936,0:46:49.172
Thank you very much[br]for listening.

0:46:49.172,0:46:50.139
>> Thank you, Laura.

0:46:50.139,0:46:52.542
Lynn?

0:46:52.542,0:46:53.576
>> Good afternoon.

0:46:53.576,0:46:55.745
This has been a very[br]comprehensive set

0:46:55.745,0:46:59.048
of speaking points, I[br]have to say to date.

0:46:59.048,0:47:02.285
So, the Internet Society is[br]a cause-based organization.

0:47:02.285,0:47:05.154
We advocate for an[br]open global internet.

0:47:05.154,0:47:06.656
In the recent revelations

0:47:06.656,0:47:08.892
about the mass scale[br]interceptions not only

0:47:08.892,0:47:12.128
by the US, the UK, but[br]many, many other countries

0:47:12.128,0:47:14.631
around the world have[br]serious implications

0:47:14.631,0:47:17.533
for the open global internet.

0:47:17.533,0:47:19.769
ISOC is an international[br]organization.

0:47:19.769,0:47:22.071
We have members, org[br]members and chapters

0:47:22.071,0:47:23.606
in virtually every country

0:47:23.606,0:47:26.809
of the world perhaps even[br]every country of the world.

0:47:26.809,0:47:30.914
We have headquarters in[br]just outside of D.C. here

0:47:30.914,0:47:33.650
in Western Virginia and[br]Geneva, Switzerland.

0:47:33.650,0:47:38.788
And we have a very senior policy[br]and technical staff in little

0:47:38.788,0:47:41.024
over 20 countries of[br]the world often times

0:47:41.024,0:47:43.393
in the same individual[br]which is more

0:47:43.393,0:47:45.595
and more the future in any case.

0:47:45.595,0:47:48.364
I spent 27 years in[br]Europe, just moved back

0:47:48.364,0:47:50.466
to the US a little[br]over a year ago.

0:47:50.466,0:47:52.568
And the one thing I'd really[br]like to do is to make sure

0:47:52.568,0:47:55.738
that here in D.C., in[br]this country's capital

0:47:55.738,0:47:58.408
that we recognize that this[br]is not just about US citizens

0:47:58.408,0:48:01.010
and it's not just[br]about the foreigners

0:48:01.010,0:48:03.780
that the US is surveilling.

0:48:03.780,0:48:06.749
This affects every[br]individual in the world.

0:48:06.749,0:48:09.585
It affects some of[br]them very directly

0:48:09.585,0:48:12.088
but it will affect the[br]internet we all have access

0:48:12.088,0:48:17.393
to going forward to tomorrow[br]and to generations to come.

0:48:17.393,0:48:21.764
If we are not careful, we will[br]actually rob both individuals

0:48:21.764,0:48:24.834
today, tomorrow and future[br]generations of all the freedom

0:48:24.834,0:48:26.736
and the benefit and[br]the innovation

0:48:26.736,0:48:29.639
that the internet has brought.

0:48:29.639,0:48:32.809
The Internet Society actually[br]deals an awful lot in principles

0:48:32.809,0:48:36.112
and the principles that make the[br]internet what the internet is.

0:48:36.112,0:48:38.381
First and foremost,[br]it's a platform.

0:48:38.381,0:48:43.019
It allows everybody to go out[br]and develop what they choose to,

0:48:43.019,0:48:46.656
to access what they choose to,[br]to innovate on material that's

0:48:46.656,0:48:49.192
out there and make[br]that available.

0:48:49.192,0:48:54.230
If we're not careful,[br]we'll loose all of that.

0:48:54.230,0:48:57.133
So, the-- in particular[br]recently,

0:48:57.133,0:48:59.902
the unwarded collection[br]storage and the ease

0:48:59.902,0:49:02.472
of correlation amongst all[br]the data that's collected.

0:49:02.472,0:49:04.841
And I actually don't[br]differentiate a lot

0:49:04.841,0:49:07.710
between metadata and content.

0:49:07.710,0:49:10.079
You can get so much[br]information from metadata

0:49:10.079,0:49:11.681
that we shouldn't kid[br]ourselves by saying,

0:49:11.681,0:49:15.418
"It's just metadata we're[br]collecting, it's OK."

0:49:15.418,0:49:19.789
That-- though the collection[br]that will undermine many

0:49:19.789,0:49:21.724
of the key principles[br]and relationships.

0:49:21.724,0:49:26.996
And in particular some of those[br]natural conclusions will start

0:49:26.996,0:49:28.598
to impact the physical[br]infrastructure

0:49:28.598,0:49:32.435
of the internet itself whether[br]it's using some of the IXPs

0:49:32.435,0:49:34.337
as choke points or[br]whether it's using some

0:49:34.337,0:49:36.372
of the technical[br]capabilities that exist

0:49:36.372,0:49:38.708
to help with surveillance.

0:49:38.708,0:49:42.111
Those are all things[br]we want to I think--

0:49:42.111,0:49:44.614
think through very,[br]very carefully.

0:49:44.614,0:49:46.115
One of the principles we argue

0:49:46.115,0:49:48.351
for is multistakeholder[br]dialogue.

0:49:48.351,0:49:51.120
And it's because so much of what[br]we're all facing whether it's

0:49:51.120,0:49:52.688
in a policy or a technical

0:49:52.688,0:49:55.024
or a social environment[br]has never been done

0:49:55.024,0:49:56.426
in the world before.

0:49:56.426,0:49:59.328
We're breaking barriers[br]every single day and we need

0:49:59.328,0:50:01.864
to bring everybody to the[br]table for a discussion

0:50:01.864,0:50:03.232
and move forward[br]thoughtfully and carefully.

0:50:03.232,0:50:09.839
That is even more so when we[br]look to governments particularly

0:50:09.839,0:50:12.909
in their role in[br]protecting citizens.

0:50:12.909,0:50:16.646
We believe that the internet[br]must be a channel for secure,

0:50:16.646,0:50:19.215
reliable, private communication

0:50:19.215,0:50:21.651
between entities[br]and individuals.

0:50:21.651,0:50:26.155
And surveillance without due[br]process is simply unacceptable.

0:50:26.155,0:50:29.859
And as some other articles[br]have said recently, frankly,

0:50:29.859,0:50:31.360
it's very creepy as well.

0:50:31.360,0:50:33.629
And if that makes it more[br]personal, this is good

0:50:33.629,0:50:38.601
because we need everybody to[br]care about what's happening now.

0:50:38.601,0:50:40.303
We also challenge the[br]view that policies

0:50:40.303,0:50:41.771
to ensure security[br]must always come

0:50:41.771,0:50:44.307
at the cost of user's rights.

0:50:44.307,0:50:47.210
I'd also argue with the fact[br]that we all know it was coming

0:50:47.210,0:50:49.445
so what are we concerned about?

0:50:49.445,0:50:50.980
Due process wasn't followed.

0:50:50.980,0:50:52.548
That's what were[br]concerned about.

0:50:52.548,0:50:54.050
Did most people that[br]pay attention

0:50:54.050,0:50:56.619
to this field understand that[br]you could do all these sorts

0:50:56.619,0:50:57.820
of things with the data?

0:50:57.820,0:51:01.057
Yes. Did we believe our[br]governments were doing it

0:51:01.057,0:51:03.759
without due process[br]and certainly

0:51:03.759,0:51:07.597
without an adequate[br]level of transparency?

0:51:07.597,0:51:09.999
I might answer yes[br]but hopefully--

0:51:09.999,0:51:11.934
hopefully we didn't[br]and [inaudible]

0:51:11.934,0:51:14.904
to happen as Frank said.

0:51:14.904,0:51:17.273
One of the things we'd actually

0:51:17.273,0:51:20.243
like to do is really[br]get everybody to focus

0:51:20.243,0:51:21.511
on the multistakeholder.

0:51:21.511,0:51:22.845
A lot of the principles

0:51:22.845,0:51:28.184
that have given us the internet[br]find new forms, structures

0:51:28.184,0:51:29.919
and processes to address that.

0:51:29.919,0:51:33.322
Don't revert back to we[br]need a new institution.

0:51:33.322,0:51:37.760
I don't think that is the answer[br]in almost every situation.

0:51:37.760,0:51:42.632
Some of the recent proposals[br]that have been put forward

0:51:42.632,0:51:45.234
to address some of these[br]aspects would call for treaties.

0:51:45.234,0:51:47.370
Treaties are largely[br]intergovernmental.

0:51:47.370,0:51:48.971
They don't allow for[br]the private sector.

0:51:48.971,0:51:51.240
They don't allow[br]for civil society.

0:51:51.240,0:51:53.209
And honestly I don't[br]know how you get some

0:51:53.209,0:51:54.610
of those private[br]sector companies

0:51:54.610,0:51:57.113
to sign on to a treaty.

0:51:57.113,0:51:59.248
So, I don't think treaties[br]are the answer either.

0:51:59.248,0:52:02.885
We're going to need to create[br]new processes and new forums

0:52:02.885,0:52:04.887
and certainly at the[br]core of all that ought

0:52:04.887,0:52:07.256
to be thoughtful[br]informed dialogue.

0:52:07.256,0:52:09.692
So, I think, you[br]know, it's our hope

0:52:09.692,0:52:13.095
that as these discussions[br]continue across the world

0:52:13.095,0:52:16.866
that we recognize and[br]come to agree again

0:52:16.866,0:52:19.035
on some other high[br]level principles.

0:52:19.035,0:52:21.504
Some of the ones I'd throw[br]out for further debate,

0:52:21.504,0:52:24.874
is it unwanted surveillance[br]even in the furtherance

0:52:24.874,0:52:27.877
of national security[br]is not acceptable.

0:52:27.877,0:52:31.347
Unwarranted surveillance[br]is not acceptable.

0:52:31.347,0:52:34.050
The disproportionate[br]surveillance is also

0:52:34.050,0:52:36.018
not acceptable.

0:52:36.018,0:52:38.654
That surveillance[br]without accountability is

0:52:38.654,0:52:41.123
not acceptable.

0:52:41.123,0:52:42.558
And further, turning

0:52:42.558,0:52:44.727
to something a little[br]more positive,

0:52:44.727,0:52:46.762
that there should be[br]transparency with respect

0:52:46.762,0:52:49.398
to policy and its[br]implementation,

0:52:49.398,0:52:53.202
that we should be harnessing the[br]expertise of all stakeholders

0:52:53.202,0:52:56.105
to discover better ways[br]to protect citizens

0:52:56.105,0:52:58.374
in a global community.

0:52:58.374,0:53:02.578
And most importantly,[br]encore to everything we do

0:53:02.578,0:53:05.147
that we uphold human rights.

0:53:05.147,0:53:07.016
And so I look forward to[br]the discussion for the rest

0:53:07.016,0:53:09.185
of the day, and thank you.

0:53:09.185,0:53:10.119
>> Thank you, Lynn.

0:53:10.119,0:53:10.920
Danny?

0:53:10.920,0:53:12.255
>> Thanks, Lance.

0:53:12.255,0:53:16.525
So, thanks to the Internet[br]Society and GW, Lynn and Lance,

0:53:16.525,0:53:18.694
for getting-- Paul for[br]getting us together.

0:53:18.694,0:53:23.633
And at the end of the[br]panel, I'm always reminded

0:53:23.633,0:53:25.635
of this very distinguished[br]member of Congress said

0:53:25.635,0:53:28.371
at the near the end of a very[br]excruciatingly long hearing,

0:53:28.371,0:53:31.807
everything's been said but[br]not every one has said it.

0:53:31.807,0:53:36.746
So, I subscribe to much[br]of what has been said

0:53:36.746,0:53:39.315
by many of my fellow panels.

0:53:39.315,0:53:42.084
I want to just make three points

0:53:42.084,0:53:47.089
about what I think we've[br]been experiencing as a result

0:53:47.089,0:53:49.458
of this surveillance[br]debate over the last month.

0:53:49.458,0:53:54.430
I think fundamentally what[br]we've had is a certain degree

0:53:54.430,0:53:57.967
of a crisis in confidence[br]and a crisis in trust

0:53:57.967,0:53:59.568
about the internet environment.

0:53:59.568,0:54:02.305
The question is, should[br]you trust it or not?

0:54:02.305,0:54:06.709
And as Mellissa noted,[br]it's, I think, useful to try

0:54:06.709,0:54:11.047
to breakdown to some extent[br]our current sources of trust

0:54:11.047,0:54:14.250
in the internet in particular,[br]in society in general.

0:54:14.250,0:54:16.719
I want to just make three[br]points about the institutional,

0:54:16.719,0:54:22.291
legal and political levels of[br]trust that we tend to look to.

0:54:22.291,0:54:25.027
To start with the[br]institutional, you heard from--

0:54:25.027,0:54:29.899
you heard from John and[br]from Lynn about some

0:54:29.899,0:54:32.368
of the institutions that[br]make the internet work.

0:54:32.368,0:54:33.569
You know, I think[br]it's interesting

0:54:33.569,0:54:36.172
when you look purely[br]technically at the internet.

0:54:36.172,0:54:40.309
People pretty much trust that[br]the pack is going to arrive more

0:54:40.309,0:54:41.510
or less in the right order.

0:54:41.510,0:54:44.246
And enough of them[br]will get there

0:54:44.246,0:54:45.514
that you could get your[br]message through it.

0:54:45.514,0:54:46.782
You can watch video.

0:54:46.782,0:54:49.218
We don't-- we don't have a[br]lot of debates about that.

0:54:49.218,0:54:55.391
I will note just as a kind of[br]a observation of the sociology

0:54:55.391,0:54:57.259
in a certain way of people

0:54:57.259,0:54:58.694
in the internet technical[br]community.

0:54:58.694,0:55:01.630
There is a sense in some[br]ways as Lynn suggested

0:55:01.630,0:55:06.769
that if any third party[br]can get in the middle

0:55:06.769,0:55:10.740
of a communication stream[br]between two parties,

0:55:10.740,0:55:13.542
but that is in a sort of[br]very idealized sense a

0:55:13.542,0:55:14.610
technical failure.

0:55:14.610,0:55:16.545
It's the internet[br]not working properly.

0:55:16.545,0:55:18.481
Now that's a narrow[br]technical view

0:55:18.481,0:55:19.615
of the internet environment.

0:55:19.615,0:55:23.319
We, of course, have a[br]broader legal and social

0:55:23.319,0:55:26.655
and political view of our[br]societies, and we do recognize

0:55:26.655,0:55:30.126
that that surveillance[br]and espionage will happen.

0:55:30.126,0:55:33.696
But part of the challenge, I[br]think, in closing the trust gap

0:55:33.696,0:55:36.232
that we have is to articulate[br]better what those sorts

0:55:36.232,0:55:37.533
of expectations are.

0:55:37.533,0:55:39.435
We do have administrative[br]institutions

0:55:39.435,0:55:41.337
like that run the[br]domain name service

0:55:41.337,0:55:42.605
and IP address assignment.

0:55:42.605,0:55:44.106
Thanks to people like John.

0:55:44.106,0:55:45.174
They just kind of worked--

0:55:45.174,0:55:46.909
people grumble about[br]I can't [phonetic].

0:55:46.909,0:55:49.545
But so far, you know, people[br]are getting new domain names.

0:55:49.545,0:55:50.780
They are being maintained.

0:55:50.780,0:55:55.484
Nothing has completely[br]fallen apart at that point.

0:55:55.484,0:55:56.786
What I think is more complicated

0:55:56.786,0:56:00.089
on the institutional trust[br]front is that in many cases,

0:56:00.089,0:56:01.657
we're used to looking[br]to government

0:56:01.657,0:56:04.393
to establish trustworthiness[br]in society.

0:56:04.393,0:56:06.262
And certainly governments[br]believe their job is

0:56:06.262,0:56:09.298
to establish trustworthiness[br]in society.

0:56:09.298,0:56:12.301
But as you've heard, many[br]of our sources of trust

0:56:12.301,0:56:14.136
in the internet are[br]actually not governmental.

0:56:14.136,0:56:17.907
They are working perfectly well[br]largely without governments.

0:56:17.907,0:56:20.209
And I'll come back[br]and talk about that.

0:56:20.209,0:56:23.312
But again because of that[br]somewhat unusual circumstance

0:56:23.312,0:56:27.049
that Lynn alluded to, these[br]multistakeholder processes,

0:56:27.049,0:56:30.820
we probably have to understand[br]that a little bit better

0:56:30.820,0:56:34.123
so that people can trust[br]those environments.

0:56:34.123,0:56:37.226
You know, on the-- when we[br]look at legal institutions,

0:56:37.226,0:56:39.195
we rely a lot on our[br]legal institutions

0:56:39.195,0:56:42.064
to establish trust in society.

0:56:42.064,0:56:44.366
We hope that our legal[br]institutions make it

0:56:44.366,0:56:47.837
so that most people and most[br]institutions mostly do the right

0:56:47.837,0:56:48.771
thing most of the time.

0:56:48.771,0:56:50.105
We don't expect perfection

0:56:50.105,0:56:53.108
but we do expect our legal[br]institutions to set standards

0:56:53.108,0:56:55.144
and that there are consequences[br]when they're not followed.

0:56:55.144,0:56:58.147
I think when we look at[br]the privacy issues raised

0:56:58.147,0:57:00.783
by the current surveillance[br]practices

0:57:00.783,0:57:04.420
that had been revealed, the[br]problem that we have, I believe,

0:57:04.420,0:57:08.090
is that every one would like[br]there to be a sense of privacy

0:57:08.090,0:57:09.959
in our communications[br]environment.

0:57:09.959,0:57:11.794
But I think we have a real--

0:57:11.794,0:57:16.799
a lot of confusion about[br]just what that ought to mean.

0:57:16.799,0:57:18.968
We tend to think about[br]privacy particularly

0:57:18.968,0:57:22.338
in the computer network[br]environment as being able

0:57:22.338,0:57:23.873
to keep things secret.

0:57:23.873,0:57:26.208
Well, I think we all understand[br]now that we don't have a lot

0:57:26.208,0:57:30.012
of secrets, and we rely[br]on lots of third parties

0:57:30.012,0:57:33.282
to maintain our information.

0:57:33.282,0:57:38.220
So, we don't keep secrets as[br]well as we may be used to.

0:57:38.220,0:57:40.923
And my own view is that that[br]means we have to start thinking

0:57:40.923,0:57:43.125
about privacy more as a question

0:57:43.125,0:57:47.029
of whether information is used[br]properly whether it's misused,

0:57:47.029,0:57:48.030
whether it's used

0:57:48.030,0:57:50.232
to discriminate unfairly[br]against people.

0:57:50.232,0:57:53.669
But that's going to require[br]certain amount of discussion.

0:57:53.669,0:57:55.371
Lots of people have[br]mentioned accountability.

0:57:55.371,0:57:58.240
We're going to need better[br]accountability mechanisms

0:57:58.240,0:58:00.409
for these more complex[br]privacy rules.

0:58:00.409,0:58:03.312
When privacy is not[br]a binary phenomenon

0:58:03.312,0:58:07.716
that is either it's secret or[br]it's not, we need mechanisms

0:58:07.716,0:58:11.787
to assure trust in the way[br]personal information is handled.

0:58:11.787,0:58:14.423
I think there's a very[br]simple analogy actually

0:58:14.423,0:58:17.393
that we can draw from[br]the financial world.

0:58:17.393,0:58:20.095
Huge parts of our economy,

0:58:20.095,0:58:23.799
huge parts of the[br]world's economy run based

0:58:23.799,0:58:26.302
on a pretty well understand[br]set of accounting rules.

0:58:26.302,0:58:29.204
We're used to looking at[br]balance sheets for corporations

0:58:29.204,0:58:30.639
and having some sense of trust

0:58:30.639,0:58:32.808
that those balance sheets[br]reflect what's actually going

0:58:32.808,0:58:35.110
on in the financial life[br]of the corporations.

0:58:35.110,0:58:37.513
We don't expect to see[br]all the transactions

0:58:37.513,0:58:40.115
in the general ledger in order[br]to look and get a picture

0:58:40.115,0:58:43.285
of whether the corporation is[br]profitable, not profitable,

0:58:43.285,0:58:46.422
paying its taxes[br]correctly, not, et cetera.

0:58:46.422,0:58:48.757
Now there are-- this doesn't[br]always work perfectly,

0:58:48.757,0:58:50.926
but I the analogy particularly

0:58:50.926,0:58:56.532
to the NSA surveillance[br]situation is quite strong.

0:58:56.532,0:58:59.401
We do as citizens of the[br]United States want to be able

0:58:59.401,0:59:01.170
to have a sense of confidence

0:59:01.170,0:59:05.274
that our intelligence agencies[br]are following the rules

0:59:05.274,0:59:06.642
that they say they're following.

0:59:06.642,0:59:10.079
My guess is they probably do[br]about 90 percent of the time.

0:59:10.079,0:59:12.114
But we want to know that[br]there's some accountability

0:59:12.114,0:59:13.382
to those rules.

0:59:13.382,0:59:16.285
I think we understand that[br]we're not going to be able

0:59:16.285,0:59:22.825
to send auditors, independent[br]auditors inside classified

0:59:22.825,0:59:25.494
environments and can have[br]them come back and report

0:59:25.494,0:59:26.829
on everything they found.

0:59:26.829,0:59:29.031
But if we follow this balance[br]sheet model, if we follow

0:59:29.031,0:59:32.201
to a methodology of assessing[br]how information is used,

0:59:32.201,0:59:34.837
we can get that sense[br]of trust back.

0:59:34.837,0:59:39.808
And finally, as a[br]matter of political trust

0:59:39.808,0:59:41.810
and by political,[br]I don't mean kind

0:59:41.810,0:59:43.746
of small P Washington politics.

0:59:43.746,0:59:45.781
I really mean politics[br]in the sense

0:59:45.781,0:59:48.917
of how we organize[br]ourselves as a society.

0:59:48.917,0:59:54.423
As people on this[br]panel have noted,

0:59:54.423,0:59:57.393
our sources of political[br]trust are complicated

0:59:57.393,1:00:00.029
in the internet environment[br]and unusual.

1:00:00.029,1:00:01.697
We are used to the[br]idea of states

1:00:01.697,1:00:06.368
of government's exercising[br]authority directly

1:00:06.368,1:00:10.539
on institutions often[br]on intermediaries,

1:00:10.539,1:00:12.875
but in the internet[br]world and we're--

1:00:12.875,1:00:15.077
and if you considered[br]the analogy

1:00:15.077,1:00:19.214
between telephone[br]networks in the past

1:00:19.214,1:00:22.351
and internet service providers[br]today, telephone networks,

1:00:22.351,1:00:24.920
broadcast networks were[br]really creatures of the state.

1:00:24.920,1:00:28.791
They were authorized by[br]the actions of legislatures

1:00:28.791,1:00:32.895
and therefore controlled in that[br]way at the local state federal

1:00:32.895,1:00:35.998
and even international[br]legal level.

1:00:35.998,1:00:38.567
The internet doesn't--[br]has not happened that way,

1:00:38.567,1:00:42.237
it was not a creature of the[br]state ever, it was really

1:00:42.237,1:00:46.709
in many ways a creature of[br]individual and voluntary action

1:00:46.709,1:00:50.279
by some people on this panel,[br]by others all around the world

1:00:50.279,1:00:54.016
who participate in making this[br]internet institutions work.

1:00:54.016,1:00:57.352
But now when we're[br]nervous about how they work

1:00:57.352,1:00:59.722
and how the state work[br]we have rethink some

1:00:59.722,1:01:00.856
of these relationships.

1:01:00.856,1:01:06.095
So, we're going to have[br]to get use to the fact

1:01:06.095,1:01:10.432
that governments-- I[br]would submit cannot reach

1:01:10.432,1:01:12.167
into these internet institutions

1:01:12.167,1:01:15.137
like the internet engineering[br]test force like I can--

1:01:15.137,1:01:17.506
like the worldwide[br]web consortium

1:01:17.506,1:01:19.875
and achieve exactly[br]the result they want.

1:01:19.875,1:01:23.378
But of course at the same time[br]governments will make laws

1:01:23.378,1:01:27.750
and rules about how individuals[br]and corporations act whether

1:01:27.750,1:01:29.384
for intellectual[br]property protection

1:01:29.384,1:01:33.088
or privacy protection[br]or anything else.

1:01:33.088,1:01:34.456
So, I think that what this--

1:01:34.456,1:01:38.327
the whole surveillance[br]experience has revealed is

1:01:38.327,1:01:42.698
that the rules and expectations

1:01:42.698,1:01:44.933
that we have are quite[br]a bit more nuanced

1:01:44.933,1:01:47.970
than the very binary[br]technical behavior

1:01:47.970,1:01:49.772
of the internet environment.

1:01:49.772,1:01:52.341
And I think our challenge[br]is now to do a better job

1:01:52.341,1:01:54.076
of articulating just[br]what we expected,

1:01:54.076,1:01:56.211
all these different[br]institutions at all these levels

1:01:56.211,1:01:58.280
and how we're going[br]to find accountability

1:01:58.280,1:02:00.516
to those expectations.

1:02:00.516,1:02:02.017
Thanks.

1:02:02.017,1:02:05.387
>> Thank you Danny and thank[br]you everybody on the panel.

1:02:05.387,1:02:09.091
I think what we'll do now,[br]I'm going to open up first

1:02:09.091,1:02:11.360
to the panelist for[br]five or 10 minutes

1:02:11.360,1:02:15.364
so they can ask questions[br]of their fellow panelists,

1:02:15.364,1:02:19.535
make further, you know,[br]comments, go some back and forth

1:02:19.535,1:02:21.436
that way for five or 10 minutes.

1:02:21.436,1:02:23.972
In the meantime if[br]you in the audience,

1:02:23.972,1:02:27.743
if you have a question would[br]you please if you're physically

1:02:27.743,1:02:31.346
in the audience here[br]at GW step up to one

1:02:31.346,1:02:34.983
of these two microphones in[br]either of the isles, form a line

1:02:34.983,1:02:38.654
and when your turn comes please[br]state your name and affiliation

1:02:38.654,1:02:41.857
and then ask your question.

1:02:41.857,1:02:45.127
If you are in the internet[br]world, if you're off

1:02:45.127,1:02:49.298
in the clouds somewhere and[br]want to communicate send it in,

1:02:49.298,1:02:52.267
Paul any other directions[br]on that

1:02:52.267,1:02:54.469
or you have some[br]questions already?

1:02:54.469,1:02:57.406
While you're waiting, I want to[br]give the panelist a chance first

1:02:57.406,1:02:59.541
but any other protocol?

1:02:59.541,1:03:06.815
>> So, they type the[br]questions into live stream

1:03:06.815,1:03:09.251
and I'll be reading them[br]here at one of these mics.

1:03:09.251,1:03:11.520
So, that's for the[br]live stream panelists.

1:03:11.520,1:03:14.723
In New York they can just line[br]up at their microphone there.

1:03:14.723,1:03:16.425
>> In New York they can[br]line up their microphone

1:03:16.425,1:03:17.593
and we'll see them[br]live up there?

1:03:17.593,1:03:18.493
>> We'll see them,[br]yes, that's right.

1:03:18.493,1:03:19.061
>> OK.

1:03:19.061,1:03:19.628
>> Very good.

1:03:19.628,1:03:20.395
>> All right.

1:03:20.395,1:03:21.230
This will be interesting.

1:03:21.230,1:03:23.398
OK, but first let's get to the--

1:03:23.398,1:03:27.502
give the panelists a chance[br]to ask questions, Leslie?

1:03:27.502,1:03:31.874
>> So, I want to ask a question[br]of Danny because talking

1:03:31.874,1:03:35.878
about the concern or persuading[br]people that, you know,

1:03:35.878,1:03:38.380
winning people of off[br]government is sort

1:03:38.380,1:03:41.650
of the governance structure[br]for the internet and trying

1:03:41.650,1:03:44.253
to educate them that it's[br]not really government,

1:03:44.253,1:03:47.189
it's all of these other[br]institutions and we do them

1:03:47.189,1:03:49.758
in a multi-stakeholder[br]way and many people

1:03:49.758,1:03:52.861
up here have spent[br]considerable time trying

1:03:52.861,1:03:55.898
to move people to that model.

1:03:55.898,1:03:58.267
It just seems to[br]me that the rest

1:03:58.267,1:04:00.802
of the world right now is going[br]to think we've been involved

1:04:00.802,1:04:02.070
in a slight of hand

1:04:02.070,1:04:06.208
that basically we're[br]saying governments stay out,

1:04:06.208,1:04:10.012
governments don't get[br]too involved here.

1:04:10.012,1:04:13.181
All these other into multi[br]stakeholder institutions are

1:04:13.181,1:04:15.083
really the core of[br]the internet and then

1:04:15.083,1:04:18.020
at the same time[br]building an environment

1:04:18.020,1:04:21.556
where the United States[br]uses historically--

1:04:21.556,1:04:25.227
historical dominance

1:04:25.227,1:04:28.230
to basically trump all[br]of those governance.

1:04:28.230,1:04:31.800
So, I hear what you're saying[br]but it was a hard argument

1:04:31.800,1:04:34.102
to make to the rest of[br]the world beforehand.

1:04:34.102,1:04:36.405
I'm just curious[br]whether you're continuing

1:04:36.405,1:04:38.206
to say it with a straight face.

1:04:38.206,1:04:39.141
But I'm having trouble.

1:04:39.141,1:04:41.443
>> It's a habit.

1:04:41.443,1:04:47.282
I guess what I would say[br]is the ability to make

1:04:47.282,1:04:49.785
that argument really[br]depends on--

1:04:49.785,1:04:51.954
as several people[br]have said the layer

1:04:51.954,1:04:53.355
at which you're making[br]the argument.

1:04:53.355,1:05:00.095
I don't believe that the NSA[br]surveillance changes one bit the

1:05:00.095,1:05:06.568
question of who should be[br]setting standards for TCPIP

1:05:06.568,1:05:10.072
or who should be determining[br]how domain names get assigned.

1:05:10.072,1:05:15.277
I do believe that as you[br]said Leslie that the question

1:05:15.277,1:05:20.248
of government espionage[br]activities whether it's the NSA

1:05:20.248,1:05:26.188
or GCHQ or MI5 or, you know,[br]the German Intelligence Agency,

1:05:26.188,1:05:28.490
the French Intelligence[br]Agency, anyone of them,

1:05:28.490,1:05:30.926
all of which you're doing[br]exactly the same thing.

1:05:30.926,1:05:35.998
I do believe that we now have[br]to have a more public discussion

1:05:35.998,1:05:37.632
about what our expectations are

1:05:37.632,1:05:39.835
for surveillance[br]including espionage

1:05:39.835,1:05:42.004
in the internet environment.

1:05:42.004,1:05:47.776
But that shouldn't get confused[br]with the question of whether all

1:05:47.776,1:05:49.778
of a sudden we need[br]a treaty about how

1:05:49.778,1:05:51.847
to set internet technical[br]standards.

1:05:51.847,1:05:55.450
And I believe that, you know,[br]I'm highly uncomfortable talking

1:05:55.450,1:05:56.952
about the rest of the world.

1:05:56.952,1:06:01.757
But I think that what we saw in[br]the internet governance debate

1:06:01.757,1:06:09.297
at the United Nations at the--[br]in Dubai where the proposition

1:06:09.297,1:06:15.670
from Democratic countries like[br]Iran and China and Russia was

1:06:15.670,1:06:17.205
to exert greater control

1:06:17.205,1:06:20.642
over the internet environment[br]was rejected not just

1:06:20.642,1:06:25.747
by the usual suspects, that[br]is the 34 OACD countries

1:06:25.747,1:06:28.016
who you could somewhat[br]expect to do that.

1:06:28.016,1:06:32.554
But by another 20 countries,[br]from Africa and South Asia

1:06:32.554,1:06:35.957
and different parts of[br]the world, that I think

1:06:35.957,1:06:42.898
at Brazil have recognized that[br]while we could always do better

1:06:42.898,1:06:44.900
with the current internet[br]governors arrangements

1:06:44.900,1:06:47.736
that they're working and[br]messing with them has a cause

1:06:47.736,1:06:49.004
for all those countries.

1:06:49.004,1:06:51.973
So, I think as long as we[br]keep these issues distinct

1:06:51.973,1:06:55.410
and don't confuse them[br]I think there's a way

1:06:55.410,1:06:58.814
to have both discussions[br]in a coherent way.

1:06:58.814,1:07:00.082
>> Well, so I agree with you.

1:07:00.082,1:07:00.715
>> I know you do.

1:07:00.715,1:07:01.817
[laughs]

1:07:01.817,1:07:06.154
>> But it seems to me[br]the opportunity here

1:07:06.154,1:07:09.157
for many countries to[br]combine them together

1:07:09.157,1:07:11.393
to not make them distinct.

1:07:11.393,1:07:14.596
The opportunity to[br]reclaim control

1:07:14.596,1:07:17.699
by basically bringing[br]this together.

1:07:17.699,1:07:19.101
>> Sure. So, what[br]did Russia say?

1:07:19.101,1:07:23.038
What did Russia say this-- you[br]know, Russia said in response

1:07:23.038,1:07:25.207
to the NSA we need more[br]government control--

1:07:25.207,1:07:26.274
>> Right.

1:07:26.274,1:07:30.212
>> -- of both the[br]internet infrastructure

1:07:30.212,1:07:31.580
and the internet companies.

1:07:31.580,1:07:34.216
It's a-- I mean, I think the[br]question is how does anyone say

1:07:34.216,1:07:35.984
that with a straight face

1:07:35.984,1:07:39.421
when the concern was undo[br]government intrusion?

1:07:39.421,1:07:42.023
But, yeah, I mean it--

1:07:42.023,1:07:45.127
people who want to make those[br]arguments will find ways

1:07:45.127,1:07:46.828
to make them.

1:07:46.828,1:07:50.198
>> I worry that many of those[br]in between are suddenly going

1:07:50.198,1:07:56.838
to become more persuadable[br]because of the outrage.

1:07:56.838,1:08:00.308
>> So, I have a question[br]for my fellow panelists.

1:08:00.308,1:08:04.212
And it's sort of following[br]what Danny just raised.

1:08:04.212,1:08:07.182
In December we had an[br]interesting conference,

1:08:07.182,1:08:09.885
the World Conference

1:08:09.885,1:08:12.320
on International[br]Telecommunications.

1:08:12.320,1:08:15.056
I'll use the acronym[br]WCIT not 'cause I want

1:08:15.056,1:08:16.558
to have the table bounded.

1:08:16.558,1:08:18.260
I explain the acronym first.

1:08:18.260,1:08:19.327
>> You did.

1:08:19.327,1:08:20.428
>> But you hear the[br]term WCIT so I want

1:08:20.428,1:08:22.096
to pronounce it as[br]you might hear it.

1:08:22.096,1:08:23.430
But the World Conference

1:08:23.430,1:08:26.401
on International[br]Telecommunications was look

1:08:26.401,1:08:28.103
at some treaty arrangements.

1:08:28.103,1:08:29.404
So, some tariffs.

1:08:29.404,1:08:33.108
Regarding interconnection[br]and there were number

1:08:33.108,1:08:36.278
of very interesting proposals[br]that shut up in Dubai.

1:08:36.278,1:08:41.283
And I'm struck by the[br]timing because that happened

1:08:41.283,1:08:46.921
and now we now have a lot of[br]events regarding surveillance

1:08:46.921,1:08:49.624
and then I say and[br]so on and so forth.

1:08:49.624,1:08:52.227
And I guess with my panelists[br]I'd ask the question,

1:08:52.227,1:08:56.631
does anyone care to speculate[br]if water had been reversed?

1:08:56.631,1:08:58.166
What the outcome[br]would have been?

1:08:58.166,1:09:01.036
Because I've had a[br]few people suggest

1:09:01.036,1:09:03.904
that that's an interesting[br]exercise.

1:09:03.904,1:09:08.475
I am not sure whether or not[br]the outcome that we had in Dubai

1:09:08.475,1:09:12.913
in December is what[br]we would be seeing

1:09:12.913,1:09:16.451
if in fact it was being[br]done instead next month.

1:09:16.451,1:09:17.786
>> Hold on, that was my concern.

1:09:17.786,1:09:21.122
That's my concern.

1:09:21.122,1:09:26.493
Well, I think that if you[br]look at the World Conference

1:09:26.493,1:09:30.198
on International[br]Telecommunications,

1:09:30.198,1:09:34.769
it was an important treaty[br]negotiation, renegotiation

1:09:34.769,1:09:41.142
that hadn't been renegotiated[br]since 1988, is that right?

1:09:41.142,1:09:45.613
'88. And as Americans we look[br]at these negotiations as one--

1:09:45.613,1:09:52.587
as a one negotiation and I think[br]that that's a poor perspective

1:09:52.587,1:09:56.057
because the WCIT was really

1:09:56.057,1:10:01.029
about how does one monetize[br]the internet and to pay

1:10:01.029,1:10:03.365
for court infrastructure.

1:10:03.365,1:10:09.437
And it is one of a multi-series[br]of negotiations, the world--

1:10:09.437,1:10:13.842
there's another[br]telecommunications conference

1:10:13.842,1:10:17.212
on policy, WTPF, it[br]just happened in Geneva

1:10:17.212,1:10:20.448
and they'll be the world[br]summit on information society

1:10:20.448,1:10:24.753
that will be culminating[br]in 2014 I think, right?

1:10:24.753,1:10:26.121
2014, '15.

1:10:26.121,1:10:27.389
>> So on, yup.

1:10:27.389,1:10:31.092
>> And there will be 24[br]negotiations to go between now

1:10:31.092,1:10:35.830
and then that will ultimately[br]be where things will land.

1:10:35.830,1:10:37.299
And then from-- the world summit

1:10:37.299,1:10:39.467
on information society[br]will be the strategy

1:10:39.467,1:10:43.471
by which will be executed[br]in the WTPF for policy.

1:10:43.471,1:10:48.143
The WCIT for regulation and[br]in the internet standards--

1:10:48.143,1:10:50.211
in the international[br]standards organization

1:10:50.211,1:10:53.281
for the overall technology.

1:10:53.281,1:10:57.452
So, I think if you are a[br]person in the corporate world

1:10:57.452,1:10:59.688
and you're worried about these[br]things you shouldn't just look

1:10:59.688,1:11:01.790
at one of these forums[br]as one off.

1:11:01.790,1:11:03.191
And if you're worried about it

1:11:03.191,1:11:05.226
from a government perspective[br]it's not just the policy forum

1:11:05.226,1:11:07.495
where the regulatory forum,[br]it's all of this forum

1:11:07.495,1:11:08.830
and they're all interconnected.

1:11:08.830,1:11:12.567
So, I would say that yes, I[br]think you actually suggested

1:11:12.567,1:11:15.770
that it was a positive outcome[br]at WCIT in Dubai and I think

1:11:15.770,1:11:19.240
that the United States lost[br]in that negotiation but--

1:11:19.240,1:11:23.111
and I think that the United[br]States and many are going

1:11:23.111,1:11:26.348
to continue to lose and it's[br]going to be a quick erosion

1:11:26.348,1:11:31.486
of our stance not a slower[br]version of our stance.

1:11:31.486,1:11:34.456
>> I'll take one more[br]question from the panel.

1:11:34.456,1:11:36.558
Any other panelist has[br]a question before we go

1:11:36.558,1:11:39.327
out to the audience?

1:11:39.327,1:11:42.197
Going once?

1:11:43.765,1:11:45.333
OK.

1:11:45.333,1:11:47.369
>> Mike Nelson with[br]Bloomberg Government

1:11:47.369,1:11:49.137
and with Georgetown University.

1:11:49.137,1:11:51.673
I want to commend the internet[br]society for great panel,

1:11:51.673,1:11:53.708
we got the lawyers,[br]we've got the techies,

1:11:53.708,1:11:56.578
we've got the scholars,[br]we've got the activists,

1:11:56.578,1:11:59.347
and that's great but we[br]tend here in Washington

1:11:59.347,1:12:00.915
to talk about the policy.

1:12:00.915,1:12:03.685
And Danny I tweeted your--

1:12:03.685,1:12:06.955
a [inaudible] of your talk[br]which I thought was exceptional.

1:12:06.955,1:12:08.890
And that was--

1:12:08.890,1:12:10.792
>> You got it to 142 characters?

1:12:10.792,1:12:12.627
>> Less than that.

1:12:12.627,1:12:17.766
But you basically said, data[br]will flow, we can't really focus

1:12:17.766,1:12:20.402
as we used to on[br]controlling that flow,

1:12:20.402,1:12:25.073
we have to control the[br]misuse of that data.

1:12:25.073,1:12:27.876
Policy makers are starting[br]to understand that.

1:12:27.876,1:12:30.478
But I think we also[br]have to figure out a way

1:12:30.478,1:12:33.648
that techies can start[br]implementing systems

1:12:33.648,1:12:35.150
that reflect that.

1:12:35.150,1:12:38.253
And the first way to[br]do that is to make sure

1:12:38.253,1:12:41.589
that systems are more[br]transparent so that we can see

1:12:41.589,1:12:44.459
where data is being misused.

1:12:44.459,1:12:47.829
And I guess I'd challenge the[br]audience to think about privacy,

1:12:47.829,1:12:50.832
not to tell the audience[br]and the panel to think

1:12:50.832,1:12:53.868
about transparency by design.

1:12:53.868,1:12:57.505
We've heard about privacy by[br]design but has anybody thought

1:12:57.505,1:13:00.642
of examples of where we're[br]building in the transparencies

1:13:00.642,1:13:03.144
so its in the technology[br]and other places

1:13:03.144,1:13:05.079
where we could do that better?

1:13:05.079,1:13:08.016
Just an open question.

1:13:08.016,1:13:09.417
>> Laura?

1:13:09.417,1:13:13.421
>> OK. I think that's a really[br]great question and a good point.

1:13:13.421,1:13:16.858
I'll give one example of where[br]I think the transparency is

1:13:16.858,1:13:18.693
excellent and then[br]a couple of examples

1:13:18.693,1:13:21.262
where I think we need[br]more transparency.

1:13:21.262,1:13:24.232
What is one of the oldest and[br]most vulnerable institutions

1:13:24.232,1:13:25.600
of internet governance?

1:13:25.600,1:13:28.736
The internet engineering[br]taskforce jumps to mind.

1:13:28.736,1:13:30.038
So, this is the-- one

1:13:30.038,1:13:32.941
of the standard setting[br]organizations for the internet.

1:13:32.941,1:13:34.676
There are many others[br]but they have set many

1:13:34.676,1:13:39.814
of the core standards so they[br]have a tradition of being open

1:13:39.814,1:13:41.249
in three different ways.

1:13:41.249,1:13:44.052
They're open in the[br]development of a standard

1:13:44.052,1:13:46.221
and that anyone can participate.

1:13:46.221,1:13:49.190
Now, granted there are a lot[br]of barriers to participation,

1:13:49.190,1:13:51.459
it requires a lot of[br]technical knowledge,

1:13:51.459,1:13:54.929
it requires in many[br]cases money to go to some

1:13:54.929,1:13:57.065
of the events in time.

1:13:57.065,1:13:59.734
But it is basically[br]open to anyone.

1:13:59.734,1:14:02.370
They are also open[br]and transparent

1:14:02.370,1:14:04.739
in that the actual[br]specification.

1:14:04.739,1:14:06.508
So, a standard is[br]not really software

1:14:06.508,1:14:09.377
or hardware specifications[br]that are written down

1:14:09.377,1:14:11.546
and people can go[br]online and view them.

1:14:11.546,1:14:14.516
So, I would differ with some[br]of the panelists and say that,

1:14:14.516,1:14:17.919
"Oh the technology[br]is-- it is political."

1:14:17.919,1:14:22.023
So, the technology designers[br]make political decisions

1:14:22.023,1:14:25.527
in the design whether they[br]like to call it that or not.

1:14:25.527,1:14:27.695
So, sometimes privacy[br]is designed in.

1:14:27.695,1:14:30.198
Think about encryption[br]standards for example.

1:14:30.198,1:14:33.535
Think about unique identifiers[br]and the privacy implications.

1:14:33.535,1:14:36.971
Yet the specification is[br]open so there are some degree

1:14:36.971,1:14:39.240
of accountability where[br]people can view it.

1:14:39.240,1:14:41.442
It's also open in[br]the implementation

1:14:41.442,1:14:44.379
because it results in[br]multiple competing products

1:14:44.379,1:14:46.247
that are based on that standard.

1:14:46.247,1:14:47.649
So, that's an example.

1:14:47.649,1:14:50.718
In other cases we don't have a[br]lot of transparency and I agree

1:14:50.718,1:14:52.186
with you that we need more.

1:14:52.186,1:14:55.890
So, here is an example, how do[br]we look at interconnections?

1:14:55.890,1:14:59.394
So, this is an area where[br]I'm worried because of all

1:14:59.394,1:15:01.563
of the calls for greater[br]government regulation

1:15:01.563,1:15:03.097
of interconnection in an area

1:15:03.097,1:15:06.401
that has worked fairly[br]well up until now.

1:15:06.401,1:15:08.536
Well, part of the reason[br]we're seeing this calls

1:15:08.536,1:15:10.772
for a regulation is that we[br]can't really see what the

1:15:10.772,1:15:13.207
agreements are between[br]these private companies.

1:15:13.207,1:15:17.178
So, I think it would be more[br]helpful to have transparency

1:15:17.178,1:15:19.714
in an area such as that as well[br]as other infrastructure areas.

1:15:19.714,1:15:25.987
>> So, I want to go[br]back to Danny's premise

1:15:25.987,1:15:28.856
which you apparently[br]support which seems to be--

1:15:28.856,1:15:32.560
data will flow, everybody[br]will collect it

1:15:32.560,1:15:34.395
and we should only[br]focus on the uses.

1:15:34.395,1:15:36.864
And that's certainly a[br]discussion we've had on sort

1:15:36.864,1:15:39.334
of the consumer side[br]of the ledger?

1:15:39.334,1:15:41.402
You know, Google will[br]collect it and where we have

1:15:41.402,1:15:44.339
to focus our attention[br]is how they're using it.

1:15:44.339,1:15:47.542
I have to submit the government[br]is collecting information

1:15:47.542,1:15:52.113
and certainly the US government[br]collecting information really

1:15:52.113,1:15:55.917
to-- is subject to-- I mean in[br]our own country it's subject

1:15:55.917,1:15:59.954
to this little thing called[br]the Fourth Amendment and I know

1:15:59.954,1:16:03.992
of no case and I stand-- I'm[br]willing to stand corrected

1:16:03.992,1:16:06.828
that says, you can go in--

1:16:06.828,1:16:09.597
I mean, this is essentially[br]what the governments is arguing

1:16:09.597,1:16:11.232
in NSA collection.

1:16:11.232,1:16:15.837
And they're calling it[br]acquisition and not collection

1:16:15.837,1:16:19.507
that acquiring the[br]information is not collection.

1:16:19.507,1:16:24.445
And that any rights that[br]might attach don't happen

1:16:24.445,1:16:26.280
until you open and[br]look at the packets.

1:16:26.280,1:16:29.117
I don't know, you know, I've[br]never heard anybody come

1:16:29.117,1:16:31.519
into somebody's house, walk[br]away with their desk drawer

1:16:31.519,1:16:33.855
and say, "We're acquiring."

1:16:33.855,1:16:37.659
To let you know if we ever[br]get around to looking at it.

1:16:37.659,1:16:41.095
And so-- Danny and I have[br]some disagreement although I'm

1:16:41.095,1:16:43.631
getting persuaded[br]more and more by his--

1:16:43.631,1:16:47.802
by the question of use[br]in the commercial side

1:16:47.802,1:16:49.837
of this big data world.

1:16:49.837,1:16:52.607
But, I'm not willing to go[br]there in terms of governments.

1:16:52.607,1:16:54.742
And I think it's a really[br]dangerous thing to do.

1:16:54.742,1:17:00.815
>> So I-- just to[br]clarify, my observation

1:17:00.815,1:17:07.789
that data will flow is not[br]meant as a moral conclusion.

1:17:07.789,1:17:11.492
And I think the extension[br]which we choose to put limits

1:17:11.492,1:17:15.596
on how much data government[br]can acquire from those

1:17:15.596,1:17:17.465
who have already[br]collected it, right.

1:17:17.465,1:17:21.636
Because that's what[br]we're talking about here,

1:17:21.636,1:17:26.708
it's very important and I think[br]that historically we have relied

1:17:26.708,1:17:32.080
on technical barriers to large[br]scale information collection

1:17:32.080,1:17:34.882
as a way to limit how much[br]power the government has

1:17:34.882,1:17:36.217
and we don't have those anymore.

1:17:36.217,1:17:38.619
So, we're going to have[br]to get very explicit

1:17:38.619,1:17:41.155
about what limits we think[br]government should have

1:17:41.155,1:17:43.424
on both the collection[br]and the use front.

1:17:43.424,1:17:46.594
My only observation kind of[br]back to your point Mike is

1:17:46.594,1:17:50.364
that we are much[br]better technically

1:17:50.364,1:17:52.734
at managing collection[br]limitation

1:17:52.734,1:17:54.736
than we are managing[br]use limitation.

1:17:54.736,1:17:57.038
Just as a pure matter[br]of the kinds

1:17:57.038,1:18:00.708
of computer science techniques[br]that we have available

1:18:00.708,1:18:04.779
and I would submit[br]that's because, you know,

1:18:04.779,1:18:07.782
the computer security community[br]cryptographers have taught us a

1:18:07.782,1:18:12.220
huge amount about how[br]to keep data secret

1:18:12.220,1:18:14.155
and control access to data.

1:18:14.155,1:18:17.125
There's a whole other set[br]of disciplines developing

1:18:17.125,1:18:21.629
in computer science that try to[br]characterize information usage,

1:18:21.629,1:18:26.134
track information usage,[br]but it is a different--

1:18:26.134,1:18:30.505
but there is less progress[br]on that because I think

1:18:30.505,1:18:33.207
that that's not a[br]view of privacy

1:18:33.207,1:18:36.944
that computer sciences[br]have previously focused on.

1:18:36.944,1:18:38.780
So, I think you're[br]exactly right to point

1:18:38.780,1:18:40.581
out that we need[br]more work there.

1:18:40.581,1:18:41.983
>> I'd actually hear[br]from the techies.

1:18:41.983,1:18:44.418
Because I wasn't thinking[br]so much about transparency

1:18:44.418,1:18:46.487
at the institution[br]level at layer eight.

1:18:46.487,1:18:48.890
I was thinking more[br]the lower levels.

1:18:48.890,1:18:49.957
Well, like--

1:18:49.957,1:18:51.325
>> Oh, I'll give the--[br]let me give the--

1:18:51.325,1:18:52.727
>> -- like route to tracing,[br]you know, when we send an e-mail

1:18:52.727,1:18:54.729
to each other you can find out[br]where it balanced along the way.

1:18:54.729,1:18:57.098
>> Let me give the techies[br]about two minutes before we move

1:18:57.098,1:18:59.433
on to another question[br]because we will have a chance

1:18:59.433,1:19:02.003
to circle back in[br]the round table again

1:19:02.003,1:19:03.805
so we can take another[br]bite at the apple here.

1:19:03.805,1:19:04.338
>> Yeah.

1:19:04.338,1:19:05.406
>> Go ahead.

1:19:05.406,1:19:06.774
>> I just want to--[br]just very quickly.

1:19:06.774,1:19:08.042
Stealing is stealing.

1:19:08.042,1:19:09.577
It doesn't matter whether[br]it's in the physical world

1:19:09.577,1:19:11.479
or in the cyber world.

1:19:11.479,1:19:16.184
So, whatever the techniques you[br]have to collect data of a theft,

1:19:16.184,1:19:18.953
in the physical world you[br]can apply the same techniques

1:19:18.953,1:19:20.288
in the cyber world.

1:19:20.288,1:19:22.156
The difference is speed.

1:19:22.156,1:19:25.293
I mean it takes me[br]physically a long time to go in

1:19:25.293,1:19:27.762
and steal a laptop from[br]the gentleman's tester

1:19:27.762,1:19:30.264
but I can steal all the[br]information on his laptop

1:19:30.264,1:19:32.934
in a second, probably as long[br]as it took me to do it as long

1:19:32.934,1:19:34.769
as I can connect[br]it over the net.

1:19:34.769,1:19:38.206
So, the comment about[br]the government, you know,

1:19:38.206,1:19:41.175
and the search warrant in[br]the constitution, you should,

1:19:41.175,1:19:42.210
you know, that's why it's there.

1:19:42.210,1:19:43.811
That's why we have[br]the constitution is

1:19:43.811,1:19:45.012
to follow those laws.

1:19:45.012,1:19:47.715
And you can still achieve[br]the same goals and stay

1:19:47.715,1:19:49.750
within the constitutional[br]limits.

1:19:49.750,1:19:51.118
It's been done.

1:19:51.118,1:19:54.021
It's just that what's happened[br]is we got a bunch of people

1:19:54.021,1:19:58.092
at the policy level that[br]didn't understand what the

1:19:58.092,1:20:00.027
implications are.

1:20:00.027,1:20:01.395
And that's where-- everything

1:20:01.395,1:20:03.097
that they've done[br]has been legal.

1:20:03.097,1:20:04.332
It-- the law is the problem.

1:20:04.332,1:20:06.601
Not what whether[br]they're doing it or that.

1:20:06.601,1:20:08.836
>> I would question that.

1:20:08.836,1:20:10.037
>> But--

1:20:10.037,1:20:13.074
>> OK. I'm going to move[br]this along because I want

1:20:13.074,1:20:15.610
to give Joanne a chance and[br]I'm sure Steve is getting a lot

1:20:15.610,1:20:17.879
of farther for the round table[br]to come back to just later on.

1:20:17.879,1:20:19.213
>> So, I don't want[br]to pick up on thing

1:20:19.213,1:20:23.818
which is the internet has[br]a tradition or convention,

1:20:23.818,1:20:28.489
I wouldn't say tradition,[br]convention of protocols

1:20:28.489,1:20:31.359
which behave in an open manner.

1:20:31.359,1:20:34.896
And so, this is for[br]example, your--

1:20:34.896,1:20:37.465
when you're looking at how[br]packets flow, there are commands

1:20:37.465,1:20:40.167
like traceroute that let you see[br]how they go through the internet

1:20:40.167,1:20:43.738
and you can map them through an[br]exchange point most of the time.

1:20:43.738,1:20:46.274
When you look at mail headers,[br]you can look at e-mail headers

1:20:46.274,1:20:48.676
and you can actually see,[br]wow that's not my e-mail,

1:20:48.676,1:20:51.512
it got from point A to[br]point B and it's visible

1:20:51.512,1:20:54.282
and you can see those[br]most of the time.

1:20:54.282,1:20:57.385
When you look at a packet that[br]you've received you can look

1:20:57.385,1:21:00.121
at the source address and[br]say, "Oh, where is that from?"

1:21:00.121,1:21:04.025
And you can look it up and[br]find it most of the time.

1:21:04.025,1:21:06.594
Now, there is no[br]obligations that any

1:21:06.594,1:21:08.429
of this information is accurate.

1:21:08.429,1:21:09.897
It's all sufficiently accurate

1:21:09.897,1:21:12.600
to keep the internet[br]running or at least so far.

1:21:12.600,1:21:15.336
And we hope it will[br]just keep it running,

1:21:15.336,1:21:18.873
but there's no actual[br]obligations and you need

1:21:18.873,1:21:23.077
to be careful because while[br]there would be some benefit

1:21:23.077,1:21:27.181
to having an attribute that says[br]there's an actual obligation

1:21:27.181,1:21:30.918
to make this accurate, then[br]I see people emerging saying,

1:21:30.918,1:21:34.455
"Well, wait a second, now I'm[br]worried about my anonymity

1:21:34.455,1:21:38.326
because now you can trace my[br]IP, or you can trace my e-mail."

1:21:38.326,1:21:43.931
So, we have just a[br]convention of transparency

1:21:43.931,1:21:46.133
which has been enough to[br]keep the internet running.

1:21:46.133,1:21:47.835
There is a question on[br]whether or not that's going

1:21:47.835,1:21:50.538
to actually work long term.

1:21:50.538,1:21:55.176
The point that was made by[br]Randy which is that the rate

1:21:55.176,1:21:58.379
at which you can attack[br]something digitally is a lot

1:21:58.379,1:21:59.914
faster than physically.

1:21:59.914,1:22:03.451
And this means that the ability[br]to have an accountable internet

1:22:03.451,1:22:07.822
where we can actually figure[br]out who sent the bomb threat

1:22:07.822,1:22:11.359
or figure out who sent the[br]e-mail which cause the problem

1:22:11.359,1:22:15.563
at the school is[br]potentially a very large duty

1:22:15.563,1:22:19.767
and it may require us making[br]a tradeoff between anonymity

1:22:19.767,1:22:24.138
and curated anonymity in[br]order to have accountability.

1:22:24.138,1:22:26.173
Right now it's not[br]clear that one

1:22:26.173,1:22:27.975
or the other is the[br]right answer.

1:22:27.975,1:22:31.245
>> So, we may-- we'll circle[br]back to this in the round table.

1:22:31.245,1:22:34.749
Let me move on to the[br]next question over here.

1:22:34.749,1:22:38.853
>> All right, I'm [inaudible][br]cofounder of Codex for Africa.

1:22:38.853,1:22:40.921
This is more to as[br]the techie side too

1:22:40.921,1:22:43.257
but at the same time[br]from a global view.

1:22:43.257,1:22:47.695
We represent thousand[br]of developers in Africa,

1:22:47.695,1:22:49.764
in the upcoming years it's going

1:22:49.764,1:22:51.832
to be more software[br]developers who're are going

1:22:51.832,1:22:56.070
to be creating thousands of[br]applications on mobile and web.

1:22:56.070,1:22:59.507
And one of the things is what[br]are the strategies there,

1:22:59.507,1:23:03.077
when you have emerging countries[br]or emerging economy jumping

1:23:03.077,1:23:06.213
on a bag of bandwagon of using[br]the internet to do transaction

1:23:06.213,1:23:08.849
with the US or the[br]western world.

1:23:08.849,1:23:12.486
What do you think what would[br]happen because I could be

1:23:12.486,1:23:16.924
in a country like Synagogue,[br]you know, do some hacking,

1:23:16.924,1:23:20.561
I can do anything I can because[br]you don't have access to the--

1:23:20.561,1:23:22.630
maybe the continent[br]level network.

1:23:22.630,1:23:27.935
But as well as the[br]western world,

1:23:27.935,1:23:29.804
what are your strategies[br]and all that?

1:23:29.804,1:23:33.607
>> Well, this is where[br]the law comes into play.

1:23:33.607,1:23:35.576
What we hear on the[br]techie side for instance is

1:23:35.576,1:23:38.345
of course there is laws[br]in hacking in the US,

1:23:38.345,1:23:41.048
but there is no laws[br]in hacking in China,

1:23:41.048,1:23:42.416
as we would understand it.

1:23:42.416,1:23:45.820
So, each country gets to define,[br]you know, what a hacking is.

1:23:45.820,1:23:49.323
Some may take it as an[br]assault against the government

1:23:49.323,1:23:51.192
if you are hacking, you know,

1:23:51.192,1:23:54.795
some might just say it's[br]a plain and simple theft.

1:23:54.795,1:23:57.131
So, you're going to have to-- I[br]would think you'd have to look

1:23:57.131,1:23:59.900
at each individual[br]country's definition

1:23:59.900,1:24:03.504
of what they considered to[br]be hacking in that case.

1:24:03.504,1:24:07.641
Now, on the other side, again,[br]if you're writing an application

1:24:07.641,1:24:09.810
for someone like that then[br]you're going to do logging,

1:24:09.810,1:24:12.480
you're going to do all of this[br]type of stuff because you want

1:24:12.480,1:24:15.749
to provide an auditor[br]if you will

1:24:15.749,1:24:17.952
if it's a financial[br]application with some record

1:24:17.952,1:24:20.654
of whatever transactions[br]your software handles.

1:24:20.654,1:24:23.557
So, there's always going to be[br]a record of something that you--

1:24:23.557,1:24:26.460
either your app did or[br]where your app went.

1:24:26.460,1:24:30.331
Whether it's accurate or[br]not that's another question

1:24:30.331,1:24:31.632
but there's always[br]going to be a record.

1:24:31.632,1:24:34.635
And again, metadata[br]analysis I can use that

1:24:34.635,1:24:35.903
and make some inferences

1:24:35.903,1:24:39.039
as to what you did even[br]though I can't see what you--

1:24:39.039,1:24:43.511
what's in your individual[br]packets if you encrypted them.

1:24:43.511,1:24:44.578
>> John?

1:24:44.578,1:24:48.716
>> So, that's an amazing[br]wake up call here.

1:24:48.716,1:24:51.552
So, we have this internet[br]that's remarkable.

1:24:51.552,1:24:56.056
It allows people to interact,[br]people in different countries

1:24:56.056,1:24:59.059
with different expectations[br]to interact.

1:24:59.059,1:25:00.995
And yet, the conventions

1:25:00.995,1:25:06.667
by which governments work[br]haven't evolved fast enough.

1:25:06.667,1:25:10.204
The idea that citizen in country[br]A is interacting with citizen

1:25:10.204,1:25:14.542
in country B and it might be[br]illegal in one country and not

1:25:14.542,1:25:17.111
in another is a whole[br]new concept

1:25:17.111,1:25:19.914
that governments are going[br]to take some time to try

1:25:19.914,1:25:21.448
to figure out how to deal with.

1:25:21.448,1:25:22.683
So, we have a problem.

1:25:22.683,1:25:25.352
We literally have an[br]internet that has capabilities

1:25:25.352,1:25:29.223
that governments haven't[br]come to grip on how

1:25:29.223,1:25:32.893
to handle their duties[br]and responsibilities.

1:25:32.893,1:25:35.429
I know governments[br]have feel very strongly

1:25:35.429,1:25:38.499
about protecting their[br]citizens against pornography

1:25:38.499,1:25:41.869
or against certain[br]types of content.

1:25:41.869,1:25:43.270
I know governments[br]in other countries

1:25:43.270,1:25:46.840
that feel very strongly that[br]that's up to each citizen.

1:25:46.840,1:25:49.944
But the reality is that that[br]intersection has now happened

1:25:49.944,1:25:51.145
because of the internet.

1:25:51.145,1:25:53.948
Two governments can have[br]very different views

1:25:53.948,1:25:56.817
on what their responsibilities[br]of their citizens are.

1:25:56.817,1:26:00.387
So, to answer your[br]question in a general case,

1:26:00.387,1:26:02.022
the internets move[br]faster than governments.

1:26:02.022,1:26:04.024
Governments literally do[br]not know how to interact

1:26:04.024,1:26:05.893
with the situation you describe.

1:26:05.893,1:26:09.396
On a practical matter, if[br]you end up doing something

1:26:09.396,1:26:13.033
of significance, something[br]that causes a lot of harm

1:26:13.033,1:26:17.271
or actually there's a very[br]nice list of types of attacks,

1:26:17.271,1:26:21.775
distraction of property, theft[br]of intellectual property.

1:26:21.775,1:26:25.412
There's different types[br]of extortion or DDoS,

1:26:25.412,1:26:29.416
if you actually do something of[br]a major magnitude you'll find

1:26:29.416,1:26:32.119
out that law enforcement does[br]cooperate between countries

1:26:32.119,1:26:33.520
and it works very well.

1:26:33.520,1:26:36.223
It's just not set up for[br]the scale of the internet.

1:26:36.223,1:26:39.560
And it's in the age[br]of the cooperation

1:26:39.560,1:26:41.195
between law enforcement

1:26:41.195,1:26:44.898
and various computer[br]response teams is one step

1:26:44.898,1:26:48.135
above fax machines ringing[br]and going back and forth.

1:26:48.135,1:26:51.538
We have the mechanism to[br]handle the really bad events

1:26:51.538,1:26:53.073
fairly slowly.

1:26:53.073,1:26:55.342
We don't have anything[br]to handle the scale

1:26:55.342,1:26:58.545
of automatic attacks[br]happening 24 hours a day

1:26:58.545,1:27:00.114
around the entire[br]globe which don't--

1:27:00.114,1:27:01.682
>> Let me move to Danny.

1:27:01.682,1:27:03.550
He wanted to say something[br]and then I'm going to move

1:27:03.550,1:27:05.152
on to the next question.

1:27:05.152,1:27:06.820
By the way, I can't[br]really talk to anybody

1:27:06.820,1:27:09.256
in New York once[br]I ask a question.

1:27:09.256,1:27:11.492
So, what they do I guess[br]they'll stand up or something

1:27:11.492,1:27:12.459
or else go through Paul.

1:27:12.459,1:27:13.794
Danny, go ahead.

1:27:13.794,1:27:17.965
>> I just want to make one[br]observation about the challenge

1:27:17.965,1:27:23.537
of international law[br]enforcement cooperation.

1:27:23.537,1:27:26.106
Most people in this room[br]are probably familiar

1:27:26.106,1:27:30.577
with the SOPA debate that was[br]proposed in United States.

1:27:30.577,1:27:33.814
In a certain sense we only[br]have that debate with all

1:27:33.814,1:27:40.154
of its cataclysm because of the[br]failure of current mechanisms

1:27:40.154,1:27:43.023
in international law[br]enforcement cooperation.

1:27:43.023,1:27:45.592
We have that debate, the[br]Congress was considering

1:27:45.592,1:27:50.564
that law blocking access

1:27:50.564,1:27:53.233
to websites outside[br]the United States

1:27:53.233,1:27:58.038
that might have infringing[br]content because people

1:27:58.038,1:27:59.473
in Congress were concerned

1:27:59.473,1:28:03.344
that US Law Enforcement didn't[br]have an effective way of working

1:28:03.344,1:28:07.781
with law enforcement[br]authorities from the countries

1:28:07.781,1:28:09.850
where the infringement[br]was actually happening.

1:28:09.850,1:28:16.256
I think that we have to get a[br]lot better as John is suggesting

1:28:16.256,1:28:18.859
at add enforcement cooperation.

1:28:18.859,1:28:21.895
There are realms where that[br]works reasonably well but it's--

1:28:21.895,1:28:25.632
the problem is it's mostly[br]cooperation in the form of how

1:28:25.632,1:28:30.003
to make a criminal conviction[br]against someone to stick.

1:28:30.003,1:28:32.773
Law enforcement cooperation[br]mechanisms are good

1:28:32.773,1:28:34.541
at exchanging evidence,[br]it make sure

1:28:34.541,1:28:37.811
that you have the information[br]you need to, you know,

1:28:37.811,1:28:41.215
bring someone to[br]trial but not good

1:28:41.215,1:28:45.219
at actually stopping[br]the behavior

1:28:45.219,1:28:47.054
that maybe harmful[br]as it's happening.

1:28:47.054,1:28:49.156
So, I think it's a[br]very big challenge.

1:28:49.156,1:28:51.792
>> All right, go to Paul for a--

1:28:51.792,1:28:53.727
>> I actually did see that[br]David Salmon [assumed spelling]

1:28:53.727,1:28:57.131
of the New York Society's[br]chapter president would

1:28:57.131,1:28:58.365
like to have a question.

1:28:58.365,1:28:59.700
So, why don't we go[br]to him if he will--

1:28:59.700,1:29:01.568
I think they have a[br]little bit of a delay.

1:29:01.568,1:29:05.539
So, he might just be[br]hearing this in a second.

1:29:05.539,1:29:07.441
>> OK David.

1:29:07.441,1:29:14.982
[ Inaudible Remark ]

1:29:14.982,1:29:22.689
>> OK, that's your cue David.

1:29:22.689,1:29:24.558
>> OK. I'll speak to the[br]camera then or-- yeah.

1:29:24.558,1:29:26.460
OK, so.

1:29:26.460,1:29:34.001
[ Inaudible Remark ]

1:29:34.001,1:29:36.570
OK, we have some delay here.

1:29:36.570,1:29:39.440
My question is what sort

1:29:39.440,1:29:41.608
of scenarios do our[br]panelists envision

1:29:41.608,1:29:45.712
and what would be some[br]alternative solutions

1:29:45.712,1:29:50.417
if our government specifically[br]Congress is unwilling or unable

1:29:50.417,1:29:54.755
to rain in agencies such as the[br]NSA in terms of surveillance?

1:29:54.755,1:29:57.057
If they can't do[br]it or choose not

1:29:57.057,1:29:58.992
to what would be[br]the consequences?

1:29:58.992,1:30:02.029
Are there technical solutions[br]or are there possible solutions

1:30:02.029,1:30:05.032
that could be implemented[br]without US government?

1:30:05.032,1:30:09.803
>> OK. The panelists are being--[br]the panelists are being asked,

1:30:09.803,1:30:11.605
is there a work around congress?

1:30:11.605,1:30:15.075
>> I would just to[br]speak to it just

1:30:15.075,1:30:16.944
as an individual not[br]as a panel member.

1:30:16.944,1:30:18.312
But if congress can't rain

1:30:18.312,1:30:21.548
in the government agency we[br]have a lot more serious problems

1:30:21.548,1:30:23.584
than what's going[br]on in the internet.

1:30:23.584,1:30:28.021
>> When was the last time[br]we passed a federal budget?

1:30:28.021,1:30:30.257
>> I mean, they are[br]government agency.

1:30:30.257,1:30:31.358
Congress has to do that.

1:30:31.358,1:30:34.695
Now, again, there is[br]classified information

1:30:34.695,1:30:37.865
and all this other stuff that[br]can influence how law is passed.

1:30:37.865,1:30:40.968
But quite frankly if congress[br]didn't have that power

1:30:40.968,1:30:43.737
to do it then we wouldn't see[br]General Alexander making a run

1:30:43.737,1:30:47.174
up to talk to members, I[br]think was it today or--

1:30:47.174,1:30:48.475
>> No, it's tomorrow.

1:30:48.475,1:30:49.409
>> Yeah, the vote is tomorrow.

1:30:49.409,1:30:50.944
So, you know, doing that,

1:30:50.944,1:30:53.780
so certainly I would think[br]congress has the ability to do

1:30:53.780,1:30:56.216
and should have the ability or[br]else we don't have a democracy.

1:30:56.216,1:30:59.820
>> OK, any other[br]panelist winging on that?

1:30:59.820,1:31:00.320
Lynn?

1:31:00.320,1:31:01.622
>> Well--

1:31:01.622,1:31:03.223
>> You can just say quicker[br]than I'm-- oh, I'm sorry.

1:31:03.223,1:31:04.324
>> No please.

1:31:04.324,1:31:06.527
>> That, you know, there[br]are ways for people

1:31:06.527,1:31:08.228
to manage their traffic.

1:31:08.228,1:31:11.331
I know I'm certainly certain[br]that would be even more ways

1:31:11.331,1:31:14.801
for people to manage their[br]traffic and choose the routing.

1:31:14.801,1:31:17.137
We actually are quite[br]concerned about that

1:31:17.137,1:31:20.707
because it will make the global[br]internet much less resilient.

1:31:20.707,1:31:24.545
It will-- putting something[br]in a box doesn't mean it's--

1:31:24.545,1:31:29.149
it maybe protecting it from[br]one country actually examine it

1:31:29.149,1:31:31.451
but it doesn't protect[br]the other country.

1:31:31.451,1:31:36.490
And so, I'm not quite sure[br]what David's question was but,

1:31:36.490,1:31:39.927
you know, if it's about[br]routing and the ability to route

1:31:39.927,1:31:42.829
around what you see as a[br]problem, I think we need

1:31:42.829,1:31:44.131
to be very, very[br]careful about what some

1:31:44.131,1:31:45.465
of those potential solutions are

1:31:45.465,1:31:47.501
and because I don't think[br]it will address the question

1:31:47.501,1:31:50.003
you're-- the problem you're[br]trying to route around.

1:31:50.003,1:31:54.274
And in fact it will overtime[br]make the global internet much

1:31:54.274,1:31:57.044
less resilient.

1:31:57.044,1:31:58.111
>> Paul?

1:31:58.111,1:31:59.880
>> OK, I have a question[br]from live stream.

1:31:59.880,1:32:01.615
It's from Garth Gram[br][assumed spelling].

1:32:01.615,1:32:03.850
He asks, is the real[br]issue autonomy

1:32:03.850,1:32:06.587
and self determined[br]choice rather than privacy?

1:32:06.587,1:32:09.423
And if so, what is[br]the role of identity

1:32:09.423,1:32:12.926
in addressing the[br]issue of trust?

1:32:12.926,1:32:20.634
>> Well, I'll take[br]one step at that.

1:32:20.634,1:32:24.871
I think that in the[br]discussions of privacy

1:32:24.871,1:32:31.778
over the last 10 years or[br]so, maybe longer I think

1:32:31.778,1:32:36.383
that we've gotten a little[br]bit distracted by the promise

1:32:36.383,1:32:41.588
of individual choice as[br]somehow the key to privacy.

1:32:41.588,1:32:45.325
I think that a lot of[br]the privacy values--

1:32:45.325,1:32:48.462
and what I mean by that[br]is the dialogue box is

1:32:48.462,1:32:51.898
that everyone sees in, you[br]know, one website or another

1:32:51.898,1:32:54.701
where you have to click here[br]to accept the privacy policy

1:32:54.701,1:32:57.571
or swat away a dialogue[br]box to proceed.

1:32:57.571,1:33:03.010
And I think certainly in-- it's[br]actually a remarkable point

1:33:03.010,1:33:06.179
of convergence between the[br]United States and Europe

1:33:06.179,1:33:10.150
in the last couple years[br]both the White House

1:33:10.150,1:33:13.620
and the Federal Trade Commission[br]issued major privacy policy

1:33:13.620,1:33:16.857
statements that noted[br]the limitations of this

1:33:16.857,1:33:20.293
so called noticing choice or[br]individual determination model.

1:33:20.293,1:33:23.563
The European certainly have[br]pointed that out as well.

1:33:23.563,1:33:26.333
A lot of the things[br]that we value associated

1:33:26.333,1:33:27.968
with privacy are[br]collected values.

1:33:27.968,1:33:30.871
We want to make sure[br]people can associate freely,

1:33:30.871,1:33:33.874
can engage in politics,[br]can engage in commerce,

1:33:33.874,1:33:36.143
can seek medical[br]care, et cetera.

1:33:36.143,1:33:39.846
And I think that giving[br]people the choices to opt

1:33:39.846,1:33:42.749
out of those things or[br]somehow control their identity

1:33:42.749,1:33:45.852
when they are trying to[br]speak to their doctor or make

1:33:45.852,1:33:48.155
up public political[br]statement really seems

1:33:48.155,1:33:51.992
to be exactly the opposite of[br]some of our core privacy value.

1:33:51.992,1:33:55.295
So, I think that[br]there are situations

1:33:55.295,1:33:58.131
in which individual[br]autonomy is quite important

1:33:58.131,1:34:00.901
but a little bit also to the[br]last question about the NSA.

1:34:00.901,1:34:04.404
I don't think we get ourselves[br]out of these privacy problems

1:34:04.404,1:34:13.280
by just giving people, you[br]know, 20K long encryption keys

1:34:13.280,1:34:15.549
to wield against everyone else.

1:34:15.549,1:34:16.750
>> Laura?

1:34:16.750,1:34:20.887
>> That's a really[br]interesting question and I want

1:34:20.887,1:34:22.689
to tie it back to something

1:34:22.689,1:34:25.792
that I think Danny said[br]before about data will flow.

1:34:25.792,1:34:27.728
And, you know, while[br]I agree with that,

1:34:27.728,1:34:30.797
that's also not necessarily[br]the case.

1:34:30.797,1:34:34.034
We have interconnection disputes[br]that have resulted in outages,

1:34:34.034,1:34:36.136
we've had countries[br]that have cut off access

1:34:36.136,1:34:37.437
for their citizens.

1:34:37.437,1:34:39.806
We have areas of the world[br]that have infrastructures

1:34:39.806,1:34:41.374
of complete censorship.

1:34:41.374,1:34:44.411
We have digital divide[br]issues, we have trends away

1:34:44.411,1:34:47.380
from interoperability where[br]we're going in the cloud

1:34:47.380,1:34:50.250
to more proprietary[br]protocols for example.

1:34:50.250,1:34:53.420
So, it's-- so data will[br]not necessarily flow.

1:34:53.420,1:34:55.288
But one of the things[br]that is required for it

1:34:55.288,1:34:59.126
to flow is this issue of trust[br]that the questioner brought up.

1:34:59.126,1:35:03.830
So, I think I can mention just[br]a couple of areas or maybe three

1:35:03.830,1:35:05.165
that are very important.

1:35:05.165,1:35:09.002
So, the trust has always excited[br]between network providers

1:35:09.002,1:35:12.639
to exchange information about[br]IP addresses that are either

1:35:12.639,1:35:15.876
in their control or that they[br]can reach on the internet.

1:35:15.876,1:35:18.678
But we have seen[br]examples that's done

1:35:18.678,1:35:20.814
by through a boarder[br]gateway protocol.

1:35:20.814,1:35:22.182
There have been examples

1:35:22.182,1:35:25.452
where false routes have been[br]advertised whether intentionally

1:35:25.452,1:35:28.555
or not and outages[br]have occurred.

1:35:28.555,1:35:31.525
So, there is-- our effort[br]is underway now to secure

1:35:31.525,1:35:33.126
that which are very necessary.

1:35:33.126,1:35:35.295
So, we have to build[br]trust into the network.

1:35:35.295,1:35:37.230
It's not something that[br]we can just assume.

1:35:37.230,1:35:39.900
It has to be designed in,[br]it has to be build in.

1:35:39.900,1:35:42.903
The same thing with how the[br]domain name system works.

1:35:42.903,1:35:45.972
We have servers located around[br]the world that resolve queries

1:35:45.972,1:35:50.343
of domain names like maybe I'm[br]up here looking at cnn.com,

1:35:50.343,1:35:54.014
I'm not but the domain[br]name server would resolve

1:35:54.014,1:35:57.050
that into its IP address[br]and route the information.

1:35:57.050,1:35:59.986
Well, that can be gamed also

1:35:59.986,1:36:03.223
and that there can be a[br]false return of a query.

1:36:03.223,1:36:06.526
So, having things like domain[br]name system security extensions

1:36:06.526,1:36:08.762
has to be continued[br]to be implemented.

1:36:08.762,1:36:10.997
You know, these are just[br]a few of the examples,

1:36:10.997,1:36:14.968
an answer to the question[br]that it has to be designed in,

1:36:14.968,1:36:18.104
same thing with website[br]authentication.

1:36:18.104,1:36:21.908
If I'm saying that correctly the[br]role of certificate authorities

1:36:21.908,1:36:24.311
and how they verify[br]through a digital signatures

1:36:24.311,1:36:27.247
that a website is who[br]the website says it is.

1:36:27.247,1:36:29.950
So, again, this is an[br]example of the politics

1:36:29.950,1:36:32.319
of the architecture, it's[br]no just about agreements

1:36:32.319,1:36:35.255
between people but about[br]designing this trust

1:36:35.255,1:36:37.457
and identity into[br]the infrastructure.

1:36:37.457,1:36:39.726
>> I'm going to move on[br]to the next question just

1:36:39.726,1:36:43.663
because I want to get the[br]audience as much opportunity

1:36:43.663,1:36:47.234
as I can because the[br]panelists are going to be able

1:36:47.234,1:36:50.904
to circle back on this[br]later on over here.

1:36:50.904,1:36:53.440
>> So, I'm Luke Wadman [assumed[br]spelling], I'm a student working

1:36:53.440,1:36:55.475
as a policy analyst intern,

1:36:55.475,1:36:58.378
analysis intern for[br]IEEE this summer.

1:36:58.378,1:37:00.513
I'm working on internet[br]governance issues.

1:37:00.513,1:37:04.050
And does the panel[br]think there is any--

1:37:04.050,1:37:10.056
would it be a good way to[br]frame the debate on privacy

1:37:10.056,1:37:13.426
and internet governance and[br]et cetera in economic terms

1:37:13.426,1:37:15.962
because if I've learned[br]anything in my time in DC it's

1:37:15.962,1:37:17.564
that catching the ear

1:37:17.564,1:37:20.200
of our congressional[br]representatives is easy

1:37:20.200,1:37:22.969
if you start talking about[br]jobs and job creation

1:37:22.969,1:37:27.207
and we've already talked a[br]little bit about the impact

1:37:27.207,1:37:31.878
of things like prism on US-based[br]IT companies like Google

1:37:31.878,1:37:34.381
and Facebook, particularly[br]in the EU

1:37:34.381,1:37:36.583
but also around the world.

1:37:36.583,1:37:39.819
One case is that Google isn't[br]really competitive in China

1:37:39.819,1:37:42.756
and that's probably going to[br]continue in that direction.

1:37:42.756,1:37:46.860
So, would that be a good way to[br]frame this whole conversation

1:37:46.860,1:37:48.395
and actually encourage some sort

1:37:48.395,1:37:52.265
of positive congressional[br]action?

1:37:53.600,1:37:56.703
>> So, I would never say[br]that I have any idea how

1:37:56.703,1:37:59.339
to encourage positive[br]congressional action.

1:37:59.339,1:38:02.375
I just want to put[br]that on the table.

1:38:02.375,1:38:03.944
I think it is true

1:38:03.944,1:38:07.514
that everything that's[br]happened this sort

1:38:07.514,1:38:13.753
of last six weeks inside this[br]sort of NSA bubble has happened

1:38:13.753,1:38:17.757
without any reference[br]as to what it might--

1:38:17.757,1:38:22.562
the impact that it might[br]have on US industry.

1:38:22.562,1:38:25.532
And I think it is possible[br]that the impact at least

1:38:25.532,1:38:27.300
in the short run maybe severe.

1:38:27.300,1:38:30.370
On the other hand a[br]lot of people may carry

1:38:30.370,1:38:33.873
on about being unhappy[br]about discovering

1:38:33.873,1:38:37.811
that the NSA is sucking[br]up their data.

1:38:37.811,1:38:42.816
Historically, when[br]the big comp--

1:38:42.816,1:38:45.685
if you look at the SOPA fight

1:38:45.685,1:38:47.554
which I think was[br]probably the first time

1:38:47.554,1:38:52.158
that US internet industry sort[br]of held hands with activists

1:38:52.158,1:38:56.329
and technologist, it does[br]get congresses attention.

1:38:56.329,1:39:00.066
I will say though that[br]National Security is different.

1:39:00.066,1:39:03.703
It is just always[br]different and the arc

1:39:03.703,1:39:08.575
of National Security has been[br]more, more, more since 9/11

1:39:08.575,1:39:13.813
and the question is whether[br]these revelations have sort

1:39:13.813,1:39:17.717
of pushed us beyond the[br]more and more place.

1:39:17.717,1:39:20.587
>> OK. Let's move over here.

1:39:20.587,1:39:24.457
>> Hi, I'm Susan Aaronson[br]with GW, I'm a professor here

1:39:24.457,1:39:26.559
and I work with the[br]Worldwide Web Foundation

1:39:26.559,1:39:28.428
on measuring internet openness.

1:39:28.428,1:39:32.032
And I want to ask you a[br]question that relates to trust,

1:39:32.032,1:39:34.034
the trust of policy makers.

1:39:34.034,1:39:38.271
So, in the last couple of[br]days we've seen [inaudible]

1:39:38.271,1:39:41.041
and Angle a Miracle [assumed[br]spelling] make these delightful

1:39:41.041,1:39:46.613
comments about sever locations[br]and threats in terms of privacy.

1:39:46.613,1:39:49.482
And again, I wonder[br]if there are--

1:39:49.482,1:39:52.919
so, they're basically saying[br]if the server can't be located

1:39:52.919,1:39:58.525
where we can control, where our[br]privacy rules dominate we might

1:39:58.525,1:40:01.194
not accept for example some

1:40:01.194,1:40:02.395
of the things the[br]United States wants

1:40:02.395,1:40:04.230
in the trade agreement or--

1:40:04.230,1:40:07.934
and we see similar things with[br]the Trans-Pacific Partnership

1:40:07.934,1:40:10.236
and I just wonder if you[br]could talk a little bit

1:40:10.236,1:40:11.571
about this now.

1:40:11.571,1:40:15.208
You know, you can always, for[br]national security reasons,

1:40:15.208,1:40:19.345
you can always say you have[br]a particular policy in place

1:40:19.345,1:40:21.181
and it's not protectionist.

1:40:21.181,1:40:23.349
But this is opposite[br]of that, right?

1:40:23.349,1:40:25.518
They're saying that[br]for privacy reasons,

1:40:25.518,1:40:31.458
they want to essentially[br]protect their citizens

1:40:31.458,1:40:33.426
from their information[br]being traded

1:40:33.426,1:40:36.696
by having the server[br]location in the United Stated.

1:40:36.696,1:40:40.600
If I may add one other[br]thing which is Frank La Rue,

1:40:40.600,1:40:44.637
who works for the-- who is[br]the UN Special Representative

1:40:44.637,1:40:48.174
on Freedom of Expression,[br]he has said basically

1:40:48.174,1:40:51.377
that the US' failure to protect[br]the privacy is a violation

1:40:51.377,1:40:53.146
of its human rights' obligation

1:40:53.146,1:40:55.148
because that is a[br]basic human right

1:40:55.148,1:40:57.750
under the Universal[br]Declaration, blah, blah, blah.

1:40:57.750,1:41:03.990
So I want to hear your comments.

1:41:03.990,1:41:05.225
>> Sure. I'll do this.

1:41:05.225,1:41:06.960
Pull it out there.

1:41:06.960,1:41:09.395
I'll-- the Trans-Pacific[br]Partnership

1:41:09.395,1:41:18.471
and the US Free Trade Agreement[br]is and always will have had

1:41:20.540,1:41:24.911
to address the data[br]privacy laws.

1:41:24.911,1:41:27.113
The Safe Harbor that[br]we had in place

1:41:27.113,1:41:31.918
in 2001 will actually[br]expire with the agreement.

1:41:31.918,1:41:35.488
And the United States, as you[br]know, has no national umbrella

1:41:35.488,1:41:37.357
for data breach and[br]data privacy.

1:41:37.357,1:41:41.494
We have 47 individual states[br]with their individual programs

1:41:41.494,1:41:43.263
and no national umbrella.

1:41:43.263,1:41:46.099
And so, if we're recalling[br]for congressional action

1:41:46.099,1:41:50.336
that had an economic, you[br]know, significant impact,

1:41:50.336,1:41:54.374
there are 52 pieces of[br]legislation currently

1:41:54.374,1:41:57.777
in 113th Congress[br]around cyber security,

1:41:57.777,1:41:59.646
about 10 of which[br]around data breach.

1:41:59.646,1:42:01.181
It would be wonderful[br]if we could get

1:42:01.181,1:42:03.716
to some bipartisan[br]agreement on that

1:42:03.716,1:42:07.787
so we could enable the[br]overall Free Trade Agreement

1:42:07.787,1:42:11.257
to move forward between[br]the two continents.

1:42:11.257,1:42:16.162
More specifically though, noting[br]the 47 different state laws

1:42:16.162,1:42:19.799
and noting the difference[br]between the Europe

1:42:19.799,1:42:23.836
and the United States,[br]cloud computing

1:42:23.836,1:42:27.574
and where the data is[br]stored follows the geography

1:42:27.574,1:42:29.976
and will always follow[br]the geography.

1:42:29.976,1:42:32.545
So if there's a data breach[br]here in the state of Virginia,

1:42:32.545,1:42:34.480
it follows a different[br]set of rules

1:42:34.480,1:42:37.550
than Massachusetts[br]and in California.

1:42:37.550,1:42:40.853
And a company, whoever the[br]company might be, actually has

1:42:40.853,1:42:44.324
to know all sets of laws[br]for that particular state

1:42:44.324,1:42:48.361
in this case in order to follow[br]the regulatory compliance,

1:42:48.361,1:42:49.429
et cetera.

1:42:49.429,1:42:51.798
That also is the same[br]for if it's stored

1:42:51.798,1:42:53.132
in the United Kingdom,

1:42:53.132,1:42:55.535
it follows the United Kingdom's[br]laws, and the Netherlands,

1:42:55.535,1:42:58.004
and Brazil, and you[br]pick the place.

1:42:58.004,1:43:04.711
And so when the EU and[br]the leaders of Germany

1:43:04.711,1:43:07.480
and elsewhere are talking[br]about the data protection

1:43:07.480,1:43:12.252
and data privacy, and they are[br]looking at the United States

1:43:12.252,1:43:15.221
and worried about how our data--

1:43:15.221,1:43:18.258
we're protecting[br]data and the privacy,

1:43:18.258,1:43:21.761
then it would be also important[br]understand how the European

1:43:21.761,1:43:26.933
companies are mirroring data[br]in other countries like Brazil

1:43:26.933,1:43:30.937
or South Africa or[br]Egypt or China or India,

1:43:30.937,1:43:34.040
et cetera because the data[br]always follows the law

1:43:34.040,1:43:39.112
of the geography[br]that it sits in.

1:43:39.112,1:43:42.181
>> I'll just add to that[br]that one of the things to--

1:43:42.181,1:43:46.886
I mean, obviously, the[br]NSA revelations have sort

1:43:46.886,1:43:50.156
of strengthened the EU's[br]hand in a discussion

1:43:50.156,1:43:52.458
that was going long before.

1:43:52.458,1:43:56.963
We have a particular view[br]of what privacy means.

1:43:56.963,1:44:02.101
It doesn't match up, going back[br]to this question earlier about,

1:44:02.101,1:44:06.973
you know, what economic kind of[br]motivation might move Congress.

1:44:06.973,1:44:10.376
One would think the US[br]companies would move forward

1:44:10.376,1:44:12.945
on a comprehensive[br]data protection regime

1:44:12.945,1:44:16.215
in the United States that[br]might be more flexible

1:44:16.215,1:44:20.553
and perhaps reflect the internet[br]more than the European one,

1:44:20.553,1:44:23.323
but I haven't seen them[br]step forward on that.

1:44:23.323,1:44:26.726
I think it would be interesting[br]for somebody to ask the question

1:44:26.726,1:44:30.863
about the various EU countries[br]in their surveillance regimes

1:44:30.863,1:44:33.733
because as much as I say[br]some very unpleasant things

1:44:33.733,1:44:37.136
about ours, I think you[br]would find that it--

1:44:37.136,1:44:39.405
with the exception[br]of our capacity

1:44:39.405,1:44:43.810
for the just incredible[br]scale of collection,

1:44:43.810,1:44:47.914
that the actual legal[br]protections are no better

1:44:47.914,1:44:50.583
at best and probably[br]a lot worse.

1:44:50.583,1:44:56.089
>> Just one comment on[br]the trade discussions.

1:44:56.089,1:44:58.091
Suzanne, I think[br]it's a very good,

1:44:58.091,1:45:00.593
it's a very important question.

1:45:00.593,1:45:04.564
I certainly think that,[br]you know, as you well know,

1:45:04.564,1:45:07.867
better than probably anyone[br]in this room, you know,

1:45:07.867,1:45:10.970
trade agreements have always[br]made exceptions for things

1:45:10.970,1:45:14.407
like national security,[br]public morals,

1:45:14.407,1:45:16.676
sometimes consumer[br]protections, things like that.

1:45:16.676,1:45:21.080
I think what we see now is[br]that simply pushing them off,

1:45:21.080,1:45:24.083
those issues off into the[br]exception category is not going

1:45:24.083,1:45:28.121
to work so we need[br]some kind of mechanism

1:45:28.121,1:45:30.323
that on the one hand[br]respects the fact

1:45:30.323,1:45:32.425
that governments do[br]have a legitimate

1:45:32.425,1:45:35.128
and important interest in[br]protecting their citizens

1:45:35.128,1:45:39.632
against unsafe products,[br]against human rights violations

1:45:39.632,1:45:42.235
if that's the way they do[br]privacy, against, you know,

1:45:42.235,1:45:44.604
security breaches,[br]what have you.

1:45:44.604,1:45:51.477
But tying that to the[br]location of data is, I think,

1:45:51.477,1:45:56.716
just an overly simplistic way[br]of accomplishing that purpose,

1:45:56.716,1:46:00.353
and I think, you know,[br]you can make fancy--

1:46:00.353,1:46:04.323
well, you can make fancy trade[br]arguments about why that's not,

1:46:04.323,1:46:07.727
you know, most favored[br]nation treatment.

1:46:07.727,1:46:13.065
But I think the bottom line is,[br]we used to have trade agreements

1:46:13.065,1:46:15.802
that were fundamentally about[br]tariffs and we've mostly dealt

1:46:15.802,1:46:18.204
with those issues, and now we[br]are going to trade agreements

1:46:18.204,1:46:21.507
that are fundamentally about[br]the non-tariff barriers

1:46:21.507,1:46:23.776
that exist between economies.

1:46:23.776,1:46:27.046
So we're going to have[br]to deal with that either.

1:46:27.046,1:46:30.883
I think that in the, you[br]know-- for some period of time,

1:46:30.883,1:46:35.388
I think the surveillance issues[br]will cloud those discussions

1:46:35.388,1:46:37.990
but we'll come back[br]to them at some point

1:46:37.990,1:46:40.827
and they will be[br]the same issues.

1:46:40.827,1:46:43.763
So-- and I-- the only thing I--

1:46:43.763,1:46:49.802
the only final thing I[br]would say, I think that one

1:46:49.802,1:46:51.204
of the big challenges[br]we're going to have

1:46:51.204,1:46:54.907
in the trade context on[br]internet issues is the challenge

1:46:54.907,1:47:00.146
that we found with ACTA,[br]that the ACTA was making--

1:47:00.146,1:47:02.448
[Inaudible Remark] Sorry, oh,[br]sorry, oh God, Steve is going

1:47:02.448,1:47:04.150
to throw that look at me.

1:47:04.150,1:47:10.523
So there was a trade agreement[br]involving intellectual property

1:47:10.523,1:47:17.163
enforcement whose[br]acronym is ACTA

1:47:17.163,1:47:22.268
and was very strenuously opposed[br]by civil society groups all

1:47:22.268,1:47:24.470
over the world because they[br]didn't know what it was,

1:47:24.470,1:47:26.539
they didn't know what was in[br]the agreement and they argued,

1:47:26.539,1:47:28.608
I think-- I thought,[br]quite legitimately

1:47:28.608,1:47:31.010
that if there are[br]going to be rules made

1:47:31.010,1:47:34.113
about intellectual property[br]rights that affect individuals,

1:47:34.113,1:47:36.182
there should be some[br]public discussion

1:47:36.182,1:47:37.783
of what those rules are.

1:47:37.783,1:47:42.121
Trade people believe they[br]somehow can't negotiate

1:47:42.121,1:47:43.489
in public.

1:47:43.489,1:47:46.125
And that's a sort of an article[br]of faith in the trade world.

1:47:46.125,1:47:50.329
They're going to have to learn[br]to be a little bit more public

1:47:50.329,1:47:53.466
if they're going to get anything[br]done on these issues is my deal.

1:47:53.466,1:47:55.401
>> Lynn, you got the last[br]word before the break.

1:47:55.401,1:47:56.802
>> Just quickly.

1:47:56.802,1:47:58.104
Not only-- it wasn't that they[br]wouldn't negotiate in public,

1:47:58.104,1:47:59.639
they would not authorize[br]a release

1:47:59.639,1:48:02.141
of the documents[br]post-negotiation.

1:48:02.141,1:48:04.243
They were not available[br]publicly.

1:48:04.243,1:48:06.846
>> So this sounds[br]like a thread going--

1:48:06.846,1:48:11.918
circling back to NSA and FISA[br]and all that, but I am sorry

1:48:11.918,1:48:15.488
that we have hit the point[br]where we promised we were going

1:48:15.488,1:48:18.291
to take a very brief five-minute[br]break that you're going

1:48:18.291,1:48:20.693
to have a chance to stretch[br]your legs, then we're going

1:48:20.693,1:48:26.699
to come back and people on the[br]panel will mix it up some more,

1:48:26.699,1:48:30.736
even better I suspect,[br]moderated by Steve Roberts.

1:48:30.736,1:48:33.239
But let's take a quick[br]five-minute break.

1:48:33.239,1:48:36.475
There will be one other[br]opportunity for you all to meet

1:48:36.475,1:48:38.744
and greet at least[br]most of the panelists

1:48:38.744,1:48:42.882
and there's a reception that[br]starts at 5:15 afterwards.

1:48:42.882,1:48:45.551
But for now, five-minute break,[br]we'll convene at 4 o'clock.

1:48:45.551,1:48:47.486
Thank you very much.

1:48:47.486,1:48:53.960
[ Inaudible Discussions ]

1:48:53.960,1:48:55.294
Well, thanks for[br]sticking around.

1:48:55.294,1:48:56.829
I know it's been[br]a long afternoon.

1:48:56.829,1:48:59.932
As Lance said, I'm[br]Steve Roberts.

1:48:59.932,1:49:02.335
I'm a professor here at[br]GW in the School of Media

1:49:02.335,1:49:04.570
and Public Affairs,[br]right across the street.

1:49:04.570,1:49:08.841
And my job is to try to[br]crystallize some of the issues

1:49:08.841,1:49:11.644
that we've been discussing

1:49:11.644,1:49:14.447
and [inaudible] some[br]conversation among

1:49:14.447,1:49:15.815
the panelists.

1:49:15.815,1:49:19.919
And I want to start by quoting[br]a couple of things I heard.

1:49:19.919,1:49:22.455
Lynn, for instance, said that

1:49:22.455,1:49:25.157
"unwanted surveillance[br]is not acceptable."

1:49:25.157,1:49:29.528
Leslie talked a lot[br]about human rights.

1:49:29.528,1:49:32.398
But there was a phrase

1:49:32.398,1:49:36.068
that I did not hear the entire[br]first hour and a half except

1:49:36.068,1:49:39.839
in passing, and that word[br]was "national security."

1:49:39.839,1:49:44.877
And so I want to pose this[br]question to the panel.

1:49:44.877,1:49:48.014
Isn't national security[br]a human right?

1:49:48.014,1:49:50.383
Isn't safety a human right?

1:49:50.383,1:49:57.123
Isn't the unwanted surveillance,

1:49:57.123,1:50:01.360
one person's unwanted[br]surveillance is another person's

1:50:01.360,1:50:06.432
protection from danger[br]and from terrorism?

1:50:06.432,1:50:10.703
So, I want to ask everybody,[br]what's the tradeoff here?

1:50:10.703,1:50:16.776
The whole idea in the first half[br]of this panel was the importance

1:50:16.776,1:50:20.146
of the freedoms in the internet.

1:50:20.146,1:50:21.480
But what are the limits,

1:50:21.480,1:50:23.916
and what are the[br]legitimate tradeoffs,

1:50:23.916,1:50:27.453
and how do we balance[br]legitimate human rights

1:50:27.453,1:50:29.922
against legitimate[br]rights to be safe

1:50:29.922,1:50:31.824
from terrorism and[br]other threats?

1:50:31.824,1:50:34.360
Who wants to start?

1:50:34.360,1:50:36.896
Go ahead, John.

1:50:36.896,1:50:42.435
>> So I'm going to almost answer[br]the question, but not quite.

1:50:42.435,1:50:50.543
It is true that the[br]governments have certain roles

1:50:50.543,1:50:51.911
and responsibilities.

1:50:51.911,1:50:56.916
And one of those roles is[br]there's a certain protection,

1:50:56.916,1:50:59.251
a certain defensive role

1:50:59.251,1:51:02.021
that a government feels[br]it has to provide.

1:51:02.021,1:51:06.559
And the question is how do[br]governments do what they see

1:51:06.559,1:51:09.128
as their obligations,

1:51:09.128,1:51:12.832
their actual responsibilities[br]given the internet.

1:51:12.832,1:51:16.268
The internet has not been[br]very good at this, OK?

1:51:16.268,1:51:16.969
So, --

1:51:16.969,1:51:18.204
>> Would you excuse me.

1:51:18.204,1:51:21.006
It's not just an obligation,[br]it's not just something

1:51:21.006,1:51:24.877
that they passing, this[br]is the first obligation

1:51:24.877,1:51:26.579
of government, is to protect--

1:51:26.579,1:51:27.146
>> Right.

1:51:27.146,1:51:27.980
>> -- people.

1:51:27.980,1:51:29.348
Isn't it the first obligation?

1:51:29.348,1:51:31.383
>> Ideal. One of the things that[br][inaudible] does, of course,

1:51:31.383,1:51:33.686
is we're responsible for[br]maintaining a registry

1:51:33.686,1:51:36.122
of IP addresses and that[br]registry is often used

1:51:36.122,1:51:39.525
because someone does[br]something in cyberspace

1:51:39.525,1:51:41.260
and the first thing[br]law enforcement would

1:51:41.260,1:51:44.263
like to know is, where is[br]that in the real world?

1:51:44.263,1:51:46.799
Because real world has the[br]people in organizations

1:51:46.799,1:51:48.534
and the cyberspace has to do

1:51:48.534,1:51:50.302
with domain names[br]and IP addresses.

1:51:50.302,1:51:53.305
And so, governments[br]feel they have

1:51:53.305,1:51:54.907
to enforce laws for example.

1:51:54.907,1:51:57.810
And yet the internet wasn't[br]built with an interface

1:51:57.810,1:52:01.380
for government is saying, "If[br]you're trying to do your duty,

1:52:01.380,1:52:04.383
here's how you go about[br]finding that person.

1:52:04.383,1:52:07.720
Here's how you go about doing[br]what you see as an obligation."

1:52:07.720,1:52:10.723
So, I know a lot of[br]people look at this

1:52:10.723,1:52:15.060
and they go this entire area of[br]governments and what they want

1:52:15.060,1:52:17.763
to do with the internet and[br]they want to take control

1:52:17.763,1:52:20.299
and they want to[br]do surveillance.

1:52:20.299,1:52:22.802
If you turn it around[br]and look at it,

1:52:22.802,1:52:25.004
remember that from the[br]government's perspective,

1:52:25.004,1:52:28.407
in many cases, these governments[br]feel they have an obligation

1:52:28.407,1:52:31.710
and the internet is[br]actively preventing them

1:52:31.710,1:52:33.579
from doing something[br]they're required

1:52:33.579,1:52:35.047
by their citizens to do.

1:52:35.047,1:52:38.350
So, we need to not omit the fact

1:52:38.350,1:52:42.521
that the internet doesn't[br]provide a friendly interface

1:52:42.521,1:52:43.856
to government.

1:52:43.856,1:52:47.226
So, me people would see that[br]as a feature but it's a fact

1:52:47.226,1:52:49.328
that shouldn't be[br]overlooked in the discussion.

1:52:49.328,1:52:50.062
>> Tradeoff.

1:52:50.062,1:52:51.230
What's the tradeoff?

1:52:51.230,1:52:52.198
Leslie?

1:52:52.198,1:52:54.500
>> So, I want to back this up.

1:52:54.500,1:52:56.869
This is not a new question[br]and it doesn't have

1:52:56.869,1:52:58.137
to do with the internet.

1:52:58.137,1:52:59.672
I mean, we have a--

1:52:59.672,1:53:04.210
an international[br]human rights framework

1:53:04.210,1:53:08.514
that explicitly makes national[br]security an exception for--

1:53:08.514,1:53:13.219
exception for-- in[br]human rights treaties.

1:53:13.219,1:53:16.589
It is an obligation of[br]the countries themselves

1:53:16.589,1:53:18.524
to protect our national[br]security.

1:53:18.524,1:53:21.493
But we also have an entire[br]developed jurisprudence

1:53:21.493,1:53:25.631
about publicly enacted[br]transparent law,

1:53:25.631,1:53:30.436
proportionate law, fair[br]process, remedy and oversight.

1:53:30.436,1:53:33.906
And, you know, I think[br]we just throw this

1:53:33.906,1:53:37.009
into the internet context, we're[br]just missing, there's a bit--

1:53:37.009,1:53:41.413
you know, there's a basic--[br]there's bodies of law and norms.

1:53:41.413,1:53:45.017
And the question here is not[br]whether there's a tradeoff,

1:53:45.017,1:53:46.685
it's whether you[br]reach a balance.

1:53:46.685,1:53:52.191
And I think when you have[br]most of this process secret,

1:53:52.191,1:53:55.794
the judicial process[br]secret, the oversight secret,

1:53:55.794,1:53:58.631
the interpretation[br]of the law secret,

1:53:58.631,1:54:01.200
then you cannot achieve[br]that balance.

1:54:01.200,1:54:03.269
The question at the[br]end of day is balance.

1:54:03.269,1:54:05.471
I certainly would take[br]issue with the idea

1:54:05.471,1:54:09.375
that the internet has been[br]unfriendly to law enforcement

1:54:09.375,1:54:11.610
and it's always this, you[br]know, we're going dark

1:54:11.610,1:54:13.012
and we can't see anything.

1:54:13.012,1:54:16.715
I think if we learned anything[br]over the last couple of months,

1:54:16.715,1:54:20.419
it's that law enforcement[br]really has access

1:54:20.419,1:54:22.021
to much more information

1:54:22.021,1:54:24.790
and that there is[br]therefore a temptation

1:54:24.790,1:54:27.726
to use what technology[br]has created

1:54:27.726,1:54:32.631
to go beyond what a balanced[br]human rights frame would allow.

1:54:32.631,1:54:34.199
And I think that's[br]what our problem is,

1:54:34.199,1:54:35.534
not that they're not[br]supposed to be [inaudible].

1:54:35.534,1:54:38.137
It is a first order of[br]business for government.

1:54:38.137,1:54:40.906
They are supposed to[br]protect their citizens.

1:54:40.906,1:54:44.977
But Steve, if you look at this[br]framework that's been created,

1:54:44.977,1:54:49.248
it was framework that was[br]created on a battlefield in Iraq

1:54:49.248,1:54:55.220
to make sure that you had every[br]less possible bid of information

1:54:55.220,1:54:58.557
to make sure you would[br]know about the IED.

1:54:58.557,1:55:03.362
And this whole haystack[br]and needle analogy assumes

1:55:03.362,1:55:06.532
that collecting a[br]haystack is proportionate,

1:55:06.532,1:55:08.167
and I don't think it is.

1:55:08.167,1:55:11.303
>> But the President[br]has said this program

1:55:11.303,1:55:13.305
of surveillance is[br]essential, the Director

1:55:13.305,1:55:16.709
of national security said that[br]it's essential, the Chairman

1:55:16.709,1:55:18.777
of the Senate Intelligence[br]Committee,

1:55:18.777,1:55:20.846
a liberal former mayor

1:55:20.846,1:55:23.649
of San Francisco had[br]said it's essential,

1:55:23.649,1:55:25.951
what's your quarrel with this?

1:55:25.951,1:55:29.121
And how do you rebut their[br]argument of everybody

1:55:29.121,1:55:33.359
who has had access to the[br]secret, say this is justifiable.

1:55:33.359,1:55:38.497
I'd like other people[br]to deal with this.

1:55:38.497,1:55:39.298
>> Please.

1:55:39.298,1:55:40.065
>> Yeah. [Multiple Speakers]

1:55:40.065,1:55:45.204
>> OK. So, it's-- there's

1:55:45.204,1:55:48.407
so many portrayals[br]of this as a binary.

1:55:48.407,1:55:50.976
And, you know, I think[br]the issue is more one

1:55:50.976,1:55:53.445
of degrees [phonetic] and[br]a more granular issue.

1:55:53.445,1:55:55.180
But there are some[br]binaries here, right?

1:55:55.180,1:55:57.616
We either have a[br]constitution or we don't.

1:55:57.616,1:55:59.918
We either have a fourth[br]amendment or we don't.

1:55:59.918,1:56:02.121
But if you start looking[br]at the actual practices

1:56:02.121,1:56:05.057
and I don't think we have a full[br]picture of exactly what's going

1:56:05.057,1:56:08.193
on but based on some of the[br]things that we've heard,

1:56:08.193,1:56:12.197
there are ways to enact the[br]necessary national security

1:56:12.197,1:56:16.568
without crossing the lines[br]that would be unacceptable

1:56:16.568,1:56:17.936
to the majority of the people.

1:56:17.936,1:56:21.507
So, having low level-- so[br]layers of control and layers

1:56:21.507,1:56:24.610
of accountability in the[br]processes of surveillance,

1:56:24.610,1:56:27.312
right, so not just having any[br]low level analyst being able

1:56:27.312,1:56:30.349
to take a fire hose of[br]information and download

1:56:30.349,1:56:33.485
that unto their computer just[br]to exaggerate the point, right?

1:56:33.485,1:56:35.487
So, there's the granularity,

1:56:35.487,1:56:37.423
there's getting the[br]information that's necessary,

1:56:37.423,1:56:38.891
there's the process[br]of accountability,

1:56:38.891,1:56:40.459
there's the issue[br]of judicial review.

1:56:40.459,1:56:42.294
So, I think that there are ways

1:56:42.294,1:56:45.330
to enact the necessary[br]national security now

1:56:45.330,1:56:47.866
that our public's[br]fear is online and now

1:56:47.866,1:56:50.903
that we have the privatization[br]of that public's fear

1:56:50.903,1:56:53.238
without going to the extremes

1:56:53.238,1:56:56.075
of basically having[br]the fire hose analogy

1:56:56.075,1:56:59.578
and just downloading[br]whatever data about anybody.

1:56:59.578,1:57:01.914
>> Anybody else on the panel[br]who want to pick on this?

1:57:01.914,1:57:03.816
Please, go ahead.

1:57:03.816,1:57:07.486
>> So, you want us to talk about[br]tradeoffs but I actually want

1:57:07.486,1:57:11.690
to suggest that I think a more[br]accountable clear system is

1:57:11.690,1:57:13.058
better for national security.

1:57:13.058,1:57:16.228
I think what's happening[br]now where you have very,

1:57:16.228,1:57:20.766
very broad authorities that[br]are unclear is almost the worst

1:57:20.766,1:57:23.869
of all possible worlds[br]for both civil liberties

1:57:23.869,1:57:27.439
and national security[br]because you have--

1:57:27.439,1:57:31.777
you have policy officials,[br]other governments, activists,

1:57:31.777,1:57:34.046
et cetera, poking[br]around in the business

1:57:34.046,1:57:36.849
of the intelligence community,[br]and that's not a very good thing

1:57:36.849,1:57:40.052
for them frankly, they want[br]to able to do what they do

1:57:40.052,1:57:45.791
of quietly and-- but in[br]order for us to do that,

1:57:45.791,1:57:49.962
in order for that to happen,[br]there has to be a clear sense

1:57:49.962,1:57:51.163
of what the rules are.

1:57:51.163,1:57:53.232
One sense I which-- I[br]largely agree with Leslie

1:57:53.232,1:57:55.400
but the one sense in which[br]I think this is an internet

1:57:55.400,1:57:58.704
problem is it's really[br]kind of a 9/11 problem,

1:57:58.704,1:58:00.472
and then I think a lot of[br]what's going on is going

1:58:00.472,1:58:06.044
on under the kind of exceptional[br]basis that we've handled a lot

1:58:06.044,1:58:08.981
of national security[br]issues post 9/11.

1:58:08.981,1:58:13.152
And to quote the President[br]again, ironically enough,

1:58:13.152,1:58:16.922
just a few weeks before this[br]whole surveillance story broke,

1:58:16.922,1:58:19.291
the President went to the[br]National Defense Universities,

1:58:19.291,1:58:24.263
you know, and gave a[br]speech saying, number one,

1:58:24.263,1:58:28.100
it is bad for a country[br]to be perpetually at war,

1:58:28.100,1:58:29.801
and number two, that[br]the threat level

1:58:29.801,1:58:35.440
from Al Qaeda was basically[br]below the level that it was

1:58:35.440,1:58:38.277
at 9/11, and that we should--

1:58:38.277,1:58:41.313
and that we should start[br]treating that threat,

1:58:41.313,1:58:45.250
that national security threat[br]as part of the norm not

1:58:45.250,1:58:47.152
as an exception that[br]we have to respond

1:58:47.152,1:58:50.455
to with these kinds[br]of exceptions.

1:58:50.455,1:58:52.958
This whole surveillance[br]program was created

1:58:52.958,1:58:54.960
as the President's[br]surveillance programs, you know,

1:58:54.960,1:58:57.162
as an exception, and[br]that's its problem.

1:58:57.162,1:58:58.297
If the problem is not--

1:58:58.297,1:58:59.998
>> Although continued by[br]a democratic president--

1:58:59.998,1:59:04.870
>> Yes, that will-- that's[br]right but I think that it needs

1:59:04.870,1:59:10.175
to be continued on a more[br]clear accountable basis.

1:59:10.175,1:59:14.913
And so I don't tend to accept[br]that the issue gets solved

1:59:14.913,1:59:17.282
by saying more surveillance,[br]less surveillance.

1:59:17.282,1:59:19.851
I think that the issue[br]is surveillance according

1:59:19.851,1:59:21.887
to what rules and with[br]what accountability.

1:59:21.887,1:59:25.057
>> Lynn I quoted [phonetic][br]you-- please, your turn.

1:59:25.057,1:59:26.325
>> Yeah. I mean, I'll come[br]to my point [inaudible]

1:59:26.325,1:59:29.561
but just [inaudible] said[br]unwarranted surveillance.

1:59:29.561,1:59:32.364
I recognize the difficulty[br]in unwanted thief

1:59:32.364,1:59:34.766
in the perspective[br]of the individual.

1:59:34.766,1:59:37.436
So, it's very much[br]an unwarranted.

1:59:37.436,1:59:38.403
>> Thank you.

1:59:38.403,1:59:39.171
>> But-- And I just[br]really wanted

1:59:39.171,1:59:40.372
to echo the three comments

1:59:40.372,1:59:42.841
that have been made here[br]very, very, very strongly.

1:59:42.841,1:59:45.010
When-- In a system[br]like the internet

1:59:45.010,1:59:47.913
which is breaking all barriers[br]where we're so interconnected

1:59:47.913,1:59:51.116
and so interdependent, we[br]have to change our paradigm

1:59:51.116,1:59:53.885
of looking at this and move[br]it to one of managing risk.

1:59:53.885,1:59:57.322
We can talk about in the context[br]of tradeoffs if you like.

1:59:57.322,1:59:59.725
But we really do[br]have to look at--

1:59:59.725,2:00:02.327
>> Wasn't that the only context?

2:00:02.327,2:00:06.265
Or isn't tradeoff is the only[br]legitimate way to talk about it?

2:00:06.265,2:00:09.034
Because we-- isn't that[br]what we do everyday?

2:00:09.034,2:00:11.136
>> I think tradeoff[br]is legitimate way

2:00:11.136,2:00:13.138
but I'm not sure we're[br]making the right tradeoffs

2:00:13.138,2:00:15.874
and I think we continue to[br]focus on national security

2:00:15.874,2:00:20.145
and quite often run[br]by flagrant abuses

2:00:20.145,2:00:23.582
than we're conflating the issue[br]or we're not pulling it apart.

2:00:23.582,2:00:26.251
It's not about national security[br]and what is the best way

2:00:26.251,2:00:28.820
to protect national security.

2:00:28.820,2:00:30.222
From my perspective, you know,

2:00:30.222,2:00:32.057
what our members[br]are actually upset

2:00:32.057,2:00:35.494
about is the flagrant[br]abuses and the lack

2:00:35.494,2:00:37.229
of transparency and the secrecy.

2:00:37.229,2:00:38.363
>> Yes, please.

2:00:38.363,2:00:42.267
>> And I think part of[br]the problem that I have

2:00:42.267,2:00:43.869
with hearing what they've said

2:00:43.869,2:00:45.971
for giving the reasons is[br]we haven't heard the reason

2:00:45.971,2:00:47.339
that makes sense.

2:00:47.339,2:00:50.042
It's-- why are you[br]collecting the data,

2:00:50.042,2:00:52.477
it's like the equivalent[br]of your mom

2:00:52.477,2:00:55.347
and dad saying well,[br]because I said so.

2:00:55.347,2:00:58.450
You have to give it something[br]behind that, you know, to--

2:00:58.450,2:01:01.953
is there a credible threat[br]at whatever level there is.

2:01:01.953,2:01:03.322
I think Danny is right.

2:01:03.322,2:01:06.725
I think the threat level from[br]what we've read in previous,

2:01:06.725,2:01:08.860
you know, speeches[br]by the President is

2:01:08.860,2:01:11.296
that the threat level is a[br]lot less than it was at 9/11.

2:01:11.296,2:01:13.098
Well, if it's a lot less[br]than it wasn't 9/11,

2:01:13.098,2:01:15.233
why do we need to expand this?

2:01:15.233,2:01:17.969
Give us something to look at.

2:01:17.969,2:01:21.373
But I think when I hear[br]them talk about these things

2:01:21.373,2:01:25.210
and give these reasons as[br]somebody who does this type

2:01:25.210,2:01:28.080
of metadata analysis[br]and, you know,

2:01:28.080,2:01:30.148
just as for my own[br]infrastructure was certainly

2:01:30.148,2:01:32.818
in my own infrastructure I[br]can do a lot of that analysis.

2:01:32.818,2:01:35.020
But there's an uplink to me.

2:01:35.020,2:01:37.556
And those people that[br]control that infrastructure,

2:01:37.556,2:01:39.324
my infrastructure,[br]your infrastructure,

2:01:39.324,2:01:41.259
they can do the same[br]type of analysis

2:01:41.259,2:01:43.028
and it trees all the way up.

2:01:43.028,2:01:45.664
It's-- So, why?

2:01:45.664,2:01:48.300
You have to give us[br]a credible reason.

2:01:48.300,2:01:50.469
>> But was running through a lot

2:01:50.469,2:01:53.705
of your comments is a basic[br]mistrust of government.

2:01:53.705,2:01:55.140
I mean you've been told--

2:01:55.140,2:01:59.678
public has been told by[br]the Intelligence committees

2:01:59.678,2:02:03.448
which have in brief that this[br]is a very valuable tool PRISM

2:02:03.448,2:02:06.051
and other surveillance are[br]very valuable to the President.

2:02:06.051,2:02:09.020
Duly elected democratic liberal[br]president had said it's a very

2:02:09.020,2:02:10.856
valuable tool, the[br]liberal chairman

2:02:10.856,2:02:12.891
of the Senate Intelligence[br]Committee has said it's a very

2:02:12.891,2:02:15.660
valuable tool and everyone[br]of you is doubting it.

2:02:15.660,2:02:20.932
So, what is the source of your[br]suspicions and your mistrust

2:02:20.932,2:02:22.434
of what you're being told?

2:02:22.434,2:02:24.703
>> So, I actually[br]don't, you know, when--

2:02:24.703,2:02:27.539
there's no way for us to[br]know if it's a valuable tool

2:02:27.539,2:02:28.940
or not a valuable tool.

2:02:28.940,2:02:32.611
So, you could take them at face[br]value that it's a valuable tool.

2:02:32.611,2:02:35.447
Collection of data[br]is a valuable thing.

2:02:35.447,2:02:39.418
It's just not the only analysis[br]in a democratic society.

2:02:39.418,2:02:41.319
And I think-- so, I mean, I--

2:02:41.319,2:02:44.156
and that's I think[br]the problem here,

2:02:44.156,2:02:48.427
we live in a democratic[br]society where we're supposed

2:02:48.427,2:02:52.230
to have proportional laws[br]that more than a small number

2:02:52.230,2:02:56.101
of people are able to know[br]about to assess that balance

2:02:56.101,2:02:58.203
between liberty and security.

2:02:58.203,2:03:00.071
We really don't have that.

2:03:00.071,2:03:03.008
I mean, if this was a discussion

2:03:03.008,2:03:07.312
that they were tasking[br]these companies

2:03:07.312,2:03:11.583
with specific request[br]based on articulable facts

2:03:11.583,2:03:13.418
about specific individuals

2:03:13.418,2:03:15.954
or even several hundred[br]individuals,

2:03:15.954,2:03:19.057
we might be having a different[br]discussion about the balance

2:03:19.057,2:03:21.326
between liberty and security.

2:03:21.326,2:03:23.695
But we're having a[br]discussion about the value

2:03:23.695,2:03:26.431
of basically collecting[br]the data potentially

2:03:26.431,2:03:27.566
on everybody in the world.

2:03:27.566,2:03:29.968
I mean, we don't know the set.

2:03:29.968,2:03:33.004
So, it's not about trust[br]of government or not.

2:03:33.004,2:03:36.174
You know, I think you could[br]probably come, you know,

2:03:36.174,2:03:39.344
device a program where you[br]know everything about everybody

2:03:39.344,2:03:41.947
in the world and claim[br]it makes you safer,

2:03:41.947,2:03:43.648
maybe it makes you safer.

2:03:43.648,2:03:48.019
But we no longer are[br]following either the values,

2:03:48.019,2:03:50.355
the constitution[br]or the norms of it.

2:03:50.355,2:03:52.324
>> Well, we see you're not[br]following the constitution.

2:03:52.324,2:03:56.461
These laws were passed by[br]democratically-elected Congress.

2:03:56.461,2:03:57.929
>> Well, having been there.

2:03:57.929,2:03:58.497
Yeah.

2:03:58.497,2:03:59.197
>> Yeah, right.

2:03:59.197,2:04:00.265
>> Having been there,

2:04:00.265,2:04:01.299
they didn't know what[br]they were passing

2:04:01.299,2:04:02.701
and they didn't know[br]what [inaudible].

2:04:02.701,2:04:04.169
>> So, [inaudible] to that, you[br]just said the issue wasn't trust

2:04:04.169,2:04:05.837
and you now you just say, well,

2:04:05.837,2:04:07.072
they didn't know what[br]they were passing.

2:04:07.072,2:04:08.440
>> They didn't know--[br]they didn't know--

2:04:08.440,2:04:10.542
>> If you believe well-- well,[br]let me ask you the question.

2:04:10.542,2:04:13.879
If you believe in a democratic[br]system, now you're saying,

2:04:13.879,2:04:15.146
I don't believe

2:04:15.146,2:04:16.815
in the democratic process[br]that's passed these laws.

2:04:16.815,2:04:18.016
>> No.

2:04:18.016,2:04:19.284
>> That they were[br]misinformed and we know better?

2:04:19.284,2:04:23.455
>> No. The laws have been[br]after the fact, stretched

2:04:23.455,2:04:26.491
and manipulated in ways[br]the Congress didn't intend.

2:04:26.491,2:04:31.596
And that's where-- and that's[br]where we've gone off the rails.

2:04:31.596,2:04:35.567
Nobody who is in Congress[br]at that time, Section 215,

2:04:35.567,2:04:37.269
the metadata law[br]that we're talking

2:04:37.269,2:04:40.105
about which is aimed[br]specifically US citizens.

2:04:40.105,2:04:44.509
In making the changes they[br]were making, nobody believed

2:04:44.509,2:04:48.780
that relevant data meant[br]everybody in the United States.

2:04:48.780,2:04:49.981
>> Let me ask you--

2:04:49.981,2:04:51.850
>> So, you know, this is--[br]so this is ultimately--

2:04:51.850,2:04:54.152
yes, it's a question[br]of trust in so far

2:04:54.152,2:04:58.323
as the people implementing the[br]law have made it as elastic

2:04:58.323,2:05:00.425
as possible without it[br]completely exploding

2:05:00.425,2:05:04.095
and it might not be exploding.

2:05:04.095,2:05:05.363
>> John.

2:05:05.363,2:05:07.599
>> I've expressed no view[br]on whether it's desirable

2:05:07.599,2:05:11.803
or undesirable or whether[br]it's illegal or legal.

2:05:11.803,2:05:15.507
Neither of those questions[br]are really interesting to me.

2:05:15.507,2:05:18.910
When it comes to[br]the internet though,

2:05:18.910,2:05:22.480
the question is there's[br]a set of events going

2:05:22.480,2:05:24.583
on regarding surveillance,

2:05:24.583,2:05:27.986
and the internet is[br]global in nature.

2:05:27.986,2:05:32.023
We have allies and[br]trading partners

2:05:32.023,2:05:39.230
and organizations globally,[br]other governments who want

2:05:39.230,2:05:42.300
to understand what's going

2:05:42.300,2:05:45.604
on because they may[br]have the same desire.

2:05:45.604,2:05:50.742
There may be another government[br]that wishes for its reasons

2:05:50.742,2:05:54.980
to engage in surveillance of[br]communication in its country.

2:05:54.980,2:05:58.750
And it wants to understand[br]what is the framework

2:05:58.750,2:06:02.854
by which this is occurring[br]and how does it happen

2:06:02.854,2:06:06.558
in the internet, how was it's[br]supported, how does it go

2:06:06.558,2:06:09.361
on because they have their[br]own national interests

2:06:09.361,2:06:12.497
and they may pass laws in their[br]region that are perfectly fine

2:06:12.497,2:06:15.700
and acceptable according[br]to their processes.

2:06:15.700,2:06:18.169
So, we now have this[br]framework that says,

2:06:18.169,2:06:19.738
there are circumstances during

2:06:19.738,2:06:22.507
which surveillance is[br]apparently an accepted part

2:06:22.507,2:06:23.875
of the architecture.

2:06:23.875,2:06:25.777
What we don't have[br]is a transparency

2:06:25.777,2:06:29.781
about where that's occurring and[br]how that occurs and what happens

2:06:29.781,2:06:32.550
if another 130 countries[br]also do it.

2:06:32.550,2:06:37.422
I believe that if we're to have[br]equitable internet governance,

2:06:37.422,2:06:40.425
it's necessary to have[br]a fully articulated

2:06:40.425,2:06:42.260
and transparent framework.

2:06:42.260,2:06:44.029
I do not know whether[br]or not everyone is going

2:06:44.029,2:06:46.831
to like what their country[br]chooses for what it does

2:06:46.831,2:06:48.333
with surveillance or not.

2:06:48.333,2:06:49.601
That's a different question.

2:06:49.601,2:06:51.736
That's a question of laws[br]and governance structure.

2:06:51.736,2:06:54.205
But if this is going to go[br]on, we need to understand

2:06:54.205,2:06:56.741
where it occurs and how[br]it occurs and the fact

2:06:56.741,2:06:58.977
that it could be occurring[br]in a lot of places.

2:06:58.977,2:07:01.980
And that should be understood[br]and documented as part

2:07:01.980,2:07:06.351
of a clearly transparent[br]recognition

2:07:06.351,2:07:08.019
that this is part[br]of the internet.

2:07:08.019,2:07:11.089
>> Let me ask you[br]all this question.

2:07:11.089,2:07:12.724
You said you're not[br]interested in legality.

2:07:12.724,2:07:17.629
But one of the key debates[br]here is the legal framework

2:07:17.629,2:07:20.398
for PRISM and the FISA law.

2:07:20.398,2:07:26.471
And there's not much[br]debate about whether

2:07:26.471,2:07:29.541
or what's been taking places[br]legal or not under the law,

2:07:29.541,2:07:32.510
but there's a big debate about[br]whether the law is the right law

2:07:32.510,2:07:34.212
and whether the framework[br]should be altered.

2:07:34.212,2:07:39.417
If you all were to testify[br]before an intelligence

2:07:39.417,2:07:42.153
committees and others[br]on the Hill and asked,

2:07:42.153,2:07:44.155
how should this law be change

2:07:44.155,2:07:46.257
to advance the values[br]your talking about?

2:07:46.257,2:07:48.393
What would be some[br]of your suggestions?

2:07:48.393,2:07:51.696
Go ahead.

2:07:51.696,2:07:54.933
>> I think we have to start[br]by walking out the changes

2:07:54.933,2:07:59.104
that we made in the[br]records law because we took

2:07:59.104,2:08:02.607
out all the words that[br]make it proportionate

2:08:02.607,2:08:06.644
and make it targeted[br]and transformed it

2:08:06.644,2:08:08.913
into a broad collection statute.

2:08:08.913,2:08:12.183
And I, you know, I think[br]the ways to walk it back

2:08:12.183,2:08:17.589
that allows substantial[br]collection of targets

2:08:17.589,2:08:22.093
and information related to[br]that targets and backs it

2:08:22.093,2:08:27.499
out of this broad relevancy[br]standard that allows it--

2:08:27.499,2:08:30.735
if one to be collected[br]on anybody but also not--

2:08:30.735,2:08:34.672
it just takes out the whole[br]national security purpose.

2:08:34.672,2:08:38.009
Basically, you no longer[br]have to be collecting data

2:08:38.009,2:08:39.778
because of a particular[br]terrorist

2:08:39.778,2:08:42.847
or particular intelligence[br]activity.

2:08:42.847,2:08:45.550
You only have to be[br]collecting in order

2:08:45.550,2:08:47.786
to be protecting[br]the United States.

2:08:47.786,2:08:52.557
And that is simply to fraud[br]and to likely to abuse.

2:08:52.557,2:08:55.426
It is harder for me to[br]note what have changed 702

2:08:55.426,2:08:57.595
because we still don't[br]understand what they're doing.

2:08:57.595,2:08:59.164
>> And [inaudible] going[br]to thought about these--

2:08:59.164,2:09:02.467
>> Except for the transparence--[br]except for greater transparency.

2:09:02.467,2:09:05.069
>> 'Cause this is-- this[br]is going to be debated

2:09:05.069,2:09:06.304
in the weeks and months ahead.

2:09:06.304,2:09:07.605
It's a very important question.

2:09:07.605,2:09:08.873
>> But the traditional method

2:09:08.873,2:09:11.376
of before the haystack[br]love [phonetic],

2:09:11.376,2:09:12.877
if you allow me to call it that.

2:09:12.877,2:09:14.679
Before that was placed,[br]the traditional methods

2:09:14.679,2:09:16.981
of law enforcement[br]worked, and they would work

2:09:16.981,2:09:18.983
with whatever the[br]internet had to provide.

2:09:18.983,2:09:20.518
You needed to identify somebody.

2:09:20.518,2:09:24.155
You usually identify them[br]through a non-technical aspect.

2:09:24.155,2:09:26.958
You had an informant[br]somebody tell you, "Hey,

2:09:26.958,2:09:29.928
I think that you were doing[br]something illegal," and that--

2:09:29.928,2:09:31.963
that puts the focus on you.

2:09:31.963,2:09:34.432
From there, you would use[br]your traditional tools whether

2:09:34.432,2:09:36.301
they're on the net or[br]not to find, you know,

2:09:36.301,2:09:38.036
to find out what's going on.

2:09:38.036,2:09:45.143
Collecting data when there's[br]no evidence of a crime is kind

2:09:45.143,2:09:47.612
of counter intuitive and[br]kind of productive in a way

2:09:47.612,2:09:49.848
because it's sitting there.

2:09:49.848,2:09:53.351
So, if it were me and I was an[br]adversary of the United States,

2:09:53.351,2:09:57.288
I would find where those--[br]that database was being stored

2:09:57.288,2:10:00.024
and I would go after it to[br]collect all that information

2:10:00.024,2:10:02.126
because I can do the same[br]type of metadata analysis

2:10:02.126,2:10:03.194
that could be done that way.

2:10:03.194,2:10:07.332
The third thing is--[br]the reason why we--

2:10:07.332,2:10:09.567
you've mentioned earlier that[br]maybe we've mistrusted is

2:10:09.567,2:10:14.005
because we know what can be[br]done with that data and we know

2:10:14.005,2:10:15.139
when somebody-- we know

2:10:15.139,2:10:18.109
when somebody has given[br]us a [inaudible] answer.

2:10:18.109,2:10:20.678
Because I know that if I[br]control my infrastructure,

2:10:20.678,2:10:23.848
I know the power that I[br]have doing in my office,

2:10:23.848,2:10:27.085
I have to act responsibly[br]and within, you know,

2:10:27.085,2:10:28.219
the laws and all that.

2:10:28.219,2:10:30.054
But I know what can be done

2:10:30.054,2:10:33.258
if there's no oversight[br]on my position.

2:10:33.258,2:10:34.959
And that's why I[br]think you hear--

2:10:34.959,2:10:36.227
>> But there is oversight.

2:10:36.227,2:10:38.997
It is, you know, I mean they--

2:10:38.997,2:10:42.200
>> It would be if you were-- if[br]you were the oversight committee

2:10:42.200,2:10:46.471
for what I would do technically,[br]do you have the technical skills

2:10:46.471,2:10:48.406
to know what I'm doing?

2:10:48.406,2:10:49.407
[Inaudible Remark]

2:10:49.407,2:10:52.877
>> So I'm going to[br]leave the legal--

2:10:52.877,2:10:55.880
so the legal policy[br]questions, I largely agree

2:10:55.880,2:10:57.015
with what has been said.

2:10:57.015,2:10:59.083
I don't think that we[br]have adequate oversight.

2:10:59.083,2:11:02.854
And if I were-- I was talking[br]to Congress about what to do

2:11:02.854,2:11:04.689
to increase the trust[br]in this environment,

2:11:04.689,2:11:07.025
I would say that that Congress

2:11:07.025,2:11:09.827
and the FISA court[br]needs a more effective

2:11:09.827,2:11:11.296
accountability mechanism.

2:11:11.296,2:11:14.499
There is no way that the FISA[br]court judges or the members

2:11:14.499,2:11:16.301
of the Intelligence[br]community are looking

2:11:16.301,2:11:17.568
at every single query--

2:11:17.568,2:11:18.569
>> Right.

2:11:18.569,2:11:20.505
>> -- that NSA analysts[br]are performing

2:11:20.505,2:11:22.006
on these enormous[br]amounts of data.

2:11:22.006,2:11:23.775
It is technically possible to do

2:11:23.775,2:11:26.010
that to Mike Nelson's [assumed[br]spelling] earlier point

2:11:26.010,2:11:30.949
to actually evaluate whether[br]when Bob led the general counsel

2:11:30.949,2:11:34.385
of ODNI says, "Yeah, we have[br]the whole state haystack

2:11:34.385,2:11:37.722
but we only ask questions[br]based on certain predicates."

2:11:37.722,2:11:40.291
I know Bob and I more[br]or less trust him

2:11:40.291,2:11:43.661
but I think it's outrageous[br]for the government to say

2:11:43.661,2:11:46.431
to its citizens,[br]"Don't worry, trust us."

2:11:46.431,2:11:48.599
We give the government[br]considerable authority

2:11:48.599,2:11:50.401
but we need mechanisms[br]to make sure it's being

2:11:50.401,2:11:51.602
used responsibly.

2:11:51.602,2:11:53.538
And none of the oversight[br]mechanisms that exist

2:11:53.538,2:11:57.775
that you've mentioned are[br]able to provide that kind

2:11:57.775,2:12:00.244
of accountability[br]other than to call

2:12:00.244,2:12:02.580
up a responsible[br]person like, you know,

2:12:02.580,2:12:03.748
Mr. Ledin [assumed[br]spelling] say,

2:12:03.748,2:12:04.882
"Are you following the rules?"

2:12:04.882,2:12:06.517
And he says, "Yes, we're[br]following the rules."

2:12:06.517,2:12:09.420
He doesn't even know what[br]every single analyst does

2:12:09.420,2:12:11.122
in the agencies that's[br]responsible for it.

2:12:11.122,2:12:15.226
>> Let me ask you about one of[br]the proposals that has been made

2:12:15.226,2:12:17.161
and why they debated[br]in Washington.

2:12:17.161,2:12:20.832
And so, a lot of people[br]pointed out one of the flaws,

2:12:20.832,2:12:23.167
critics had pointed[br]out one of the flaws

2:12:23.167,2:12:26.804
in the FISA process is there's[br]no adversarial mechanism

2:12:26.804,2:12:31.709
within the FISA system that the[br]government comes in and asks

2:12:31.709,2:12:35.646
for permission and there[br]is no counter voice.

2:12:35.646,2:12:37.348
There is no adversarial[br]proceeding.

2:12:37.348,2:12:42.220
And in most legal systems, there[br]is a mechanism for challenging.

2:12:42.220,2:12:45.990
So, a number of legislative[br]proposals have been advanced

2:12:45.990,2:12:47.392
in one form or another.

2:12:47.392,2:12:50.361
Is this one of the mechanism set[br]that Congress should be looking

2:12:50.361,2:12:53.531
at to try to reorder[br]this balance that many

2:12:53.531,2:12:55.166
of you think is out way?

2:12:55.166,2:12:59.270
>> Yeah. I actually think[br]this question of some kind

2:12:59.270,2:13:02.306
of a public advocate and[br]I think it's probably--

2:13:02.306,2:13:05.576
we figured it out how to give[br]private lawyers the ability

2:13:05.576,2:13:07.378
to look at classified[br]information

2:13:07.378,2:13:09.380
and criminal procedures.

2:13:09.380,2:13:12.216
We ought to be able to come up[br]with this table of those people

2:13:12.216,2:13:15.353
who litigate the[br]national security state,

2:13:15.353,2:13:18.356
who can stand in for the public.

2:13:18.356,2:13:24.762
And, you know, I think it's one[br]of many potential points of sort

2:13:24.762,2:13:28.299
of strengthening oversight here.

2:13:28.299,2:13:30.835
I think it's-- I think[br]it's critically important.

2:13:30.835,2:13:32.336
I think different levels of sort

2:13:32.336,2:13:35.039
of reporting back[br]to the FISA court.

2:13:35.039,2:13:37.041
I think part of the[br]problem and the reason

2:13:37.041,2:13:39.477
that people are responding[br]is, I mean,

2:13:39.477,2:13:42.914
it's interesting FISA was[br]a civil liberties measure

2:13:42.914,2:13:46.150
when it was adopted in 1978.

2:13:46.150,2:13:48.686
And, you know, it's basically[br]my mentors were the civil

2:13:48.686,2:13:51.589
libertarians who[br]proposed this crazy idea.

2:13:51.589,2:13:58.696
And the world is really[br]different from the ones in 1978.

2:13:58.696,2:14:02.300
And being in contact with[br]a foreign person, I mean,

2:14:02.300,2:14:03.968
you know, there was[br]an iron curtain.

2:14:03.968,2:14:05.436
If you were-- if they[br]could actually figure

2:14:05.436,2:14:08.239
out you were communicating[br]with a foreign person,

2:14:08.239,2:14:10.708
it probably had some[br]significance.

2:14:10.708,2:14:12.777
We now live in this[br]world where 20 percent

2:14:12.777,2:14:15.746
of us are first generation,

2:14:15.746,2:14:18.549
where our corporations[br]are global,

2:14:18.549,2:14:21.886
where we travel all the[br]time, and where we--

2:14:21.886,2:14:24.555
people don't identify[br]themselves in that the same kind

2:14:24.555,2:14:28.226
of we-them way and[br]yet we have a law

2:14:28.226,2:14:31.295
and a designation[br]of foreign persons.

2:14:31.295,2:14:34.966
That really is a Cold[br]War era and almost has

2:14:34.966,2:14:37.235
to be reconsidered[br]all by itself.

2:14:37.235,2:14:39.871
And the law can't[br]be working very well

2:14:39.871,2:14:41.672
because it's not[br]supposed to sweep

2:14:41.672,2:14:43.541
up American's communications.

2:14:43.541,2:14:46.077
And all you have to do is read[br]the minimization guidelines

2:14:46.077,2:14:48.846
to understand how much of our[br]communications [inaudible].

2:14:48.846,2:14:53.151
>> Hal Berghel wrote[br]an interesting article

2:14:53.151,2:14:56.087
that just came out in[br]IEEE Computer magazine.

2:14:56.087,2:14:57.788
It's called "Through[br]the PRISM Darkly".

2:14:57.788,2:15:00.024
And there's a quote[br]in there that says,

2:15:00.024,2:15:01.893
"The Foreign Intelligence[br]Surveillance Court has an

2:15:01.893,2:15:05.930
approval rate of 99.93 percent[br]of all surveillance requests.

2:15:05.930,2:15:08.666
While this might not meet[br]the strict definition

2:15:08.666,2:15:10.902
of a kangaroo court,[br]it seems to fall

2:15:10.902,2:15:13.237
within the marsupial family."

2:15:13.237,2:15:13.971
So--

2:15:13.971,2:15:15.339
[ Laughter ]

2:15:15.339,2:15:18.509
The point of it is is that there[br]are, you know, there are two

2:15:18.509,2:15:22.046
and he calls them cyber urban[br]myths that deal with this.

2:15:22.046,2:15:25.216
One is that you do need[br]to all of this, you know,

2:15:25.216,2:15:28.753
information to do it[br]and that there's not--

2:15:28.753,2:15:30.821
there's sufficient oversight.

2:15:30.821,2:15:31.856
And I think we all agree,

2:15:31.856,2:15:34.525
there's not sufficient[br]oversight.

2:15:34.525,2:15:39.797
You wouldn't ask me to be on[br]a medical oversight committee

2:15:39.797,2:15:42.033
to review surgical procedures

2:15:42.033,2:15:43.801
because I'm not a[br]doctor, I'm not a surgeon.

2:15:43.801,2:15:46.070
I don't have that[br]expertise in that area.

2:15:46.070,2:15:47.371
And so, I think that's the--

2:15:47.371,2:15:49.040
I think that's the thing

2:15:49.040,2:15:53.244
that bothers the technology[br]people is we know it is a small

2:15:53.244,2:15:56.013
community of the actual people[br]that know the nuts and bolts

2:15:56.013,2:15:58.616
about technology security[br]from that standpoint.

2:15:58.616,2:16:00.818
And if we don't know[br]each other by--

2:16:00.818,2:16:04.088
personally, we know each other[br]by reputation and whatever.

2:16:04.088,2:16:07.992
And so when you look and[br]you query your other peers

2:16:07.992,2:16:10.161
and they have the same[br]misgivings that you do,

2:16:10.161,2:16:11.596
then it makes you[br]wonder what's going on.

2:16:11.596,2:16:15.800
>> I just want to make one[br]other point about the people

2:16:15.800,2:16:19.203
who are being swept up in[br]this-- in this surveillance.

2:16:19.203,2:16:20.705
I think one of the reasons

2:16:20.705,2:16:23.040
that more fine-grained[br]accountability is really

2:16:23.040,2:16:26.110
critical is we don't know

2:16:26.110,2:16:29.380
but I think it's a safe[br]assumption that, you know,

2:16:29.380,2:16:32.683
somewhere north of 90 percent[br]of the people who are on any

2:16:32.683,2:16:36.153
of these terrorism watch list[br]who were the targets of any

2:16:36.153,2:16:38.623
of this surveillance[br]are Arab-Americans

2:16:38.623,2:16:40.424
who have some connection[br]to the Middle East,

2:16:40.424,2:16:42.826
many of whom are[br]probably Muslims.

2:16:42.826,2:16:45.563
In this country, we don't[br]have a great history

2:16:45.563,2:16:49.734
of treating minorities[br]perfectly fairly.

2:16:49.734,2:16:54.305
And part of the reason we[br]have oversight mechanisms,

2:16:54.305,2:16:57.174
part of reason we have open[br]courts, part of reason we try

2:16:57.174,2:17:02.713
to have due process with public[br]visibility is to make sure

2:17:02.713,2:17:05.516
that we actually do[br]our job and really--

2:17:05.516,2:17:08.084
and really treating people[br]fairly and not discriminating.

2:17:08.084,2:17:11.522
And again, I don't--[br]I don't think--

2:17:11.522,2:17:13.591
I think it's really interesting,[br]you hear this panel,

2:17:13.591,2:17:14.892
you hear the public discussion.

2:17:14.892,2:17:16.994
I don't think through[br]that many people saying,

2:17:16.994,2:17:18.896
"Stop the Surveillance."

2:17:18.896,2:17:20.031
People are not saying that I was

2:17:20.031,2:17:22.400
in Boston during the[br]marathon bombings.

2:17:22.400,2:17:25.036
People are clamoring for the[br]instillation of more cameras.

2:17:25.036,2:17:27.638
You know, the question[br]I really believe is not

2:17:27.638,2:17:30.508
about whether law enforcement[br]should have these tools.

2:17:30.508,2:17:32.109
It's about whether[br]we can feel confident

2:17:32.109,2:17:34.779
that they're using[br]them responsibly.

2:17:34.779,2:17:37.781
>> One of you made[br]the point that--

2:17:37.781,2:17:39.483
actually, this is[br]not a new issue--

2:17:39.483,2:17:42.852
that just a few years ago,[br]Washington posted an expose,

2:17:42.852,2:17:46.424
a very lengthy one, Diana Press[br][assumed spelling] and others.

2:17:46.424,2:17:50.460
And there was not anything[br]like the same kind of reaction

2:17:50.460,2:17:52.263
that there's been lately.

2:17:52.263,2:17:55.333
And I'm wondering why you[br]think what's the difference,

2:17:55.333,2:17:58.536
why has there been such--[br]why are we having this panel

2:17:58.536,2:17:59.637
and not three years ago.

2:17:59.637,2:18:01.572
Why is there so much[br]conversation now

2:18:01.572,2:18:04.674
about this issue[br]when, in fact, when--

2:18:04.674,2:18:08.379
at least some of this[br]was made known through--

2:18:08.379,2:18:10.448
to post another mechanisms[br]some years ago?

2:18:10.448,2:18:11.816
>> Smartphones.

2:18:11.816,2:18:13.484
>> We didn't have the numbers,[br]we didn't have the numbers.

2:18:13.484,2:18:15.852
I mean, from the Verizon[br]order, we now know.

2:18:15.852,2:18:17.321
It's-- I don't remember[br]how many millions

2:18:17.321,2:18:18.723
of people's records were--

2:18:18.723,2:18:20.825
tens of millions of people's[br]records were collected.

2:18:20.825,2:18:23.294
We had-- we have[br]general outlines

2:18:23.294,2:18:26.931
from the post reporting,[br]from, you know, from all kinds

2:18:26.931,2:18:30.300
of things but we did-- it was[br]not dramatized with numbers.

2:18:30.300,2:18:33.637
And I think and now we know[br]it's basically everyone's data.

2:18:33.637,2:18:35.638
We never actually knew[br]that was happening.

2:18:35.638,2:18:36.540
>> Right. I think that's right.

2:18:36.540,2:18:38.609
I also think there was an uproar

2:18:38.609,2:18:43.280
when the warrantless[br]wiretapping was first revealed.

2:18:43.280,2:18:45.750
We had a very big[br]battle in Congress.

2:18:45.750,2:18:47.550
People were really[br]worried about it.

2:18:47.550,2:18:49.420
People who were not[br]following it closely

2:18:49.420,2:18:51.922
and they passed an amendment[br]might have actually thought

2:18:51.922,2:18:54.325
that what we wound[br]up with was some kind

2:18:54.325,2:18:56.093
of additional procedural[br]protections.

2:18:56.093,2:18:59.730
Instead, we wound up-- what we[br]wound up with was a ratification

2:18:59.730,2:19:01.898
of that program, immunity

2:19:01.898,2:19:05.468
for the providers,[br]and not much more.

2:19:05.468,2:19:09.173
And so I, you know, I[br]think a lot of us knew some

2:19:09.173,2:19:12.009
of this was going on but[br]I think we didn't know.

2:19:12.009,2:19:14.844
One of my colleagues, Jim[br]Dempsey who's on the Privacy

2:19:14.844,2:19:19.884
and Civil Liberties Oversight[br]Board wrote an article saying,

2:19:19.884,2:19:22.852
"Did they just approve[br]a vacuum cleaner?"

2:19:22.852,2:19:25.489
And lots of people then[br]responded with, "Oh,

2:19:25.489,2:19:28.092
you know, that's ridiculous."

2:19:28.092,2:19:31.529
Well, no, in fact, they[br]approved a vacuum cleaner

2:19:31.529,2:19:33.297
and we didn't know it.

2:19:33.297,2:19:34.432
>> Laura? Laura.

2:19:34.432,2:19:35.566
>> I agree with those points.

2:19:35.566,2:19:38.035
I think it is a matter[br]of scale in this case.

2:19:38.035,2:19:39.670
But I think there are[br]few other points, too,

2:19:39.670,2:19:41.472
that are a little[br]bit more subtle.

2:19:41.472,2:19:43.207
So, one issue is that this came

2:19:43.207,2:19:46.811
after Hillary Clinton's[br]internet freedom speech

2:19:46.811,2:19:50.981
and this entire mean[br][phonetic] that has been created

2:19:50.981,2:19:54.318
and I think rightly[br]replicated around the world

2:19:54.318,2:19:55.786
about internet freedom.

2:19:55.786,2:20:00.891
So, this is a very important[br]issue and what this does is it--

2:20:00.891,2:20:03.727
it's providing an opportunity[br]for people to challenge

2:20:03.727,2:20:07.031
that notion of the internet[br]freedom and to point

2:20:07.031,2:20:09.567
out what they're[br]calling hypocrisy.

2:20:09.567,2:20:12.269
So, that to me is a problem.

2:20:12.269,2:20:16.440
It can also be an opportunity[br]if it's addressed appropriately.

2:20:16.440,2:20:21.512
Another issue is that individual[br]citizens are living their life

2:20:21.512,2:20:23.380
online to a much greater extent

2:20:23.380,2:20:25.049
than they did five[br]years ago even.

2:20:25.049,2:20:27.051
It's really amazing[br]if you think.

2:20:27.051,2:20:29.019
I mean, I'll just give you[br]an example I was talking

2:20:29.019,2:20:29.820
about today.

2:20:29.820,2:20:31.856
So, five years ago, I was--

2:20:31.856,2:20:34.225
I would read the paper[br]in the morning and now,

2:20:34.225,2:20:37.194
I'm completely connected to[br]my smartphone all the time

2:20:37.194,2:20:40.397
and I am posting information,[br]I'm communicating in it.

2:20:40.397,2:20:42.800
So, the public sphere[br]is what's at stake here.

2:20:42.800,2:20:44.468
The public sphere is online.

2:20:44.468,2:20:45.803
And I think that[br]that is much greater

2:20:45.803,2:20:48.606
than during these last[br]instances a few years ago

2:20:48.606,2:20:49.874
that were mentioned.

2:20:49.874,2:20:53.143
So, scale, the issue of[br]people being more cognizant

2:20:53.143,2:20:56.247
about how their internal[br]private life is lived

2:20:56.247,2:20:59.183
out in the digital[br]realm and also the mean

2:20:59.183,2:21:01.685
that has been fairly successful

2:21:01.685,2:21:03.988
about internet freedom[br]has ensued

2:21:03.988,2:21:06.857
in these intervening years.

2:21:06.857,2:21:09.426
>> I think those were[br]grilling [phonetic] points.

2:21:09.426,2:21:10.394
>> Yeah. [Multiple Speakers]

2:21:10.394,2:21:12.263
>> I was just going[br]to say quickly

2:21:12.263,2:21:15.733
that technology makes lots of[br]things possible and it was clear

2:21:15.733,2:21:17.167
at the time of those articles.

2:21:17.167,2:21:18.502
It's clear today.

2:21:18.502,2:21:21.238
It doesn't mean that[br]it's eminently minable

2:21:21.238,2:21:23.974
but that's done outside[br]of due process.

2:21:23.974,2:21:25.142
And I think those are the things

2:21:25.142,2:21:26.510
that are getting[br]people excitable.

2:21:26.510,2:21:30.114
It's not technology and it's[br]not what's technically possible

2:21:30.114,2:21:32.016
or even what's technically[br]feasible.

2:21:32.016,2:21:37.221
It's actually ultimately[br]the full mining

2:21:37.221,2:21:39.790
and then the lack[br]of public scrutiny.

2:21:39.790,2:21:41.892
>> What about the argument[br]that you hear from some people

2:21:41.892,2:21:45.796
that not only are we three[br]years farther away from 9/11?

2:21:45.796,2:21:48.499
Several of you made[br]the point that a lot

2:21:48.499,2:21:52.169
of these original[br]processes were passed almost

2:21:52.169,2:21:55.673
in a battlefield mentality,[br]one of you used that phrase.

2:21:55.673,2:22:01.478
And that there were extreme[br]circumstances with the value

2:22:01.478,2:22:02.479
of national security

2:22:02.479,2:22:04.815
in protecting the[br]homeland very much

2:22:04.815,2:22:06.784
in the forefront[br]of a public debate.

2:22:06.784,2:22:10.654
So you got three years later[br]but some people would argue--

2:22:10.654,2:22:12.289
there's almost a[br]contradiction here.

2:22:12.289,2:22:14.758
Certainly the intelligence[br]community would say, "Well,

2:22:14.758,2:22:18.329
actually people are more[br]relaxed now and less concerned

2:22:18.329,2:22:21.632
about the threat because[br]our systems have worked

2:22:21.632,2:22:24.468
and that you shouldn't[br]be dismantling systems

2:22:24.468,2:22:26.570
which have actually made[br]people more secure."

2:22:26.570,2:22:27.938
How would you answer that?

2:22:27.938,2:22:29.340
>> Let's concentrate to what[br]the President has said though.

2:22:29.340,2:22:31.241
I mean, what the[br]President has told us--

2:22:31.241,2:22:33.110
>> Although he has said[br]he's in favor of the system.

2:22:33.110,2:22:36.947
>> Yes. And he said that[br]the capability is necessary.

2:22:36.947,2:22:39.850
He's in no way precluded[br]additional oversight.

2:22:39.850,2:22:42.286
I think he's actually[br]welcomed the discussion of--

2:22:42.286,2:22:43.354
>> Sure.

2:22:43.354,2:22:44.688
>> -- of what kind[br]of oversight we need.

2:22:44.688,2:22:49.226
But he said we're living[br]it in a lower threat level

2:22:49.226,2:22:52.396
and that we need to make[br]changes as a society

2:22:52.396,2:22:54.465
and as government[br]in response to that.

2:22:54.465,2:22:57.968
So, not the other way around.

2:22:57.968,2:23:03.941
>> Edward Snowden, to some[br]people he's a traitor.

2:23:03.941,2:23:05.376
To some people, he's a hero.

2:23:05.376,2:23:07.111
What do you think?

2:23:07.111,2:23:11.649
>> Everybody, on your clearance[br]you signed a document that says,

2:23:11.649,2:23:15.786
"If you disclose secrecy,[br]there's a penalty."

2:23:15.786,2:23:18.822
So, from that standpoint,[br]you clearly violated

2:23:18.822,2:23:23.927
that document and, you know,[br]I don't have a problem with--

2:23:23.927,2:23:26.563
with being prosecuted[br]because of that.

2:23:26.563,2:23:27.865
On the oversight--

2:23:27.865,2:23:29.633
>> Because it this contractual--

2:23:29.633,2:23:30.868
>> Because it is contractual.

2:23:30.868,2:23:32.336
I mean, it states, "Anybody[br]who has a clearance."

2:23:32.336,2:23:34.605
You have that-- it's in[br]your-- in the agreement,

2:23:34.605,2:23:38.308
and it says clearly that you,[br]you know, 25 years in prison

2:23:38.308,2:23:39.309
or whatever it is that--

2:23:39.309,2:23:40.044
>> You actually read that?

2:23:40.044,2:23:41.812
>> No, it's-- yeah.

2:23:41.812,2:23:44.515
It happens when you come from[br]a family of lawyers, you know.

2:23:44.515,2:23:45.849
>> It's privacy policy.

2:23:45.849,2:23:48.052
>> No. I mean, you look-- yeah,[br]I mean, if I'm going to go

2:23:48.052,2:23:50.220
to jail, I want to know[br]what I have to say, right?

2:23:50.220,2:23:52.923
And, so I think-- I think[br]from that standpoint, yes.

2:23:52.923,2:23:54.792
I think the rest of the[br]community is still trying

2:23:54.792,2:23:57.895
to divide it as to whether[br]or not the information

2:23:57.895,2:24:01.065
that is disclosed is a problem.

2:24:01.065,2:24:03.100
And some people go back kind

2:24:03.100,2:24:06.070
of like what I was saying[br]is there have been articles

2:24:06.070,2:24:08.172
about this for, you[br]know, a long time.

2:24:08.172,2:24:10.374
You know, you can go[br]back into the '70s

2:24:10.374,2:24:14.445
when NSA had the ECHELON[br]program, in the mid-'90s

2:24:14.445,2:24:16.613
with Omnivore and[br]Carnivore, you know,

2:24:16.613,2:24:17.648
all of those type of things.

2:24:17.648,2:24:18.816
You've had this type

2:24:18.816,2:24:20.884
of electronic surveillance[br]for quite sometime.

2:24:20.884,2:24:24.054
So, we're not quite sure what[br]it is and not having seen all

2:24:24.054,2:24:27.224
that is disclosed but we're[br]not quite sure of what it is

2:24:27.224,2:24:31.829
that he's telling the world[br]that we don't know already.

2:24:31.829,2:24:35.299
And so from that stand point,[br]I think part of my community,

2:24:35.299,2:24:37.901
we're not sure about[br]the content.

2:24:37.901,2:24:40.738
But certainly he violated an[br]agreement and he, you know,

2:24:40.738,2:24:43.040
that's what they're going[br]to go after him for.

2:24:43.040,2:24:46.410
>> So I have mixed views[br]about Snowden because I think

2:24:46.410,2:24:49.213
that whistleblowing in a[br]free society and a right

2:24:49.213,2:24:51.348
to know is critically important.

2:24:51.348,2:24:54.651
And if you go back[br]to Pentagon Papers

2:24:54.651,2:24:57.788
and terrible things did not[br]happen with the publishing

2:24:57.788,2:24:59.523
of the Pentagon Papers.

2:24:59.523,2:25:02.226
[ Pause ]

2:25:02.226,2:25:04.261
So-- so, part of--

2:25:04.261,2:25:05.796
>> I'll cover the[br]Pentagon Papers story and--

2:25:05.796,2:25:06.797
>> I'm sure--

2:25:06.797,2:25:07.765
>> -- cover Daniel[br]Ellsberg's trial.

2:25:07.765,2:25:08.465
So, I'm--

2:25:08.465,2:25:09.099
>> And Ellsberg's trial.

2:25:09.099,2:25:09.800
>> Yes.

2:25:09.800,2:25:10.834
>> And Ellsberg is very,

2:25:10.834,2:25:13.771
very out there right[br]now about Snowden.

2:25:13.771,2:25:16.073
I was kind of right with him

2:25:16.073,2:25:21.311
until he started keeping away[br]the US cyber security strategy

2:25:21.311,2:25:24.114
with respect to China[br]while he was in Hong Kong.

2:25:24.114,2:25:29.253
And then I started to wonder[br]exactly what he's motivations

2:25:29.253,2:25:30.587
were, you know.

2:25:30.587,2:25:35.526
And so, I do feel like[br]there's a level or recklessness

2:25:35.526,2:25:42.299
that worries me and although[br]it's hard for me to really know

2:25:42.299,2:25:45.836
if there's damage to national[br]security because I've set

2:25:45.836,2:25:48.972
in some of these meetings[br]with national security people

2:25:48.972,2:25:51.909
who I've held up the[br]minimization guidelines

2:25:51.909,2:25:53.277
and said, "Is there anything

2:25:53.277,2:25:55.379
in here that's really[br]secret or should be?"

2:25:55.379,2:25:56.847
And they said, "No."

2:25:56.847,2:26:00.184
The existence of[br]these programs sort

2:26:00.184,2:26:02.853
of have been broad-brushed[br]some people knew.

2:26:02.853,2:26:05.022
So, if at the end of the day,

2:26:05.022,2:26:06.390
it's that the public[br]finally knows

2:26:06.390,2:26:08.325
that it's happening[br]'cause I'm not sure

2:26:08.325,2:26:10.894
if any thing's been revealed[br]that will allow people

2:26:10.894,2:26:15.232
to somehow evade all of this,[br]that, I think, you know,

2:26:15.232,2:26:18.302
society has to make[br]room for whistleblowers.

2:26:18.302,2:26:20.304
I just wish we had[br]whistleblowers

2:26:20.304,2:26:23.407
who were a little less reckless.

2:26:23.407,2:26:24.708
>> Well, you know,[br]as a whistleblower,

2:26:24.708,2:26:26.910
he appears to have[br]delusions of grandeur.

2:26:26.910,2:26:28.011
>> Well, right.

2:26:28.011,2:26:28.979
>> I mean, the first[br]couple of days, he had--

2:26:28.979,2:26:31.014
he'd made statements[br]such as saying--

2:26:31.014,2:26:33.483
such as that he could order[br]a wiretap of the President

2:26:33.483,2:26:35.853
and he could, you know,[br]had all the locations

2:26:35.853,2:26:37.254
of all the NSA stations.

2:26:37.254,2:26:42.626
Pretty unlikely, that said,[br]I guess the, you know,

2:26:42.626,2:26:45.796
I think that his disclosures[br]have done a public service.

2:26:45.796,2:26:47.931
I think he's a whistleblower[br]in that sense.

2:26:47.931,2:26:48.999
I actually agree.

2:26:48.999,2:26:50.434
It seems like he[br]just broken the law

2:26:50.434,2:26:52.336
and doesn't seem[br]very complicated.

2:26:52.336,2:26:55.205
What I find confusing and--

2:26:55.205,2:26:59.676
is that somehow the[br]traditional notion

2:26:59.676,2:27:02.880
of civil disobedience seems[br]to have been lost track

2:27:02.880,2:27:04.514
of in what he's doing.

2:27:04.514,2:27:06.250
I mean, I wish-- I mean, look,

2:27:06.250,2:27:09.353
he's obviously has put his[br]life at total risk and--

2:27:09.353,2:27:11.622
>> Although traditional[br]idea is you pay the penalty

2:27:11.622,2:27:12.956
for having broken the law.

2:27:12.956,2:27:14.324
>> You pay the penalty and[br]you [inaudible] having a trial

2:27:14.324,2:27:16.994
and you expose-- you expose the[br]things that you're concerned

2:27:16.994,2:27:19.263
about and you expose[br]them, further look at me.

2:27:19.263,2:27:20.597
He's a civilian.

2:27:20.597,2:27:23.667
He wouldn't be tried in a[br]court martial the way Bradley

2:27:23.667,2:27:24.401
Manning is.

2:27:24.401,2:27:25.402
>> Right.

2:27:25.402,2:27:26.803
>> He could've staged[br]a public trial

2:27:26.803,2:27:30.540
and a big public discussion that[br]he chose not to and I, you know,

2:27:30.540,2:27:31.909
again, it's not for me

2:27:31.909,2:27:35.512
to say how people should put[br]their lives at risk as he'd has

2:27:35.512,2:27:38.782
but I think it's a-- I think[br]it's an incomplete active

2:27:38.782,2:27:40.450
civil disobedience.

2:27:40.450,2:27:42.519
>> Anybody else want[br]it, got a view on that?

2:27:42.519,2:27:45.155
Let me ask you another question.

2:27:45.155,2:27:49.059
One of the things that[br]Dan said that the--

2:27:49.059,2:27:51.261
are the very interesting[br]analysis when he talked

2:27:51.261,2:27:53.864
about the internet not being[br]a creature of the state,

2:27:53.864,2:27:55.933
how earlier forms

2:27:55.933,2:27:59.937
of communication whether[br]it's telephones and telegraph

2:27:59.937,2:28:02.205
and so many of them grew up.

2:28:02.205,2:28:05.142
Television spectrums,[br]I mean, they were sold

2:28:05.142,2:28:07.177
by the government,[br]right, and still are.

2:28:07.177,2:28:12.015
So, there was an inherent[br]regulatory legal organic

2:28:12.015,2:28:14.484
connection between earlier[br]forms of communication

2:28:14.484,2:28:18.288
and government regulation which,[br]as you point out is missing

2:28:18.288,2:28:22.159
in a large part in this[br]particular system we've all been

2:28:22.159,2:28:23.593
talking about.

2:28:23.593,2:28:25.562
>> But it's more than a legal[br]question it seems to me,

2:28:25.562,2:28:30.767
it's also a cultural question,[br]that a lot of you being soaked

2:28:30.767,2:28:32.602
in this culture and committed

2:28:32.602,2:28:37.607
to this culture have evinced[br]skepticism of government

2:28:37.607,2:28:42.045
and of regulation and yet at[br]the same time, you're grappling

2:28:42.045,2:28:46.016
with the notion of how do you[br]bring some order to a system

2:28:46.016,2:28:50.921
that continues to cry out[br]for some kind of regulation.

2:28:50.921,2:28:53.690
I'm interested for you[br]to use a little bit

2:28:53.690,2:28:58.095
about the contradiction between[br]sort of the historic origins

2:28:58.095,2:29:01.999
and the culture of this[br]system and the need

2:29:01.999,2:29:05.035
to bring some order[br]and regulation to it.

2:29:05.035,2:29:07.671
It seems to me there's an[br]inherent conflict that's worth

2:29:07.671,2:29:09.740
talking about.

2:29:09.740,2:29:10.841
Start.

2:29:10.841,2:29:11.942
>> I'll kick off the[br]discussion about that.

2:29:11.942,2:29:15.746
I think sometimes when[br]you go to a workshop

2:29:15.746,2:29:18.482
that discusses internet[br]governance,

2:29:18.482,2:29:23.687
it descends into a question[br]such as who should grab the keys

2:29:23.687,2:29:25.288
of internet governance, right?

2:29:25.288,2:29:26.323
So, the question of--

2:29:26.323,2:29:27.624
so if question were asked

2:29:27.624,2:29:30.794
such as should the United[br]Nations control the internet

2:29:30.794,2:29:32.829
or should the United[br]States control it

2:29:32.829,2:29:34.064
or should Google control it?

2:29:34.064,2:29:36.166
Like those kinds of[br]questions don't make any sense

2:29:36.166,2:29:37.667
in their first instance.

2:29:37.667,2:29:41.204
And part of that is because[br]there is no monolithic system

2:29:41.204,2:29:42.305
of internet governance.

2:29:42.305,2:29:45.142
It's highly granular,[br]it's multi layered.

2:29:45.142,2:29:47.577
There are-- there are[br]so many different levels

2:29:47.577,2:29:49.746
of internet governance.

2:29:49.746,2:29:51.381
I mean, I-- my book is very long

2:29:51.381,2:29:53.316
and I only get into[br]some of them.

2:29:53.316,2:29:56.453
But the issue here is[br]multistakeholder governance

2:29:56.453,2:29:57.854
and what that means.

2:29:57.854,2:30:01.191
So, internet governance is very[br]interesting because it is not

2:30:01.191,2:30:03.660
about governments necessarily[br]but that doesn't mean

2:30:03.660,2:30:05.295
that there's not a[br]role for government

2:30:05.295,2:30:06.963
in many different areas.

2:30:06.963,2:30:09.599
So, if I have identity theft,[br]I'd like the government

2:30:09.599,2:30:10.600
to step in and help me.

2:30:10.600,2:30:12.702
I expect antitrust enforcement.

2:30:12.702,2:30:15.806
I expect laws about--[br]some laws about privacy.

2:30:15.806,2:30:16.973
I expect some laws

2:30:16.973,2:30:19.109
about intellectual[br]property rights enforcement.

2:30:19.109,2:30:22.079
I expect certain national[br]statute on any variety

2:30:22.079,2:30:25.515
of things related to[br]trade, child protection.

2:30:25.515,2:30:28.785
So, there are many places[br]for the government to be

2:30:28.785,2:30:31.054
in internet regulation[br]and governance.

2:30:31.054,2:30:34.157
But most functions[br]that are related

2:30:34.157,2:30:36.660
to the operational[br]stability and security

2:30:36.660,2:30:39.129
of the internet have[br]not been the purview

2:30:39.129,2:30:40.297
of traditional governments

2:30:40.297,2:30:42.532
but they have been enacted[br]by private industry.

2:30:42.532,2:30:44.734
And I think that that's[br]a very important point.

2:30:44.734,2:30:47.270
Now, tying this back[br]to the PRISM issue,

2:30:47.270,2:30:52.109
one concern that I have is[br]that the one separate area

2:30:52.109,2:30:54.478
of how the internet is[br]being used in the data

2:30:54.478,2:30:56.713
that can be collected[br]and gathered will bleed

2:30:56.713,2:30:59.349
into this other area of[br]the operational stability

2:30:59.349,2:31:01.084
and security of the internet.

2:31:01.084,2:31:05.455
So, we can expect to see[br]this issue used as a proxy

2:31:05.455,2:31:08.191
for governments that are[br]interested in gaining control

2:31:08.191,2:31:10.327
in certain operational[br]areas of the internet.

2:31:10.327,2:31:12.429
I guarantee that[br]that will happen.

2:31:12.429,2:31:14.531
So, we'll see that in some--

2:31:14.531,2:31:16.833
once he calls for[br]international treaties.

2:31:16.833,2:31:19.236
Again, that leave[br]out private industry.

2:31:19.236,2:31:21.071
That leave out civil society.

2:31:21.071,2:31:23.874
We'll see it in additional[br]calls for bringing

2:31:23.874,2:31:26.443
in a more multilateral control

2:31:26.443,2:31:28.245
of some critical[br]internet resources.

2:31:28.245,2:31:30.680
So, I think one bleeds[br]into another.

2:31:30.680,2:31:34.351
But that it's really not[br]about private industry

2:31:34.351,2:31:37.320
versus governments[br]or civil society

2:31:37.320,2:31:39.723
versus private industry,[br]for example.

2:31:39.723,2:31:42.359
It's about the more[br]contextual question

2:31:42.359,2:31:45.462
of what governance is[br]necessary for what--

2:31:45.462,2:31:47.097
which particular area.

2:31:47.097,2:31:50.033
So, in certain cases, it's[br]completely appropriate

2:31:50.033,2:31:52.536
for only the private[br]sector to be involved.

2:31:52.536,2:31:54.538
In other cases, it's the[br]purview of government.

2:31:54.538,2:31:57.841
So, it has to be asked[br]in a contextual area,

2:31:57.841,2:32:00.110
and that's what multistakeholder[br]governance is.

2:32:00.110,2:32:03.713
It's not everybody in charge[br]of every-- it's granular area.

2:32:03.713,2:32:04.781
That's not it.

2:32:04.781,2:32:06.516
It's about what's[br]the appropriate form

2:32:06.516,2:32:08.718
of governance in[br]a particular area.

2:32:08.718,2:32:10.654
>> John?

2:32:10.654,2:32:12.422
>> So the one thing[br]we do know is

2:32:12.422,2:32:15.692
that the internet[br]evolves very quickly.

2:32:15.692,2:32:22.766
I was involved 25 years of[br]it and it changes rapidly.

2:32:22.766,2:32:28.538
What was dial-up[br]modems and just Telnet

2:32:28.538,2:32:36.112
and FTP quickly became[br]circuits and high speed fiber.

2:32:36.112,2:32:37.881
Yeah, OK, sorry.

2:32:37.881,2:32:39.149
[Inaudible] And the web--

2:32:39.149,2:32:41.084
>> My work here is done, yeah.

2:32:41.084,2:32:47.891
>> The fact is that that[br]evolution doesn't work well

2:32:47.891,2:32:49.726
with government regulation.

2:32:49.726,2:32:54.397
Having been involved in[br]the telecommunication side

2:32:54.397,2:32:57.400
of the industry as opposed the[br]internet side, I also dealt

2:32:57.400,2:32:59.102
with a lot of [inaudible][br]regulations.

2:32:59.102,2:33:02.138
And generally, we're dealing[br]with regulations that were three

2:33:02.138,2:33:05.809
to ten years behind the[br]time trying to drag them

2:33:05.809,2:33:10.614
into current circumstance,[br]and it was inevitable.

2:33:10.614,2:33:14.918
The process of regulation[br]doesn't work well

2:33:14.918,2:33:17.954
with a forward-looking[br]rapidly evolving internet.

2:33:17.954,2:33:22.559
So, when we start[br]thinking about--

2:33:22.559,2:33:27.764
about the non-governmental[br]nature of the internet,

2:33:27.764,2:33:31.635
as the internet grows up, we[br]find ourselves in a conundrum

2:33:31.635,2:33:35.038
because the internet[br]is no longer optional.

2:33:35.038,2:33:38.108
The internet is intwined[br]in everyone's life.

2:33:38.108,2:33:40.910
Governments are looking at[br]their economies and going,

2:33:40.910,2:33:44.748
"Some percentage of my[br]economy is tied to this?"

2:33:44.748,2:33:47.517
You can say I have a choices[br]to whether or not I'm going

2:33:47.517,2:33:49.486
to participate but I don't.

2:33:49.486,2:33:51.655
I have to be involved.

2:33:51.655,2:33:55.025
So, governments are now[br]realizing they have no choice,

2:33:55.025,2:33:56.426
they need to be involved.

2:33:56.426,2:33:59.296
They look at their duties,[br]their responsibilities.

2:33:59.296,2:34:01.898
And they go, "How do I[br]affect what I'm required

2:34:01.898,2:34:03.900
to do in this new media?"

2:34:03.900,2:34:08.571
And it's a big challenge,[br]folks, because the protocols

2:34:08.571,2:34:11.074
and the operational conventions

2:34:11.074,2:34:13.643
that hold the internet[br]together have to be global.

2:34:13.643,2:34:16.613
They have to interoperate[br]on global basis.

2:34:16.613,2:34:18.481
But governments are[br]used to acting

2:34:18.481,2:34:22.385
on a national basis[br]occasionally regional,

2:34:22.385,2:34:26.122
occasionally bilateral,[br]multilateral, but generally,

2:34:26.122,2:34:28.158
they act on a national basis

2:34:28.158,2:34:31.895
and you can easily break[br]the internet by attempting

2:34:31.895,2:34:35.432
to regulate it without the[br]idea of a global context

2:34:35.432,2:34:36.766
in which it operates in.

2:34:36.766,2:34:38.301
This is really what's[br]been opened

2:34:38.301,2:34:39.302
up in the last five years.

2:34:39.302,2:34:40.637
In the last five years,

2:34:40.637,2:34:42.772
governments are realizing[br]they do need to get involved,

2:34:42.772,2:34:44.374
they don't understand[br]the framework

2:34:44.374,2:34:46.476
by which they can do so safely.

2:34:46.476,2:34:50.747
In general, this has resulted[br]to not much regulation

2:34:50.747,2:34:53.650
but that's not necessarily going[br]to be the case going forward.

2:34:53.650,2:34:57.187
And it's-- the internet[br]community and I say

2:34:57.187,2:35:00.256
that being the operators,[br]the various entities

2:35:00.256,2:35:01.458
that operate pieces

2:35:01.458,2:35:04.894
of the infrastructure[br]aren't exactly forthcoming

2:35:04.894,2:35:06.696
to government saying, "Here,

2:35:06.696,2:35:09.099
this is how to safely[br]regulate the internet.

2:35:09.099,2:35:11.334
That guide book has[br]not been written."

2:35:11.334,2:35:15.004
And so, without a meeting[br]of the minds on this topic,

2:35:15.004,2:35:18.875
we run the risk that governments[br]are going to make regulations

2:35:18.875,2:35:21.978
that make no sense or break[br]portions of the internet.

2:35:21.978,2:35:24.080
Until this an understood[br]common framework

2:35:24.080,2:35:26.616
for this, we're all at risk.

2:35:26.616,2:35:29.219
>> Lynn, do you wanted to talk?

2:35:29.219,2:35:32.188
>> Yeah, very good comments[br]both from Laura and John,

2:35:32.188,2:35:35.158
and I just want to make sure[br]that we're left with a myth here

2:35:35.158,2:35:36.693
that much of the internet[br]committee believes

2:35:36.693,2:35:38.528
that there's no rule[br]for governments.

2:35:38.528,2:35:40.230
We've been engaging[br]with governments

2:35:40.230,2:35:43.500
and certainly we could have[br]done it better over the years.

2:35:43.500,2:35:45.402
But, you know, for many,

2:35:45.402,2:35:48.671
many years when ISOC had a very[br]small staff of seven people,

2:35:48.671,2:35:51.841
I was going to [inaudible][br]and spending weeks

2:35:51.841,2:35:54.644
because you don't go to United[br]Nations meeting for two days,

2:35:54.644,2:35:56.679
you'd go for two[br]and three weeks.

2:35:56.679,2:35:58.648
That's a significant investment,

2:35:58.648,2:36:00.483
and we went because[br]we wanted people

2:36:00.483,2:36:03.787
to understand how the[br]internets actually worked.

2:36:03.787,2:36:06.322
And I-- it's like a slight[br]disagreement with John

2:36:06.322,2:36:09.793
and nobody has the answer[br]but how we regulate for a lot

2:36:09.793,2:36:11.327
of this new environments.

2:36:11.327,2:36:13.797
It's not because we think[br]there should be no regulations

2:36:13.797,2:36:15.465
because we can't[br]figure out what sort

2:36:15.465,2:36:17.367
of regulation there should be.

2:36:17.367,2:36:20.403
And to John's other point,[br]it is because of the pace

2:36:20.403,2:36:22.472
with which the internet changes.

2:36:22.472,2:36:23.907
And it is to the fact[br]that it has broken

2:36:23.907,2:36:25.108
so many global boundaries.

2:36:25.108,2:36:28.211
You can do it within[br]any single context.

2:36:28.211,2:36:30.079
So, it is a very,[br]very complex world.

2:36:30.079,2:36:34.984
And we continue to advocate for[br]dialogue discussion, thoughtful,

2:36:34.984,2:36:36.619
let it take the time it needs.

2:36:36.619,2:36:40.123
We need to pull apart lots[br]of different complexities

2:36:40.123,2:36:42.025
and let the right thing emerge.

2:36:42.025,2:36:43.860
That is not the same[br]as saying no rule

2:36:43.860,2:36:46.729
for governments but[br]it often gets--

2:36:46.729,2:36:49.666
>> And another dimension of[br]this is not all governments are

2:36:49.666,2:36:51.034
the same.

2:36:51.034,2:36:56.706
Because you can talk about China[br]being a pretty malign force

2:36:56.706,2:37:00.043
in terms of internet freedom[br]to say nothing of Iran

2:37:00.043,2:37:03.980
which uses the internet to roll[br]up all networks of descent,

2:37:03.980,2:37:05.882
where in Tahrir Square,

2:37:05.882,2:37:09.886
the internet is a[br]mechanism for expression.

2:37:09.886,2:37:12.689
So, part of it, you can--

2:37:12.689,2:37:15.024
part of the problem[br]is government even

2:37:15.024,2:37:17.827
as a concept is subject to[br]many different definitions.

2:37:17.827,2:37:19.028
Yeah.

2:37:19.028,2:37:20.763
>> It is Steve but that's[br]probably why the western

2:37:20.763,2:37:26.302
governments that operate[br]in democracies with legal

2:37:26.302,2:37:28.538
and constitutional frameworks

2:37:28.538,2:37:31.341
that it's particularly[br]important.

2:37:31.341,2:37:34.210
And one of the reasons people[br]are particularly unhappy

2:37:34.210,2:37:37.146
about this particular[br]surveillance is if we're trying

2:37:37.146,2:37:39.482
to come up with this[br]nuanced role

2:37:39.482,2:37:41.618
about where government belongs,

2:37:41.618,2:37:43.987
we haven't exactly[br]sent the right message

2:37:43.987,2:37:45.188
to the rest of the world.

2:37:45.188,2:37:47.423
And I think that's part[br]of the problem here.

2:37:47.423,2:37:50.393
>> I just want to offer a[br]kind of a friendly amendment,

2:37:50.393,2:37:52.662
I hope to John's view, you know.

2:37:52.662,2:37:56.633
I think John correctly[br]points out that attempting

2:37:56.633,2:37:59.836
to regulate the internet[br]infrastructure whether it's the

2:37:59.836,2:38:02.105
institutions that[br]operate and design it

2:38:02.105,2:38:06.042
or the actual operators[br]is very [inaudible]

2:38:06.042,2:38:08.478
because it changes[br]very quickly and it has

2:38:08.478,2:38:09.746
to work on a global basis.

2:38:09.746,2:38:11.915
That was the experience of the--

2:38:11.915,2:38:14.551
of SOPA, the Stop[br]Online Privacy Act,

2:38:14.551,2:38:18.721
was that policymakers[br]thought they could reach in--

2:38:18.721,2:38:19.422
>> Piracy.

2:38:19.422,2:38:21.057
>> -- sorry, Piracy Act.

2:38:21.057,2:38:22.559
>> [Inaudible] is the stop--

2:38:22.559,2:38:23.993
>> That's right.

2:38:23.993,2:38:27.430
Thank you, thank you, thank you.

2:38:27.430,2:38:29.999
Right, you know, governments[br]thought they could reach

2:38:29.999,2:38:32.602
in to the internet[br]infrastructure

2:38:32.602,2:38:34.304
to solve a problem[br]that is really

2:38:34.304,2:38:37.473
about human behavior[br]and violating laws.

2:38:37.473,2:38:40.843
However, at the same time[br]there are plenty of legal rules

2:38:40.843,2:38:44.881
that actually work incredibly[br]well on the internet.

2:38:44.881,2:38:48.117
You know, the FTC is still using[br]the Fair Credit Reporting Act

2:38:48.117,2:38:51.054
from 1970 which was one[br]of our first piracy laws

2:38:51.054,2:38:54.691
in United States to stop very[br]advanced sophisticated online

2:38:54.691,2:38:56.292
services from harming people.

2:38:56.292,2:38:58.394
That's not causing[br]John any problems.

2:38:58.394,2:39:01.030
He's not-- he [inaudible][br]even think about it.

2:39:01.030,2:39:08.338
And so I think there's-- I think[br]that it's when governments try

2:39:08.338,2:39:10.173
to do this sort of[br]shortcuts that they were used

2:39:10.173,2:39:12.642
to doing is you were suggesting[br]with the broadcasters, you know,

2:39:12.642,2:39:14.978
say, "You guys have to behave[br]this way in order for us

2:39:14.978,2:39:16.813
to achieve a broader[br]policy goal."

2:39:16.813,2:39:18.848
That's where we really[br]have problems

2:39:18.848,2:39:20.583
in the internet environment.

2:39:20.583,2:39:25.822
>> You know, number of you have[br]used the word privacy as a value

2:39:25.822,2:39:29.292
and as a very curious[br][phonetic] value.

2:39:29.292,2:39:32.195
But I want you to[br]play with the idea

2:39:32.195,2:39:34.297
that perhaps we're[br]actually really ambivalent

2:39:34.297,2:39:37.767
about the question of privacy[br]because in fact in many ways,

2:39:37.767,2:39:43.940
the wide availability of data is[br]actually an enormous convenient.

2:39:43.940,2:39:46.843
Every time you go to[br]a website and you put

2:39:46.843,2:39:49.779
in your e-mail address[br]and up comes your password

2:39:49.779,2:39:52.048
and all your credit[br]card information

2:39:52.048,2:39:54.984
and at one stop shopping[br]at Amazon, right?

2:39:54.984,2:39:58.821
We all love it but isn't that--

2:39:58.821,2:40:01.024
>> But we've made a decision[br]to share that with them, so.

2:40:01.024,2:40:01.724
>> Well--

2:40:01.724,2:40:02.792
>> Wait just a minute.

2:40:02.792,2:40:04.861
I want a-- I want a--[br]I understand that.

2:40:04.861,2:40:08.798
But I want to pose a question[br]about whether at some point,

2:40:08.798,2:40:11.534
aren't we really ambivalent[br]about this question

2:40:11.534,2:40:17.173
that we actually like people[br]to have information about us

2:40:17.173,2:40:20.610
when it serves our purposes of[br]convenience and accessibility.

2:40:20.610,2:40:22.945
And that there was a certain--

2:40:22.945,2:40:25.214
I understand your[br]point about voluntary.

2:40:25.214,2:40:27.650
But this will mark [phonetic][br]a point here as well.

2:40:27.650,2:40:29.752
>> I think part of[br]the problem is--

2:40:29.752,2:40:32.088
is the public is[br]realizing that the people

2:40:32.088,2:40:34.357
that are storing the[br]information that we give

2:40:34.357,2:40:37.827
to them aren't doing a good[br]a job in protecting it.

2:40:37.827,2:40:39.962
I could go to my local bank--[br]I grew up in Falls Church.

2:40:39.962,2:40:42.098
I used to go to the local[br]First Virginia Bank right there

2:40:42.098,2:40:43.232
in Falls Church.

2:40:43.232,2:40:45.068
I gave them all my[br]information when I opened

2:40:45.068,2:40:47.170
up my first account[br]when I was a teenager.

2:40:47.170,2:40:49.539
And I had a reasonable[br]expectation

2:40:49.539,2:40:51.107
that the only way they[br]were going to get that--

2:40:51.107,2:40:53.409
anybody else is going to[br]get that information was

2:40:53.409,2:40:56.713
if they actually went in and[br]rob the bank and stole the file,

2:40:56.713,2:40:59.048
you know, the file[br]cabinet or whatever.

2:40:59.048,2:41:00.717
>> Or if anyone in the[br]government wanted it?

2:41:00.717,2:41:02.318
>> Or if anyone in the[br]government want it?

2:41:02.318,2:41:04.754
I mean that-- I mean[br]that, you know, that--

2:41:04.754,2:41:05.588
that's a reasonable thing.

2:41:05.588,2:41:07.056
But nowadays when we find

2:41:07.056,2:41:09.992
out that you have all these[br]massive data leaks, you know,

2:41:09.992,2:41:13.096
and when you examine[br]the root cause of what--

2:41:13.096,2:41:15.565
what the leak was from[br]a tactical standpoint,

2:41:15.565,2:41:17.900
I should have been[br]fixed 15 years ago.

2:41:17.900,2:41:22.238
You know, some of these attacks,[br]I do a talk now if they ask me,

2:41:22.238,2:41:24.741
you know, I guess it's because[br]I had gray hair and I've been

2:41:24.741,2:41:26.943
in the security business[br]for 20 years.

2:41:26.943,2:41:29.011
I think I noticed something

2:41:29.011,2:41:32.648
but I do [inaudible][br]that the contract--

2:41:32.648,2:41:33.750
>> It's because of the ponytail.

2:41:33.750,2:41:35.151
>> I think it is.

2:41:35.151,2:41:37.086
You know, it's the-- it's the[br]same attack methods that we saw

2:41:37.086,2:41:41.157
in the early '90s are[br]still effective in 2013.

2:41:41.157,2:41:44.494
And so my question to the[br]technical community was,

2:41:44.494,2:41:47.764
what have we been doing[br]this last 20 years?

2:41:47.764,2:41:53.035
I mean, you know, I in the SANS[br]Institute that I was a part of,

2:41:53.035,2:41:56.672
we drew up a top[br]ten threats in 2001.

2:41:56.672,2:42:00.810
I pulled it out and today[br]in 2013, every single one

2:42:00.810,2:42:05.181
of those top ten threats from[br]2001 is still affecting today.

2:42:05.181,2:42:07.850
So, what have we been[br]doing to protect ourselves?

2:42:07.850,2:42:09.218
And I think it's that type

2:42:09.218,2:42:13.322
of thing that's causing this[br]rumble about, you know, well,

2:42:13.322,2:42:15.491
private industry isn't[br]doing anything about it,

2:42:15.491,2:42:17.493
individuals aren't[br]doing anything about it.

2:42:17.493,2:42:19.629
So, that only leaves[br]a government

2:42:19.629,2:42:22.331
to do something about[br]it, you know.

2:42:22.331,2:42:25.301
And so I think that's why[br]we're seeing that pushing

2:42:25.301,2:42:27.670
that direction, 'cause[br]historically when you look

2:42:27.670,2:42:30.840
at it, the same things[br]are still affecting us,

2:42:30.840,2:42:33.342
it's just that what's[br]happening now is back in 2001,

2:42:33.342,2:42:37.013
the scope of a data breach[br]was much less than the scope

2:42:37.013,2:42:38.014
of the data breach now.

2:42:38.014,2:42:39.048
>> Sure, sure.

2:42:39.048,2:42:40.016
>> And just one last[br]aside [phonetic].

2:42:40.016,2:42:41.050
The iPhone, I think,[br]I looked it up,

2:42:41.050,2:42:43.586
is five years old[br]today-- this year.

2:42:43.586,2:42:47.690
So, to answer your question[br]about why the difference from--

2:42:47.690,2:42:49.091
>> Hold on just a second.

2:42:49.091,2:42:50.493
John and Leslie, you want a-- is[br]there a point you wanted to make

2:42:50.493,2:42:52.962
about the voluntary[br]submission of data.

2:42:52.962,2:42:54.697
>> I don't think so.

2:42:54.697,2:42:58.234
I think every point has been[br]made by everybody quite well.

2:42:58.234,2:42:59.669
>> OK. John?

2:42:59.669,2:43:03.306
>> You thought-- say that maybe[br]people don't value privacy

2:43:03.306,2:43:06.809
over convenience, and that[br]that we give up privacy

2:43:06.809,2:43:10.146
and there's no outrage[br]about that.

2:43:10.146,2:43:12.815
Why is there an outrage[br]in some cases?

2:43:12.815,2:43:15.117
And I guess the question[br]that comes up is,

2:43:15.117,2:43:18.120
a lot of people voluntarily[br]give up privacy

2:43:18.120,2:43:19.755
because we want the convenience.

2:43:19.755,2:43:22.091
We want to click the button[br]and get the order done.

2:43:22.091,2:43:24.293
We want the website[br]to know who we are.

2:43:24.293,2:43:26.195
We want to fill out[br]all the information

2:43:26.195,2:43:30.233
on the airline profile because[br]it just makes traveling a little

2:43:30.233,2:43:31.868
easier and anything[br]that makes it easier--

2:43:31.868,2:43:34.303
>> And who can not remember all[br]those damn passwords anyway,

2:43:34.303,2:43:35.271
right?

2:43:35.271,2:43:36.806
>> So there are times[br]we do that.

2:43:36.806,2:43:40.109
But the reality is that there's[br]also times when you consent

2:43:40.109,2:43:43.846
to losing your privacy[br]in situations that aren't

2:43:43.846,2:43:46.582
for your convenience but[br]you're going to anyway.

2:43:46.582,2:43:47.950
Next time you're[br]going to your doctor,

2:43:47.950,2:43:51.153
pick up that HIPAA form[br]and look at it, OK?

2:43:51.153,2:43:53.890
It says, "We're going to[br]share your data with the CDC

2:43:53.890,2:43:55.925
because if there's an[br]outbreak of something,

2:43:55.925,2:43:57.693
we're going to do that, OK?"

2:43:57.693,2:44:00.096
It's not for my convenience,[br]hopefully, I'm not relevant,

2:44:00.096,2:44:02.598
but the fact is they're[br]going to do what--

2:44:02.598,2:44:06.135
and we consent with because[br]well, we knew about it.

2:44:06.135,2:44:07.370
We understand--

2:44:07.370,2:44:08.771
>> And there's a public[br]interest involved because--

2:44:08.771,2:44:12.275
>> There's a public[br]interest but also as annoying

2:44:12.275,2:44:15.177
as that form is, they[br]took the time to tell us.

2:44:15.177,2:44:17.480
I do think that's a[br]different question

2:44:17.480,2:44:19.181
when there's surveillance[br]is going on

2:44:19.181,2:44:20.917
and you don't know[br]about it at all.

2:44:20.917,2:44:25.021
And I think that might be the[br]angst behind a lot of this.

2:44:25.021,2:44:26.155
>> Leslie?

2:44:26.155,2:44:27.456
>> Well, I also think[br]that there's difference

2:44:27.456,2:44:30.393
between surveillance[br]by the government

2:44:30.393,2:44:33.729
and surveillance by companies.

2:44:33.729,2:44:35.898
I mean I think they've[br]become more joined together

2:44:35.898,2:44:39.101
because they are now the[br]source of all the information

2:44:39.101,2:44:40.403
that the government[br]is collecting.

2:44:40.403,2:44:43.439
But I think at least in[br]the constitutional system,

2:44:43.439,2:44:46.042
not in Europe where they're[br]making a distinction.

2:44:46.042,2:44:51.847
Having that government who has[br]the capacity to impose penalties

2:44:51.847,2:44:59.155
on people and make choices about[br]who is going to be prosecuted,

2:44:59.155,2:45:03.859
et cetera, is entirely different[br]matter than whether I like

2:45:03.859,2:45:05.428
or disliked it, you know,

2:45:05.428,2:45:08.731
Google Profiles keep[br]sending me the same crib

2:45:08.731,2:45:11.600
for my pregnant daughter[br]over and over again.

2:45:11.600,2:45:14.403
I'm annoyed, I'm[br]extremely annoyed.

2:45:14.403,2:45:15.638
But I also think--

2:45:15.638,2:45:17.039
>> They knew she was[br]pregnant before she did, yes?

2:45:17.039,2:45:18.107
>> Yes.

2:45:18.107,2:45:19.308
>> Well, they probably[br]did, but they knew

2:45:19.308,2:45:21.277
that I did this thing once[br]and it's following the--

2:45:21.277,2:45:23.512
it's literally following[br]me around the world.

2:45:23.512,2:45:24.947
I mean it's became[br]kind of a joke.

2:45:24.947,2:45:28.250
But I find that annoying and[br]I'm somebody who knows how

2:45:28.250,2:45:29.819
to set my privacy settings.

2:45:29.819,2:45:33.889
So, you know, in one-- in[br]one circumstance it's a loss

2:45:33.889,2:45:37.393
of some measure of control,[br]we ought to have more control,

2:45:37.393,2:45:39.762
it's one of the reasons we[br]ought to have a baseline build

2:45:39.762,2:45:42.498
to give us some fair[br]information practices.

2:45:42.498,2:45:46.869
In the other, you know, the[br]government has the capacity

2:45:46.869,2:45:49.271
to make very important[br]decisions about us.

2:45:49.271,2:45:53.309
And we have a constitution that[br]says they have to follow rules.

2:45:53.309,2:45:59.548
And so we do react differently[br]to the crib and to the NSA.

2:45:59.548,2:46:00.683
>> Yeah.

2:46:00.683,2:46:04.987
>> The one thing I would[br]say about our tension

2:46:04.987,2:46:09.358
between convenience and[br]privacy is-- I just think that--

2:46:09.358,2:46:14.296
I think privacy has always been[br]a kind of a contested concept.

2:46:14.296,2:46:15.865
I mean, it's not an absolute.

2:46:15.865,2:46:18.300
I don't think there's[br]anyone hardly in the world

2:46:18.300,2:46:21.670
who thinks it's-- it's[br]an absolute condition.

2:46:21.670,2:46:23.572
But we know, as Leslie[br]is saying,

2:46:23.572,2:46:26.709
we have different[br]privacy expectations.

2:46:26.709,2:46:30.346
We want different privacy[br]results at different times.

2:46:30.346,2:46:34.016
And some of the-- some[br]of the privacy promise

2:46:34.016,2:46:35.484
that we have [inaudible]

2:46:35.484,2:46:38.454
like seeing the same[br]crib too many times.

2:46:38.454,2:46:40.923
Others have real consequence

2:46:40.923,2:46:42.291
like if you're credit[br]report is wrong

2:46:42.291,2:46:44.293
and you can't get a mortgage,[br]you're really, you know,

2:46:44.293,2:46:46.529
it really-- or you don't[br]get a job, you know,

2:46:46.529,2:46:47.730
it really makes a difference.

2:46:47.730,2:46:52.701
And I think that-- I think[br]in a way the phrase--

2:46:52.701,2:46:54.703
I think categorizing privacy

2:46:54.703,2:46:58.007
as a single right is what[br]makes the conversation a little

2:46:58.007,2:47:00.476
confused because it-- the[br]reality is it's a number

2:47:00.476,2:47:02.845
of concerns wrapped up into one.

2:47:02.845,2:47:06.882
>> But in this day and age,[br]isn't it a little naive to say,

2:47:06.882,2:47:08.984
I'm going to give my[br]information to Amazon?

2:47:08.984,2:47:11.087
Or I'm going to give my[br]information to Google

2:47:11.087,2:47:14.824
for my own purposes because I[br]choose to, and somehow I'm going

2:47:14.824,2:47:16.959
to be able to control--

2:47:16.959,2:47:17.993
>> Oh, yes.

2:47:17.993,2:47:19.829
>> -- all the use[br]of that information.

2:47:19.829,2:47:21.630
>> Yeah, that's not--[br]that's not doable,

2:47:21.630,2:47:24.033
and I don't think any[br]privacy law we would pass

2:47:24.033,2:47:27.803
in this country would[br]change that.

2:47:27.803,2:47:29.238
>> It is naive but I think--

2:47:29.238,2:47:33.542
I think the problem is I don't[br]mind giving you any information

2:47:33.542,2:47:37.179
you ask about me if you tell me[br]ahead of time what you're going

2:47:37.179,2:47:38.380
to do with that information.

2:47:38.380,2:47:40.816
So, what John was talking[br]about in the HIPAA thing

2:47:40.816,2:47:43.853
when they say, "We're going[br]to give it out to the CDC,"

2:47:43.853,2:47:46.655
and you tell me ahead of[br]time before I give you

2:47:46.655,2:47:48.724
that information, that's much--

2:47:48.724,2:47:51.927
that's a much different[br]environment than giving it here

2:47:51.927,2:47:54.563
and then buried in [inaudible][br]fine print is a little click

2:47:54.563,2:47:55.764
thing that says,[br]"Oh, by the way,

2:47:55.764,2:47:57.500
we're going to just give[br]this to anybody we want."

2:47:57.500,2:47:59.235
>> We only have few[br]minutes, and I want to--

2:47:59.235,2:48:02.771
you've mentioned out, a number[br]of you, the fact that we're--

2:48:02.771,2:48:06.308
we're dealing with a very[br]complex system as Laura said

2:48:06.308,2:48:08.310
with a lot of stakeholders here.

2:48:08.310,2:48:13.015
And one of the stakeholders are[br]these providers whether it's

2:48:13.015,2:48:18.220
Google, whether it's Yahoo,[br]who take that information.

2:48:18.220,2:48:20.389
They don't warn you in some[br]ways that they're going

2:48:20.389,2:48:23.259
to give it away because they're[br]not voluntarily giving it away.

2:48:23.259,2:48:24.393
They're being subpoenaed,

2:48:24.393,2:48:26.295
they're being ordered[br]to by the government.

2:48:26.295,2:48:27.296
And they are caught.

2:48:27.296,2:48:29.765
We have-- this institution,

2:48:29.765,2:48:33.536
these huge institutions[br]are private institutions,

2:48:33.536,2:48:34.970
but as we've learned[br]through PRISM

2:48:34.970,2:48:39.909
and all the revelation[br]subject to government orders

2:48:39.909,2:48:42.244
and government warrants.

2:48:42.244,2:48:45.814
And many of them are fighting[br]this at least fighting

2:48:45.814,2:48:49.552
to be able to be more[br]transparent because they have--

2:48:49.552,2:48:51.620
they're stakeholders, too.

2:48:51.620,2:48:54.523
And-- and they are worried[br]that their brands are going

2:48:54.523,2:48:57.059
to be tarnished by[br]being swept up in this.

2:48:57.059,2:48:59.562
And to talk a little bit[br]about the special role

2:48:59.562,2:49:02.097
of this institution, these[br]intermediary institutions,

2:49:02.097,2:49:04.867
the Apples, the Microsofts,[br]the Googles who are

2:49:04.867,2:49:06.869
on one hand are getting[br]pulled by the government

2:49:06.869,2:49:08.270
to release information.

2:49:08.270,2:49:10.940
On the other hand, they're being[br]pressured to keep it private.

2:49:10.940,2:49:12.041
>> Yeah.

2:49:12.041,2:49:14.877
>> Yeah, that's a really[br]important question.

2:49:14.877,2:49:18.781
And if you look at-- Let me[br]just back it up to before PRISM.

2:49:18.781,2:49:21.951
If you look at even just the[br]Google transparency reports

2:49:21.951,2:49:24.353
which probably don't have[br]everything and I think

2:49:24.353,2:49:27.723
and even Google says that[br]national security isn't--

2:49:27.723,2:49:30.459
not everything is reflected[br]in the transparency reports.

2:49:30.459,2:49:32.428
But when you do look[br]at something like that,

2:49:32.428,2:49:34.430
you can see that there[br]is a very big disconnect

2:49:34.430,2:49:36.966
between what governments[br]are asking information

2:49:36.966,2:49:40.102
intermediaries to do and[br]what they actually do.

2:49:40.102,2:49:43.706
So, you can see that--[br]just to give an example.

2:49:43.706,2:49:49.411
Maybe they disclosed data about[br]an individual in 37 percent,

2:49:49.411,2:49:53.816
37 percent of the time in--[br]to the Brazilian government

2:49:53.816,2:49:56.685
or 47 percent of the time[br]to another government.

2:49:56.685,2:49:58.087
Do you see what I'm saying?

2:49:58.087,2:50:01.223
There is a disconnect in that[br]differential between the request

2:50:01.223,2:50:04.260
to turn over user data[br]and the actual instances

2:50:04.260,2:50:05.494
of turning over the data.

2:50:05.494,2:50:09.064
That's where they have this[br]special governance role.

2:50:09.064,2:50:10.933
And that's an important[br]point the make.

2:50:10.933,2:50:15.938
But they also bear a burden[br]in carrying out a request

2:50:15.938,2:50:18.207
such as the more[br]recent revelations

2:50:18.207,2:50:20.843
because there is a[br]public relations hit.

2:50:20.843,2:50:25.648
There is the cost of hiring[br]numerous attorneys to deal

2:50:25.648,2:50:27.316
with the fallout from this.

2:50:27.316,2:50:29.485
And there's the possible[br]economic impact

2:50:29.485,2:50:32.755
of having trouble doing business[br]in other parts of the world

2:50:32.755,2:50:35.924
that might be suspicious[br]towards those companies.

2:50:35.924,2:50:39.194
>> Yeah, you might be thanking--[br]they might be thanking Snowden

2:50:39.194,2:50:41.563
for the revelations[br]because and, of course,

2:50:41.563,2:50:44.600
by the national security[br]letters.

2:50:44.600,2:50:45.734
They're not allowed to--

2:50:45.734,2:50:48.304
to let anyone know that[br]they collected the data.

2:50:48.304,2:50:49.805
So, now on the other[br]hand, you have the--

2:50:49.805,2:50:51.707
the Snowden revelations[br]which were saying, "Hey,

2:50:51.707,2:50:53.976
these guys had to[br]give out the data".

2:50:53.976,2:50:56.812
So, you know, and[br]now that's come out.

2:50:56.812,2:50:58.580
What they should have[br]said is instead of trying

2:50:58.580,2:50:59.648
to back [inaudible][br]been saying, "You know,

2:50:59.648,2:51:01.717
trying to save their[br]reputation."

2:51:01.717,2:51:03.018
We said, "Look, you[br]got subpoenaed,

2:51:03.018,2:51:04.086
we know you got subpoenaed,

2:51:04.086,2:51:07.089
you gave up the data[br]because it's a law."

2:51:07.089,2:51:11.760
But I think that that[br]piece of it is the secrecy,

2:51:11.760,2:51:15.964
not being able to say why[br]something was collected,

2:51:15.964,2:51:18.567
you know, and not being able[br]to even say anything about it.

2:51:18.567,2:51:19.835
Lesley?

2:51:19.835,2:51:23.706
>> Well, the question raised[br]is this bigger question

2:51:23.706,2:51:27.576
when we talk about players[br]in the internet echo system.

2:51:27.576,2:51:31.413
The intermediaries[br]are a critical part.

2:51:31.413,2:51:35.584
And we have-- under our law, we[br]sort of provide them with a lot

2:51:35.584,2:51:39.455
of special protections[br]because they can't be liable

2:51:39.455,2:51:42.524
for everything that's going[br]on in their platforms.

2:51:42.524,2:51:44.526
And yet there under[br]enormous pressure,

2:51:44.526,2:51:50.265
this national security[br]revelation is one small piece

2:51:50.265,2:51:53.502
of this very complex[br]environment where when you ask

2:51:53.502,2:51:57.339
about governments and government[br]is trying to regulate,

2:51:57.339,2:52:01.944
the first place that governments[br]go in trying to solve anything,

2:52:01.944,2:52:05.013
a social problem is to[br]try to figure out how

2:52:05.013,2:52:08.283
to get the intermediaries to[br]take on that responsibility.

2:52:08.283,2:52:11.620
So, this has been sort of[br]a tension that's existed

2:52:11.620,2:52:15.858
since we actually had any[br]kind of powerful intermediary.

2:52:15.858,2:52:18.527
So, that's one side, and the[br]other side is the amounts

2:52:18.527,2:52:21.163
of power they have as[br]a governance entity

2:52:21.163,2:52:22.831
to set the rules of[br][inaudible] for the internet.

2:52:22.831,2:52:24.032
And so--

2:52:24.032,2:52:25.801
>> And one of the[br]interesting variables here is,

2:52:25.801,2:52:28.737
I noticed just recently that[br]several of the big players,

2:52:28.737,2:52:30.939
Microsoft, Google, Yahoo,

2:52:30.939,2:52:33.575
I think three have[br]all filed suit--

2:52:33.575,2:52:34.877
>> Right.

2:52:34.877,2:52:38.080
>> -- in an attempt to be[br]able to be more transparent

2:52:38.080,2:52:40.883
about the role and the-- and[br]the requirements they're under.

2:52:40.883,2:52:43.185
I think in part because of[br]the point Laura was raising

2:52:43.185,2:52:46.955
that they themselves, given the[br]culture that they're part of

2:52:46.955,2:52:48.857
and the stakeholders they have,

2:52:48.857,2:52:52.060
they are taking a big public[br]relations in branding hit

2:52:52.060,2:52:53.162
for this kind of cooperation.

2:52:53.162,2:52:55.063
>> And they also have[br]real leverage here

2:52:55.063,2:52:58.600
which they have exercised[br]on occasion, you know.

2:52:58.600,2:53:02.838
Many of the big intermediaries[br]Google, Twitter,

2:53:02.838,2:53:06.975
others have at times gone to[br]court to challenge subpoenas

2:53:06.975,2:53:09.144
and other kinds of court[br]orders they receive saying

2:53:09.144,2:53:10.345
that they're too broad.

2:53:10.345,2:53:11.780
I mean, Google had been--

2:53:11.780,2:53:15.617
had been under order to[br]turnover large volumes

2:53:15.617,2:53:17.686
of search log data, this[br]was just a criminal case,

2:53:17.686,2:53:18.287
it's not [inaudible] cases.

2:53:18.287,2:53:19.555
>> Right.

2:53:19.555,2:53:20.923
>> And they've challenged[br]those and they, you know,

2:53:20.923,2:53:24.126
so the intermediaries have[br]a really important role

2:53:24.126,2:53:26.829
because at least until[br]there's a change in the law,

2:53:26.829,2:53:29.865
they are often the only ones[br]who can actually bring any kind

2:53:29.865,2:53:31.400
of challenge to the[br]scope of the--

2:53:31.400,2:53:34.102
of the authority that the[br]government is claiming.

2:53:34.102,2:53:37.473
>> This is nothing new[br]because in World War II,

2:53:37.473,2:53:41.009
the federal government used to[br]look at the telegraphs at RCA

2:53:41.009,2:53:44.112
and look at the phone system[br]for records and stuff like that.

2:53:44.112,2:53:46.448
I mean what's changed[br]is the number of players

2:53:46.448,2:53:48.550
because back then it was[br]just those two, I suppose,

2:53:48.550,2:53:49.885
plus maybe some minors.

2:53:49.885,2:53:51.220
Now you have you know multi--

2:53:51.220,2:53:53.255
multinational groups[br]all over the place.

2:53:53.255,2:53:56.725
But the technique, I mean,[br]the tactic of government going

2:53:56.725,2:54:01.964
to a provider and getting the[br]information they need, it's--

2:54:01.964,2:54:03.098
it's [inaudible] been there.

2:54:03.098,2:54:04.733
>> I would assume the[br]Egyptian government did

2:54:04.733,2:54:07.102
that when the communications[br]were chiseled, you know,

2:54:07.102,2:54:08.637
letters chiseled[br]on stone tablets.

2:54:08.637,2:54:11.206
>> I'm going to-- We[br]have five minutes left.

2:54:11.206,2:54:13.709
I'm going to give each[br]you one minute to--

2:54:13.709,2:54:14.776
we've had a long day,

2:54:14.776,2:54:18.080
very attentive audience,[br]lot of issues.

2:54:18.080,2:54:23.385
But I want to give each of you[br]a chance to make a final point

2:54:23.385,2:54:25.120
after this conversation.

2:54:25.120,2:54:27.322
You started with[br]your initial remarks.

2:54:27.322,2:54:29.691
But what do you want the[br]audience to be left with?

2:54:29.691,2:54:33.562
What-- in each of your mind[br]is something significant we've

2:54:33.562,2:54:36.164
talked about today, an issue[br]that you want to reinforce?

2:54:36.164,2:54:37.866
I want to give each you[br]a chance to do that,

2:54:37.866,2:54:39.601
and since we've started[br]with you earlier,

2:54:39.601,2:54:43.572
I'll start with you this[br]way and we'll go down.

2:54:43.572,2:54:47.376
>> So as contentious[br]this processes is,

2:54:47.376,2:54:49.578
I think it's incredibly[br]important,

2:54:49.578,2:54:52.648
the dialogue that's happening[br]in the United States.

2:54:52.648,2:54:57.052
Hopefully, we can do more than[br]just, you know, have battles

2:54:57.052,2:55:00.489
in the newspapers and on panels[br]like this and really look

2:55:00.489,2:55:04.326
at our legal system and make[br]sure that it has the kind

2:55:04.326,2:55:06.595
of accountability[br]that we needed.

2:55:06.595,2:55:09.131
Laura said, you know,[br]the problem here is scale

2:55:09.131,2:55:10.666
and I really agree with that.

2:55:10.666,2:55:11.967
Courts have been good

2:55:11.967,2:55:14.736
at supervising electronic[br]surveillance [inaudible] one

2:55:14.736,2:55:18.373
wiretap on one phone number[br]or a handful of phone numbers.

2:55:18.373,2:55:22.911
The scale of intrusion here is[br]such that we can only manage it

2:55:22.911,2:55:27.516
and have it a proper oversight[br]with using exactly the same kind

2:55:27.516,2:55:29.518
of computational tools[br]and analytic tools

2:55:29.518,2:55:32.454
that are being used by the[br]intelligence agencies to try

2:55:32.454,2:55:34.423
to mind this data to begin with.

2:55:34.423,2:55:38.260
And the one other thing I[br]would just say is, this is--

2:55:38.260,2:55:40.729
as several people said,[br]this is a global discussion.

2:55:40.729,2:55:48.003
The US is obviously an important[br]part of the internet environment

2:55:48.003,2:55:50.839
but we are not the only[br]country on the internet

2:55:50.839,2:55:55.644
and we do not control the whole[br]internet and I think that just

2:55:55.644,2:55:58.714
as we are examining the behavior[br]of our intelligence agencies,

2:55:58.714,2:56:01.483
I think it's very important[br]that other countries

2:56:01.483,2:56:04.953
that have democratic values[br]that believe in transparency

2:56:04.953,2:56:08.223
and due process really look[br]very hard at their intelligence

2:56:08.223,2:56:10.258
and surveillance[br]practices as well.

2:56:10.258,2:56:11.293
>> Thanks, Dan.

2:56:11.293,2:56:12.394
Lynn.

2:56:12.394,2:56:15.530
>> I guess I'd start with saying

2:56:15.530,2:56:18.467
that everybody's voice is[br]extraordinarily important,

2:56:18.467,2:56:19.601
not only here in the US

2:56:19.601,2:56:21.403
but every individual[br]around the world.

2:56:21.403,2:56:23.805
And we need attention[br]and we need voice

2:56:23.805,2:56:27.676
to every issue whether it's[br]this particular set of issues

2:56:27.676,2:56:31.980
or it's United Nation's[br]expressed interest

2:56:31.980,2:56:34.549
in some portions of[br]the internet ecosystem.

2:56:34.549,2:56:37.753
And I think specific[br]to this issue,

2:56:37.753,2:56:39.821
the only thing I would say is--

2:56:39.821,2:56:41.890
[inaudible] we're all[br]very interconnected

2:56:41.890,2:56:43.725
and very interdependent.

2:56:43.725,2:56:46.194
And when we think about[br]things such as security

2:56:46.194,2:56:50.198
or managing risk or trying[br]to manage those tradeoffs,

2:56:50.198,2:56:52.367
we actually need[br]to do that in a--

2:56:52.367,2:56:54.002
with both sides of the dialogue.

2:56:54.002,2:56:56.938
One actually looking at what[br]we can actually do to protect

2:56:56.938,2:57:00.909
and ensure things that[br]support economic prosperity

2:57:00.909,2:57:04.146
and social development[br]while trading off

2:57:04.146,2:57:07.015
against preventing[br]any perceived harm.

2:57:07.015,2:57:10.852
I think we're far too much to[br][inaudible] over in the side

2:57:10.852,2:57:12.821
of preventing perceived harm,

2:57:12.821,2:57:15.223
and that we don't quite[br]have the balanced rate yet.

2:57:15.223,2:57:16.625
>> Laura.

2:57:16.625,2:57:22.698
>> I think it's important not to[br]take the stability and success

2:57:22.698,2:57:25.701
and the security of the[br]internet for granted.

2:57:25.701,2:57:29.104
So, we're used to it working for[br]the most part because of efforts

2:57:29.104,2:57:32.274
like John's organization and[br]others and it is working,

2:57:32.274,2:57:36.144
but we also have examples[br]of problems with denial

2:57:36.144,2:57:38.046
of service attacks, examples

2:57:38.046,2:57:40.082
of government is[br]cutting off access,

2:57:40.082,2:57:42.350
examples of interconnection[br]problems.

2:57:42.350,2:57:44.519
We have trends away[br]from interoperability

2:57:44.519,2:57:46.488
which I think is a[br]really big problem.

2:57:46.488,2:57:48.356
We have trends away[br]from anonymity

2:57:48.356,2:57:50.992
which changes the nature of[br]the technical infrastructure.

2:57:50.992,2:57:53.695
So, point one is that we[br]cannot take the stability

2:57:53.695,2:57:54.863
and security for granted.

2:57:54.863,2:57:57.699
It has required a[br]tremendous amount of effort

2:57:57.699,2:58:00.068
on the parts of many,[br]many people.

2:58:00.068,2:58:04.439
And it's something that concerns[br]me everyday when I see some

2:58:04.439,2:58:07.776
of the trends away from[br]interoperability and security

2:58:07.776,2:58:11.747
and interconnection[br]security, basically.

2:58:11.747,2:58:13.115
So, that's point number one.

2:58:13.115,2:58:15.550
The second point[br]is if we believe

2:58:15.550,2:58:19.955
that we have the public sphere[br]in the online environment,

2:58:19.955,2:58:21.990
if we believe that there's[br]a technical mediation

2:58:21.990,2:58:24.292
of the public sphere,[br]then we have to think

2:58:24.292,2:58:25.494
about what that means.

2:58:25.494,2:58:27.095
What does the democracy look

2:58:27.095,2:58:30.699
like when the public[br]sphere is now digital?

2:58:30.699,2:58:35.170
So, we know historically that[br]possibility is for anonymity

2:58:35.170,2:58:37.806
or at least traceable anonymity[br]have been closely linked

2:58:37.806,2:58:39.007
to democracy.

2:58:39.007,2:58:43.645
So, I think it's important[br]to just ask the question

2:58:43.645,2:58:45.280
of what does democracy look

2:58:45.280,2:58:48.817
like when we have this technical[br]mediation of the public sphere

2:58:48.817,2:58:51.319
and the privatization of[br]conditions of civil liberties

2:58:51.319,2:58:55.690
where private companies are[br]getting a request delegated

2:58:55.690,2:58:58.994
from governments or carrying[br]out their own governance

2:58:58.994,2:59:00.362
of these infrastructures.

2:59:00.362,2:59:01.863
So, don't take the[br]internet security

2:59:01.863,2:59:03.765
and instability for granted.

2:59:03.765,2:59:05.801
Remember that we have[br]the technical mediation

2:59:05.801,2:59:07.569
of the public sphere[br]and the privatization

2:59:07.569,2:59:09.171
of conditions of[br]civil liberties.

2:59:09.171,2:59:14.042
And the final point is that[br]internet governance is something

2:59:14.042,2:59:19.381
that is-- that the[br]public can be engaged in.

2:59:19.381,2:59:22.217
We've seen examples of[br]civil society action

2:59:22.217,2:59:27.255
of private action, civil[br]liberties advocates involved

2:59:27.255,2:59:28.990
in decisions about[br]internet governance.

2:59:28.990,2:59:30.826
There are many avenues[br]to do that.

2:59:30.826,2:59:33.495
That the-- I do have an[br]engineering background

2:59:33.495,2:59:35.664
but the technology[br]is not that hard

2:59:35.664,2:59:38.600
that people can learn the[br]technology, learn the issues

2:59:38.600,2:59:41.369
and get engaged in these[br]debates which are very important

2:59:41.369,2:59:43.104
because as goes internet[br]governance,

2:59:43.104,2:59:44.906
so goes internet freedom.

2:59:44.906,2:59:46.908
>> Randy?

2:59:46.908,2:59:51.379
>> All of you here that are[br]attending this panel discussion,

2:59:51.379,2:59:54.249
you all have stake in what[br]we've been talking about.

2:59:54.249,2:59:57.519
And so I would challenge you[br]guys to not only make sure

2:59:57.519,2:59:59.321
that your peers understand[br]what some of the pressures are

2:59:59.321,3:00:00.622
and what some of the[br]pitfalls and what are some

3:00:00.622,3:00:02.023
of the disadvantages are of[br]working with the internet.

3:00:02.023,3:00:07.462
But also, you guys are[br]probably going to be on a track

3:00:07.462,3:00:11.433
where you're going to be[br]working with legislators

3:00:11.433,3:00:13.568
and policy makers[br]and things like that.

3:00:13.568,3:00:16.905
And make sure that they[br]understand the implications

3:00:16.905,3:00:20.408
of whatever it is that they're[br]trying to write up or implement,

3:00:20.408,3:00:23.311
both on the legal side[br]and on the policy side.

3:00:23.311,3:00:27.115
That's to me what I see your[br]contribution to the whole thing.

3:00:27.115,3:00:28.884
It's going to be[br]very incremental.

3:00:28.884,3:00:30.619
It's going to take a long time.

3:00:30.619,3:00:33.021
You know if some people talk[br]about the fact that it's

3:00:33.021,3:00:35.490
like when the automobile was[br]first introduced at the turn

3:00:35.490,3:00:39.261
of the century and it took us[br]25 years to come up with the set

3:00:39.261,3:00:41.162
of laws and procedures[br]to make things work

3:00:41.162,3:00:42.497
when we didn't do that.

3:00:42.497,3:00:44.799
But you guys are the ones that[br]are going to be talking to

3:00:44.799,3:00:48.670
and down the road[br]influencing policy and laws.

3:00:48.670,3:00:51.239
And so, you know,[br]take the challenge,

3:00:51.239,3:00:55.143
do it and influence[br]what you can.

3:00:55.143,3:00:56.177
>> Leslie.

3:00:56.177,3:00:59.080
>> So I'm just going[br]to make one point.

3:00:59.080,3:01:03.051
And that's that those of us[br]who are Americans or people

3:01:03.051,3:01:07.322
in the United States have[br]a voice in this debate

3:01:07.322,3:01:09.257
that we need to exercise.

3:01:09.257,3:01:11.092
But we need to exercise[br]it with more

3:01:11.092,3:01:12.961
than our own rights in mind.

3:01:12.961,3:01:16.965
If-- the interesting thing[br]about the internet and the lack

3:01:16.965,3:01:19.334
of a government control is the--

3:01:19.334,3:01:23.371
it's also very unclear[br]about who's responsible

3:01:23.371,3:01:29.577
for the human rights of people[br]in the online environment.

3:01:29.577,3:01:33.682
And we-- I think the NSA example[br]that we have data flowing all

3:01:33.682,3:01:37.352
over the world, states[br]have obligations to people

3:01:37.352,3:01:43.758
within their borders, and[br]a few other kinds of places

3:01:43.758,3:01:45.627
that the law has developed.

3:01:45.627,3:01:48.964
We're not sure who has the[br]obligation for the rights

3:01:48.964,3:01:51.399
of internet users in[br]this kind of environment.

3:01:51.399,3:01:56.538
And it's a conversation[br]that really needs to happen

3:01:56.538,3:01:59.007
because the-- our lives,[br]some significant part

3:01:59.007,3:02:03.878
of who we are is now online[br]and flowing through these wires

3:02:03.878,3:02:07.248
and who ultimately is[br]responsible to make sure

3:02:07.248,3:02:10.185
that basic privacy and free[br]expression rights are honored

3:02:10.185,3:02:12.954
has become increasingly complex.

3:02:12.954,3:02:15.657
So, people need to[br]take that on as well.

3:02:15.657,3:02:16.424
>> Last word, John.

3:02:16.424,3:02:20.628
>> It's a global internet.

3:02:20.628,3:02:23.965
There needs to be an[br]equally global discussion

3:02:23.965,3:02:28.203
about the principles[br]by which we operate it.

3:02:28.203,3:02:30.538
And part of what's occurred

3:02:30.538,3:02:34.709
over the last few months will[br]help encourage one aspect

3:02:34.709,3:02:35.677
of that discussion.

3:02:35.677,3:02:37.746
So, it's a probably[br]a good thing.

3:02:37.746,3:02:39.214
>> I want to thank all[br]of you for being here.

3:02:39.214,3:02:40.548
I want to thank the[br]Internet Society.

3:02:40.548,3:02:43.184
I want to thank the GW[br]Engineering Department

3:02:43.184,3:02:45.553
and their [inaudible][br]Lance Hoffman's Institute.

3:02:45.553,3:02:48.189
Long afternoon, thanks[br]for your patience.

3:02:48.189,3:02:49.324
I hope you learned something.

3:02:49.324,3:02:50.825
Come back again.

3:02:50.825,3:02:51.860
Thanks a lot.

3:02:51.860,3:02:53.928
[Applause]