0:00:00.380,0:00:05.670 Herald: Good morning to this last minute[br]edition to our “Fahrplan” today. 0:00:05.670,0:00:09.540 There will probably be time for a few[br]minutes of Q&A in the end, so you can 0:00:09.540,0:00:15.160 ask questions here or on IRC[br]and Twitter via our Signal Angels. 0:00:15.160,0:00:19.560 Please welcome Jake Appelbaum,[br]independent journalist, 0:00:19.560,0:00:23.510 for his talk[br]“To Protect And Infect Part 2”. 0:00:23.510,0:00:29.690 applause 0:00:29.690,0:00:35.840 Jacob: Okay. Alright. Thanks so much[br]for coming so early in the morning. 0:00:35.840,0:00:38.550 Or maybe not so early in the morning[br]for most of you apparently since 0:00:38.550,0:00:44.150 you’ve all been up for more than an hour.[br]But I’m gonna talk today a little bit 0:00:44.150,0:00:48.669 about some things that we’ve heard about[br]at the conference and I’m gonna talk a bit 0:00:48.669,0:00:52.740 about some things that you have not[br]probably ever heard about in your life and 0:00:52.740,0:00:55.680 are even worse than your worst nightmares. 0:00:55.680,0:01:00.200 So recently we heard a little bit about[br]some of the low-end corporate spying 0:01:00.200,0:01:04.900 that’s often billed as being sort of like[br]the hottest, most important stuff, so the 0:01:04.900,0:01:09.340 FinFisher, the HackingTeam, the VUPEN.[br]And sort of in that order it becomes 0:01:09.340,0:01:14.490 more sophisticated and more and more[br]tied in with the National Security Agency. 0:01:14.490,0:01:17.660 There are some Freedom of Information Act[br]requests that have gone out that actually 0:01:17.660,0:01:23.670 show VUPEN being an NSA contractor writing[br]exploits, that there are some ties there. 0:01:23.670,0:01:28.010 This sort of covers the… sort of…[br]the whole gamut, I believe, 0:01:28.010,0:01:31.650 which is that, you know you can buy these[br]like little pieces of forensics hardware. 0:01:31.650,0:01:35.240 And just as a sort of fun thing I bought[br]some of those and then I looked at 0:01:35.240,0:01:38.670 how they worked and I noticed that this[br]‘Mouse Jiggler’, you plug it in and 0:01:38.670,0:01:42.860 the idea is that it like keeps your screen[br]awake. So have any of you seen that 0:01:42.860,0:01:46.910 at all? It’s a piece of forensics hardware[br]so your screensaver doesn’t activate. 0:01:46.910,0:01:51.290 So I showed it to one of the systemd[br]developers, and now when you plug those 0:01:51.290,0:01:55.901 into a Linux box that runs systemd,[br]they automatically lock the screen 0:01:55.901,0:02:02.081 when it sees the USB ID.[br]applause 0:02:02.081,0:02:05.470 So when people talk about Free Software,[br]‘free as in freedom’, that’s part of 0:02:05.470,0:02:09.260 what they’re talking about. So there are[br]some other things which I’m not going 0:02:09.260,0:02:11.660 to really talk a lot about it because[br]basically this is all bullshit that 0:02:11.660,0:02:15.420 doesn’t really matter and we can defeat[br]all of that. This is individualized things 0:02:15.420,0:02:20.060 we can defend against. But I want[br]to talk a little bit about how it’s 0:02:20.060,0:02:23.960 not necessarily the case that because[br]they’re not the most fantastic, they’re 0:02:23.960,0:02:27.720 not the most sophisticated, that[br]therefore we shouldn’t worry about it. 0:02:27.720,0:02:31.320 This is Rafael. I met him when[br]I was in Oslo in Norway 0:02:31.320,0:02:36.449 for the Oslo Freedom Forum, and basically[br]he asked me to look at his computer 0:02:36.449,0:02:40.400 because he said, “You know, something[br]seems to be wrong with it. I think that 0:02:40.400,0:02:43.750 there’s something, you know,[br]slowing it down.” And I said: 0:02:43.750,0:02:46.260 “Well, I’m not going to find anything.[br]I don’t have any tools. We are just 0:02:46.260,0:02:49.580 going to like sit at the computer…”[br]And I looked at it, and it has to be 0:02:49.580,0:02:53.200 the lamest back door I’ve ever found. It[br]was basically a very small program that 0:02:53.200,0:02:56.980 would just run in a loop and take[br]screenshots. And it failed to upload 0:02:56.980,0:03:01.160 some of the screenshots, and so there were[br]8 GB of screenshots in his home directory. 0:03:01.160,0:03:04.570 laughter and applause[br]And I said, “I’m sorry to break it to you 0:03:04.570,0:03:09.440 but I think that you’ve been owned.[br]And… by a complete idiot.” 0:03:09.440,0:03:14.429 laughter[br]And he, he, yeah, he was, 0:03:14.429,0:03:17.829 he was really… actually, he felt really[br]violated and then he told me what he does, 0:03:17.829,0:03:21.080 which is he’s an investigative journalist[br]who works with top secret documents 0:03:21.080,0:03:25.680 all the time, with extreme, extreme[br]operational security to protect 0:03:25.680,0:03:30.820 his sources. But when it came to computing[br]J[ournalism] school failed him. 0:03:30.820,0:03:35.530 And as a result, he was compromised[br]pretty badly. He was not using 0:03:35.530,0:03:38.129 a specialized operating system like[br]Tails, which if you’re a journalist 0:03:38.129,0:03:40.910 and you’re not using Tails you should[br]probably be using Tails unless 0:03:40.910,0:03:44.410 you really know what you’re doing.[br]Apple did a pretty good job at 0:03:44.410,0:03:48.839 revoking this application, and it was, you[br]know, in theory it stopped, but there are 0:03:48.839,0:03:52.950 lots of samples from the same group[br]and this group that did this is tied to 0:03:52.950,0:03:57.670 a whole bunch of other attacks across[br]the world, actually, which is why 0:03:57.670,0:04:03.320 it’s connected up there with Operation[br]Hangover. The scary thing, though, is that 0:04:03.320,0:04:06.689 this summer, after we’d met, he was[br]actually arrested relating to some 0:04:06.689,0:04:11.238 of these things. And now, as[br]I understand it, he’s out, but, 0:04:11.238,0:04:14.690 you know, when you mess with a military[br]dictatorship it messes with you back. 0:04:14.690,0:04:18.900 So even though that’s one of the lamest[br]backdoors, his life is under threat. 0:04:18.900,0:04:23.519 So just simple things can cause serious,[br]serious harm to regular people that are 0:04:23.519,0:04:27.990 working for some kind of truth telling.[br]And that to me is really a big part 0:04:27.990,0:04:31.869 of my motivation for coming here to talk[br]about what I’m going to talk about next, 0:04:31.869,0:04:35.069 which is that for every person that we[br]learn about like Rafael, I think there are 0:04:35.069,0:04:39.530 lots of people we will never learn about,[br]and that’s, to me that’s very scary, 0:04:39.530,0:04:43.320 and I think we need to bring some[br]transparency, and that’s what we’re 0:04:43.320,0:04:47.130 going to talk about now. And I really want[br]to emphasize this point. Even though 0:04:47.130,0:04:50.839 they’re not technically impressive, they[br]are actually still harmful, and that, 0:04:50.839,0:04:55.410 that is really a key point to drive home.[br]I mean, some of the back doors that 0:04:55.410,0:04:59.849 I’ve seen are really not sophisticated,[br]they’re not really that interesting, and 0:04:59.849,0:05:03.640 in some cases they’re common off-the-shelf[br]purchases between businesses, 0:05:03.640,0:05:08.650 so it’s like business-to-business[br]exploitation software development. 0:05:08.650,0:05:13.490 I feel like that’s really kind of sad,[br]and I also think we can change this. 0:05:13.490,0:05:19.190 We can turn this around by exposing it.[br]So, what’s it all about, though? 0:05:19.190,0:05:24.219 Fundamentally it’s about control, baby,[br]and that is what we’re going to get into. 0:05:24.219,0:05:27.679 It’s not just about control of machines.[br]What happened with Rafael is about 0:05:27.679,0:05:31.520 control of people. And fundamentally[br]when we talk about things like internet 0:05:31.520,0:05:35.669 freedom and we talk about tactical[br]surveillance and strategic surveillance, 0:05:35.669,0:05:39.529 we’re talking about control of people[br]through the machinery that they use. 0:05:39.529,0:05:43.529 And this is a really, I think a really[br]kind of – you know I’m trying 0:05:43.529,0:05:46.979 to make you laugh a little bit because[br]what I’m going to show you today 0:05:46.979,0:05:53.219 is wrist-slitting depressing.[br]So. Part 2, or Act 2 of Part 2. 0:05:53.219,0:05:57.760 Basically the NSA, they want[br]to be able to spy on you, and 0:05:57.760,0:06:00.580 if they have 10 different options for[br]spying on you that you know about, 0:06:00.580,0:06:06.119 they have 13 ways of doing it and they[br]do all 13. So that’s a pretty scary thing, 0:06:06.119,0:06:11.329 and basically their goal is to have[br]total surveillance of everything that 0:06:11.329,0:06:15.339 they’re interested in. So there really[br]is no boundary to what they want to do. 0:06:15.339,0:06:19.020 There is only sometimes a boundary of[br]what they are funded to be able to do and 0:06:19.020,0:06:23.819 the amount of things they’re able to do at[br]scale. They seem to just do those things 0:06:23.819,0:06:27.199 without thinking too much about it. And[br]there are specific tactical things 0:06:27.199,0:06:30.690 where they have to target a group or an[br]individual, and those things seem limited 0:06:30.690,0:06:35.650 either by budgets or simply by their time.[br]And as we have released today 0:06:35.650,0:06:39.980 on Der Spiegel’s website, which it should[br]be live – I just checked, it should be live 0:06:39.980,0:06:44.350 for everyone here – we actually[br]show a whole bunch of details 0:06:44.350,0:06:49.780 about their budgets as well as the[br]individuals involved with the NSA 0:06:49.780,0:06:53.479 and the Tailored Access Operations group[br]in terms of numbers. So it should give you 0:06:53.479,0:06:58.889 a rough idea showing that there was a[br]small period of time in which the internet 0:06:58.889,0:07:02.589 was really free and we did not have people[br]from the U.S. military that were watching 0:07:02.589,0:07:07.029 over it and exploiting everyone on[br]it, and now we see every year 0:07:07.029,0:07:11.779 that the number of people who are hired to[br]break into people’s computers as part of 0:07:11.779,0:07:16.700 grand operations, those people are growing[br]day by day, actually. In every year 0:07:16.700,0:07:21.820 there are more and more people that are[br]allocated, and we see this growth. So 0:07:21.820,0:07:26.249 that’s the goal: non-attribution, and total[br]surveillance, and they want to do it 0:07:26.249,0:07:30.689 completely in the dark. The good[br]news is that they can’t. So, 0:07:30.689,0:07:34.849 now I’m going to show you a bit about it.[br]But first, before I show you any pictures, 0:07:34.849,0:07:38.989 I want to sort of give you the big picture[br]from the top down. So there is 0:07:38.989,0:07:43.249 a planetary strategic surveillance system,[br]and there – well, there are many of them 0:07:43.249,0:07:48.410 actually. Everything from I think[br]off-planetary surveillance gear, which is 0:07:48.410,0:07:51.749 probably the National Reconnaissance[br]Office and their satellite systems 0:07:51.749,0:07:54.669 for surveillance like the Keyhole[br]satellites – these are all things most, 0:07:54.669,0:07:58.389 for the most part we actually know about[br]these things. They’re on Wikipedia. 0:07:58.389,0:08:01.109 But I want to talk a little bit more about[br]the internet side of things because 0:08:01.109,0:08:04.639 I think that’s really fascinating. So[br]part of what we are releasing today 0:08:04.639,0:08:07.759 with ‘Der Spiegel’, or what has actually[br]been released – just to be clear 0:08:07.759,0:08:11.710 on the timeline, I’m not disclosing it[br]first, I’m working as an independent 0:08:11.710,0:08:15.340 journalist summarizing the work that we[br]have already released onto the internet 0:08:15.340,0:08:19.430 as part of a publication house that went[br]through a very large editorial process 0:08:19.430,0:08:23.710 in which we redacted all the names of[br]agents and information about those names, 0:08:23.710,0:08:26.159 including their phone numbers[br]and e-mail addresses. 0:08:26.159,0:08:29.019 applause 0:08:29.019,0:08:32.890 And I should say that I actually think[br]that the laws here are wrong, 0:08:32.890,0:08:36.810 because they are in favor of[br]an oppressor who is criminal. 0:08:36.810,0:08:41.160 So when we redact the names of people who[br]are engaged in criminal activity including 0:08:41.160,0:08:45.420 drone murder, we are actually not doing[br]the right thing, but I believe that 0:08:45.420,0:08:49.200 we should comply with the law in order[br]to continue to publish, and I think 0:08:49.200,0:08:55.740 that’s very important.[br]applause 0:08:55.740,0:09:00.030 We also redacted the names of[br]victims of NSA surveillance, 0:09:00.030,0:09:04.890 because we think that there’s a balance.[br]Unfortunately there is a serious problem 0:09:04.890,0:09:08.630 which is that the U.S. government asserts[br]that you don’t have standing to prove 0:09:08.630,0:09:12.270 that you’ve been surveilled unless[br]we release that kind of information, 0:09:12.270,0:09:15.040 but we don’t want to release that kind[br]of information in case it could be 0:09:15.040,0:09:18.680 a legitimate target, and we – I’m really[br]uncomfortable with that term, but let’s 0:09:18.680,0:09:22.280 say that there is a legitimate target, the[br]most legitimate target, and we didn’t want 0:09:22.280,0:09:25.900 to make that decision. But we[br]did also want to make sure 0:09:25.900,0:09:29.230 that we didn’t harm someone, but we[br]also wanted to show concrete examples. 0:09:29.230,0:09:32.470 So if you look at the ‘Spiegel’ stuff online,[br]we redacted the names even of those 0:09:32.470,0:09:36.490 who were victimized by the NSA’s[br]oppressive tactics, which I think 0:09:36.490,0:09:39.600 actually goes further than is necessary,[br]but I believe that it strikes 0:09:39.600,0:09:43.150 the right balance to ensure continued[br]publication and also to make sure 0:09:43.150,0:09:46.700 that people are not harmed and that[br]legitimate good things, however rare 0:09:46.700,0:09:52.090 they may be, they are also not harmed.[br]So if you’ve been targeted by the NSA 0:09:52.090,0:09:54.490 and you would have found out today[br]if we had taken a different decision, 0:09:54.490,0:09:59.190 I’m really sorry, but this is the thing[br]I think that keeps us alive, 0:09:59.190,0:10:02.200 so this is the choice that I think is the[br]right choice, and I think it’s also 0:10:02.200,0:10:06.310 the safest choice for everyone.[br]So that said, basically the NSA has 0:10:06.310,0:10:10.630 a giant dragnet surveillance system that[br]they call TURMOIL. TURMOIL is a passive 0:10:10.630,0:10:14.520 interception system. That passive[br]interception system essentially spans 0:10:14.520,0:10:17.980 the whole planet. Who here has heard[br]about the Merkel phone incident? 0:10:17.980,0:10:21.740 Some of you heard about Chancellor Merkel?[br]So we revealed that in ‘Der Spiegel’, and 0:10:21.740,0:10:25.770 what we found was that they tasked her[br]for surveillance. And I’ll talk a little bit 0:10:25.770,0:10:29.030 about that later. But basically the way[br]that this works is that they have this 0:10:29.030,0:10:34.020 huge passive set of sensors; and any data[br]that flows past it, they actually look at it. 0:10:34.020,0:10:37.880 So there was a time in the past where[br]surveillance meant looking at anything 0:10:37.880,0:10:43.010 at all. And now the NSA tries[br]to basically twist the words 0:10:43.010,0:10:46.780 of every person who speaks whatever[br]language they’re speaking in, and they 0:10:46.780,0:10:50.560 try to say that it’s only surveillance[br]if after they collect it and record it 0:10:50.560,0:10:55.500 to a database, and analyze it with[br]machines, only if – I think – an NSA agent 0:10:55.500,0:10:59.690 basically looks at it[br]personally and then clicks 0:10:59.690,0:11:03.750 “I have looked at this” do[br]they call it surveillance. 0:11:03.750,0:11:07.410 Fundamentally I really object to that[br]because if I ran a TURMOIL collection 0:11:07.410,0:11:10.220 system – that is passive signals[br]intelligence systems collecting data 0:11:10.220,0:11:14.120 from the whole planet, everywhere they[br]possibly can – I would go to prison 0:11:14.120,0:11:17.990 for the rest of my life.[br]That’s the balance, right? 0:11:17.990,0:11:21.520 Jefferson talks about this. He says, you[br]know, “That which the government[br] 0:11:21.520,0:11:25.160 is allowed to do but you are not, this is[br]a tyranny.” There are some exceptions 0:11:25.160,0:11:29.820 to that, but the CFAA in the United[br]States, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 0:11:29.820,0:11:33.720 you know, it’s so draconian[br]for regular people, 0:11:33.720,0:11:38.260 and the NSA gets to do something like[br]intercepting 7 billion people all day long 0:11:38.260,0:11:42.820 with no problems, and the rest of us[br]are not even allowed to experiment 0:11:42.820,0:11:47.440 for improving the security of our own[br]lives without being put in prison 0:11:47.440,0:11:51.700 or under threat of serious indictment, and[br]that I think is a really important point. 0:11:51.700,0:11:55.730 So the TURMOIL system is a surveillance[br]system, and it is a dragnet surveillance 0:11:55.730,0:12:00.150 system that is a general warrant dragnet[br]surveillance if there ever was one. 0:12:00.150,0:12:04.030 And now we shot the British over this when[br]we started our revolution. We called them 0:12:04.030,0:12:06.970 “general writs of assistance.” These[br]were generalized warrants which 0:12:06.970,0:12:10.730 we considered to be a tyranny. And[br]TURMOIL is the digital version of a 0:12:10.730,0:12:15.410 general writ of assistance system. And[br]the general writ of assistance itself, 0:12:15.410,0:12:18.530 it’s not clear if it even exists, because[br]it’s not clear to me that a judge 0:12:18.530,0:12:21.910 would understand[br]anything that I just said. 0:12:21.910,0:12:27.310 applause 0:12:27.310,0:12:31.920 Okay, so now we’re gonna get scary.[br]So that’s just the passive stuff. 0:12:31.920,0:12:36.120 There exists another system that’s called[br]TURBINE, and we revealed about this system 0:12:36.120,0:12:41.040 in the ‘Spiegel’ publications[br]today as well. So if TURMOIL 0:12:41.040,0:12:47.210 is deep packet inspection, then[br]TURBINE is deep packet injection. 0:12:47.210,0:12:52.130 And it is the system that combined[br]together with a thing… 0:12:52.130,0:12:55.820 – with TURMOIL and TURBINE you can create[br]a platform which they have consolidated 0:12:55.820,0:13:01.900 which they call QFIRE. QFIRE is[br]essentially a way to programmatically 0:13:01.900,0:13:05.790 look at things that flow across the[br]internet that they see with TURMOIL 0:13:05.790,0:13:09.770 and then using TURBINE they’re able to[br]actually inject packets to try to do attacks, 0:13:09.770,0:13:13.720 and I’ll describe some of those attacks[br]in detail in a moment. But essentially 0:13:13.720,0:13:17.430 the interesting thing about QFIRE also[br]is that they have a thing that’s called 0:13:17.430,0:13:22.300 a diode. So if you have for[br]example a large number 0:13:22.300,0:13:24.670 of systems where you control them, you[br]might say: “Hey, what are you doing 0:13:24.670,0:13:27.590 on that backbone?”, “Hey, what’s going on[br]with these systems?” And they could say, 0:13:27.590,0:13:30.930 well, you know, we paid for access, we’re[br]doing this, it’s all legal, etcetera. 0:13:30.930,0:13:33.830 QFIRE has this really neat little detail[br]which is that they compromise 0:13:33.830,0:13:36.770 other people’s routers and then redirect[br]through them so that they can beat 0:13:36.770,0:13:40.160 the speed of light. And how[br]they do that is that they have 0:13:40.160,0:13:43.480 a passive sensor that’s nearby,[br]a thing that they can inject from. 0:13:43.480,0:13:47.649 And when they see that that thing sees[br]a selector that is interesting to them 0:13:47.649,0:13:51.689 or is doing a thing that they would like[br]to tamper with in some way, then they 0:13:51.689,0:13:55.350 take a packet, they encapsulate the[br]packet, they send it to the diode, 0:13:55.350,0:14:00.210 which might be your home router[br]potentially, and then that home router 0:14:00.210,0:14:05.410 decapsulates that packet and sends it out.[br]And because that is very close to you, 0:14:05.410,0:14:10.170 and let’s say you’re visiting Yahoo, then[br]the Yahoo packet will not beat you. 0:14:10.170,0:14:14.740 That is, they will not beat the NSA[br]or GCHQ. So it’s a race condition. 0:14:14.740,0:14:17.940 And so they basically are able to[br]control this whole system and then 0:14:17.940,0:14:23.250 to localize attacks in that[br]process. So that’s a pretty – 0:14:23.250,0:14:27.530 pretty scary stuff, actually. And while it[br]is a digital thing, I think it’s important 0:14:27.530,0:14:30.790 to understand that this is what Jefferson[br]talked about when he talked about tyranny. 0:14:30.790,0:14:34.300 This is turnkey tyranny, and it’s not that[br]it’s coming, it’s actually here. It’s just 0:14:34.300,0:14:38.210 merely the question about whether or not[br]they’ll use it in a way that we think is 0:14:38.210,0:14:42.480 a good way or not a good way. One[br]of the scariest parts about this is that 0:14:42.480,0:14:47.810 for this system or these sets of systems[br]to exist, we have been kept vulnerable. 0:14:47.810,0:14:51.500 So it is the case that if the Chinese,[br]if the Russians, if people here 0:14:51.500,0:14:55.980 wish to build this system, there’s nothing[br]that stops them. And in fact the NSA has 0:14:55.980,0:15:00.210 in a literal sense retarded the process[br]by which we would secure the internet 0:15:00.210,0:15:04.740 because it establishes a hegemony[br]of power, their power in secret, 0:15:04.740,0:15:08.760 to do these things. And in fact I’ve seen[br]evidence that shows that there are so many 0:15:08.760,0:15:12.320 compromises taking place between the[br]different Five Eyes signals intelligence 0:15:12.320,0:15:16.200 groups that they actually have lists that[br]explain, “If you see this back door 0:15:16.200,0:15:20.610 on the system, contact a friendly agency.[br]You’ve just recompromised the machine 0:15:20.610,0:15:24.760 of another person.” So[br]when we talk about this, 0:15:24.760,0:15:29.020 we have to consider that this is[br]designed for at-scale exploitation. 0:15:29.020,0:15:33.099 And as far as I can tell it’s being[br]used for at-scale exploitation. 0:15:33.099,0:15:38.541 Which is not really in my mind a[br]targeted particularized type of thing, 0:15:38.541,0:15:42.270 but rather it’s fishing operations.[br]It’s fishing expeditions. It’s 0:15:42.270,0:15:47.200 more like fishing crusades, if you will.[br]And in some cases, looking at the evidence 0:15:47.200,0:15:51.380 that seems to be what it is. Targeting[br]Muslims, I might add. Because that’s 0:15:51.380,0:15:54.800 what they’re interested in doing.[br]So that said, that’s the internet, 0:15:54.800,0:15:58.270 and we get all the way down to the bottom[br]and we get to the Close Access Operations 0:15:58.270,0:16:02.940 and Off-Net. Off-Net and Close Access[br]Operations are pretty scary things, 0:16:02.940,0:16:06.249 but basically this is what we would call a[br]black bag job. That’s where these guys, 0:16:06.249,0:16:10.260 they break into your house, they put[br]something in your computer and 0:16:10.260,0:16:13.350 they take other things out of your[br]computer. Here’s an example. 0:16:13.350,0:16:16.240 First top secret document[br]of the talk so far. 0:16:16.240,0:16:18.480 This is a Close Access Operations box. 0:16:18.480,0:16:22.470 It is basically car[br]metasploit for the NSA, 0:16:22.470,0:16:25.190 which is an interesting thing. But[br]basically they say that the attack is 0:16:25.190,0:16:30.140 undetectable, and it’s sadly[br]a laptop running free software. 0:16:30.140,0:16:34.890 It is injecting packets. And they say that[br]they can do this from as far away as 0:16:34.890,0:16:40.459 8 miles to inject packets, so presumably[br]using this they’re able to exploit 0:16:40.459,0:16:45.590 a kernel vulnerability of some kind,[br]parsing the wireless frames, and, yeah. 0:16:45.590,0:16:50.000 I’ve heard that they actually put this[br]hardware, from sources inside of the NSA 0:16:50.000,0:16:54.420 and inside of other[br]intelligence agencies, that 0:16:54.420,0:16:58.160 they actually put this type of hardware on[br]drones so that they fly them over areas 0:16:58.160,0:17:02.219 that they’re interested in and they[br]do mass exploitation of people. 0:17:02.219,0:17:05.579 Now, we don’t have a document[br]that substantiates that part, but 0:17:05.579,0:17:08.239 we do have this document that actually[br]claims that they’ve done it from up to 0:17:08.239,0:17:12.879 8 miles away. So that’s a really[br]interesting thing because it tells us 0:17:12.879,0:17:17.490 that they understand that common wireless[br]cards, probably running Microsoft Windows, 0:17:17.490,0:17:21.259 which is an American company, that they[br]know about vulnerabilities and they 0:17:21.259,0:17:25.369 keep them a secret to use them. This is[br]part of a constant theme of sabotaging 0:17:25.369,0:17:29.989 and undermining American companies and[br]American ingenuity. As an American, 0:17:29.989,0:17:33.419 while generally not a nationalist, I find[br]this disgusting, especially as someone 0:17:33.419,0:17:38.000 who writes free software and would[br]like my tax dollars to be spent 0:17:38.000,0:17:40.650 on improving these things. And when they[br]know about them I don’t want them 0:17:40.650,0:17:43.890 to keep them a secret because[br]all of us are vulnerable. 0:17:43.890,0:17:45.950 It’s a really scary thing. 0:17:45.950,0:17:52.270 applause 0:17:52.270,0:17:55.829 And it just so happens that at my house,[br]myself and many of my friends, 0:17:55.829,0:17:58.859 when we use wireless devices[br]– Andy knows what I’m talking about, 0:17:58.859,0:18:03.300 a few other people here –[br]all the time we have errors 0:18:03.300,0:18:07.950 in certain machines which are set up at[br]the house, in some cases as a honey pot 0:18:07.950,0:18:11.919 – thanks, guys – where kernel[br]panic after kernel panic, 0:18:11.919,0:18:15.659 exactly in the receive handler of the[br]Linux kernel where you would expect 0:18:15.659,0:18:19.619 this specific type of thing to take place.[br]So I think that if we talk about 0:18:19.619,0:18:23.369 the war coming home, we probably will[br]find that this is not just used in places 0:18:23.369,0:18:27.299 where there’s a literal war on but where[br]they decide that it would be useful, 0:18:27.299,0:18:31.730 including just parking outside your house.[br]Now I only have an hour today, 0:18:31.730,0:18:35.660 so I’m gonna have to go through some[br]other stuff pretty quickly. I want to make 0:18:35.660,0:18:40.679 a couple of points clear. This wasn’t[br]clear, even though it was written 0:18:40.679,0:18:46.280 in the New York Times by my dear friend[br]Laura Poitras, who is totally fantastic 0:18:46.280,0:18:51.520 by the way, and… you are great.[br]But 15 years of data retention – 0:18:51.520,0:18:55.769 applause 0:18:55.769,0:18:59.969 So the NSA has 15 years[br]of data retention. 0:18:59.969,0:19:03.649 It’s a really important point to[br]drive home. I joked with Laura 0:19:03.649,0:19:06.470 when she wrote the New York Times article[br]with James Risen, she should do the math 0:19:06.470,0:19:10.659 for other people and say “15 years”. She[br]said: “They can do the math on their own, 0:19:10.659,0:19:15.729 I believe in them”. I just wanna do the[br]math for you. 15 years, that’s scary! 0:19:15.729,0:19:19.559 I don’t ever remember voting on that,[br]I don’t ever remember even having 0:19:19.559,0:19:24.170 a public debate about it. And that[br]includes content as well as metadata. 0:19:24.170,0:19:30.090 So they use this metadata. They search[br]through this metadata retroactively. 0:19:30.090,0:19:33.599 They do what’s called ‘tasking’, that is,[br]they find a set of selectors – so that’s 0:19:33.599,0:19:38.090 a set of unique identifiers, e-mail[br]addresses, cookies, MAC addresses, IMEIs… 0:19:38.090,0:19:42.010 whatever is useful. Voice prints[br]potentially, depending on the system. 0:19:42.010,0:19:46.570 And then they basically[br]task those selectors 0:19:46.570,0:19:51.499 for specific activities. So that ties[br]together with some of the attacks 0:19:51.499,0:19:55.499 which I’ll talk about, but essentially[br]QUANTUMINSERTION and things that are 0:19:55.499,0:20:01.350 like QUANTUMINSERTION, they’re triggered[br]as part of the TURMOIL and TURBINE system 0:20:01.350,0:20:05.839 and the QFIRE system, and they’re all put[br]together so that they can automate 0:20:05.839,0:20:09.390 attacking people based on the plain[br]text traffic that transits the internet 0:20:09.390,0:20:13.299 or based on the source or[br]destination IP addresses. 0:20:13.299,0:20:16.270 This is a second top secret document. 0:20:16.270,0:20:21.310 This is an actual NSA lolcat 0:20:21.310,0:20:25.730 for the QUANTUMTHEORY program. 0:20:25.730,0:20:29.290 applause 0:20:29.290,0:20:33.150 You’ll notice it’s a black cat, hiding. Okay. 0:20:33.150,0:20:36.900 So there are a few people in the audience[br]that are still not terrified enough, and 0:20:36.900,0:20:40.270 there are a few people that as part[br]of their process for coping with 0:20:40.270,0:20:44.589 this horrible world that we have found[br]ourselves in, they will say the following: 0:20:44.589,0:20:48.259 “There’s no way they’ll ever find me. I’m[br]not interesting.” So I just want to dispel 0:20:48.259,0:20:52.879 that notion and show you a little bit[br]about how they do that. So we mentioned 0:20:52.879,0:20:56.899 TURMOIL, which is the dragnet surveillance,[br]and TURBINE, which is deep packet injection, 0:20:56.899,0:21:00.839 and QFIRE, where we tie it all together,[br]and this is an example of something which 0:21:00.839,0:21:03.839 I think actually demonstrates a crime but[br]I’m not sure, I’m not a lawyer, I’m 0:21:03.839,0:21:07.729 definitely not your lawyer, and I’m[br]certainly not the NSA’s lawyer. 0:21:07.729,0:21:11.511 But this is the MARINA system. This is[br]merely one of many systems where they 0:21:11.511,0:21:15.350 actually have full content as well as[br]metadata. Taken together, they do 0:21:15.350,0:21:19.160 contact chaining, where they find out you[br]guys are all in the same room with me 0:21:19.160,0:21:24.990 – which reminds me, let’s[br]see, I’ve got this phone… 0:21:24.990,0:21:31.040 Okay. That’s good. Let’s[br]turn that on. So now… 0:21:31.040,0:21:34.480 laughter[br]You’re welcome. 0:21:34.480,0:21:37.640 laughter[br]You have no idea! 0:21:37.640,0:21:40.379 laughter[br]But I just wanted to make sure that 0:21:40.379,0:21:44.069 if there was any question about whether[br]or not you are exempt from needing to do 0:21:44.069,0:21:47.689 something about this,[br]that that is dispelled. 0:21:47.689,0:21:53.489 applause 0:21:53.489,0:21:58.950 Okay? Cell phone’s on.[br]Great. So. Hey, guys! 0:21:58.950,0:22:02.760 laughter[br]So, the MARINA system is a 0:22:02.760,0:22:07.689 contact chaining system as well as a[br]system that has data, and in this case 0:22:07.689,0:22:12.849 what we see is in fact reverse contact[br]and forward contact graphing. So, 0:22:12.849,0:22:17.129 any lawyers in the audience? If there[br]are American citizens in this database, 0:22:17.129,0:22:21.140 is reverse targeting like this illegal?[br]Generally? Is it possible that that 0:22:21.140,0:22:26.420 could be considered illegal?[br]Someone from audience mumbling 0:22:26.420,0:22:29.330 Yeah, so, interesting. If it’s called[br]reverse contacts instead of 0:22:29.330,0:22:34.550 reverse targeting – yeah, exactly.[br]So, you’ll also notice the, 0:22:34.550,0:22:40.000 on the right-hand side, webcam photos. 0:22:40.000,0:22:43.779 So, just in case you’re wondering,[br]in this case this particular target, 0:22:43.779,0:22:47.480 I suppose that he did not or[br]she did not have a webcam. 0:22:47.480,0:22:50.400 Good for them. If not, you should follow[br]the EFF’s advice and you should put 0:22:50.400,0:22:54.460 a little sticker over your webcam. But[br]you’ll also note that they try to find 0:22:54.460,0:22:57.649 equivalent identifiers. So every time[br]there’s a linkable identifier that you 0:22:57.649,0:23:03.189 have on the internet, they try to put that[br]and tie it together and contact chain it, 0:23:03.189,0:23:08.090 and they try to show who you are among all[br]of these different potential identifiers – 0:23:08.090,0:23:11.189 if you have 5 e-mail addresses, they would[br]link them together – and then they try 0:23:11.189,0:23:14.300 to find out who all your friends are.[br]You’ll also note at the bottom here, 0:23:14.300,0:23:18.969 logins and passwords. So they’re[br]also doing dragnet surveillance 0:23:18.969,0:23:22.879 in which they extract – the feature set[br]extraction where they know semantically 0:23:22.879,0:23:26.459 what a login and a password is in a[br]particular protocol. And in this case 0:23:26.459,0:23:30.780 this guy is lucky, I suppose, and they[br]were not able to get passwords or webcam, 0:23:30.780,0:23:34.159 but you’ll note that they were able to get[br]his contacts and they were able to see 0:23:34.159,0:23:38.429 in fact 29, give or take,[br]received messages as well, 0:23:38.429,0:23:41.829 of which there are these things. Now in[br]this case we have redacted the e-mail 0:23:41.829,0:23:45.980 and instant messenger information,[br]but this is an example of how 0:23:45.980,0:23:49.720 laughs[br]you can’t hide from these things, and 0:23:49.720,0:23:54.400 thinking that they won’t find you[br]is a fallacy. So this is basically 0:23:54.400,0:23:59.219 the difference between taking one wire and[br]clipping onto it in a particularized 0:23:59.219,0:24:02.350 suspicious way where they’re really[br]interested, they have a particularized 0:24:02.350,0:24:05.609 suspicion, they think that someone is a[br]criminal, they think someone has taken 0:24:05.609,0:24:10.040 some serious steps that are illegal, and[br]instead what they do is they put all of us 0:24:10.040,0:24:14.220 under surveillance, record all of this[br]data that they possibly can, and then 0:24:14.220,0:24:17.829 they go looking through it. Now[br]in the case of Chancellor Merkel, 0:24:17.829,0:24:22.510 when we revealed NSRL 2002-388,[br]what we showed was that 0:24:22.510,0:24:26.369 they were spying on Merkel. And by their[br]own admission 3 hops away, that’s everyone 0:24:26.369,0:24:30.360 in the German Parliament[br]and everyone here. 0:24:30.360,0:24:35.930 So that’s pretty serious stuff. It also[br]happens that if you should be visiting 0:24:35.930,0:24:41.939 certain websites, especially if you’re[br]a Muslim, it is the case that you can be 0:24:41.939,0:24:47.059 attacked automatically by this system.[br]Right? So that would mean that 0:24:47.059,0:24:50.379 they would automatically start to break[br]into systems. That’s what they would call 0:24:50.379,0:24:55.430 ‘untasked targeting’. Interesting idea[br]that they call that targeted surveillance. 0:24:55.430,0:24:58.669 To me that doesn’t really sound too[br]much like targeted surveillance unless 0:24:58.669,0:25:02.659 what you mean by carpet bombing, it – you[br]know, I mean it just – you know, like… it 0:25:02.659,0:25:07.780 just doesn’t… it doesn’t strike me right.[br]It’s not my real definition of ‘targeted’. 0:25:07.780,0:25:11.129 It’s not well defined. It’s not that a[br]judge has said, “Yes, this person is 0:25:11.129,0:25:14.579 clearly someone we should target.” Quite[br]the opposite. This is something where 0:25:14.579,0:25:19.460 some guy who has a system has decided to[br]deploy it and they do it however they like 0:25:19.460,0:25:22.539 whenever they would like. And while there[br]are some restrictions, it’s clear that 0:25:22.539,0:25:27.030 the details about these programs do not[br]trickle up. And even if they do, they 0:25:27.030,0:25:31.289 do not trickle up in a useful way. So[br]this is important, because members 0:25:31.289,0:25:36.049 of the U.S. Congress, they have no clue[br]about these things. Literally, in the case 0:25:36.049,0:25:42.599 of the technology. Ask a Congressman[br]about TCP/IP. Forget it. 0:25:42.599,0:25:46.559 You can’t even get a meeting with them.[br]I’ve tried. Doesn’t matter. Even if you 0:25:46.559,0:25:49.909 know the secret interpretation of Section[br]215 of the Patriot Act and you go 0:25:49.909,0:25:52.619 to Washington, D.C. and you meet with[br]their aides, they still won’t talk to you 0:25:52.619,0:25:56.000 about it. Part of that is because they[br]don’t have a clue, and another part of it 0:25:56.000,0:26:00.099 is because they can’t talk about it,[br]because they don’t have a political solution. 0:26:00.099,0:26:02.929 Absent a political solution, it’s very[br]difficult to get someone to admit that 0:26:02.929,0:26:06.370 there is a problem. Well, there is a[br]problem, so we’re going to create 0:26:06.370,0:26:09.649 a political problem and also talk[br]about some of the solutions. 0:26:09.649,0:26:12.589 The Cypherpunks generally have[br]come up with some of the solutions 0:26:12.589,0:26:16.610 when we talk about encrypting the entire[br]internet. That would end dragnet mass 0:26:16.610,0:26:20.719 surveillance in a sense, but it will[br]come back in a different sense 0:26:20.719,0:26:25.569 even with encryption. We need both[br]a marriage of a technical solution 0:26:25.569,0:26:30.580 and we need a political solution[br]to go with it, and if we don’t have 0:26:30.580,0:26:35.480 those 2 things, we will unfortunately be[br]stuck here. But at the moment the NSA, 0:26:35.480,0:26:40.489 basically, I feel, has more power than[br]anyone in the entire world – any one 0:26:40.489,0:26:44.800 agency or any one person. So Emperor[br]Alexander, the head of the NSA, really has 0:26:44.800,0:26:50.149 a lot of power. If they want to right now,[br]they’ll know that the IMEI of this phone 0:26:50.149,0:26:55.230 is interesting. It’s very warm, which is[br]another funny thing, and they would be 0:26:55.230,0:26:59.129 able to break into this phone almost[br]certainly and then turn on the microphone, 0:26:59.129,0:27:03.270 and all without a court.[br]So that to me is really scary. 0:27:03.270,0:27:06.889 And I especially dislike the fact that[br]if you were to be building these 0:27:06.889,0:27:10.550 types of things, they treat you as an[br]opponent, if you wish to be able to 0:27:10.550,0:27:14.000 fulfill the promises that you make to your[br]customers. And as someone who writes 0:27:14.000,0:27:18.159 security software[br]I think that’s bullshit. 0:27:18.159,0:27:22.179 So. Here’s how they do a bit of it.[br]So there are different programs. 0:27:22.179,0:27:25.860 So QUANTUMTHEORY, QUANTUMNATION,[br]QUANTUMBOT, QUANTUMCOPPER 0:27:25.860,0:27:29.389 and QUANTUMINSERT. You’ve heard of a few[br]of them. I’ll just go through them real quick. 0:27:29.389,0:27:33.449 QUANTUMTHEORY essentially has[br]a whole arsenal of zero-day exploits. 0:27:33.449,0:27:38.490 Then the system deploys what’s called[br]a SMOTH, or a seasoned moth. 0:27:38.490,0:27:43.540 And a seasoned moth is an[br]implant which dies after 30 days. 0:27:43.540,0:27:48.549 So I think that these guys either took a[br]lot of acid or read a lot of Philip K. Dick, 0:27:48.549,0:27:51.759 potentially both![br]applause 0:27:51.759,0:27:55.379 And they thought Philip K. Dick[br]wasn’t dystopian enough. 0:27:55.379,0:27:59.869 “Let’s get better at this”.[br]And after reading VALIS, I guess, 0:27:59.869,0:28:04.760 they went on, and they also have[br]as part of QUANTUMNATION 0:28:04.760,0:28:08.849 what’s called VALIDATOR or COMMONDEER.[br]Now these are first-stage payloads 0:28:08.849,0:28:13.940 that are done entirely in memory.[br]These exploits essentially are where they 0:28:13.940,0:28:18.279 look around to see if you have what are[br]called PSPs, and this is to see, like, 0:28:18.279,0:28:21.730 you know, if you have Tripwire, if you[br]have Aid, if you have some sort of 0:28:21.730,0:28:25.549 system tool that will detect if an[br]attacker is tampering with files or 0:28:25.549,0:28:28.659 something like this, like[br]a host intrusion detection system. 0:28:28.659,0:28:33.689 So VALIDATOR and COMMONDEER, which,[br]I mean, clearly the point of COMMONDEER, 0:28:33.689,0:28:36.659 while it’s misspelled here – it’s not[br]actually… I mean that’s the name 0:28:36.659,0:28:40.649 of the program… but the point is to make[br]a pun on commandeering your machine. So, 0:28:40.649,0:28:44.550 you know, when I think about the U.S.[br]Constitution in particular, we talk about 0:28:44.550,0:28:49.300 not allowing the quartering of[br]soldiers – and, gosh, you know? 0:28:49.300,0:28:53.629 Commandeering my computer sounds[br]a lot like a digital version of that, and 0:28:53.629,0:28:57.379 I find that’s a little bit confusing, and[br]mostly in that I don’t understand 0:28:57.379,0:29:01.219 how they get away with it. But part of it[br]is because until right now we didn’t know 0:29:01.219,0:29:05.679 about it, in public, which is why we’re[br]releasing this in the public interest, 0:29:05.679,0:29:09.400 so that we can have a better debate[br]about whether or not that counts, in fact, 0:29:09.400,0:29:14.189 as a part of this type of what I would[br]consider to be tyranny, or perhaps 0:29:14.189,0:29:18.719 you think it is a measured and reasonable[br]thing. I somehow doubt that. But 0:29:18.719,0:29:23.070 in any case, QUANTUMBOT is where[br]they hijack IRC bots, because why not? 0:29:23.070,0:29:26.490 They thought they would like to do[br]that, and an interesting point is that 0:29:26.490,0:29:31.320 they could in theory stop a lot[br]of these botnet attacks and 0:29:31.320,0:29:35.200 they have decided to maintain that[br]capability, but they’re not yet doing it 0:29:35.200,0:29:38.749 except when they feel like doing it for[br]experiments or when they do it to 0:29:38.749,0:29:42.699 potentially use them. It’s not clear[br]exactly how they use them. But 0:29:42.699,0:29:46.350 the mere fact of the matter is that that[br]suggests they’re even in fact able to do 0:29:46.350,0:29:49.850 these types of attacks, they’ve tested[br]these types of attacks against botnets. 0:29:49.850,0:29:53.879 And that’s the program you should FOIA[br]for. We’ve released a little bit of detail 0:29:53.879,0:29:57.890 about that today as well. And[br]QUANTUMCOPPER to me is really scary. 0:29:57.890,0:30:01.719 It’s essentially a thing that can[br]interfere with TCP/IP and it can do things 0:30:01.719,0:30:06.799 like corrupt file downloads. So if you[br]imagine the Great Firewall of China, 0:30:06.799,0:30:10.289 so-called – that’s for the whole planet. 0:30:10.289,0:30:14.319 So if the NSA wanted to tomorrow, they[br]could kill every anonymity system 0:30:14.319,0:30:20.259 that exists by just forcing everyone who[br]connects to an anonymity system to reset 0:30:20.259,0:30:24.750 just the same way that the Chinese do[br]right now in China with the Great Firewall 0:30:24.750,0:30:28.589 of China. So that’s like the NSA builds[br]the equivalent of the Great Firewall 0:30:28.589,0:30:33.999 of Earth. That’s, to me that’s[br]a really scary, heavy-handed thing, 0:30:33.999,0:30:39.080 and I’m sure they only use it for good.[br]clears throat 0:30:39.080,0:30:44.520 But, yeah. Back here in reality that to[br]me is a really scary thing, especially 0:30:44.520,0:30:48.610 because one of the ways that they are able[br]to have this capability, as I mentioned, 0:30:48.610,0:30:52.979 is these diodes. So what that suggests[br]is that they actually repurpose 0:30:52.979,0:30:56.260 other people’s machines in order to[br]reposition and to gain a capability 0:30:56.260,0:31:01.349 inside of an area where they actually[br]have no legitimacy inside of that area. 0:31:01.349,0:31:07.049 That to me suggests it is not only[br]heavy-handed, that they have probably some 0:31:07.049,0:31:12.289 tools to do that. You see where I’m going[br]with this. Well, QUANTUMINSERTION, 0:31:12.289,0:31:16.119 this is also an important point, because[br]this is what was used against Belgacom, 0:31:16.119,0:31:22.060 this is what’s used by a whole number of[br]unfortunately players in the game where 0:31:22.060,0:31:26.409 basically what they do is they inject[br]a packet. So you have a TCP connection, 0:31:26.409,0:31:30.169 Alice wants to talk to Bob, and for some[br]reason Alice and Bob have not heard 0:31:30.169,0:31:34.880 about TLS. Alice sends an HTTP[br]request to Bob. Bob is Yahoo. 0:31:34.880,0:31:40.799 NSA loves Yahoo. And basically they[br]inject a packet which will get to Alice 0:31:40.799,0:31:44.429 before Yahoo is able to respond, right?[br]And the thing is that if that was a 0:31:44.429,0:31:48.960 TLS connection, the man-on-the-side[br]attack would not succeed. 0:31:48.960,0:31:53.180 That’s really key. If they were using TLS,[br]the man-on-the-side attack could at best, 0:31:53.180,0:31:56.330 as far as we understand it at the moment,[br]they could tear down the TLS session but 0:31:56.330,0:31:59.659 they couldn’t actually actively inject.[br]So that’s a man-on-the-side attack. 0:31:59.659,0:32:05.349 We can end that attack with TLS.[br]When we deploy TLS everywhere 0:32:05.349,0:32:09.559 then we will end that kind of attack. So[br]there was a joke, you know, when you 0:32:09.559,0:32:12.820 download .mp3s, you ride with communism[br]– from the ’90s, some of you may 0:32:12.820,0:32:19.060 remember this. When you bareback with[br]the internet, you ride with the NSA. 0:32:19.060,0:32:24.450 applause 0:32:24.450,0:32:28.969 Or you’re getting a ride, going for[br]a ride. So the TAO infrastructure, 0:32:28.969,0:32:33.449 Tailored Access and Operations. Some[br]of the FOXACID URLs are public. 0:32:33.449,0:32:38.309 FOXACID is essentially like a watering[br]hole type of attack where you go to, 0:32:38.309,0:32:43.759 you go to a URL. QUANTUMINSERT[br]puts like an iframe or puts some code 0:32:43.759,0:32:46.729 in your web browser, which you then[br]execute, which then causes you to 0:32:46.729,0:32:50.569 load resources. One of the resources that[br]you load while you’re loading CNN.com, 0:32:50.569,0:32:55.180 for example, which is one of their[br]examples, they – you like that, by the way? 0:32:55.180,0:32:59.050 So, you know, that’s an extremist site. So[br]coughs 0:32:59.050,0:33:03.020 you might have heard about that. A lot of[br]Republicans in the United States read it. 0:33:03.020,0:33:08.130 So – right before they wage[br]illegal imperialist wars. So, 0:33:08.130,0:33:12.620 the point is that you go to a FOXACID[br]server and it basically does a survey 0:33:12.620,0:33:17.899 of your box and decides if it can break[br]into it or not, and then it does. 0:33:17.899,0:33:22.409 Yep, that’s basically it. And the FOXACID[br]URLs, a few of them are public. 0:33:22.409,0:33:27.139 Some of the details about that have been[br]made public, about how the structure 0:33:27.139,0:33:31.060 of the URLs are laid out and so on.[br]An important detail is that they pretend 0:33:31.060,0:33:34.340 that they’re Apache, but they actually[br]do a really bad job. So they’re 0:33:34.340,0:33:38.230 like Hacking Team, maybe it’s the same[br]guys, I doubt it though, the NSA wouldn’t 0:33:38.230,0:33:43.790 slum with scumbags like that, but…[br]Basically you can tell, you can find them, 0:33:43.790,0:33:47.610 because they aren’t really Apache servers.[br]They pretend to be, something else. 0:33:47.610,0:33:51.020 The other thing is that none of their[br]infrastructure is in the United States. 0:33:51.020,0:33:56.480 So, real quick anonymity question. You[br]have a set of things and you know that 0:33:56.480,0:34:01.919 a particular attacker never comes from one[br]place. Every country on the planet 0:34:01.919,0:34:06.439 potentially, but never one place. The[br]one place where most of the internet is. 0:34:06.439,0:34:10.050 What does that tell you in terms of[br]anonymity? It tells you usually that 0:34:10.050,0:34:14.960 they’re hiding something about that one[br]place. Maybe there’s a legal requirement 0:34:14.960,0:34:19.020 for this. It’s not clear to me. But what[br]is totally clear to me is that if you see 0:34:19.020,0:34:22.720 this type of infrastructure and it is not[br]in the United States, there is a chance, 0:34:22.720,0:34:28.289 especially today, that it’s the NSA’s[br]Tailored Access and Operations division. 0:34:28.289,0:34:34.490 And here’s an important point. When the[br]NSA can’t do it, they bring in GCHQ. 0:34:34.490,0:34:38.820 So, for example, for targeting certain[br]Gmail selectors, they can’t do it. 0:34:38.820,0:34:42.740 And in the documents we released today,[br]we show that they say: “If you have 0:34:42.740,0:34:46.800 a partner agreement form and you need to[br]target, there are some additional selectors 0:34:46.800,0:34:51.330 that become available should you[br]need them”. So when we have a limit 0:34:51.330,0:34:54.640 of an intelligence agency in the United[br]States, or here in Germany or 0:34:54.640,0:34:58.690 something like this, we have to recognize[br]that information is a currency 0:34:58.690,0:35:03.380 in an unregulated market. And these[br]guys, they trade that information, and 0:35:03.380,0:35:08.260 one of the ways they trade that is like[br]this. And they love Yahoo. 0:35:08.260,0:35:15.470 So, little breather? 0:35:15.470,0:35:18.630 It’s always good to make fun of[br]the GCHQ with Austin Powers! 0:35:18.630,0:35:22.200 laughter[br]Okay. Another classified document here. 0:35:22.200,0:35:27.310 That’s actual NSA OpenOffice or Powerpoint[br]clip art of their horrible headquarters 0:35:27.310,0:35:31.440 that you see in every news story, I can’t[br]wait to see a different photo of the NSA 0:35:31.440,0:35:38.470 someday. But you’ll notice right here they[br]explain how QUANTUM works. Now SSO is 0:35:38.470,0:35:43.200 a Special Source Operations site. So[br]you’ve seen U.S. embassies? Usually 0:35:43.200,0:35:46.430 the U.S. embassy has dielectric panels on[br]the roof, that’s what we showed in Berlin, 0:35:46.430,0:35:51.870 it was called “DAS NEST” on the cover[br]of ‘Der Spiegel’. That’s an SSO site. 0:35:51.870,0:35:55.900 So they see that this type of stuff is[br]taking place, they do an injection and 0:35:55.900,0:36:01.650 they try to beat the Yahoo packet back.[br]Now another interesting point is 0:36:01.650,0:36:07.820 that for the Yahoo packet to be beaten,[br]the NSA must impersonate Yahoo. 0:36:07.820,0:36:11.230 This is a really important detail because[br]what it tells us is that they are 0:36:11.230,0:36:16.300 essentially conscripting Yahoo and saying[br]that they are Yahoo. So they are 0:36:16.300,0:36:20.960 impersonating a U.S. company[br]to a U.S. company user 0:36:20.960,0:36:24.530 and they are not actually supposed[br]to be in this conversation at all. 0:36:24.530,0:36:29.140 And when they do it, then they of course[br]– basically if you’re using Yahoo, 0:36:29.140,0:36:32.620 you’re definitely going to get owned. So[br]– and I don’t just mean that in that 0:36:32.620,0:36:37.270 Yahoo is vulnerable, they are, but[br]I mean people that use Yahoo tend to 0:36:37.270,0:36:40.380 – maybe it’s a bad generalization,[br]but, you know – they’re not the most 0:36:40.380,0:36:43.150 security-conscious people on the planet,[br]they don’t keep their computers up to date, 0:36:43.150,0:36:47.220 I’m guessing, and that’s probably why[br]they love Yahoo so much. They also love 0:36:47.220,0:36:51.340 CNN.com, which is some other… I don’t know[br]what that says, it’s like a sociological 0:36:51.340,0:36:56.900 study of compromise. But that’s an[br]important detail. So the SSO site sniffs 0:36:56.900,0:36:59.820 and then they do some injection, they[br]redirect you to FOXACID. That’s for 0:36:59.820,0:37:04.261 web browser exploitation. They obviously[br]have other exploitation techniques. 0:37:04.261,0:37:08.930 Okay. So now. We all know[br]that cellphones are vulnerable. 0:37:08.930,0:37:13.530 Here’s an example. This is a base station 0:37:13.530,0:37:17.790 that the NSA has that, I think it’s the[br]first time ever anyone’s ever revealed 0:37:17.790,0:37:22.340 an NSA IMSI catcher. So, here it is.[br]Well, actually the second time, because 0:37:22.340,0:37:25.320 ‘Der Spiegel’ did it this morning.[br]But you know what I mean. 0:37:25.320,0:37:30.300 applause 0:37:30.300,0:37:35.060 So they call it ‘Find, Fix and[br]Finish targeted handset users’. 0:37:35.060,0:37:38.940 Now it’s really important to understand[br]when they say “targeting” you would think 0:37:38.940,0:37:43.370 ‘massive collection’, right? Because what[br]are they doing? They’re pretending to be 0:37:43.370,0:37:48.540 a base station. They want to overpower.[br]They want to basically be the phone 0:37:48.540,0:37:51.630 that you connect to… or the phone system[br]that you connect to. And that means 0:37:51.630,0:37:54.740 lots of people are going to connect[br]potentially. So it’s not just one 0:37:54.740,0:37:59.430 targeted user. So hopefully they have it[br]set up so that if you need to dial 911, 0:37:59.430,0:38:02.990 or here in Europe 112 – you know,[br]by the way, if you ever want to find 0:38:02.990,0:38:05.740 one of these things try to call different[br]emergency numbers and note which ones 0:38:05.740,0:38:09.960 route where. Just as a little detail.[br]Also note that sometimes if you go 0:38:09.960,0:38:14.420 to the Ecuadorian embassy you will receive[br]a welcome message from Uganda Telecom. 0:38:14.420,0:38:18.670 Because the British when they deployed[br]the IMSI catcher against Julian Assange 0:38:18.670,0:38:23.150 at the Ecuadorian embassy made the mistake[br]of not reconfiguring the spy gear they [had] 0:38:23.150,0:38:27.390 deployed in Uganda [before][br]when they deployed in London.[br] 0:38:27.390,0:38:33.330 applause 0:38:33.330,0:38:38.420 And this can be yours[br]for only US$ 175.800. 0:38:38.420,0:38:43.120 And this covers GSM and PCS and[br]DCS and a bunch of other stuff. 0:38:43.120,0:38:46.870 So basically if you use a cell phone[br]– forget it. It doesn’t matter 0:38:46.870,0:38:50.520 what you’re doing. The exception may[br]be Cryptophone and Redphone. In fact 0:38:50.520,0:38:54.660 I’d like to just give a shoutout to the[br]people who work on free software, and 0:38:54.660,0:38:57.640 software which is actually secure. Like[br]Moxie Marlinspike – I’m so sorry I mention 0:38:57.640,0:39:02.300 your name in my talk, but don’t worry,[br]your silence won’t protect you! 0:39:02.300,0:39:05.160 I think it’s really important to know[br]Moxie is one of the very few people 0:39:05.160,0:39:08.270 in the world who builds technologies that[br]is both free and open source, and 0:39:08.270,0:39:12.940 as far as I can tell he refuses to do[br]anything awful. No backdoors or anything. 0:39:12.940,0:39:18.170 And from what I can tell this proves[br]that we need things like that. 0:39:18.170,0:39:22.000 This is absolutely necessary because they[br]replace the infrastructure we connect to. 0:39:22.000,0:39:25.920 It’s like replacing the road that we would[br]walk on, and adding tons of spy gear. 0:39:25.920,0:39:30.250 And they do that too,[br]we’ll get to that. Okay. 0:39:30.250,0:39:33.601 So I’m gonna go a little quick through[br]these because I think it’s better that you 0:39:33.601,0:39:36.600 go online and you adjust. And I wanna[br]have a little bit of time for questions. 0:39:36.600,0:39:41.290 But basically here’s an example of how[br]even if you disable a thing the thing is 0:39:41.290,0:39:45.480 not really disabled. So if you have a WiFi[br]card in your computer the SOMBERKNAVE 0:39:45.480,0:39:51.080 program, which is another classified[br]document here, they basically repurpose 0:39:51.080,0:39:55.060 your WiFi gear. They say: “You’re not[br]using that WiFi card? We’re gonna scan 0:39:55.060,0:39:58.350 for WiFi nearby, we’re gonna exfiltrate[br]data by finding an open WiFi network 0:39:58.350,0:40:01.310 and we’re gonna jump on it”. So[br]they’re actually using other people’s 0:40:01.310,0:40:05.480 wireless networks in addition to having[br]this stuff in your computer. And this is 0:40:05.480,0:40:11.030 one of the ways they beat a so-called[br]air-gapped target computer. 0:40:11.030,0:40:14.400 Okay, so here’s some of the software[br]implants. Now we’re gonna name a bunch 0:40:14.400,0:40:18.800 of companies because – fuck those guys[br]basically, for collaborating when they do, 0:40:18.800,0:40:22.540 and fuck them for leaving us[br]vulnerable when they do. 0:40:22.540,0:40:26.030 applause 0:40:26.030,0:40:29.930 And I mean that in the most loving way[br]because some of them are victims, actually. 0:40:29.930,0:40:33.400 It’s important to note that we don’t[br]yet understand which is which. 0:40:33.400,0:40:36.930 So it’s important to name them, so that[br]they have to go on record, and so that 0:40:36.930,0:40:40.310 they can say where they are, and so[br]that they can give us enough rope 0:40:40.310,0:40:44.370 to hang themselves. I really want that to[br]happen because I think it’s important 0:40:44.370,0:40:47.820 to find out who collaborated and who[br]didn’t collaborate. In order to have truth 0:40:47.820,0:40:51.840 and reconciliation we need to start with[br]a little of truth. So STUCCOMONTANA 0:40:51.840,0:40:55.660 is basically BadBIOS if you guys have[br]heard about that. I feel very bad 0:40:55.660,0:40:59.070 for Dragos, he doesn’t really talk to me[br]right now. I think he might be kinda mad. 0:40:59.070,0:41:04.880 But after I was detained – by the[br]US Army on US soil, I might add – 0:41:04.880,0:41:08.490 they took a phone from me. Now it[br]shouldn’t matter but it did. They also 0:41:08.490,0:41:11.420 I think went after all my phone records so[br]they didn’t need to take the phone. But 0:41:11.420,0:41:14.170 for good measure, they just wanted[br]to try to intimidate me which is exactly 0:41:14.170,0:41:19.710 the wrong thing to do to me. But as he[br]told the story after that happened 0:41:19.710,0:41:23.180 all of his computers including his Xbox[br]were compromised. And he says 0:41:23.180,0:41:27.870 even to this day that some of those things[br]persist. And he talks about the BIOS. 0:41:27.870,0:41:32.990 Here’s a document that shows clearly[br]that they actually re-flash the BIOS 0:41:32.990,0:41:37.410 and they also have other techniques[br]including System Management Mode 0:41:37.410,0:41:42.260 related rootkits and that they have[br]persistence inside of the BIOS. 0:41:42.260,0:41:46.380 It’s an incredibly important point. This[br]is evidence that the thing that Dragos 0:41:46.380,0:41:50.150 talked about, maybe he doesn’t[br]have it, but it really does exist. 0:41:50.150,0:41:54.990 Now the question is how would he find it?[br]We don’t have the forensics tools yet. 0:41:54.990,0:41:58.420 We don’t really have the capabilities[br]widely deployed in the community 0:41:58.420,0:42:02.230 to be able to know that, and to be[br]able to find it. Here’s another one. 0:42:02.230,0:42:06.740 This one’s called SWAP. In this case it[br]replaces the Host Protected Area 0:42:06.740,0:42:11.580 of the hard drive, and you can see a[br]little graph where there’s target systems, 0:42:11.580,0:42:14.860 you see the internet, Interactive OPS, so[br]they’ve got like a guy who is hacking you 0:42:14.860,0:42:19.350 in real time, the People’s[br]Liberation Army… uh, NSA! And… 0:42:19.350,0:42:22.370 laughter[br]And you can see all of these different 0:42:22.370,0:42:25.190 things about it. Each one of these things,[br]including SNEAKERNET, these are 0:42:25.190,0:42:29.520 different programs, most of which we[br]revealed today in ‘Der Spiegel’. 0:42:29.520,0:42:32.880 But you’ll notice that it’s Windows,[br]Linux, FreeBSD and Solaris. 0:42:32.880,0:42:38.250 How many Al Qaeda people[br]use Solaris, do you suppose? 0:42:38.250,0:42:42.390 This tells you a really important point.[br]They are interested in compromising 0:42:42.390,0:42:46.960 the infrastructure of systems,[br]not just individual people. 0:42:46.960,0:42:50.460 They want to take control and[br]literally colonize those systems 0:42:50.460,0:42:55.490 with these implants. And that’s not part[br]of the discussion. People are not talking 0:42:55.490,0:42:59.880 about that because they don’t know about[br]that yet. But they should. Because 0:42:59.880,0:43:03.500 in addition to the fact that Sun is a U.S.[br]company which they are building 0:43:03.500,0:43:07.710 capabilities against – that to me, really,[br]it really bothers me; I can’t tell you 0:43:07.710,0:43:10.700 how much that bothers me – we also[br]see that they’re attacking Microsoft, 0:43:10.700,0:43:13.670 another U.S. company, and Linux and[br]FreeBSD, where there are a lot of people 0:43:13.670,0:43:15.900 that are building it from all around the[br]world. So they’re attacking not only 0:43:15.900,0:43:19.260 collective efforts and corporate[br]efforts, but basically every option 0:43:19.260,0:43:24.660 you possibly can, from end users[br]down to telecom core things. 0:43:24.660,0:43:28.830 Here’s another one, DEITYBOUNCE.[br]This is for Dell, 0:43:28.830,0:43:33.840 so Dell PowerEdge 1850,[br]2850, 1950, 2950… 0:43:33.840,0:43:37.910 RAID servers using any of the[br]following BIOS versions. Right? 0:43:37.910,0:43:41.950 So just in case you’re wondering, hey[br]Dell, why is that? Curious about that. 0:43:41.950,0:43:45.810 Love to hear your statements about it.[br]So if you write YARA sigs [signatures] 0:43:45.810,0:43:49.930 and you’re interested in looking[br]for NSA malware, look for things 0:43:49.930,0:43:55.080 that use RC6, so look for the constants[br]that you might find in RC6. 0:43:55.080,0:43:59.650 And when they run, if they emit UDP[br]traffic – we’ve actually seen a sample 0:43:59.650,0:44:03.620 of this but we were not able[br]to capture it, sadly, but 0:44:03.620,0:44:07.750 emitting UDP traffic that is encrypted.[br]You know, people that I’ve worked with 0:44:07.750,0:44:10.830 on things related to this, they’ve even,[br]they’ve had their house black bagged. 0:44:10.830,0:44:13.640 They’ve had pretty bad stuff happen[br]to them. That’s their story to tell. 0:44:13.640,0:44:19.170 But one of the interesting details is[br]that after those events occurred, 0:44:19.170,0:44:23.630 these types of things were seen. Ben[br]has a really bad idea for those guys, 0:44:23.630,0:44:27.310 I might add, because I wouldn’t have put[br]this slide in if that had not occurred. 0:44:27.310,0:44:29.880 But if you want to look for it, you’ll[br]find it. I know some people that have 0:44:29.880,0:44:33.860 looked with YARA sigs and they have[br]in fact found things related to this, 0:44:33.860,0:44:37.000 so I suspect a lot of malware researchers[br]in the near future are going to have 0:44:37.000,0:44:40.970 a lot of stuff to say about this[br]particular slide. I’ll leave that to them. 0:44:40.970,0:44:44.910 I think it’s very important to go looking[br]for these things, especially to find out 0:44:44.910,0:44:49.850 who is victimized by them. Here’s an[br]iPhone back door. 0:44:49.850,0:44:56.330 So DROPOUTJEEP, so[br]you can see it right there. 0:44:56.330,0:45:01.420 So, SMS, contact list retrieval,[br]voicemail, hot microphone, 0:45:01.420,0:45:06.850 camera capture, cell tower location. Cool.[br]Do you think Apple helped them with that? 0:45:06.850,0:45:10.140 I don’t know. I hope Apple will clarify[br]that. I think it’s really important 0:45:10.140,0:45:14.070 that Apple doesn’t. Here’s[br]a problem. I don’t really believe 0:45:14.070,0:45:18.290 that Apple didn’t help them. I can’t[br]prove it yet, but they literally claim 0:45:18.290,0:45:24.420 that any time they target an iOS device,[br]that it will succeed for implantation. 0:45:24.420,0:45:28.620 Either they have a huge collection of[br]exploits that work against Apple products, 0:45:28.620,0:45:31.730 meaning that they are hoarding[br]information about critical systems that 0:45:31.730,0:45:35.430 American companies produce[br]and sabotaging them, 0:45:35.430,0:45:40.080 or Apple sabotaged it themselves.[br]Not sure which one it is! 0:45:40.080,0:45:43.180 I’d like to believe that since Apple[br]didn’t join the PRISM program until 0:45:43.180,0:45:49.580 after Steve Jobs died that maybe it’s[br]just that they write shitty software. 0:45:49.580,0:45:52.960 We know that’s true![br]laughter 0:45:52.960,0:45:58.040 applause 0:45:58.040,0:46:02.320 Here’s a HVT, high-value target.[br]This is a high-value target 0:46:02.320,0:46:05.770 being targeted with a back door for[br]Windows CE Thuraya phones. 0:46:05.770,0:46:11.290 So if you have a Thuraya phone and you’re[br]wondering if it was secure – yeah maybe. 0:46:11.290,0:46:15.220 Good luck! Here’s one where they[br]replaced the hard drive firmware. 0:46:15.220,0:46:19.340 There was a talk at OHM this year[br][OHM2013] where a guy talked about 0:46:19.340,0:46:22.960 replacing hard drive firmware.[br]You were onto something. 0:46:22.960,0:46:25.850 You were really onto something. Whoever[br]you are, you were onto something. 0:46:25.850,0:46:29.540 Because the NSA has a program here,[br]IRATEMONK, and that’s exactly 0:46:29.540,0:46:32.600 what they do. They replace the firmware[br]in the hard drive, so it doesn’t matter 0:46:32.600,0:46:37.160 if you reformat the hard drive, you’re[br]done. The firmware itself can do 0:46:37.160,0:46:42.320 a whole bunch of stuff. So. Here are[br]the names of the hard drive companies 0:46:42.320,0:46:47.480 were it works: Western Digital, Seagate,[br]Maxtor and Samsung, and of course 0:46:47.480,0:46:52.380 they support FAT, NTFS, EXT3 and UFS.[br]They probably now have support for 0:46:52.380,0:46:56.490 additional file systems, but this is[br]what we can prove. Please note 0:46:56.490,0:47:00.770 at the bottom left and the bottom right:[br]“Status: Released and Deployed. 0:47:00.770,0:47:06.000 Ready for Immediate Delivery”.[br]And: “Unit Cost: $0”. 0:47:06.000,0:47:11.550 It’s free! No, you can’t get it.[br]It’s not free as in free software. 0:47:11.550,0:47:15.270 It’s free as in “You’re owned!”.[br]laughter 0:47:15.270,0:47:19.580 applause 0:47:19.580,0:47:22.930 I want to give a shoutout to Karsten Nohl[br]and Luca [Luca Melette] for their 0:47:22.930,0:47:26.460 incredible talk where they showed this[br]exact attack without knowing that 0:47:26.460,0:47:30.940 they had found it. Right?[br]They say – yeah, absolutely. 0:47:30.940,0:47:35.230 applause 0:47:35.230,0:47:39.300 Important point. The NSA says that when[br]they know about these things, that 0:47:39.300,0:47:42.350 nobody will come to harm, no one will be[br]able to find them, they’ll never be able 0:47:42.350,0:47:47.180 to be exploited by another third party.[br]Karsten found this exact vulnerability. 0:47:47.180,0:47:51.930 They were able to install a Java applet on[br]the SIM card without user interaction, 0:47:51.930,0:47:55.170 and it was based on the service provider’s[br]security configuration, which is exactly 0:47:55.170,0:47:58.740 what the NSA says here, and they talk[br]about attacking the same toolkit 0:47:58.740,0:48:02.760 inside of the phone; and Karsten[br]found the same vulnerability 0:48:02.760,0:48:07.140 and attacked it in the wild. This[br]is perfect evidence, not only of 0:48:07.140,0:48:10.960 how badass Karsten and Luca are[br]– they are, no question – but also about 0:48:10.960,0:48:16.210 how wrong the NSA is with this balance.[br]Because for every Karsten and Luca, there 0:48:16.210,0:48:21.420 are hundreds of people who are paid to do[br]this full-time and never tell us about it. 0:48:21.420,0:48:29.000 applause 0:48:29.000,0:48:32.760 Important detail. Do you see that[br]‘interdiction’ phrase right there? 0:48:32.760,0:48:35.770 “Through remote access” – in other[br]words, we broke into your computer – 0:48:35.770,0:48:40.420 “or interdiction” – in other words,[br]we stole your fucking mail. Now. 0:48:40.420,0:48:43.471 This is a really important point. We[br]all have heard about these paranoid 0:48:43.471,0:48:46.380 crazy people talking about people breaking[br]into their houses – that’s happened to me 0:48:46.380,0:48:49.700 a number of times – motherfuckers,[br]getting you back – it’s really important 0:48:49.700,0:48:53.460 to understand this process is[br]one that threatens all of us. 0:48:53.460,0:48:59.170 The sanctity of the postal system[br]has been violated. I mean – whoa! 0:48:59.170,0:49:02.340 God, it makes me so angry, you know?[br]You can’t even send a letter without 0:49:02.340,0:49:05.940 being spied on, but even worse that they[br]tamper with it! It’s not enough that 0:49:05.940,0:49:10.510 the U.S. Postal Service records all[br]of this information and keeps it 0:49:10.510,0:49:13.640 – that’s not enough. They also have to[br]tamper with the packages! So every time 0:49:13.640,0:49:18.050 you buy from Amazon, for example, every[br]time you buy anything on the internet, 0:49:18.050,0:49:22.230 there is the possibility that they will[br]actually take your package and change it. 0:49:22.230,0:49:25.340 One of the ways that I’ve heard that they[br]change it is that they will actually 0:49:25.340,0:49:29.800 take the case of your computer and they[br]will injection mold a hardware back door 0:49:29.800,0:49:33.680 into the case of the computer.[br]So that even if you were to look 0:49:33.680,0:49:37.350 at the motherboard or have it serviced,[br]you would not see this. It merely 0:49:37.350,0:49:42.120 just needs to be in the proximity[br]of the motherboard. So. 0:49:42.120,0:49:46.920 Let’s talk about hardware implants[br]that they will put into your devices. 0:49:46.920,0:49:52.160 Here’s one. This is called BULLDOZER.[br]It’s a PCI bus hardware implant. 0:49:52.160,0:49:55.740 Pretty scary, doesn’t look so great,[br]but let’s go on a little bit. Okay? 0:49:55.740,0:49:59.180 Here’s one where they actually exploit[br]the BIOS and System Management Mode. 0:49:59.180,0:50:02.480 There’s a big graph that shows all of[br]these various different interconnections, 0:50:02.480,0:50:06.360 which is important. Then they talk about[br]the long-range comms, INMARSAT, VSAT, 0:50:06.360,0:50:10.430 NSA MEANS and Future Capabilities. I think[br]NSA MEANS exists. Future Capabilities 0:50:10.430,0:50:14.860 seems self-explanatory. “This[br]hardware implant provides 0:50:14.860,0:50:19.860 2-way RF communication.” Interesting.[br]So you disable all the wireless cards, 0:50:19.860,0:50:23.420 whatever you need. There you go.[br]They just added a new one in there and 0:50:23.420,0:50:27.910 you don’t even know. Your system has no[br]clue about it. Here’s a hardware back door 0:50:27.910,0:50:31.800 which uses the I2C interface, because[br]no one in the history of time 0:50:31.800,0:50:35.160 other than the NSA probably has ever[br]used it. That’s good to know that finally 0:50:35.160,0:50:40.690 someone uses I2C for something[br]– okay, other than fan control. But, 0:50:40.690,0:50:43.890 look at that! It’s another American[br]company that they are sabotaging. 0:50:43.890,0:50:48.210 They understand that HP’s servers[br]are vulnerable, and they decided, 0:50:48.210,0:50:52.960 instead of explaining that this is[br]a problem, they exploit it. And IRONCHEF, 0:50:52.960,0:50:56.800 through interdiction, is one of[br]the ways that they will do that. 0:50:56.800,0:51:01.810 So I wanna really harp on this. Now it’s[br]not that I think European companies 0:51:01.810,0:51:06.950 are worth less. I suspect especially[br]after this talk that won’t be true, 0:51:06.950,0:51:10.480 in the literal stock sense, but I don’t[br]know. I think it’s really important 0:51:10.480,0:51:13.700 to understand that they are sabotaging[br]American companies because of the 0:51:13.700,0:51:17.950 so-called home-field advantage. The[br]problem is that as an American who writes 0:51:17.950,0:51:22.430 software, who wants to build hardware[br]devices, this really chills my expression 0:51:22.430,0:51:25.490 and it also gives me a problem, which[br]is that people say: “Why would I use 0:51:25.490,0:51:29.840 what you’re doing? You know,[br]what about the NSA?” 0:51:29.840,0:51:35.000 Man, that really bothers me.[br]I don’t deserve the Huawei taint, 0:51:35.000,0:51:39.260 and the NSA gives it. And President[br]Obama’s own advisory board 0:51:39.260,0:51:43.550 that was convened to understand the scope[br]of these things has even agreed with me 0:51:43.550,0:51:47.820 about this point, that this should not be[br]taking place, that hoarding of zero-day 0:51:47.820,0:51:52.640 exploits cannot simply happen without[br]thought processes that are reasonable 0:51:52.640,0:51:58.070 and rational and have an economic and[br]social valuing where we really think about 0:51:58.070,0:52:03.010 the broad-scale impact. Now.[br]I’m gonna go on to a little bit more. 0:52:03.010,0:52:07.230 Here’s where they attack SIM cards. This[br]is MONKEYCALENDAR. So it’s actually 0:52:07.230,0:52:11.670 the flow chart of how this would work.[br]So in other words, they told you all of 0:52:11.670,0:52:16.690 the ways in which you should be certainly,[br]you know, looking at this. So if you ever 0:52:16.690,0:52:22.090 see your handset emitting encrypted SMS[br]that isn’t Textsecure, you now have 0:52:22.090,0:52:27.350 a pretty good idea that it might be this.[br]Here’s another example. If you have 0:52:27.350,0:52:33.830 a computer in front of you… I highly[br]encourage you to buy the Samsung SGH-X480C 0:52:33.830,0:52:38.740 – that’s the preferred phone of the NSA[br]for attacking another person’s phone. 0:52:38.740,0:52:43.000 I’m not exactly sure why, but an important[br]point is, they add the back door, then 0:52:43.000,0:52:47.830 they send an SMS from a regular phone[br]– what does that tell you? What does that 0:52:47.830,0:52:51.670 tell you about the exploitation process?[br]It tells you that it’s actually something 0:52:51.670,0:52:55.060 which is pretty straightforward,[br]pretty easy to do, doesn’t require 0:52:55.060,0:52:59.220 specialized access to the telecoms once[br]they’ve gotten your phone compromised. 0:52:59.220,0:53:02.730 That to me suggests that other people[br]might find it, other people might use 0:53:02.730,0:53:06.680 these techniques. Okay, here’s a USB[br]hardware implant called COTTONMOUTH. 0:53:06.680,0:53:10.910 We released this in ‘Spiegel’ today as[br]well. See the little red parts. It will 0:53:10.910,0:53:14.100 provide a wireless bridge onto the[br]target network with the ability to load 0:53:14.100,0:53:18.640 exploit software. Here’s a little bit of[br]extra details about that. It actually 0:53:18.640,0:53:23.240 shows the graph at the bottom, how they do[br]this, how they get around, how they beat 0:53:23.240,0:53:27.370 the air gap with these things. And they[br]talk a bit about being GENIE compliant. 0:53:27.370,0:53:31.790 So GENIE, and for the rest of these[br]programs, these are – like DROPOUTJEEP 0:53:31.790,0:53:35.530 is part of the CHIMNEYPOOL programs,[br]and COTTONMOUTH is part of the rest of 0:53:35.530,0:53:41.130 these programs over here. These are huge[br]programs where they’re trying to beat 0:53:41.130,0:53:45.240 a whole bunch of different adversaries,[br]and different capabilities are required. 0:53:45.240,0:53:48.820 And this is one of the probably I think[br]more interesting ones, but here’s 0:53:48.820,0:53:53.460 the next revision of it where it’s in a[br]USB plug, not actually in the cable. 0:53:53.460,0:53:58.120 And look, 50 units for US$ 200,000.[br]It’s really cheap. 0:53:58.120,0:54:03.920 You like my editorializing there, I hope?[br]So, $200,000, okay. 0:54:03.920,0:54:08.740 And here’s where you look for it. If you[br]happen to have an x-ray machine, 0:54:08.740,0:54:14.450 look for an extra chip. And that’s[br]a HOWLERMONKEY radiofrequency transmitter. 0:54:14.450,0:54:18.750 Well what’s a HOWLERMONKEY? We’ll[br]talk about that in a second, but basically 0:54:18.750,0:54:23.730 this is for ethernet, here. This is the[br]FIREWALK. It can actually do injection 0:54:23.730,0:54:27.370 bidirectionally on the ethernet controller[br]into the network that it’s sitting on. 0:54:27.370,0:54:30.270 So it doesn’t even have to do things[br]directly to the computer. It can actually 0:54:30.270,0:54:33.800 inject packets directly into the network,[br]according to the specification sheet, 0:54:33.800,0:54:39.400 which we released today on[br]Der Spiegel’s website. As it says, 0:54:39.400,0:54:43.510 ‘active injection of ethernet packets onto[br]the target network’. Here’s another one 0:54:43.510,0:54:50.020 from Dell with an actual FLUXBABBITT[br]hardware implant for the PowerEdge 2950. 0:54:50.020,0:54:55.360 This uses the JTAG debugging interface[br]of the server. Why did Dell leave 0:54:55.360,0:55:00.080 a JTAG debugging interface on these[br]servers? Interesting, right? Because, 0:55:00.080,0:55:04.060 it’s like leaving a vulnerability in. Is[br]that a bug door or a back door or 0:55:04.060,0:55:09.380 just a mistake? Well hopefully they will[br]change these things or at least make it so 0:55:09.380,0:55:12.730 that if you were to see this you would[br]know that you had some problems. 0:55:12.730,0:55:15.970 Hopefully Dell will release some[br]information about how to mitigate 0:55:15.970,0:55:19.640 this advanced persistent threat. Right?[br]Everything that the U.S. Government 0:55:19.640,0:55:25.190 accuse the Chinese of doing – which they[br]are also doing, I believe – we are learning 0:55:25.190,0:55:30.580 that the U.S. Government has been doing to[br]American companies. That to me is really 0:55:30.580,0:55:34.600 concerning, and we’ve had no public debate[br]about these issues, and in many cases 0:55:34.600,0:55:38.530 all the technical details are obfuscated[br]away and they are just completely 0:55:38.530,0:55:43.280 outside of the purview of discussions. In[br]this case we learn more about Dell, and 0:55:43.280,0:55:47.330 which models. And here’s the HOWLERMONKEY.[br]These are actually photographs 0:55:47.330,0:55:52.620 of the NSA implanted chips that they[br]have when they steal your mail. 0:55:52.620,0:55:55.590 So after they steal your mail they put[br]a chip like this into your computer. 0:55:55.590,0:56:00.190 So the one, the FIREWALK[br]one is the ethernet one, and 0:56:00.190,0:56:05.170 that’s an important one. You probably will[br]notice that these look pretty simple, 0:56:05.170,0:56:09.850 common off-the-shelf parts. So. 0:56:09.850,0:56:15.650 Whew! All right. Who here[br]is surprised by any of this? 0:56:15.650,0:56:20.881 waits for audience reaction[br]I’m really, really, really glad to see 0:56:20.881,0:56:24.640 that you’re not all cynical fuckers and[br]that someone here would admit 0:56:24.640,0:56:29.710 that they were surprised. Okay, who[br]here is not surprised? waits 0:56:29.710,0:56:34.510 I’m going to blow your fucking mind![br]laughter 0:56:34.510,0:56:39.240 Okay. We all know about TEMPEST,[br]right? Where the NSA pulls data 0:56:39.240,0:56:42.240 out of your computer, irradiate stuff[br]and then grab it, right? Everybody 0:56:42.240,0:56:44.251 who raised their hand and said they’re[br]not surprised, you already knew 0:56:44.251,0:56:49.370 about TEMPEST, right?[br]Right? Okay. Well. 0:56:49.370,0:56:53.460 What if I told you that the NSA had[br]a specialized technology for beaming 0:56:53.460,0:56:57.550 energy into you and to the computer[br]systems around you, would you believe 0:56:57.550,0:57:01.000 that that was real or would that be[br]paranoid speculation of a crazy person? 0:57:01.000,0:57:05.000 laughter[br]Anybody? You cynical guys 0:57:05.000,0:57:08.090 holding up your hand saying that you’re[br]not surprised by anything, raise your hand 0:57:08.090,0:57:12.100 if you would be unsurprised by that.[br]laughter 0:57:12.100,0:57:16.770 Good. And it’s not the same number.[br]It’s significantly lower. It’s one person. 0:57:16.770,0:57:23.710 Great. Here’s what they do with those[br]types of things. That exists, by the way. 0:57:23.710,0:57:29.910 When I told Julian Assange about this, he[br]said: “Hmm. I bet the people who were 0:57:29.910,0:57:33.890 around Hugo Chavez are going to wonder[br]what caused his cancer.” And I said: 0:57:33.890,0:57:37.490 “You know, I hadn’t considered that. But,[br]you know, I haven’t found any data 0:57:37.490,0:57:42.640 about human safety about these tools.[br]Has the NSA performed tests where they 0:57:42.640,0:57:48.070 actually show that radiating people[br]with 1 kW of RF energy 0:57:48.070,0:57:51.360 at short range is safe?”[br]laughter 0:57:51.360,0:57:56.450 My God! No, you guys think I’m[br]joking, right? Well, yeah, here it is. 0:57:56.450,0:58:00.720 This is a continuous wave generator,[br]a continuous wave radar unit. 0:58:00.720,0:58:05.250 You can detect its use because it’s[br]used between 1 and 2 GHz and 0:58:05.250,0:58:09.630 its bandwidth is up to 45 MHz,[br]user adjustable, 2 watts 0:58:09.630,0:58:12.790 using an internal amplifier. External[br]amplifier makes it possible to go 0:58:12.790,0:58:19.230 up to 1 kilowatt. 0:58:19.230,0:58:25.210 I’m just gonna let you take that[br]in for a moment. clears throat 0:58:25.210,0:58:31.840 Who’s crazy now?[br]laughter 0:58:31.840,0:58:35.010 Now, I’m being told I only have one[br]minute, so I’m going to have to go 0:58:35.010,0:58:39.480 a little bit quicker. I’m sorry. Here’s[br]why they do it. This is an implant 0:58:39.480,0:58:43.950 called RAGEMASTER. It’s part of the[br]ANGRYNEIGHBOR family of tools, 0:58:43.950,0:58:47.340 laughter[br]where they have a small device that they 0:58:47.340,0:58:52.490 put in line with the cable in your monitor[br]and then they use this radar system 0:58:52.490,0:58:57.070 to bounce a signal – this is not unlike[br]the Great Seal bug that [Leon] Theremin 0:58:57.070,0:59:01.060 designed for the KGB. So it’s good to[br]know we’ve finally caught up with the KGB, 0:59:01.060,0:59:06.540 but now with computers. They[br]send the microwave transmission, 0:59:06.540,0:59:10.700 the continuous wave, it reflects off of[br]this chip and then they use this device 0:59:10.700,0:59:15.320 to see your monitor. 0:59:15.320,0:59:20.780 Yep. So there’s the full life cycle.[br]First they radiate you, 0:59:20.780,0:59:24.500 then you die from cancer,[br]then you… win? Okay, so, 0:59:24.500,0:59:30.080 here’s the same thing, but this time for[br]keyboards, USB and PS/2 keyboards. 0:59:30.080,0:59:34.560 So the idea is that it’s a data[br]retro-reflector. Here’s another thing, 0:59:34.560,0:59:38.200 but this one, the TAWDRYYARD program, is[br]a little bit different. It’s a beacon, so 0:59:38.200,0:59:44.390 this is where probably then[br]they kill you with a drone. 0:59:44.390,0:59:48.910 That’s pretty scary stuff. They also have[br]this for microphones to gather room bugs 0:59:48.910,0:59:52.610 for room audio. Notice the bottom. It says[br]all components are common off the shelf 0:59:52.610,0:59:57.140 and are so non-attributable to the NSA.[br]Unless you have this photograph 0:59:57.140,1:00:01.700 and the product sheet. Happy hunting! 1:00:01.700,1:00:07.950 applause 1:00:07.950,1:00:12.380 And just to give you another idea, this is[br]a device they use to be able to actively 1:00:12.380,1:00:15.990 hunt people down. This is a hunting[br]device, right? Handheld finishing tool 1:00:15.990,1:00:22.910 used for geolocation targeting[br]handsets in the field. So! 1:00:22.910,1:00:28.860 Who was not surprised by this? I’m so[br]glad to have finally reached the point 1:00:28.860,1:00:33.240 where no one raised their hand except[br]that one guy who I think misheard me. 1:00:33.240,1:00:38.300 laughter[br]Or you’re brilliant. And 1:00:38.300,1:00:41.040 please stay in our community[br]and work on open research! 1:00:41.040,1:00:42.750 somebody off mike shouts:[br]Audience: Maybe he can add something! 1:00:42.750,1:00:47.310 Yeah! And if you work for the NSA,[br]I’d just like to encourage you 1:00:47.310,1:00:51.690 to leak more documents![br]laughter 1:00:51.690,1:00:58.202 applause, cheers 1:00:58.202,1:01:04.737 applause 1:01:04.737,1:01:11.588 applause 1:01:11.588,1:01:18.488 applause, cheers, whistles 1:01:18.488,1:01:25.258 applause, cheers, whistles, ovation 1:01:25.258,1:01:31.988 applause, ovation 1:01:31.988,1:01:38.748 applause, cheers, ovation 1:01:38.748,1:01:45.698 applause, ovation 1:01:45.698,1:01:48.820 Herald: Thank you very much, Jake. 1:01:48.820,1:01:52.760 Thank you. I’m afraid we ran[br]all out of time for the Q&A. 1:01:52.760,1:01:55.570 I’m very sorry for anyone[br]who wanted to ask questions. 1:01:55.570,1:01:58.400 Jacob: But we do have a press conference.[br]Well, if you guys… you know, 1:01:58.400,1:02:01.310 I’d say: “occupy the room for another[br]5 minutes”, or… know that there’s 1:02:01.310,1:02:04.220 a press conference room that will be[br]opened up, where we can all ask 1:02:04.220,1:02:07.260 as many questions as we want,[br]in 30 minutes, if you’re interested. 1:02:07.260,1:02:11.480 And I will basically be available until[br]I’m assassinated to answer questions. 1:02:11.480,1:02:18.600 laughter, applause[br]So… 1:02:18.600,1:02:22.250 in the immortal words of Julian Assange:[br]Remember, no matter what happens, 1:02:22.250,1:02:26.409 even if there’s a videotape of it,[br]it was murder! Thank you! 1:02:26.409,1:02:30.339 Herald: Thank you. Please give a warm[br]round of applause to Jake Appelbaum! 1:02:30.339,1:02:33.339 applause 1:02:33.339,1:02:37.796 silent postroll 1:02:37.796,1:02:42.403 Subtitles created by c3subtitles.de[br]in the year 2016. Join, and help us!