Documentário | João Goulart: Jango

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Documentário sobre a vida política do presidente João Goulart, o famoso Jango.

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VISIT TO CHINA OF JOĂO BELCHIOR GOULART,

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE UNITES STATES OF BRAZIL.

THE CENTRAL STUDIOS OF
NEWS AND DOCUMENTARIES

OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
BEIJING, AUGUST 1961 .

In the afternoon of August 13th,
Joăo GouIart,

the Vice-President of the Republic of the
United States of BraziI arrives in Beijing.

I'm the bearer of a
message to the Chinese people,

a message of friendship from
the Brazilian people,

I am undoubtedly contributing towards
a closer relationship between our peoples,

who can and should be good friends.

Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister
of the State Council,

talks with
Vice-President Joăo Goulart.

Liu Shaoqi, President
of the People's Republic of China,

welcomes Vice-President Joăo Goulart.

The guests of honor visit the museum
about the history of the Chinese revolution.

These Chinese characters mean:

" let's distribute the land,
through the strike of the hatchet,

we shall unlock a new world;

with the strike of the scythe,
we shall eliminate the old one."

On August 23rd,
Vice-President Joăo Goulart

ends his visit to China and leaves
Canton to return to Brazil.

Xeng Xeng, the vice-governor
of the Guangzhou province,

and other officials
of the province of the city,

together with a well-wishing crowd,

say goodbye to the guests of honor
at the railway station.

The friendship, closeness and cooperation
between the peoples of China and Brazil

are ever increasing.

Greetings to the Brazilian people.

May the guests of honor have a safe trip.

BRASÍLlA, August 25th, 1961

It was a little past 6 in the morning

when president
Jânio Quadros, as usual,

locked himself up in his office.

That day, however, he drafted
the terms of his resignation,

which would be sent to the National
Congress a few hours later,

stirring up a lethargic Friday session.

With expression and gestures that
did not betray his decision,

Jânio attended the Soldier Day
Service.

Defeated by what he called " terrible
forces" in his resignation note,

Jânio was photographed for the last time as
president alongside the " occuIt forces" .

Minister of Navy
Sílvio Heck warned:

if Vice-President Joăo Goulart
were to be inaugurated in office,

a civiI war would erupt in the country.

The backdrop for the coup was set.

I was informed of the resignation

by a phone call from the chief
of staff of the presidency of the republic,

minister Macedo Soares.

And immediately I though of
calling a meeting in Itamaraty

with those friends I could
talk to immediately,

in order to pay homage to the
resigning president.

And I was glad that idea was well-accepted,

because, not only my personal friends
met in Itamaraty

but also the diplomats that
were then in Rio de Janeiro -

Few had moved to Brasília yet, the transfer
of the capital had just happened -

and many workers.

From the most humble employees,
door-keepers, office-boys,

The drivers of the ministry,

to diplomats
who were then in Rio de Janeiro.

So we opened a bottle of
Champagne in honor of the president

And, in a moment of
conservative traditionalism,

we offered to those present
one last Itamaraty reception.

He received the news in Singapore,

at the Raffles hotel,
in the middle of the night.

An American telegraphic
agency called

seeking his comments
on the resignation of Jânio Quadros.

He had not been aware of such resignation
untiI just then.

He was surprised.

And I remember, I mean, I was told later,

that one of the participants
In that mission,

senator Barros de Carvalho, of PTB,

Said right away: " Dr. Jango, Let's
open a bottle of champagne

to celebrate the future president."

But Jango was a very cautious man,

very down-to-earth.

He said: " Look, Barros,
if you want to have champagne

there's nothing wrong with that.
We'll have the bar send up some.

Now, we will not be celebrating my
presidency,

but rather paying homage to
unpredictability."

Săo Borja, a frontier town,
at the Missions ŕrea,

is the birth and resting place
of two presidents:

Getúlio Dornelles Vargas and
Joăo Belchior Marques Goulart.

Joăo Goulart's bedroom
at Granja Săo Vicente

displays moments of his public life,
started with president Vargas' help.

The 1 7 years in between his
swearing in as state congressman in '47

and his overthrowing from power in '64,

only deepened his nationalism and
commitment to social justice,

the tragic reasons behind
the common destiny of both men.

By putting a gun to his chest
on the morning of August 24th, 1954,

Getúlio Vargas brought an end
to his own life

and also to the plans of his opponents
who wanted to achieve power,

following the trail
torn open by the coup.

Everything changed in those hours
between Vargas' suicide

and the resignation that had been demanded
the day before by a military uItimatum.

When Jango left for Porto Alegre
to bury his friend,

he took with him the will
and the political heritage of Getúlio.

Born on March 1st, 1918,

Jango, the seventh child of
Vicente and Vicentina Goulart,

affluent landowners,

spontaneously lived in close
contact with farm workers.

His youth years in Porto Alegre

were spent between the bliss of bohemian
life and the rigors of the academy.

In the country of lawyers,
Jango also got a law degree

and quickly climbed the steps of
a life in politics.

State congressman in 1947,
Federal congressman in 1950,

secretary of interior and justice
in Rio Grande do Sul,

national chairman for PTB.

In 1954, when Getúlio had to replace
his waves to the people

for commitments with the working classes,

Jango stepped out of the shadows,
joining the Ministry of Employment.

Side-by-side in the ministry
sat people from the old-republic,

Getúlio's comrades from the 1930 Revolution,
seasoned politicians.

Joăo Goulart, at age 36,

personified Vargas' wish to inject
new blood into Brazilian politics.

Jango became minister when
seamen were carrying out a strike

for better pay.

He mediated the conflict
and used his influence to

grant their claims.

To celebrate May 1st, he prepared
a fair gift to workers:

a 100% -increase in minimum wage.

Getúlio granted the increase
but dismissed Jango,

because the salary increase reignited
a military crisis,

that exploded in a manifesto
signed by 42 colonels.

BraziI and its army
had been closely following

the ongoing ideological battle
for a long time.

And this battle was
greatly strengthened

when Mr. Joăo Goulart
was minister of employment

in the Getúlio administration.

Surrounded by leftists
in his ministry,

Jango started adopting measures
that caused concern among the military.

And the colonels,
in light of the Brazilian atmosphere,

decided to warn
their military chiefs, generals,

and signed a manifesto.

To communicate their concern

about the path that BraziI was
following towards the left.

That was the purpose of the manifesto.

this manifesto was written
by a group of military officers

at the Superior War College and at the
General Command of the Military Forces.

The writer was General Golbery.

The man doing the lobbying
was then General Ademar de Queiroz.

The campaign against Getúlio was unrelenting.

Gregório Fortunato, head of
the president's Personal guard

tried to silence the opposition
with a gun.

The attack, wich injured
Journalist Carlos Lacerda

and killed air force major Rubem Vaz,
in the small hours of August 5th,

strengthened the conspiracy
against the government.

The dramatic outcome of the crisis,
with the president's suicide,

robbed the conspirators
of the thrill of victory

A defeated candidate
for a senate seat in '54,

during the '55 elections, Jango received
the votes from the labor class

which elected him Vice-President

and gave to Juscelino Kubitschek
the presidency of the republic.

Before the inauguration, the wedding.

On May 12nd, 1955, Jango got married
to Maria Teresa Fontela,

who had also been born
in his hometown of Săo Borja.

As vice-president, Jango represented
the always smiling JK

in dealings with the working class.

Securing the necessary stability
to allow JK to apply his Plan of Goals

and to increase industrialization,

PTB's political support protected the
salaries and the freedom of the workers.

With peace underway,

the constitutional rules govern Brazil.

While occupying the office of
President, during JK's absences,

Jango combined administrative know-how
and political expertise.

The visit to the Soviet Union
in late 1960

turned Vice-President Joăo Goulart
into the first Latin-American leader

to pierce the ideological barrier
buiIt by western countries around Moscow.

Welcomed by Alexei Kosygin
and Leonid Brejnev,

high-ranking soviet officials,

Jango broadened Brazil's political horizons.

Breaching the automatic alignment
with the United States,

he included the country among the
frontline of non-aligned nations.

Jango could not go to the Soviet Union
and not see the burial place of Lenin,

the hero of the 191 7 communist revolution.

The protocoI visit displeased
the military

which, in 1961 ,
tried to prevent his inauguration.

When visiting Leningrad,

the port where Russia's feudal
history began to sink,

Jango went onboard the Aurora cruiser,

from which the first shots of the
Bolshevik revolution were fired.

Jango would be reminded of those images
when granting freedom to Brazilian mariners

after the 1964 revoIt.

The trip's joyfuI and informal tone,

caused a meIting of the " cold war" .

Robots, mechanical arms, atoms.

Jango discovered in Russia a world
on the brink of the Sputnik age.

BraziI was on the brink of the " Broom age."

Jânio Quadros' victory in
the 1960 presidential elections

enabled UDN to quench its
thirst for power.

Carlos Lacerda, Afonso Arinos
and Magalhăes Pinto

were the hosts of a party that
turned Jânio into a born-again UDN member.

Banners, waves,

hugs and applause

surrounded the conversion ritual.

BraziI had caught the
"Jânio fever" .

Jânio Quadros is the hope
Of this abandoned people

Sweep, sweep, sweep, sweep...

Sweep, sweep little broom

Sweep away all this shamefuI behavior

Because the people is tired

Of so much suffering

In the eyes of the PTB and of the leftist groups,
Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott

was the ideal presidential candidate.

Well-respected by the Armed Forces,

he had conquered the admiration of civilians
on November 1 1st, 1955,

when, as ministry of defense, he guaranteed

the inauguration of JK and Jango.

His candidacy had been launched in 1956,

when he received the " golden sword " ,

during a ceremony promoted
by sergeants and officers.

Jango was a candidate for reelection.

BraziI needs a strong arm

I am, you are, we are voting for Lott

The bond between military nationalism
and the labor party

included government plans for agricuItural
reform and illiterate vote.

When its time to vote
I'll "Jang", I'll "Jang"

Jango, Jango
Jango Goulart

For Vice-President
Will "Jang" Jorge Freitas

Jango, Jango
Jango Goulart

PSB, aiming to maintain its
successfuI alliance with PTB,

supported the Lott-Joăo Goulart slate.

Perpetual candidate Ademar de Barros,

and his same old Social Progressive Party,

pilfered popular votes.

First from Juscelino, now from Lott.

A solemn MiIton Campos was UDN's
bet for Jânio's slate.

In an attempt to free up his hands,
Jânio connived towards

a " Jan-Jan" slate,
which ended up being successful.

The 5 years of the JK
administration rocked Brazil.

Modernization trends ran rampant in the country,
as part of a " new" fever:

Bossa Nova, New Cinema, a new capital city.

The city's bold architecture
became a futurist frame

for a country full of
age-old contrasts.

JK left office feeling
certain he would come back.

Almost 6 million votes
brought Jânio to power.

Soon he'd pull a rabbit out of his hat.

Jânio initiated a program
of moral reforms.

Prohibited horse racing
during the week,

adopted slack suits as uniform,

prohibited cock fighting
and banned bikini-clad women from TV.

The country, in dire need of a leader,
had, at last, found its vice-policeman.

The government staggered in ambiguity.

Moralist internal policies sealed
its commitments

with middle-class standards.

Economic measures,
such as instruction 204,

which created a single tax
assessed on dollar transactions,

benefited exporters and
foreign investors.

The end of agricuItural subventions

caused increased food prices and inflation.

Foreign policies followed a
different mould,

The visit of president Sukarno inaugurated
a new possibility of talks

with the non-aligned block,
that was formed in the early 60s.

The president had this contradiction

between the expansion
of the Brazilian personality abroad

and a limitation on the country's
economic-financial status.

He had to advance policies that
were not contradictory,

but that had to abide by
those two contingencies,

those two requirements.

BraziI was ready to strengthen its
international identity,

but the country, at that time, really
depended on the countries

with which it had
economic-financial relations

in order to maintain its internal
financial stability.

The decoration of Ernesto " Che" Guevara

was too bold a gesture for the
Government's internal allies.

Carlos Lacerda, a fierce ally
up to then,

turned his back on Jânio and started
a crisis that would lead to his resignation.

In August 1961 ,

a handshake with Mao Tsę-Tung turned
Joăo Goulart into a pioneer again,

this time bringing
BraziI closer to the 3rd world.

Jango broke the barriers that separated
the western countries

from the People's Republic of China.

In Beijing he repeated the " meIting"
ritual that had taken place in Moscow.

For Jango, friendship between people
went beyond ideological frontiers

The visit acknowledged the Chinese people's
right to self-determination.

My Chinese friends,

during these last few days
with the Chinese people

and its officials,

I was able to see that this is not the
old China, full of legends and superstitions,

which westerners regard
with a mixture of vague fright

and reverential admiration
for the unknown.

Your country exhibits
a renewed youthfuIness

in and on itself.

In the first contact with your people,

in light of the warm welcome
extended to us,

I feIt like I was being hosted
by an old friend.

Let friendship grow ever closer,

between the People's Republic of China
and the United States of Brazil.

Let the friendship among Asian, African

and Latin-American people grow.

On August 25th, 1961 ,

news of the president's
resignation were everywhere.

Jânio left Brasília and took refuge
at the Cumbica Airbase in Săo Paulo,

where he awaited the
outcome of the events.

In doubt, one of
his assistants

brought the presidential ribbon.

With the Vice-President abroad,

Congress chairman Ranieri Mazzilli

became interim head of state.

The military ministers tried to avoid
Jango's return and inauguration.

And those that were involved
with the problem of the ongoing

battle in Brazil,

were against Jango's ascension,

even though we were not

against Jango himself,

but against the men that surrounded him

and that were leading him
into adopting a leftist standing

that was not what we wanted.

And it is important to note:

at that point, a revolutionary war
was underway in Brazil

urging a peaceful
take over of power.

And that was what we wanted
to avoid in Brazil.

We did not want BraziI to follow
in the steps of the Czech-Slovak republic.

My first gesture was to offer
guarantees to president Jânio Quadros,

because we believed, at first,

that he had been the victim of a coup.

Finally, we were able to get in contact,

via the journalist Castello Branco,

with the Cumbica airbase, in Săo Paulo.

And president Quadros told me
that he had actually resigned.

From then on, we protested
incessantly.

for the inauguration of the Vice-President.

I took all actions that
were incumbent on the state

in terms of mobilization

so as to ensure public order.

I got in touch with the
3rd Army Commander

and said that, in view of the situation,
which I was also aware of,

the State had to take all actions

to ensure pubic order.

And that, according to the Constitution,

only if we were unable to
ensure public order,

would we request help and protection
from the federal forces.

He agreed and I took all actions.

We mobilized all available
weapons

and got ready for resistance.

And we feIt that the entire country was closed.

All other states
accepted the military counciI rule,

except for governor Mauro Borges.

Here in Rio de Janeiro, governor
Lacerda gave repression a free rein.

In Săo Paulo, governor
Carvalho Pinto was also absent

and repression ensued.
The same happened in Minas.

And I sought to contact all
Generals and military chiefs

that I could, directly or indirectly.

It was, in fact, at that time that I had a
very harsh conversation

with General Costa e Silva,
the commander of the 4th Army in Recife.

I'll tell you, in summary, that it
was a very spontaneous movement,

a very natural movement, that got stronger;

we attempted to use
all available means,

especially the media,

which was our salvation.
We were able to bring information

not only to the public opinion
of the state and country,

I mean, we essentially
won that fight

via a public-opinion battle,

but also we managed
to inform the military themselves,

to a point when the military council
that took over the government

sent an order to a
military unit to go against the south

and it was the officers themselves
who met and refused to follow the order.

When I was its president, the National Union
of Students (UNE) called a national strike

and students were widely mobilized.

The Union's board decided
to relocate its headquarters

to Rio Grande do Sul, where,

together with the people
of Rio Grande do SuI and of Brazil,

they could take part
in the campaign for legality.

I had the opportunity to
talk to Brazilian university students

throught the chain of legality

and to take part in the entire
mobilization process of the population

to oppose the military coup
against president Joăo Goulart.

The people in the streets,
the resistance in the South,

the split in the armed forces,

gave back to the national congress
the controI over the political process.

this time politicians were
not discussing Jango's unseating,

but rather his inauguration.

Legality was reestablished
with a compromise.

The congress approved the
parliamentary amendment.

In the course of the voting
process, some were still undecided.

In his journey back, Joăo
Goulart exhibited aptitude and patience.

Upon hearing of the resignation,
he returned immediately to Brazil

through the longest route:

Paris, New York,
Buenos Aires and Montevideo.

The Pacific Route.

From the balcony of Piratini palace

he saluted the crowd calling his name.

Upon arriving in Brasília, politicians
and military officers celebrated

the peacefuI solution to the crisis.

Even those who had
sided with a military veto

welcomed the new president.

The Colonels of '54 were split.

ColoneI Antônio Carlos Muricy
was forced to leave his position

in Rio Grande do Sul
due to his opposition to Brizola.

General Golbery, frustrated
with Jânio's resignation,

left the army to set up lPES.

General Ernesto Geisel,
the military commander of Planalto,

aborted the " Mosquito Operation" , that
had been devised by the FAB officers,

to bring down the plane that
was flying Jango back to Brasília.

On September 7th, 1961 ,

Jango was inaugurated as president
and announced that his administration

intended to be the marker
of a new independence of Brazil.

Political parties, congressmen,

everybody knows that,
due to my very nature,

I tend to bring together
and not to set apart,

I'm a peacemaker, not an instigator,

I prefer to harmonize
rather than stimulate resentment.

We shall promote internal peace,
peace with dignity,

peace leading to the safety
of our institutions,

ensuring our democratic rights,

the permanent observance of the
will of the people

and the inviolability
of the national sovereignty.

Congressman Ranieri Mazzilli of PSB

returned the presidential ribbon
to Joăo Goulart.

However, the president would still
be under the rule of PSB

during the new regime.

The first parliamentary cabinet

was moderate and followed the style
of Prime Minister Tancredo Neves.

UDN and the Christian Democratic Party
made up the conciliation cabinet.

President Goulart's PTB
was in the minority.

Pressure from the population
would be used

to change the cadence
of ministerial decision-making.

The government met old
nationalist claims.

Cancelled the agreement
with Hanna Mining Corporation,

a muItinational mining company,
and signed the rural act.

When Mr. Joăo Goulart
became president of the republic,

we worked the fields

organizing peasant leagues,
peasant associations

and other associations,

to fight for agricuItural reform,

rallying for the most important claims
of poor countrymen in Brazil.

During his administration
we had more freedom

because we strengthened our organizations,

especially our unions.

The first National AgricuItural
Workers' Meeting was held,

which included all classes of
poor countrymen,

in Belo Horizonte.

In attendance during the meeting
were Mr. Magalhăes Pinto

and Mr. Joăo Goulart

as well as numerous senators
and federal congressmen

and other administrative
and political authorities

of the country.

Goulart was a supporter of base reforms.

AgricuItural reform, urban reform,
tax reform

So we joined this fight.

What we wanted was the participation
of rural workers

in the great mobilization process
that was going on in Brazil

beginning in 1960.

In May 1962

the government announced the intention
to amend article 1 41 of the Constitution

that determined the payment of
previous cash indemnification

for expropriation.

Without that change, agricuItural reform

would become merely a good
deal for speculators.

The ideological fight took to the streets.

Right-wing propaganda used Cuba

as a pretext to wear
its old costumes in public.

Leftists believed
in the success of the Cuban model.

Political mobilization to support
FideI Castro

extended all over Brazil.

Chief of police, Sir,

we are in a
democratic country...

We are in a country...

Chief of police, Sir,

It will be OK.

It will be OK because from now...

In Pernambuco, in the city of Caruaru,

communist leader David Capistrano,

who would suffer state-sponsored
violence come the 70s,

was facing the intolerant 60s.

Workers of Caruaru!

I call to all communist
leaders of Caruaru!

The escalating terrorist violence

would leave its mark
on the soviet expo,

that exhibited in Brazil
the new trends of the socialist world

and the new technology
of Eastern Europe.

The inquiry that looked into the attack
revealed that part of those actions

had been planned in the backrooms of
the government of Guanabara.

The list of those involved,
included the chief of the state police.

The National Union of Students
was a target of the terrorist actions

of extreme-right groups.

The anti-communist movement
gave rise to an action against

the National Union of Students with machine
guns being shot at the headquarters of UNE.

In fact, what was going on
was that in Brazil,

a fascist group was getting organized,
forming paramilitary organizations,

the right-wing was getting organized, its
activities funded by foreign organizations;

later, all that
was revealed.

All of that had a very clear purpose:

to prevent the people from
taking part in politics.

to curtaiI the participation of workers,
of the working class,

to curtaiI the participation
of rural workers,

to curtaiI the participation
of students.

Because we were actually advancing

towards increased democratization.

Economic democratization,
democratization of the land,

democratization of political power,
democratization of knowledge.

And the Brazilian upper class,
from the heights of its reactionary nature,

the large foreign groups,
large muItinational companies,

the great landowners,
the large bourgeoisie of Brazil,

could not accept
even the basic reforms

that president Jango Goulart
wanted to implement in Brazil.

The most audacious part of the
Brazilian government was its foreign policy.

Itamaraty established a
non-aligned diplomacy,

unfastening the knots that
bound the interests of the country

to the decisions that came from Washington.

The government resumed
relations with the Soviet Union,

voted against the
colonialist policy in Africa,

and supported Cuba's
right to self-determination.

The foreign policy
got stuck in the frontiers of economic dependency.

Pressure from the U.S. caused
minister Santiago Dantas to go to Washington,

where, in a cold weather,

he was to negotiate the limits of the
Brazilian foreign debt.

I believe that those days

spent with American and international
authorities in Washington

are part of the situation
I had the opportunity to announce

to the Brazilian people
before leaving Brazil

and that the resuIts of this visit will
meet the expectations of the Brazilian people.

Those are: that BraziI has no intention
of increasing its debt immoderately

instead,
we seek to establish

conditions that will allow the
country to face its commitments

according to its paying capabilities.

Joăo Goulart's trip
to the U.S. in ApriI 1962

suspended temporarily the increase
in the gap between both countries.

A priority in Jango's agenda
was to renegotiate the foreign debt.

For Kennedy, the important thing
was to redefine the political rules in Brazil.

Nationalization of U.S. companies
and the program of reforms

sounded like communism.

One week before,

governor LeoneI Brizola
expropriated in Rio Grande do Sul

the assets of Companhia Telefônica Nacional,

the Brazilian arm of lTT.

The U.S. welcomed Jango with open arms,

fearing that Brazil
could move away from the western block.

In UN, Jango explained, in person
to the international press

the meaning of the nationalizations.

The need we feIt

to talk about
the expropriation of companies,

as part of the discussions,
was caused exactly by the difficuIties

that they were creating,
at the time, in my country.

We can encourage
foreign-capital investments

if we pay fair
remuneration on their capital.

When I say " fair" ,
I wish to express

the country's ideal of justice.

It cannot yield excessive
profits either.

Profits that would lead
to very fast enrichment

in detriment of the national interest

or at the expense of
the country's economic stability.

So we wish to find a fair balance,

in which reasonable remuneration
is paid on the capital,

yielding profits,

but as a resuIt of activities that
are in the best interest of the nation,

so that the profits can also bring
about benefits for the country.

The department of state sent
two stars to Brazil.

The pale glamour of John Gavin

and the rehearsed faith
of father Patrick Peyton,

Hollywood vicar, a favorite of
9 out of 10 movie stars.

To mobilize the
middle classes,

father Peyton organized
a religious crusade under the motto:

" The family that prays together
stays together."

The purpose was to have Catholics
unite against communists.

And, at the personal request of Jango,
as press secretary,

I extended father Peyton
all kinds of courtesies,

and even gave him
television tapes

so that he could record his campaign.

The opposition transferred
the capital to Washington.

Dollar loans that had been denied
to the Brazilian government

funded directly the administration of
anti-Joăo Goulart governors.

The Whitehouse was the
headquarters of the government,

where Carlos Lacerda and
Ademar de Barros feIt at home.

I looked into the problem
of slums

and the president was
clearly impressed

with the data I showed him.

Rio de Janeiro, for example,
has an annual deficit

of 10 thousand homes,

and this deficit has been accruing over the
last 10 years.

Which means that we have a deficit,
in Rio de Janeiro alone,

of 100 thousand homes.

And not only was the president impressed,
but he also got in touch with Mr. Goodman

to try and move forward
the ongoing projects

relating to the slums in Guanabara.

We discussed a half-dozen matters;

the problem of the Port of Santos,
the problem of the Săo Sebastiăo Port.

The problem of the water supply
to the city of Săo Paulo;

we have water for 2.5 million inhabitants

and we need water for
4.5 million inhabitants.

We have huge problems,

new highways,
electricity for railroads,

new hydroelectric plants,

many problems

relating to the economy of Săo Paulo
and of the country.

The cabinet headed by Tancredo Neves
came to an end

when the prime minister resigned
to run in the elections.

The new cabinet,
headed by Brochado da Rocha

survived two months
of successive crisis.

The last prime minister, Hermes Lima,
a member of the Socialist Party,

came to wind up parliamentarism
in the country.

With presidentialism in sight,

the 1962 elections
became more important.

As part of the elections,
the right wing laid down its arms.

To stop the progress of the left,

Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action
- lBAD -,

the advanced arm of lPES,

injected over 2 million
dollars in the campaign

funding the campaign of
250 candidates to the federal congress

and several governors.

Will the democratic institutions
prevaiI over the battle of relentless ambitions?

From crisis to chaos

The country can be dragged
into an irreversible crisis.

What are we doing to prevent
that the Brazilian people be faced

with the tragic choice between
anti-democratic solutions?

We, the intellectuals,
we, the company owners,

we, the men who have
the responsibility to rule,

we, who believe in democracy
and in free initiative,

we cannot remain silent while
the situation deteriorates day by day.

Omission is a crime.!

lf we remain isolated, we'll be crushed.
We must combine our efforts.

Let us direct the actions of the
democrats into one single path

so that we shall not be
victims of totalitarianism.

And it is exactly to coordinate
the thoughts and actions

of all those that do not
wish to remain silent

in light of the catastrophe
that threatens us,

that we have created
a new organism,

with a new message for the
new reality of Brazil.

We have one basic purpose.:

To prevent the difficuIt situation
that the country is facing

from compromising
our democratic institutions

and christian traditions.

The Institute for Social Research and Study
has these basic goals.

Its purposes are clear and well-defined.

The Institute shall execute a plan
to achieve such purposes as.:

The strengthening of the
democratic institutions,:

end of underdevelopment,:

currency stabilization,:

The moralization and efficiency
of the governmental structure.

But lPES cannot be reduced to words.

Action is necessary.

All those dollars
were not enough to prevent the triumph

of politicians committed to
the reforms.

The number of congressmen from UDN dropped

while the number of congressmen
from PTB increased.

PSB maintained the majority.

The new congress
gained a different face.

Politicians regrouped
in fronts.

On the one side,
the Nationalist Parliamentary Front.

And on the other,
the Parliamentary Democratic Action,

the lair of reaction
against the reforms.

One of the most important aspects of
that group of right-wing congressmen,

was the fact that, even though it was
called " Parliamentary Democratic Action" ,

and had little or no democracy about it,

it managed to
turn congress

into a stage for conflicts.

Conflicts that were certainly
based on actual economic interests

but that were being presented
as ideological battles.

When asked to decide
the fate of parliamentarism,

the people returned to Jango the
powers that had been stripped from him.

15 million people voted.

Almost 10 million said
"no" to parliamentarism.

Jango had 3 more years
of government ahead of him.

The president, with a minority in congress,
organized a conciliatory cabinet

where PSB had a majority
of the representatives

and the left-wing
held the most influence.

Democratization in the use of land,
illiterate vote,

rules to govern rents,
fair basis for minimum wage.

Those were the highlights
of a government program

that could achieve
greater social harmony.

Jango intended to end hunger
and misery,

in a country where justice had always
been the dark side of democracy.

The situation in the northeast received
special attention from the government.

The president's plan
in '64 received

the same opposition he had attracted
back in '54 as minister of employment.

Strike seeker,
promoter of class battles

and enemy of capitalism.

The agricuItural workers, mobilized by
the social transformation process,

received a wakeup call
about the longstanding poverty in the fields.

The perspective of small changes
in a country with great inequalities

brought about many illusions.

Thousands of workers,
landless and jobless,

embarked aboard a train of hope,

leaping from the pages of a book
onto the political scene.

With the reforms, Jango
made the country live its utopia.

The president needed the support
of the military.

The tradition of military
intervention in the political life

no longer had the hues of adventure.

The improvisation of the 20s had
been replaced by the ideology of the late 40s.

The Superior War College,
created in 1950

to mirror the North-American War College,

assembled its own political model,

based on the concept of
safety and development.

Challenging the disciplinary rule,

sergeants elected two representatives
in the October '62 elections.

RevoIting against the legal decision

that prevented the investiture
of the elected representatives,

the sergeants followed a
military tradition and rebelled.

Jango had to punish them to
prevent a breach of discipline

that could bring down
the government itself.

Unions, students and politicians
rallied for the rebelling sergeants.

The president pardoned the sergeants,

in a decision that usually
was only granted to officers.

The political activities of the sergeants
intimidated the military chiefs.

General Ozino Alves, a nationalist
with a good reputation among the ranks

was personally trying,
as head of the 1st army

to have the officers
support the government.

Joăo Goulart would
soon commit a fatal mistake.

As many other progressive
heads of state in Latin America,

he paid the price for his na:ďvetę

in trying to settle
the military dispute over lunch.

The plot against Goulart
was well underway.

Telegrams confirmed that the minister
of war of the Jango administration,

general Amaury Kruel, was,
himself, part of the military group

plotting the coup d'etat.

Together at the palace, they
once again swore

loyalty to the president
and allegiance to the constitution.

The intention of the military chiefs

was exactly to have Jango
reach the end of his term of office,

since we only intended to start
an armed fight as a last resort.

We did prepare to
be able to face

any government action.

But, by late '63,

we received notice that the government
had been preparing a coup,

and those news were confirmed by
an individual we held in high esteem

and trust,

so we contemplated the possibility of
taking action before the government.

The armed forces tend to adopt
interventionist actions,

because usually in Brazil
social conflicts

are settled via the intervention
of the armed forces.

So the political entities behind
those conflicts

are the ones that invite the intervention
of the armed forces.

The manner in which such
intervention can be prevented

is to have the armed forces turn into
a neutral entity,

which is only possible

with the political and ideological
division of the armed forces.

The economic crisis, with an inflation
threatening to go beyond the 100% mark

would be one of the obstacles
affecting social development.

The general command of workers,
the compact group of PTB,

LeoneI Brizola and the
National Union of Students

called for basic reforms
as the immediate solution.

The three-year plan of Celso Furtado
and Santiago Dantas

suggested, first,
the sanitizing of the economy.

This is a very important point,

since it touches the very nature
of the Joăo Goulart administration.

Joăo Goulart had not been elected
president of the republic,

he had actually been part of a
PSD-PTB coalition.

And the head of the coalition was PSD,
the majority party.

When Jango was sworn into office,
he had to adjust such forces.

And l'd say that it led...
not so much to a dichotomy,

but rather to a double
orientation of the government,

or the forces
that supported the government.

One group was intent on recovering
controI over the situation.

I mean, the economy
was in a state of disarray,

and, as I said,
it faced a strong inflationary surge,

lack of payments,
domestic and foreign problems.

And it was necessary to recover
controI over that.

And my opinion, even back then,

is that it is impossible
to recover controI without growth,

in an orderly fashion.
Hence the three-year plan.

l'd say: if we recover the reigns of the
situation, we'll make the economy grow

so we'll be able to introduce reforms,

that are the essence
of the government's policies.

That is why the three-year plan ended
with a list of the structural reforms

that were necessary.

But they resuIted from
an increased controI over the economy

and, therefore, a consensus
was necessary

to ensure a solid standing
for the government.

What happened was that the different
groups that supported the government

could not reach a consensus.

At least with regard to this strategy,
they couldn't .

And there were powerfuI groups that
believed that it was more important

to launch immediately
the reform plans.

And that is what prevented a consensus.

And president Joăo Goulart was
torn between the two groups.

Attacked by unions
and business owners,

the three-year plan never left the drawer.

As a remedy for the economic crisis,

it had an effect that was
unacceptable to the government:

limits on salaries.

The General Command of Workers,

completely immersed
in institutional debates,

abandoned the strengthening
of its union foundations.

CGT exchanged the work at production lines,

where it worked side-by-side
with the workers,

for activities developed
side-by-side with politicians.

Strike was a word of order,

heard only by employees
of state-owned companies

sometimes with the cautious support
of industrial and trade workers.

When the command of workers realized
its mistake, it was too late.

March was around the corner.

ENOUGH EXPLOlTATlON

Jango intended to change
the face of Brazilian capitalism

by reducing social inequalities, giving
capitalism a more humanitarian, less

savage appearance.

Among his allies, his goals
were often mistaken

for an intention to end capitalism.

Other times, his allies thought he had
no intention of ending capitalism,

He had to put together a strategy
while battling the personal discomfort

of being the rich president
of a poor country.

The President was aware of
the influence of the church.

It was up tp Jango to convince the
high catholic hierarchy

that the social reforms that he
intended to carry out in Brazil

would establish the principles of justice
that were defended by Christianity.

The factions that supported Brizola, organized
all over the country in groups of 1 1 ,

described Brizola's battle
for power with the following slogan:

" A brother-in-law is not a relative.
Brizola for president."

The family ties were an
obstacle created by the constitution.

The proposed amendment

served as a weapon for the propaganda
against the government.

Travestied as a defender of the constitution,
the right wing got stronger.

The noisy campaign convinced
the middle class, the military,

the church and business owners that the
government wanted to change the constitution

to put an end to democracy.

In an interview to the
Los Angeles Times,

Governor Carlos Lacerda
announced that the Brazilian military

were setting the exact date
to remove Joăo Goulart from power.

Military ministers, indignant,
wanted to have Lacerda punished.

JANGO FLlES TODAY TO
PROPERTY lN BRASÍLlA

Jango tried to use a state of emergency

to overcome, in a political manner,
the military reaction against the governor

and reestablish the authority of his administration.

The left wing suspected that the action
could adversely affect it.

One needs to look back on
those difficuIt and complex days,

when the pressure mounted
against us.

When it came from everywhere.

From our country and from abroad.

People truly didn't want

fundamental reforms to be made in Brazil.

We had been informed that,
in Săo Paulo, Ademar de Barros,

and in the state of Rio de Janeiro,
Carlos Lacerda,

were actively getting ready
to carry out a revolution or coup d'etat.

The state of emergency was
called in Rio de Janeiro

during a meeting between Jango,
his ministry

and the military ministers.

The news that got to
Brasília about the state of emergency

were really daunting for us.

We did not know at that time
if the correlation of powers

allowed the installation
of a state of emergency in this country

that would not be later
changed by the majority forces,

by the reactionary part of PSD,
in alliance with UDN,

into an instrument against workers.

An instrument against
the labor rights that had been achieved.

Regardless of Joăo Goulart's will.

After Jango arrived in Brasília

and we found out that the project
for state of emergency

had started to be amended,
to enable violations of domicile,

and allowing all of the abuses
that became commonplace after '64,

we came to the conclusion
that we'd oppose the state of emergency.

To this day I'm not sure
if that was the right decision.

To avoid defeat, Jango capitulated.

lsolated in congress,

opposed by governors
Lacerda, Magalhăes and Ademar,

suffering an economic embargo on the part of
the U.S., Jango had no alternative:

he tried to mobilize the citizens

by personally raising
the flag of reform.

In January 1964,

the president revived and regulated
the law on remittance of profits,

which had been approved by the
Congress over one year before.

By March, a lunch party
held at the Military Base

and the warm welcome extended
by a number of officers

were not enough to erase
the restlessness and doubts

from the worn-out expression
of the president.

The adhesion of low-ranking

and military officers to
the nationalist governmental project

expressed the efforts of most
of the sectors of the Brazilian society

towards the construction
of a fair democracy.

The menace represented by the reforms
that threatened the Brazilian powerful,

came to life in March.

In its strategy of popular mobilization,

the government called a mass meeting
in Rio de Janeiro.

The " meeting of the Central" ,
as it was called,

was scheduled for Friday, 13th.

Everything had been carefully planned.

From amplifiers to security,
nothing could go wrong

when the president took
the message of reform to the people.

The setting for the last act
had been prepared.

March '64 was a month
of intense activity

and many concerns.

Subversive activities promoted
by the government were on the rise

and we had decided to face whatever
the government could dish out.

When the meeting on the 13th was held,

we considered that meeting
to be an intimidation,

a strike against the army. Carried out
next door to the army headquarters,

with posters that were clearly
subversive against the democratic order

That meeting deeply affected the military.

And a few days before the 13th,

one of my subordinates told me

that a group of officers were planning
to put an end to that movement

in the most violent manner possible.
I saw such an intention as alarming.

I brought the fact to the knowledge
of General Castelo Branco

at the army headquarters

and to the knowledge
of general Costa e Silva

at the department of production
and construction works.

Both of them, general Castelo
in particular,

were very concerned and said:
"but that is unacceptable!

the meeting must take place,
we should not interfere

we must stop this from happening."

It was really important that
the meeting took place.

Because we were aware that the rebellion
in the military ranks would increase

against a government that wanted
to disestablish the democracy in Brazil.

Therefore, together
with other officers,

including general Aragăo,

who had also been informed
of the plan,

we took action and, on the morning of the 13th,
after arriving at the headquarters,

I sought one of those officers
that were part of the group and asked:

" How's it going?
ls it settled? ls it going to happen?"

" General, no one is interfering.
There is only one I couldn't talk to."

" Go out there and talk to this 'one'

The meeting is not to sustain
any interference from us."

The immediate consequence:

the next day, in the ministry, the meeting
was all that everyone talked about

and revoIt was widespread.

So we had gained the support
of many people who, up to then,

still hadn't decided to
part ways with legality.

Because it's very hard,
as I said before.

So the meeting on the 13th meant that we
got the support of many individuals...

upstanding, loyal individuals,

that up to then, had still been
attached to the idea of absolute legality.

The meeting of the Central
was a kind of...

attempt to speed up the
project of reforms.

And many people advised
him not to do that meeting.

That, from a certain point of view,
it would mean an aggravation.

And that he should not announce
those reforms,

many of which would not
be possible to implement.

Then, I clearly remember Jango saying:

" I don't have a problem
with staying in office or leaving,

my problem is that I have
to carry out those reforms.

l'd rather fall,
but fall with my chin up."

RAlMUNDO ALMElDA MUST GO!

LET'S GO, ARRAES
THE PEOPLE CAN'T TAKE lT AN Y LONGER!

THlS TlME, THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE PEOPLE ARE NOT ALONE!

HOUSEWlVES AGAlNST TAX DODGlNG

WOMEN'S LEAGUE lN THE STATE
OF GUANABARA

FULL MONOPOLY NOW!
ALL THE OlL BELONGS TO PETROBRAS.

SUPPORTlNG JANGO'S BASE REFORMS

By the late afternoon,

200 thousand people gathered
at the Central Station square.

The crowd keyed the speakers up.
Jango did not disappoint.

By his side, his wife Maria Teresa

soothed the tension
of the moment.

On the same wooden stage

that Getúlio Vargas used for
his public appearances,

Jango announced the
execution of his program.

A few hours before, he had signed the
decrees that expropriated unproductive lands

alongside federal highways and railroads
and took over private refineries.

AgricuItural workers will find

that their most important
and fairest claim

will have been met in many places.

The claim for a plot of land
in which to work.

A plot of land to harvest crops.

Then, that worker and his family,

his dejected family,
will be able to be their own bosses,

because up to now they've been working for
the owner of the land they rent,

or for the owner
of the land they loan.

Today, in the eyes of the nation,

with the solidarity
of the people united in this square,

a square that belongs
only to the people,

the government,
that also belongs to the people,

and to the people alone,

reaffirms its unshakable goal

to fight with all its might

to improve the Brazilian society
in a quest

Not only for agricuItural reform,
but also for tax reform.

For full electorial reform,
for illiterate vote,

for the eligibility of all Brazilians.

for the purity of democratic life,
for economic emancipation,

for social justice

and, together with its people,
for the progress of Brazil.

In Săo Paulo, the ruling class
was also mobilized against the reforms.

With the support of the state government,
the rural society and sections of the church,

the " family march, with God
and for freedom" was organized.

Veterans of '32 and members
of traditional families of Săo Paulo

held a rosary in one hand
and banners on the other,

with a few of their slogans:

" Civism shall kill communism." " In defense
of the Constitution and of legality."

Jango and his family went to Săo Borja

to spent the holy week holidays,
in March 1964.

Earlier pictures in the family album

reveal the relaxed lifestyle of
of a farmer president.

His life with Maria Teresa,
the barbecues, the chimarrăo,

the horse riding along the fields,

all of which was tinted by
an anxious mood this time around.

In fact, that would be the
last time Jango and his family

spent time together at the ranch

where he'd briefly stay in April, lonely
and on his way to the exile in Uruguay.

By late March,

after watching the movie
about the battleship Potemkin,

the Brazilian navy
was seduced by a dream.

Gathering in the steeI workers' union,

during the celebration of the
2nd anniversary of their association,

which had been kept a secret from the Navy,

hundreds of mariners claimed their rights:

freedom for mates held in confinement,
better meals

and the right to get married.

In attendance, as a role modeI and witness,
was an elderly Joăo Cândido,

a hero who had survived the rebellion

that brought an end to
physical punishment back in 1910.

Like in the movie,
the population supported the rebels.

Gathered in mutiny at the
Navy Club,rallying for discipline,

officers called for the punishment
of the rebellious mariners.

Back in Rio,
Jango finds a solution:

the mariners are arrested
and subsequently released.

The Minister of Navy quits.

Minister of the Army,
Jair Dantas Ribeiro,

left office and was hospitalized,
due to renal problems.

The impact of the events in the Armed Forces

caused the adhesion of legalist officers to
the movement that deposed the president.

For them, it was intolerable
to see hierarchy crumbling.

Rumors of a military rebellion
had already been around

when the president attended,
on March 30th,

at the headquarters
of the Automobile Club,

a ceremony in his honor, sponsored by
the Association of Sergeants

and sub-officers of the military police.

The president energetically prohibited
any subversion in the name of order.

His improvised greeting
to the subordinates

was a belated warning
to higher-ranking officers.

JANGO: WE DO NOT WANT
A CLOSED CONGRESS.

In the early hours of March 31st,

a few hours after the end of the celebration,

the troops of general Olímpio Mourăo Filho,
commander of the 4th Military Region,

marched over Guanabara.

The rebellion, coming from Minas Gerais,
triggered the coup.

In Guanabara, army tanks
rolled into the cities

without resistance.

The middle class exorcized its ghosts

by setting the building
of the National Union of Students on fire

In the afternoon of ApriI 1st,
in the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro,

victory was already being celebrated.

President Joăo Goulart
had left Guanabara,

the enemy quarters, and gone to Brasília.

The Capital was not safe
for the president either.

Jango went to Porto Alegre.

The battle in Congress
would soon be over.

Presiding over the tumuItuous
session of ApriI 1st,

senator Aldo de Moura Andrade,

in an act of solemn disregard
for the destiny of the legal institutions,

declared the office of president
of the republic to be vacant

while the head of state, Joăo Goulart,
was still on Brazilian soil.

The president of the republic
has left the headquarters of the government.

He left a headless nation behind.

That's not true.!

In a very grave time in our history.

When it is necessary that the head of state

remain in the command of the government.

He has abandoned the government.

And I hereby give notice to the
National Congress...

This abandonment...

This abandonment configures...

the need to have the National Congress,
as the civiI power,

immediately take
the action expected from it

Under the Brazilian Constitution

in order to restore
in this turbulent nation

the authority of the government...

and the existence of the government.

We cannot allow...

BraziI to remain without a government,
abandoned.

Under our responsibility

is the people of Brazil.
The people. The order.

That being so, I hereby declare
the office of president of republic to be vacant.

Conspirator.!

Conspirator.!

In Rio Grande do Sul, the defeat
was not yet consummated.

Former governor LeoneI Brizola
used the radio as his best weapon.

People on the streets promised to repeat
the resistance of '61 .

When president Joăo Goulart
arrived in Porto Alegre,

in the middle of the full-blown crisis,

a meeting was held at the residence
of the commander of the 3rd army,

who was general Ladŕrio Teles,

a great man and
military chief.

President Joăo Goulart was in attendance
together with eight generals and myself.

And my proposal was:

that the president retreated
to the interior of Rio Grande do Sul,

precisely to Săo Borja,

and that, at that time, he appointed
General Ladŕrio as minister of the army

and I would accept the appointment
for the office of minister of justice.

And we would organize the resistance.

General Ladŕrio said

he agreed with my proposal
completely.

And that the 3rd army had enough
weapons to organize civil

corps that could include
over 100 thousand men,

in addition to the army troops.

And that he considered the situation
to be complex, difficuIt,

with a number of followers
within the 3rd Army,

but he thought it was possible
to defend legality.

The final decision of the meeting was
to be made by the president.

Who decided that no resistance
would be offered

because he considered it to be
too high a price to be paid in blood

by the Brazilian people
to restore its rights.

In fact, I got myself ready

for a potential reaction
of the state of Minas Gerais,

one year and a half before March '64.

When I appointed
ColoneI Josę Geraldo

to command the Military Police,
I gave him the task

of preparing the police for a reaction.

Because I was sure,

that with the difficuIties
I had with the government,

they would end up
attempting an intervention in Minas.

And I would react.

So I got ready for a reaction
to a potential intervention

rather than to depose a president.

Magalhăes had assumed a
national responsibility.

And in this case he thought he should
use Palŕcio da Liberdade to develop

a government that had a national
characteristic as well

So he called MiIton Campos,
Josę Maria de Alckmin and myself.

I was informed of that
a few weeks beforehand.

And was told that I would be called

the day my presence was needed
in Belo Horizonte.

My office, which was
that of nonspecific minister -

the three of us, MiIton Campos,
Josę Maria de Alckmin and l,

were appointed nonspecific secretaries.

And my duty as nonspecific secretary

was to attain potential
international support

to have recognition of our belligerent status,

if the actual conditions of
the movement we were expecting

came to that.

Recognition of a belligerent
status, as you know,

entails the supply
of elements that can support

the political movement underway.

It was not necessary.

We knew, we trusted we'd succeed.

And there was a meeting among ourselves,

during which we tried to estimate
how long it would last.

The estimation was that the fight
would last for six months. At least.

I was regarded as an optimist,

I thought that it would
be over in one month.

The only one who
got it right was Golbery,

who said: " it will fall apart
like a castle of cards."

Despite the surprise,

despite the weakening that
the government had been experiencing,

if president Joăo Goulart
had decided to resist,

to counter-strike -

he still had troops,
he still had elements here in Rio,

to take over the Guanabara palace,
where Lacerda had been scheming -

he could have won that fight.

Or at least put up
a longer fight.

But he decided not to resist,

which, in my opinion, was the right decision,
because it avoided bloodshed,

and today, after those informations
were released by the Americans,

we became aware of the involvement
of the American government

in the military coup that
was underway in Brazil.

The story that the U.S. had sent
ships to Brazil

was old news.

It had even been mentioned in

an American talk show called
"Firing Line" , with William Buckley.

He was interviewing at that time,
in the early 70s,

governor - former governor
at that time, Carlos Lacerda -,

when someone from the audience stood up
and said: " look, that is not true,

I was in the Caribbean at the time,
embarked, doing military work,

and the ship I was in
was rerouted to the Brazilian coast

at the time of the revolution.

There were stories like that.
And tales too

that maybe the U.S. had actually
sent ships to the Brazilian coast,

but that they were only tankers.

What was discovered about
Operation " Brother Sam"

is that it was much bigger.

I mean, in fact, it included
the four tankers,

the four tankers were full

to ensure the supply of fuel
for the revolution

if the movement had to last,
if it faced too much resistance

and had to last for
over one month.

There were 136 thousand barrels of
regular gas,

aviation kerosene,
all that.

Battleships were also
involved,

six destroyers
if I'm not mistaken

One aircraft carrier was sent to the
Brazilian coast,

a ship that specialized
in carrying helicopters,

24 combat and transport planes.

A large amount of ammunition was embarked,

which never made it to Brazil,

but that was loaded
into ships in the U.S..

Those ships, from different points
in the Atlantic,

converged at the Brazilian
coast.

A few hours before sunrise
on ApriI 2nd,

the entire operation was demobilized
when news came

that the military
had already taken over.

This was the Operation " Brother Sam" .

On ApriI 2, with the people of
Rio Grande do SuI demobilized,

Jango went to Săo Borja and,
from there, to his exile in Uruguay.

ENLlST HERE.

In Rio, the police of Carlos Lacerda
arrested a Chinese trade mission,

under charges of terrorism.

It was up to Sobral Pinto, the old advocate
of political prisoners

to prove the innocence of the diplomats.

Communist leader Gregório Bezerra, was
dragged through the streets of Recife,

and arrested.

Among the prisoners, one traitor:

soldier Josę Alselmo dos Santos,
known as corporal Anselmo.

A leader of the association of mariners

and head of the rebellion
at the metal workers' union,

years later he would be
exposed as a police undercover agent

by the armed activists.

In Rio de Janeiro, the middle class
would perform its version

of the " march, with God and for freedom" ,

with the victory guaranteed.

" The right to be born. "

This civic furor would soon be
used to support the campaign

" Donate gold for the good of Brazil" ,

an attempt at solving
the economic problems of the country

with acts of patriotic charity.

After their arrival in Rio,

Mourăo and Magalhăes were commended
for the triumph

of a movement that
they apparently headed.

The way I see it, there were
two coups in '64.

The first was a typical
Latin-American coup.

Certain civiI forces
supporting a military movement

that was initiated in Minas Gerais

and that actually,

in its exterior appearance,

was actually what we know
about Latin-American history.

Now, during the course of that coup,
another one took place.

On the inside.

That was the one that lingered

and expelled all
civiI and military characters,

that took part in the first coup.

That was the coup that remained,

it was this coup that
buiIt a military core

and an economic system.

Because, in fact,
there were two movements.

The one from Minas, which I refer to
as a na:ďve, patriotic movement,

that wanted only to bring
order to the country,

and wanted nothing for itself.
I never did.

So much so that, after my
arrival in Rio de Janeiro,

Carlos Lacerda
and Juscelino came to me,

saying it was time I took over
and I told them

I had not carried out the movement
to become president of the republic.

It was not to claim anything for myself.

What I wanted was to have
BraziI find its true way

of order, of tranquility.

In Rio de Janeiro there was
a group that got ready.

That really got ready.

It seems that LincoIn Gordon
was connected to this group.

Because this group had money.

We, back in Minas, did it
with our own funds.

Which was not much.

And we never got any indemnification.

Because president Castelo...

was part of the other group.

The appointment of general Castelo Branco

instituted in BraziI the system
of indirect elections for president

with a single candidate protected
by institutional acts.

I hereby declare the Honorable Humberto
de Alencar Castelo Branco

vested in office
of president of the republic

of the United States of Brazil

I shall defend and fulfill, with honor
and loyalty the Constitution of Brazil.

We shall plunge ahead
knowing that the remedy

against the ill effects
of the extreme left

shall not be the birth
of a reactionary right.

My deeds shall be those

of an uncompromised
head of state

during the process
of election of the Brazilian

to whom I shall convey this office
on January 31 , 1966.

1964 closes the '54 cycle of colonels.

This time they were united
and had a plan.

The concepts developed
in the Superior War College

replaced social justice
for development

and democracy for security.

Castelo Branco's cabinet
had politicians from UDN

and technocrats, now at
the service of the new order.

But the true core of power
after '64

laid in the hands of the brothers in arms.

General Costa e Silva
in the ministry of war,

General Ernesto Geisel
as Head of the Military Household

and General Golbery do Couto e Silva,
who used lPES records

to set up the National Information Service.

During the Castelo Branco administration,
old alliances were recovered.

The law on remittance of profits
was revoked,

and the trust of the United States in the
Brazilian democracy was reestablished.

Annulling the decree on
expropriation of unproductive lands,

the new president put the minds
of large land owners at ease.

With the new economic guidelines,

the International Monetary Fund
came to the assistance of its ally.

A rigorous controI on salaries

would fund development and the
fight against inflation.

After sending to prison
or to exile

the main leaders of
the left and of the union movement,

the military put an end to the
ambitions of their civiI allies.

Ademar de Barros,
Governor of Săo Paulo,

was an ally of Castelo Branco
but ended up being discharged and unseated,

charged with bribery.

Lacerda's dreams of becoming president

were over when marshal Castelo Branco
extended his own term of office,

and cancelled the presidential
election of 1965.

lRREVERSlBLE DEClSlON:
GOVERNORS-ELECT TO BE VESTED lN OFFlCE.

The elections for state governor
turned JK into the heart of the civiI resistance.

The victory of the opposition
for state governor

in Minas and in Guanabara
alarmed the government.

Pressured by the hard-core
segment of the armed forces,

Castelo Branco
enacted Institutional Act No. 2,

banning political parties

and turning the elections for governor
into indirect ones.

A cordial JK, after being unseated,
followed the same lPM ritual,

walking the same path that
many other Brazilians would follow.

Jango the farmer, exiled in Uruguay,

lived in angst over the
uncertainties of the wait.

His most wanted return
had no scheduled date.

The anguish of those days

caused his children's birthdays
to go almost uncelebrated.

The desire to see Brazil
become a democracy again

led Jango, in exile, to unite
with Carlos Lacerda and JK

to structure the Ample Front, a movement
that was banned soon thereafter.

Opposition movements had
less and less freedom

Lacerda would be the most illustrious name
in the next list of unseated politicians.

The successor of Marshal Castelo Branco
was General Costa e Silva.

Against the will of Castelo,
the minister of war was made candidate.

In the Congress, under the applause of Arena
and before a silent MDB,

Costa e Silva was inaugurated.

The new president was sworn in
under a new Constitution,

enacted in 1967 with deep
restrictions on the liberal principles

of the previously untouched
Constitution of 1946.

Marginalization of the people
and failed political solutions

led the way to opposition marches.

Protests promoted
by students,

intellectuals and professionals,
under violent repression,

led the way to radicalization.

The defeat of populism

caused disenchantment with
traditional political formulas

and launched a new motto:
"armed fight."

From the Caraíbas area
to the southern mountains,

stretched the revolutionary wave of the 60s.

Tupamaros in Uruguay,
Douglas Bravo in Venezuela

and father Camilo Torres in Colombia
started guerrilla activities.

Rangers trained in the U.S.

were chasing Ernesto Che Guevara.

The formidable shadow of Che

would disappear on October 8, 1967.

The death of the guerilla commander,
that had been announced so many times,

would soon be acknowledged
by FideI Castro in Havana.

...also a dark photograph.

This is the picture.

You can be sure

that I wish Che had adopted

at least certain preventive measures.

He often led the way
on exploration units.

On the other hand, it is also
possible that he

was very conscious
of the mission he had chosen

and of the subjective value of men.

In the heart of America,
in the province of La Higuera, in Bolivia,

a helicopter brought
the tied-up body of Guevara.

General Hugo Bŕnzer
inspected the operation in person.

He was nervous, as a hunter
feeling inferior to his prey.

Ernesto Che Guevara, the exemplary
activist, was dead.

His image holding a shotgun,
with a star on his cap

would reemerge not only in the 3rd world,

but also in the '68 rebellions in
Paris, Prague, Berlin, Berkeley.

Édson Luiz, a young man
shot to death in Rio de Janeiro,

would be the first victim of the
clash between the police and students.

Those who remain silent over your body

Agree to your death

THE YANKEES HAVE MURDERED
A BRAZlLlAN MAN

By sword and fire

Deep down in the tear

Shot in the chest

OUR PEOPLE ARE BLEEDlNG
Those who remain silent die with you

Those who remain silent die with you

Deader than you are now

ARM Y GO HOME

A watch on the floor of the square

Ticking, telling the time

Set by anger

MURDERS. VENGEANCE

In the fire, mirroring

The shine of your hair

Those who shouted live on with you

His death prompted great
movements of protest on the streets.

On the other hand, it was decided by
the meeting of intellectuals

that they would attend the march
en masse.

I'll be there and hope
you will too.

- How about you, Tônia?
- We will all be there.

I'll go as a woman, as an actress,
as a mother, as a citizen.

I'll go because I want
the pubic opinion

to known that we have a lot of courage
to unmask the myth

that the students are doing something
wrong, that they are troublemakers.

They are our hope and we
have our arms open for them,

to accept their claims.

I'm very proud that
my kids are taking part in it.

I'll be on the streets. I have
two kids who are university students.

l'd rather they be on the streets
than smoking marijuana.

Partying and smoking marijuana.

Let's take a walk on the hidden forest,
My love

Let's take a walk down the avenue

Let's take a walk through the high path,
My love

There are mountains looming over the asphalt

The pretext for the toughening up of the regime

was the speech by opposition
congressman Mŕrcio Moreira Alves,

the government's attempt to sue him
and the denial of the Congress,

to protect its sovereignty.

President Vargas

President Vargas

President Vargas

Let's go for a walk
In the United States of Brazil

Let's go for a walk in disguise

In December 1968,
again on a Friday 13th,

the government closed the Congress
and enacted Institutional Act No. 5.

The toughening up of the regime and
the repression of civiI organizations

neutralized the opposition.

Censorship on newspapers, radio and TV
concealed any sign of protest.

The church, which had supported
the forces that removed Jango from power,

reappeared in the late 60s
as the only organized institution

to defend justice and
human rights.

The murder of father Henrique,
a direct assistant to D. Hęlder Câmara,

marked with blood
the new standing of the Church.

The repression, the ban
on people's movements,

the obstruction of union movements,

caused the Church to be the
last remaining place

where people's movements
can get organized.

In a way, the Church is
the only institution to which

a retired general could
not be appointed

chairman of the Episcopal Conference

or Archbishop of Săo Paulo.

So that brought people to the
Church.

After the initial success,

marked by kidnappings
and bank robberies,

the urban guerrilla, isolated
from the people, began to crumble.

Former congressman Carlos Marighella,
who used to head the Communist Party,

the founder of the National Action
for Liberty, ALN,

died in Săo Paulo in an ambush
put together by police forces.

ALLENDE'S LAST SPEECH
SEPTEMBER 1 1 , 1973

All I can say to the workers is:
I shall not resign.

Standing at a historical
crossroads,

I shall repay the loyalty of
the people with my life.

In Chile, another alternative
was attempted:

one coalition that brought together
communists, socialists,

liberals and progressive Catholics
elected senator Salvador Allende.

The defeated candidate in the
'52, '58 and '64 elections,

Allende came to power in 1970

proposing a pacific route
towards socialism.

lMAGES OF ALLENDE'S CAMPAlGN - 1964

The elation of Allende's administration,

the attempt to conciliate
socialism and liberty,

ended up in a bloodbath
sponsored by the U.S.

Long live Chile.
Long live the people.

Long live the workers.

In 1973, the CIA and ITT

financed the overthrowing
and assassination of Allende.

In 1975 no democracy
was left standing in the southern cone.

But the scenario
would get even more somber.

Police and paramilitary organizations
organized Operation Condor,

with the purpose of preventing all political
and oppositional actions in the continent.

In Washington, a bomb brought
to an end the life of Orlando Letelier,

a former minister
of the Allende administration.

In Buenos Aires, senator Michelini
of Uruguay was kidnapped and killed.

General Juan Josę Torres,
the president of Bolivia,

and general Carlos Prates,
former commander-in-chief of the Chilean army,

were killed in bombings.

President Joăo Goulart
knew that his name was

on that list of doomed presidents.

His greatest dream,
his greatest wish

was to go back to Brazil.

I believe deep down he couldn't
stand that instability any longer,

To go from country
to country in Latin America,

and later even thinking
about moving to Europe...

Because his wish,
his hope

was to be able to go back to Brazil.

His dreams were halted
on December 6, 1976.

At his farm in Mercedes, Argentina,

where he lived with Maria Tereza,
Jango died of a heart attack.

SĂO VICENTE RANCH

Journalist Carlos Castello Branco
described his death:

President Joăo Goulart,
unable to return to Brazil,

compelled to leave Argentina
and advised not to stay in Uruguay,

died like a lost cowboy,

looking for a way
back home.

His desire to go home
was very strong.

In the split second that
separates life from death,

the images of his youth in
Săo Borja were relived,

his inauguration in Brasília, the images
of March 13th in the Central Station,

of Vargas' funeral.

The kind gestures from the people

and his role in the fight
for a better society,

which caused him to be the
only Brazilian president to die in exile.

WELCOME TO BRAZlL.

On December 7,

the body of Joăo Goulart crossed
the border back to Brazil

to be buried in Săo Borja.

12 years had elapsed
since he left for the exile.

The family, friends,
former assistants

spread over the casket of the former
president of the republic

the flag of amnesty.

Silence was the official version
of the government.

JANGO WILL REMAIN WlTH US

CENTRAL CEMETERY

THE EVENTS OF THAT DAY
ARE STlLL CLEAR lN M Y MEMORY:

IN A DARK BEDROOM,

TRYlNG TO ESCAPE THE WORLD
THAT REACHED ME THROUGH THE RADlO,

I WAS LITTLE MORE THAN A BOY,
CRYING TO DEATH

OVER PRESlDENT JANGO'S
JOURNE Y-ESCAPE.

THE YEARS WENT B Y, MATURlTY CAME, AND
A DAlLY DOSE OF lNJUSTlCE AND HATRED,

OPPRESSlON, LlES AND FEAR,
HAVE MADE ME NOW, AS AN ADULT,

ON BEHALF OF THE TRUTH AND HlSTORY,
REAFFlRM THE BO Y:

THE TEARS THAT WERE SHED lN 64
ARE STlLL FAlR. - FERNANDO BRANT