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How we can predict the next financial crisis

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    Once upon a time
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    we lived in an economy of financial growth and prosperity.
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    This was called the Great Moderation,
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    the misguided belief by most economists,
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    policymakers and central banks
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    that we have transformed into a new world
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    of never-ending growth and prosperity.
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    This was seen by robust and steady GDP growth,
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    by low and controlled inflation,
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    by low unemployment,
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    and controlled and low financial volatility.
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    But the Great Recession in 2007 and 2008,
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    the great crash, broke this illusion.
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    A few hundred billion dollars of losses in the financial sector
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    cascaded into five trillion dollars
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    of losses in world GDP
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    and almost $30 trillion losses
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    in the global stock market.
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    So the understanding of this Great Recession
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    was that this was completely surprising,
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    this came out of the blue,
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    this was like the wrath of the gods.
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    There was no responsibility.
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    So, as a reflection of this,
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    we started the Financial Crisis Observatory.
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    We had the goal to diagnose in real time
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    financial bubbles
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    and identify in advance their critical time.
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    What is the underpinning, scientifically, of this financial observatory?
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    We developed a theory called "dragon-kings."
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    Dragon-kings represent extreme events
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    which are of a class of their own.
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    They are special. They are outliers.
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    They are generated by specific mechanisms
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    that may make them predictable,
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    perhaps controllable.
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    Consider the financial price time series,
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    a given stock, your perfect stock,
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    or a global index.
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    You have these up-and-downs.
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    A very good measure of the risk of this financial market
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    is the peaks-to-valleys that represent
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    a worst case scenario
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    when you bought at the top and sold at the bottom.
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    You can look at the statistics, the frequency of the occurrence
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    of peak-to-valleys of different sizes,
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    which is represented in this graph.
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    Now, interestingly, 99 percent
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    of the peak-to-valleys of different amplitudes
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    can be represented by a universal power law
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    represented by this red line here.
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    More interestingly, there are outliers, there are exceptions
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    which are above this red line,
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    occur 100 times more frequently, at least,
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    than the extrapolation would predict them to occur
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    based on the calibration of the 99 percent remaining
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    peak-to-valleys.
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    They are due to trenchant dependancies
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    such that a loss is followed by a loss
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    which is followed by a loss which is followed by a loss.
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    These kinds of dependencies
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    are largely missed by standard risk management tools,
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    which ignore them and see lizards
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    when they should see dragon-kings.
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    The root mechanism of a dragon-king
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    is a slow maturation towards instability,
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    which is the bubble,
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    and the climax of the bubble is often the crash.
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    This is similar to the slow heating of water
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    in this test tube reaching the boiling point,
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    where the instability of the water occurs
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    and you have the phase transition to vapor.
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    And this process, which is absolutely non-linear --
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    cannot be predicted by standard techniques --
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    is the reflection of a collective emergent behavior
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    which is fundamentally endogenous.
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    So the cause of the crash, the cause of the crisis
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    has to be found in an inner instability of the system,
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    and any tiny perturbation will make this instability occur.
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    Now, some of you may have come to the mind
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    that is this not related to the black swan concept
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    you have heard about frequently?
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    Remember, black swan is this rare bird
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    that you see once and suddenly shattered your belief
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    that all swans should be white,
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    so it has captured the idea of unpredictability,
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    unknowability, that the extreme events
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    are fundamentally unknowable.
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    Nothing can be further
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    from the dragon-king concept I propose,
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    which is exactly the opposite, that most extreme events
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    are actually knowable and predictable.
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    So we can be empowered and take responsibility
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    and make predictions about them.
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    So let's have my dragon-king burn this black swan concept.
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    (Laughter)
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    There are many early warning signals
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    that are predicted by this theory.
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    Let me just focus on one of them:
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    the super-exponential growth with positive feedback.
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    What does it mean?
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    Imagine you have an investment
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    that returns the first year five percent,
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    the second year 10 percent, the third year 20 percent,
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    the next year 40 percent. Is that not marvelous?
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    This is a super-exponential growth.
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    A standard exponential growth corresponds
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    to a constant growth rate, let's say, of 10 percent
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    The point is that, many times during bubbles,
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    there are positive feedbacks which can be of many times,
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    such that previous growths enhance,
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    push forward, increase the next growth
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    through this kind of super-exponential growth,
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    which is very trenchant, not sustainable.
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    And the key idea is that the mathematical solution
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    of this class of models exhibit finite-time singularities,
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    which means that there is a critical time
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    where the system will break, will change regime.
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    It may be a crash. It may be just a plateau, something else.
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    And the key idea is that the critical time,
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    the information about the critical time is contained
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    in the early development of this super-exponential growth.
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    We have applied this theory early on, that was our first success,
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    to the diagnostic of the rupture of key elements
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    on the iron rocket.
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    Using acoustic emission, you know, this little noise
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    that you hear a structure emit, sing to you
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    when they are stressed, and reveal the damage going on,
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    there's a collective phenomenon of positive feedback,
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    the more damage gives the more damage,
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    so you can actually predict,
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    within, of course, a probability band,
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    when the rupture will occur.
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    So this is now so successful that it is used
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    in the initial phase of [unclear] the flight.
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    Perhaps more surprisingly, the same type of theory
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    applies to biology and medicine,
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    parturition, the act of giving birth, epileptic seizures.
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    From seven months of pregnancy, a mother
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    starts to feel episodic precursory contractions of the uterus
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    that are the sign of these maturations
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    toward the instability, giving birth to the baby,
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    the dragon-king.
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    So if you measure the precursor signal,
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    you can actually identify pre- and post-maturity problems
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    in advance.
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    Epileptic seizures also come in a large variety of size,
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    and when the brain goes to a super-critical state,
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    you have dragon-kings which have a degree of predictability
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    and this can help the patient to deal with this illness.
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    We have applied this theory to many systems,
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    landslides, glacier collapse,
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    even to the dynamics of prediction of success:
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    blockbusters, YouTube videos, movies, and so on.
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    But perhaps the most important application
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    is for finance, and this theory
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    illuminates, I believe, the deep reason
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    for the financial crisis that we have gone through.
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    This is rooted in 30 years of history of bubbles,
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    starting in 1980, with the global bubble
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    crashing in 1987,
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    followed by many other bubbles.
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    The biggest one was the "new economy" Internet bubble
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    in 2000, crashing in 2000,
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    the real estate bubbles in many countries,
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    financial derivative bubbles everywhere,
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    stock market bubbles also everywhere,
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    commodity and all bubbles, debt and credit bubbles --
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    bubbles, bubbles, bubbles.
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    We had a global bubble.
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    This is a measure of global overvaluation
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    of all markets, expressing what I call
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    an illusion of a perpetual money machine
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    that suddenly broke in 2007.
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    The problem is that we see the same process,
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    in particular through quantitative easing,
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    of a thinking of a perpetual money machine nowadays
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    to tackle the crisis since 2008 in the U.S., in Europe,
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    in Japan.
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    This has very important implications
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    to understand the failure of quantitative easing
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    as well as austerity measures
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    as long as we don't attack the core,
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    the structural cause of this perpetual money machine thinking.
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    Now, these are big claims.
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    Why would you believe me?
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    Well, perhaps because, in the last 15 years
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    we have come out of our ivory tower,
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    and started to publish ex ante --
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    and I stress the term ex ante, it means "in advance" —
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    before the crash confirmed
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    the existence of the bubble or the financial excesses.
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    These are a few of the major bubbles
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    that we have lived through in recent history.
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    Again, many interesting stories for each of them.
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    Let me tell you just one or two stories
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    that deal with massive bubbles.
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    We all know the Chinese miracle.
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    This is the expression of the stock market
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    of a massive bubble, a factor of three,
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    300 percent in just a few years.
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    In September 2007,
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    I was invited as a keynote speaker of a macro hedge fund
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    management conference,
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    and I showed to the conference a prediction
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    that by the end of 2007, this bubble
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    would change regime.
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    There might be a crash. Certainly not sustainable.
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    Now, how do you believe the very smart,
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    very motivated, very informed macro hedge fund managers
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    reacted to this prediction?
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    You know, they had made billions
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    just surfing this bubble until now.
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    They told me, "Didier,
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    yeah, the market might be overvalued,
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    but you forget something.
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    There is the Beijing Olympic Games coming
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    in August 2008, and it's very clear that
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    the Chinese government is controlling the economy
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    and doing what it takes
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    to also avoid any wave and control the stock market."
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    Three weeks after my presentation,
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    the markets lost 20 percent
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    and went through a phase of volatility,
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    upheaval, and a total market loss of
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    70 percent until the end of the year.
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    So how can we be so collectively wrong
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    by misreading or ignoring the science
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    of the fact that when an instability has developed,
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    and the system is ripe, any perturbation
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    makes it essentially impossible to control?
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    The Chinese market collapsed, but it rebounded.
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    In 2009, we also identified that this new bubble,
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    a smaller one, was unsustainable,
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    so we published again a prediction, in advance,
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    stating that by August 2009, the market will correct,
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    will not continue on this track.
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    Our critics, reading the prediction,
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    said, "No, it's not possible.
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    The Chinese government is there.
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    They have learned their lesson. They will control.
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    They want to benefit from the growth."
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    Perhaps these critics have not learned their lesson previously.
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    So the crisis did occur. The market corrected.
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    The same critics then said, "Ah, yes,
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    but you published your prediction.
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    You influenced the market.
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    It was not a prediction."
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    Maybe I am very powerful then.
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    Now, this is interesting.
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    It shows that it's essentially impossible until now
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    to develop a science of economics
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    because we are sentient beings who anticipate
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    and there is a problem of self-fulfilling prophesies.
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    So we invented a new way of doing science.
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    We created the Financial Bubble Experiment.
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    The idea is the following. We monitor the markets.
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    We identify excesses, bubbles.
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    We do our work. We write a report
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    in which we put our prediction of the critical time.
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    We don't release the report. It's kept secret.
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    But with modern encrypting techniques,
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    we have a hash, we publish a public key,
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    and six months later, we release the report,
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    and there is authentication.
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    And all this is done on an international archive
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    so that we cannot be accused of just releasing the successes.
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    Let me tease you with a very recent analysis.
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    17th of May, 2013, just two weeks ago,
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    we identified that the U.S. stock market
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    was on an unsustainable path
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    and we released this on our website on the 21st of May
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    that there will be a change of regime.
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    The next day, the market started to change regime, course.
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    This is not a crash.
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    This is just the third or fourth act
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    of a massive bubble in the making.
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    Scaling up the discussion at the size of the planet,
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    we see the same thing.
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    Wherever we look, it's observable:
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    in the biosphere, in the atmosphere, in the ocean,
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    showing these super-exponential trajectories
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    characterizing an unsustainable path
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    and announcing a phase transition.
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    This diagram on the right
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    shows a very beautiful compilation of studies
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    suggesting indeed that there is a nonlinear -- possibility
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    for a nonlinear transition just in the next few decades.
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    So there are bubbles everywhere.
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    From one side, this is exciting
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    for me, as a professor who chases bubbles
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    and slays dragons, as the media has sometimes called me.
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    But can we really slay the dragons?
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    Very recently, with collaborators,
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    we studied a dynamical system
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    where you see the dragon-king as these big loops
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    and we were able to apply tiny perturbations at the right times
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    that removed, when control is on, these dragons.
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    "Gouverner, c'est prévoir."
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    Governing is the art of planning and predicting.
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    But is it not the case that this is probably
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    one of the biggest gaps of mankind,
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    which has the responsibility to steer
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    our societies and our planet toward sustainability
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    in the face of growing challenges and crises?
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    But the dragon-king theory gives hope.
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    We learn that most systems have pockets of predictability.
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    It is possible to develop advance diagnostics of crises
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    so that we can be prepared, we can take measures,
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    we can take responsibility,
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    and so that never again will
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    extremes and crises like the Great Recession
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    or the European crisis take us by surprise.
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    Thank you.
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    (Applause)
Title:
How we can predict the next financial crisis
Speaker:
Didier Sornette
Description:

The 2007-2008 financial crisis, you might think, was an unpredictable one-time crash. But Didier Sornette and his Financial Crisis Observatory have plotted a set of early warning signs for unstable, growing systems, tracking the moment when any bubble is about to pop. (And he's seeing it happen again, right now.)

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Video Language:
English
Team:
closed TED
Project:
TEDTalks
Duration:
17:01

English subtitles

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